To a superior mind, all the magnificence of nature is present, and all its scheme unfolded; all its qualities appear in array, and all its operations display themselves, before it. The vast and the minute are equally open to its view; and it is ever ready to astonish by comprehension, or surprise with acuteness. It combines the most distant relations, and dissevers things apparently most connected. Those related qualities, which adventitious circumstances have separated, can, by no disguise, or remoteness of situation, be concealed from it; and those of a heterogeneous nature, accidentally associated, can, by no closeness of union, escape the vigour of its observation. It traces relations, and multiplies distinctions, in every variety of form; it restores the order of nature, and re-conceives the plan of things. In that greatness of mind which may be contracted to penetration, or expanded to comprehension, whose concentrated heat burns at a point, or whose dilated light illuminates a vast extent of nature, is displayed all that is admirable in the human capacity.

That native force of mind, which appears only by effect, is, in itself, inconceivable; but every variety of intellectual energy may be comprehended under the term reason. Reason is the power of knowing what is ;* and to remark the difference or connection between one object or quality and another, may, perhaps, form a general characteristic of mental efforts. The laws of the intellect are very simple, but, at the same time, the difference between one mind and another is very apparent. To distinguish between two objects appears to be a portion of that mental operation by which the greatest systems are constructed; and the most extensive arrangement of facts seems but a chain of discriminations.

Precision of thought does, not, indeed, afford so direct and complete evidence of the powers of the intellect, as that which is extended. But there can be no doubt that every

Superiority of judgment seems to arise from that power of contemplation by which we fix our minds exclusively on an object, or its relations, until we receive their exact impression. But all ability may be said to consist in the knowledge of fact.

mind is acute only because it is comprehensive. The most penetrating thoughts, as well as unexpected combinations, arise merely from general views and extensive reflection. "As fortune favours the brave," so likewise, it has been observed, that "lucky hits seldom happen but to men of genius." It is astonishing, when we hear the remarks of a mind greater than our own, to think how near they lay to us, and it seems wonderful how they escaped us! It is remarkable how very different ideas are presented by the same event or object to two persons of different degrees of ability! how many reflections occur to men of talents, which are unknown to those whose capacity is destitute of creative vigour! But every display of wit, or brilliant idea, originates merely in latitude of conception, or extent of mind."

turns.

Every intellectual effort may be summed up in the term comprehension. Wherever the acquisitions of the mind commence, here they terminate. Towards comprehension, all human conceptions tend; and from it, every noble effort reThat vivida vis, that power of penetrating into things, of detecting their agreement or disagreement, is never exercised without adding to our ideas; and the same strength of mind which enables a person to conceive his ideas, enables him to recal them.† Every additional attainment, adds to the capability of acquiring another; so that a continual progression appears to be the natural state of an intellect impelled by the energy of great talents. But such, again, is the width of nature, that no force of genius can exhaust its variety: Its amplitude must always defy the acquisitions of the greatest mind. The originality of nature does, indeed, often seem exhausted to the eye of common observation, until a superior genius arise to unfold its treasures, and extend the sphere of human reason; when we perceive that what we had taken for the boundary of things, was merely the limits of our own reflection.

• Wit does not, however, require first rate talents; at least that species of it which may be denominated smart sayings, does not consist in uniting very remote objects.

† See Memory, Chap. IV.

The mind of man may, possibly, exhaust the novelty of the general and distinguishing features of nature; but to explore all its qualities, and trace all their relations, has hitherto defied the efforts of human genius. The principles of nature are few and uniform; but they appear in a multitude of events, and diversity of individual objects, sufficient to engage the most exalted talents.

The objects and qualities of nature ale thrown together without any connection or order, and mingled in the most confused variety. Hence, steadiness of mind is necessary to prevent being dazzled by their diversity, and force of judgment to remove their confusion, and join them together according to their natural dependance.

