and then pronounced judgment that the order be quashed, with forty shillings costs: upon motion for a mandamus to the justices to enter continuances, and to consider, award and order such costs to the appellants as they should think reasonable and just,-Coleridge, J., granted it, saying that it appeared from the affidavits that the justices had not exercised their discretion in that particular case (2).

Where the appeal in such a case is not entered, the court merely make an order for the costs, upon proof of the notice of appeal given. If the appeal be entered, then the judgment is, that the appeal be dismissed, and that the appellants pay the respondents their costs; but the sessions cannot confirm the order (a). But where it was confirmed, yet, as the rights of the parties did not appear to be affected by such confirmation, and the costs would have been the same had the appeal been, as it properly ought to have been, dismissed, the court confirmed the order of sessions (b). Where however notice of appeal was given, and was afterwards countermanded, but not in time, which by the practice of the sessions entitled the respondents to the costs incurred by them in attending the court to support their order; at the sessions, the appellants not having entered the appeal, the respondents entered it, and upon motion the sessions confirmed the order and adjudged the appellants to pay the costs incurred by the respondents in attending the court to support their said order: but this order of sessions being removed by certiorari, the court upon motion quashed it, holding that the sessions had no jurisdiction to confirm the order under such circumstances, and the order for costs being ancillary to the order of confirmation, was bad also (c). And in another case where the like proceeding was had, the court actually awarded a mandamus, commanding the justices at sessions to erase from their records the entry of the appeal, and the order of their court confirming it (d).

Where upon appeal against an order of removal, the order was quashed" for informality," and the sessions ordered the respondents to pay costs; both orders being removed by certiorari, it was contended, that as the order was not quashed upon the merits, but for informality, and there was no decision therefore upon the settlement, it was not a case within the above statute, and the justices had no authority to grant costs: but the court held, that to authorize the justices to award costs, it was not necessary, within the meaning of the statute, that the appeal should be determined on the merits (e).

(z) R. v. JJ. of Glamorganshire,

19 Law J. 172, m.

(a) R. v. Over, 19 Law J. 57, m. (b) Id.

(c) R. v. Stoke Bliss, 13 Law J. 151, m.; 6 Q. B. 158.

(d) R. v. JJ. of W. R. Yorkshire, 12 Law J. 148, m.

(e) R. v. Cottingham, 2 Ad. & El. 250.

Also, by stat. 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 76, s. 82, upon every such appeal," the court before whom the same shall be brought, shall and may, if they think fit, order and direct the parish against whom the same shall be decided, to pay to the other such costs and charges as may to such court appear just and reasonable, and shall certify the amount thereof; and in case the overseers of the poor of the parish liable to pay the same, shall upon demand, and upon the production of such certificate, refuse or neglect to pay the same, the amount thereof may be recovered from such overseer, in the same manner as any penalties or forfeitures are by this Act recoverable” (ƒ).

And by stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 31, s. 5, if either party to the said appeal shall have included in the statement of grounds of removal or of appeal sent to the opposite party any ground or grounds of removal or of appeal which shall, in the opinion of the court determining the appeal, be frivolous and vexatious, such party shall be liable, at the discretion of the said court, to pay the whole or any part of the costs incurred by the other party in disputing any such ground or grounds, such costs to be recovered in the same manner as any penalties or forfeitures are recoverable under stat. 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 76. They are now, however, recoverable under stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43.

And generally, by stat. 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 5, " upon any appeal to any court of general or quarter sessions of the peace the court before whom the same shall be brought, may, if it think fit, order and direct the party or parties against whom the same shall be decided to pay to the other party or parties such costs and charges as may to such court appear just and reasonable, such costs to be recoverable in the manner provided for the recovery of costs upon an appeal against an order or conviction by an Act passed in the twelfth year of her Majesty's reign, intituled 'An Act to facilitate the performance of the duties of justices of the peace out of sessions within England and Wales with respect to summary convictions and orders.'" This has reference to stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 27; and see the forms in the schedule to that Act, R., S. 1, S. 2.

Upon a mandamus being awarded, requiring justices to grant costs in an appeal, to the party in whose favour it had been determined, the court, after reading the return, held that it was reasonable the justices should have the power of judging whether costs should be allowed or not; and they, therefore, quashed the writ (g).

The amount of the costs must be mentioned in the judg

(f) See 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 76, s. 99, and see the form of the certificate, Arch. P. L. Amend. Act, p. 10.

(g) R. v. JJ. of the County of Nottingham, 1 Sess. Ca. 422.

ment, that is to say, the order of the sessions (h); and therefore the costs must of course be taxed before the end of the sessions; if taxed afterwards, the order as to the costs cannot be enforced, although the taxation have been approved of by the recorder or chairman (i).

Costs of maintenance.] By stat. 9 G. 1, c. 7, s. 9, "for the preventing vexatious removals," it is enacted that "if the justices of the peace shall, at their quarter sessions, upon an appeal before them there had concerning the settlement of any poor person, determine in favour of the appellant that such poor person was unduly removed, that then the said justices shall, at the same quarter sessions, order and award to such appellant so much money as shall appear to the said justices to have been reasonably paid by the parish or other place, on whose behalf such appeal was made, for or towards the relief of such poor person or persons, between the time of such undue removal, and the determination of such appeal." Upon an application for a mandamus, requiring the justices at sessions to order the respondents to pay to the appellants the costs of maintenance of the pauper, the order of removal having been quashed upon appeal: the court held that the sessions were bound by this statute to do so, and granted the writ (k).

