relieved her; the sessions, thinking this sufficient evidence of a settlement at Chadderton, confirmed the order: but on a case being stated for the opinion of the court of King's Bench, that court held that it was no evidence at all of a settlement; what the mother had said as to her settlement, was not admissible in evidence, even although she were since dead; and mere relief is no evidence of a settlement, unless the party were residing out of the parish at the time, which was not stated in the case (u). So, where upon the trial of an appeal from Ashford to Chatham, it was proved that the pauper's husband resided at Chatham, and was frequently relieved by the parish officers whilst residing there, was received into the workhouse when sick, died in the workhouse, and was buried at the expense of the parish: the court of King's Bench held that this was no evidence of a settlement in Chatham; relieving a pauper whilst residing in the same parish is no evidence of a settlement there, however often relief may have been given (v). So, where a widow and her children, residing at Coleorton, were relieved there for a long period, and one of her children put out apprentice by the parish; but the mother at the same time received relief for herself and her family from the adjoining parish of Thringstone: the sessions having holden that the settlement was in Coleorton; the court of King's Bench quashed the order of sessions, saying that the relief in Coleorton was no evidence whatever of a settlement, as the pauper was residing there at the time (w). So, where a pauper, chargeable to the parish of St. Giles-in-the-Fields, and relieved by that parish several times, whilst residing within it, was sent with other paupers to the establishment of a person who contracted with the parish for the maintenance of their paupers, and after being maintained there some time at the expense of the parish, he was removed thence to another establishment of the same kind in Surrey, and there maintained at the expense of the parish for some time: the court held that the relief in this case was of the same nature as if the pauper were residing in the parish, and was no evidence whatever of a settlement in the parish (x).

How proved.] The relief may be proved by the pauper who received it, when it was given by a parish or township not in a union. Even where the parish was in a union, and the pauper swore that whilst residing in Newland she received monthly relief from Hartpury (parish), and that whilst she was in Newent union workhouse she was relieved there by the parish of Hartpury, which was in the said union: this was holden

27.

(u) R. v. Chadderton, 2 East,

(v) R. v. Chatham, 8 East, 498. (w) R. v. Coleorton, 1 B. & Ad.

25. And see R. v. Trowbridge, 7 B. & C. 252.

(x) R. v. St. Giles-in-the Fields, 13 Law J. 89, m.

good evidence of relief, to prove a settlement in Hartpury (y). The only difficulty arises, where the relief is given by the relieving officer of a union, without any evidence to show that he is the agent for that purpose of the particular parish on account of which the relief was given. Where the relieving officer of a union swore that he paid the paupers parish relief for upwards of a year, during which time he had given them 28. 6d. weekly on account of the township of Steeple Aston, out of money in his hands belonging to the said township: the court held it to be no evidence of relief by the township, because it did not appear that the officer, who was an officer of the union, had any authority from the township to make the payment (z). So, where the relieving officer of a union, including the parishes of Little Marlow and Woburn, swore that he had for three years relieved the paupers whilst resident in Little Marlow, and charged such relief in his account to the parish of Woburn: the court held that this was no evidence whatever of relief given by Woburn (a). But where the relieving officer relieved the pauper on behalf of the respondent township, on the application of one of the overseers, and the matter being afterwards brought before the board of guardians, the relief was ordered to be and was accordingly continued ; and the order book was also produced: this was holden to be sufficient (b). So, where application for relief is made by a pauper to the relieving officer of a union, and in consequence the board of guardians order relief to be given on account of a particular parish in the union, and the officer relieves accordingly, this is evidence of the relief being given on account of that parish. And where a pauper, residing in the parish of A. in the B. union, applied to the relieving officer there for relief on account of the parish of C. in the D. union, where she was settled, and the board of guardians of the B. union ordered the relieving officer to give her certain relief on account of C., and he did so; he afterwards applied for repayment to the board of guardians for the D. union, and they ordered payment on account of the parish of C.: this was holden to be legal evidence from which might be inferred that the relief was given by authority of the parish C. (c). How far the clerk to the guardians of a union may be deemed the agent of a parish in the union, in ordering relief to be given on account of such parish,-See R. v. Wigan, 19 Law J. 18, m.