That mind is greatest which can view the connection of things to the greatest extent, and which can separate them in the most minute manner. A strong mind is that which keeps a firm hold of the present idea, and which can pass from one quality to another by the slightest tie; but which can, at the same time, trace one principle, or an individual cause, by itself, and reject whatever is unconnected. It requires great vigour of thought to see things as they are. An intellect which can grasp but a single idea, loses one before it reaches another, and must determine according to the last which it retains. Excellence of mind, therefore, consists merely in being able to compare many ideas; to comprehend their mutual dependance, and to distinguish between them.

* The natural progress of the mind is rapid at first, and slow at last. It is limited as much by nature as by capacity. Our talents are originally advanced by the novelty, and ultimately checked by the poverty, of things. The prominent features of any subject obtrude themselves upon us; while more delicate pecularities are distinguished with difficulty. Hence, an early display of ability is often followed by a total want of improvement. Pope never excelled his Essay on Criticism, written at the age of twenty; and Akenside never, by any future effort, equalled his Pleasures of Imagination, written at twenty three.

CHAPTER VIII.

The mind excels in all things, according to its strength.

AFTER contemplating the natural powers of the mind,— we come to consider their applicability to different pursuits.

Independently of the erroneous nature of the doctrine of innate ideas; if one object or quality be conceived with the same ease as another, it is not to be supposed that the powers of the mind are affected by every change in the mode of their application.

He, indeed, who is wise upon one subject, if he have the same degree of experience or information, will be equally wise upon another; and he who excels in one science must, with equal exertion, excel in every.

The mind is the same in all circumstances. But, as the sun is sometimes obscured by clouds and vapours, its splendour is liable to be extinguished by casualties. Situation, education, and opportunity, may exalt the talents of some, and depress those of others; diversifying the human character, and varying the excellence of the performances of mankind, in every degree.

When, indeed, the mind of any person is once formed by an education which involves nature in its view, and takes for its basis those universal principles which are to be found in every place, society, and age, if the various species of information be mixed in such degrees of temperament as to induce the preponderance of no particular science, habit, or inclination, then that person will be equally fitted for all professions, pursuits, and occasions. Whatever be his situation, he will always make distinctions and remarks, and discover the same degree of penetration and strength of understanding. A man of enlarged ideas can never be misplaced. Place Dr. Johnson in London, or the Hebrides, and he will still be surrounded with the radience of philosophy, and his mind will still emit the rays of wisdom.

rude

But a person of great powers, if originally situated in a

arbarous society, although he may hold the same

superiority over those around him, and preserve the same difference from an inferior, as if he had been born in a more favourable situation, will, in acquirements, be much below one of the same natural capacity who has had better opportunities. The strongest mind must bend to those customs and prejudices which are obtruded upon it by authority and necessity, and which are continually in its view, even although a person be placed among them at an advanced period of life. But if he be exposed to their influence from his infancy, he must unavoidably draw all his principles of thought and reasoning from them, because he can have none else to judge by. If, however, he determine justly, according to his knowledge, as the merit of thinking does not consist in the knowledge of fact, but in inference, wise men can never be prejudiced against his understanding, In estimating capacity we must, therefore, if practicable, make allowance for the defects of education; although it is very difficult to distinguish the original inequality of minds whose circumstances have been different.

In the difference of circumstances, inclination forms a very important part. As the performances of the mind have a strict correspondence with exertion, it often happens that a person fails in one pursuit, and succeeds in another, not less difficult, but of a different nature; the reason of which, supposing opportunity equally favourable in both, can only be that his habits have been such as to produce a taste for the one, and a dislike to the other. Hence, what is called peculiarity of talent, distinguished from education and the degree of ability, is merely peculiarity of taste or inclination; and hence the wonderful phenomenon of persons who have appeared entirely deficient in capacity for one science, but who have shone in another of greater intricacy, is not to be solved by peculiarity of talent but merely by peculiarity of disposition."

Of the error here alluded to, the following instance is from the Spectator." The story of Clavius is well known. He was entered in a college of Jesuits; and, after he had been tried at several parts of learning, was upon the point of being