As the pauper is not now actually removed, until after the expiration of twenty-one days from the making of the order, and as the respondent parish incurs the expense of relieving him during that time, it was thought right by stat. 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 76, s. 84, to enact, "that the parish to which any poor person whose settlement shall be in question at the time of granting relief, shall be admitted or finally adjudged to belong, shall be chargeable with and liable to pay the costs and expense of the relief and maintenance of such poor person, and such costs and expense may be recovered against such parish, in the same manner as any penalties or forfeitures are by this Act recoverable: provided always, that such parish, if not the parish granting such relief, shall pay to the parish by which such relief shall be granted, the costs and expense of such relief and maintenance, from such time only as notice of such poor person having become chargeable shall have been sent by such relieving parish, to the parish to which such poor person shall be so admitted or finally adjudged to belong: provided always, that no charges or expenses of relief or maintenance shall be recoverable under a suspended order of removal, un

(h) See Selwood v. Mount et al., 1 Q. B. 726.

(i) R. v. Long, 1 Q. B. 740. See R. v. JJ. of Westmoreland, 12 Law J. 113, m., per Coleridge, J., semb. cont.

(k) St. Mary's, Nottingham, v. Kirklington, 2 Sess. Ca. 67. See R. v. Great Chart, Burr. S. C. 194. R. v. JJ. of Norfolk, 5 B. & Ald. 484. R. v. JJ. of Monmouthshire, MS. T. 1843; 12 Law J. 126, m.

less notice of such order of removal, with a copy of the same, and of the examination on which such order was made, shall have been given within ten days of such order being made, to the overseers of the poor of the parish, to whom such order is directed." And this section has been holden to extend to the case of a suspended order, not appealed against, although the pauper had not died or been removed (d).

As to the delivery of a statement of these charges, and a demand of the same, see stat. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 105, s. 13, ante, p. 766.

Pauper how sent back, if order quashed.] If the pauper have been actually removed, and the order be afterwards quashed upon appeal, two justices may, by their order, reciting the former order, the removal, the appeal, and the judgment of the sessions, order the overseers of the parish to which the pauper has been removed, to take him back to the respondent parish, and may require the overseers of the latter parish to receive him (e). This, however, can seldom now occur unless from some irregularity on the part of the respondents. Where, upon an order being confirmed upon appeal, subject to the opinion of the court of Queen's Bench, the overseer of the respondent parish, without waiting for the decision of that court, removed the paupers under the order; and for this he was indicted; it was holden on demurrer that, in the absence of fraud or menace, this was not an indictable offence (ƒ). But the pauper might have been sent back by an order of justices, as above mentioned.

(d) Re Chedgrave, 20 Law J. 23, m.

(e) Honiton v. South Beverton, Comb. 401.

(f) R. v. Cooper, 18 Law J. 16, m.

CHAPTER VII.

Special Case. Arbitration.

Special case.] By stat. 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 11, it is enacted, "that at any time after notice given of appeal to any court of general or quarter sessions of the peace against any judgment, order, rate, or other matter (except an order in bastardy, or a proceeding under or by virtue of any of the statutes relating to Her Majesty's revenue of excise or customs, stamps, taxes, or post office), for which the remedy is by such appeal, it shall be lawful for the parties, by consent, and by order of any judge of one of the superior courts of common law at Westminster, to state the facts of the case in the form of a special case for the opinion of such superior court, and to agree that a judgment in conformity with the decision of such court, and for such costs as such court shall adjudge, may be entered on motion by either party at the sessions next or next but one after such decision shall have been given; and such judgment shall and may be entered accordingly, and shall be of the same effect in all respects as if the same had been given by the court of general or quarter sessions upon an appeal duly entered and continued."

Arbitration.] By stat. 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 12, after reciting that by stat. 9 & 10 W. 3, c. 15, "provision was made for rendering more effectual the awards of arbitrators in the case of controversies and disputes for which there is no other remedy but by personal action or by suit in equity;" and reciting that "it is expedient in like manner to facilitate and render more effectual references to arbitration of controversies and disputes for which the remedy is by appeal to a court of general or quarter sessions of the peace:" it is enacted, "that at any time after notice given of appeal to any court of general or quarter sessions of the peace against any order, rate, or other matter, (except a summary conviction, or an order in bastardy, or any proceeding under or by virtue of any of the statutes relating to her Majesty's revenue of excise or customs, stamps, taxes, or post office,) for which the remedy is by such appeal, it shall be lawful for the parties, by themselves or their attornies, and by order of a judge of her Majesty's court of Queen's Bench, to submit the matter or matters of such appeal to the award or umpirage of any person or persons, and to agree that such submission should be made a rule of the said court of Queen's Bench, and to insert such agreement in their submission or the condition of the bond or promise whereby they oblige themselves respectively to submit