(y) R. v. Hartpury, 8 Q. B. 566. (z) R. v. Bradford, 15 Law J. 117, m.; 8 Q. B. 571, n.

(a) R. v. Little Marlow, 16 Law J. 70, m.

(b) R. v. Pott Shrigley, 18 Law J. 33, m.

(c) B. v. Crondall, 16 Law J. 175, m.

3. Order of Removal unappealed against.

In what cases, 822.

How far conclusive, 823.

In what cases.] If an order of removal, upon which a pauper has been removed, be not appealed against, it is conclusive evidence of the pauper's settlement at that time. Therefore, where a pauper was removed by order to Chalbury, and Chalbury, instead of appealing against it, obtained another order for the removal of the pauper to Chipping Farringdon, and had him removed accordingly, the court held that this could not be done; the first order was good against all the world, until reversed (d). So, where a pauper and his family were removed by order from Sutton St. Mary to Leverington, and there was no appeal against the order; in four months afterwards they were again removed by an order from Leverington to Sutton St. Nicholas; Sutton St. Nicholas appealed, but the sessions confirmed the order: it was admitted in argument in the court of King's Bench, that the order unappealed against was final as to the settlement at that time, but it was suggested, that the court, in favour of the order of sessions, would presume that the paupers had gained a subsequent settlement in the appellant parish; but the court held, that the time which intervened between the two orders was too short to raise such a presumption (e). So, where the pauper, in May, hired for a year in Birmingham, and served until the April following, when he was removed by order to Kenilworth; this order was not appealed against, but the pauper in three or four days afterwards returned to his master in Birmingham, and completed his year's service: the court of King's Bench held that the order being unappealed against, was conclusive that the settlement was in Kenilworth; it put an end to the contract of hiring (ƒ). But where it appeared that the pauper had rented and occupied for several years a tenement in Fillongley, of the yearly value of more than 101.; and in April, 1786, whilst he still occupied the tenement, he was removed by order to Kinwalsey; he returned, however, to Fillongley the same evening, and, without any fresh agreement with his landlord, continued to occupy the tenement for three-quarters of a year longer, when he was again removed to Kinwalsey, and that hamlet then appealed against the order: the court of King's Bench held, that although the first order being unappealed against, was conclusive as to the pauper's settlement at that time, yet there was nothing to prevent the pauper return

(d) Chalbury v. Chipping Farringdon, 2 Salk. 488; and see Malendine v. Hunsdon, Fol. 273, S. P.

(e) R. v. Leverington, Burr.S.C.

276.

(f) R. v. Kenilworth, 2T. R. 598.

ing to Fillongley, provided he did not return in a state of pauperism; nor did the removal rescind the contract between the pauper and his landlord; and therefore when he returned and occupied the tenement under the old agreement, he thereby gained a new settlement (g). The distinction between the last two cases is this: in the first, there must have been a new hiring, and a service for a year under it, in order to gain a new settlement; but in the last, it was sufficient, in order to gain a new settlement, that he occupied the tenement for forty days with the permission of his landlord. Both cases establish the same proposition, that an order of removal unappealed against, is conclusive as to the settlement of the pauper up to that time, but does not prevent him gaining any other settlement afterwards.

How far conclusive.] And it is conclusive, not only as to the settlement, but also as to every other material matter stated in the order. Therefore, where the pauper Jane Moor, and one G. Wise, were removed from Newbury to Euborn, by the names of G. Wise and Jane his wife, and the order was not appealed against; the overseers of Euborn, however, finding that the woman was not Wise's wife, had her removed, by the name of Jane Moor, to Silchester, and Silchester appealed: the court of King's Bench held that Euborn, by not appealing, was now estopped from saying that the woman was not the wife of Wise, or that both were not settled in that parish (h). So, where upon the trial of an appeal against an order of removal from Midsomer Norton to Binegar, the appellants proved that the pauper Elizabeth Savage, and one Joseph Savage, had formerly been removed from Kilmursdon to Midsomer Norton, by an order which described them as "Joseph Savage and Betty his wife," which order was not appealed against; the respondents then proved circumstances, from which it appeared that a marriage, which had taken place between these two, was a nullity, and they proved a subseqent hiring and service by the pauper Elizabeth in Binegar; and the question was, whether it was competent to the respondents to go into that evidence, after proof of the order unappealed against: the court held, that the order unappealed against was conclusive as to the fact of the marriage, and that the respondents were thereby estopped from giving evidence to impeach it (i). So, where two justices, by their order, removed Sarah, "the wife of J. Griffin," and their five children, from Cheshunt to Hinksworth, and there was no appeal against this order; afterwards, two other justices, by their order, removed

(g) R. v. Fillongley, 2 T. R. 709. (h) R. v. Silchester, Burr. S. C. 551. R. v. Berkswell, 2 Bott, 69,

S. P. R. v. North Featherton, 1
Sess. Ca. 154, 8. P.

(i) R. v. Binegar, 7 East, 377.

J. Griffin, Sarah his wife, and their five children, back from Hinksworth to Cheshunt, and Cheshunt appealed; the sessions quashed the order as to the wife and children, and confirmed it as to the man: but the court of King's Bench held that the first order was conclusive as to the then place of settlement, not only of the wife and children, but of the husband also, for their settlement must be presumed to be his (g). So, where the pauper, Emanuel Smith, who resided in Acton Trussell, under a certificate from Rudgeley, married in 1760, but separated from his wife in 1787; in 1799 the wife was removed from the parish of St. George, Hanover-square, to Acton Trussell, by an order describing her as Elizabeth Smith, widow, and this order was not appealed against; and in 1800 both Smith and his wife were removed by order from Acton Trussell to Rudgeley, and Rudgeley appealed: the court of King's Bench held, that the former order for the removal of the wife alone, being unappealed against, was conclusive as to the settlement of both husband and wife; by that order she was called "widow," which implied that her husband's last place of settlement was Acton Trussell, and if that were not the fact, that parish should have appealed (h). So, where an order was made for the removal of two children, one aged eleven years, the other five, stating them to be "the lawful children of William Gould and Esther Gould, absent," and it was admitted that the children were then unemancipated: this order, not being appealed against, was holden to be conclusive as to the settlement of Esther Gould, the mother (i).

And it is equally conclusive as to the settlement of those who have to derive their settlement from the parties named in the order, afterwards, and before such parties gain a new settlement. And therefore, where Thomas Hankin and Hester his wife, were removed by order in 1731 from Nympsfield to Woodchester, which was not appealed against; and in 1741, Hankin, with three children, which he had by his wife, (who was since dead,) were removed from Nympsfield to Woodchester as before, and Woodchester appealed; upon the trial of the appeal, the appellants offered evidence to prove that Hankin was not lawfully married to his wife Hester, having then another wife living: but the sessions refused to receive the evidence, and confirmed the order; and the court held that they were right in doing so, as the first order unappealed against was conclusive of the fact of Hankin and Hester being husband and wife, and consequently of the legitimacy of their children (k). And where, on the hearing of an appeal against

(g) R. v. Hinxworth, Cald. 42; Doug. 46, n.

(h) R. v. Rudgeley, 8 T. R. 620. And see R. v. Towcester, 2 Bott, 679.

(i) R. v. Hartington Middle Quarter, 24 Law J. 98, m.

(k) R. v. Woodchester, Burr. S. C. 191; 2 Str. 1172. R. v. St. Mary, Lambeth, 6 T.R. 615, S. P.