Whenever the principle of self-interest unalloyed by ideas of national self-abnegation exists, there is a natural trend toward political opportunism. In eighteenth-century Europe, however, this system did not run to the excesses to which such a laissez faire conception naturally leads, but was controlled by the powerful convictions which existed in the theory of legitimacy. I have already indicated the rôle which this doctrine played in the history of European thought and political action, and it was still the keynote of the system of international jurisprudence when the first revolutionary conflict began.

The Seven Years' War was brought to a close by the Treaty of 1763, by which France surrendered practically her entire possessions in the Western Hemisphere and in return was left with only a burning desire to be avenged for her losses. This feeling at first found no violent expression, for the war had left her in a weakened condition, having seriously crippled both her military and her naval strength. But these material considerations did not prevent her from nursing her grievances and looking forward to the day of reckoning. In 1774, Count Gravier de Vergennes was installed as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and he set about to find some means of satisfying the national honor.' The policy of Count Vergennes portended essential changes in the map of European alliances. The Seven Years' War had left France and Spain still closely united with Austria as a more distant and less enthusiastic ally. On the other side were ranged Prussia and Great Britain, with neutral Russia tending more toward these countries than towards France. Count Vergennes, who cherished no illusions concerning the sanctity of international friendships, foresaw that England was to be success

1 Revue Historique, vol. xiv, p. 241; vol. xv, p. 1. Also Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, vol. i, § 50.

fully combated only by isolating her from her Prussian ally and leaving her in as vulnerable a position as possible. This task was not difficult, for the Anglo-Prussian friendship was cooling and Frederick the Great, with his evident leanings toward Gallic culture and thought, proved open to suggestion. Count Vergennes became an enthusiastic Prussophile, and his Austrian-loving master, Louis XVI, was left to support this alliance for which he himself felt little sympathy and which accorded little with his plans. It took two years to accomplish these schemes, but the diplomacy of Count Vergennes was so successful that the outbreak of the American Revolution found England without any warm. friends on the continent to whom she could turn for support, but with a great many enemies who would be glad to contemplate her humiliation. At the same time, in the Colonies themselves, French agents had been active, and when actual hostilities at length began Count Vergennes was surer of the political complexion of America and of the probable trend of events than anyone in Europe or in that country itself. Indeed, his policy toward the Colonies was so definitely outlined even before they declared their independence that it awaited merely the development of events to bring about its consummation.

Two memoranda which were drawn up in March, 1776, will throw light on the general outlines of French policy.1 One of these papers, which Doniol2 attributes to Maurepas, embodied certain general principles by which French policy was to be guided. In the first place, England was to be kept quiet at the start to avoid the growth of hostilities to France, but indirect aid was to be furnished by the

1 Stevens, Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives Relating to America, 1773-83, nos. 1320 and 1316.

Doniol, Histoire de la Participation de la France à l'éstablissement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, vol. i, p. 284.

latter to the American insurgents, and preparations were to be made for active and open participation in the struggle by getting into shape both the army and navy. No treaty, however, was to be concluded with the rebels until they had declared their independence. Finally, the memorandum indicated that steps must also be taken for dealing with the British in India. The other document which was drawn up by Count Vergennes was a careful study of the political situation and its probable consequences, and the advantages which would accrue from the independence of the colonies. His conclusion was that in almost any event war with England would be inevitable, and his outline of policy was practically identical with that attributed to M. Maurepas. In addition, however, the Count pointed out that it would be incompatible with the dignity of the King, as well as with his interests, to enter into a treaty with the insurgents. Apart from the fact that such an arrangement would be of value only in the event that they became independent, it would necessarily depend upon the disposition of the Americans to abide by it, and upon the changes in British administration which would eventually lead to a reconciliation on the basis of the Act of Navigation. "Such an arrangement," he concluded, "can only be solidly founded on respective interests, and it seems it would not be time to examine this question until the liberty of English America has taken positive consistency."

2

The memorandum of Count Vergennes was sent to Turgot for an opinion, which he rendered April 6, 1776. The Comptroller-General, who was not influenced by the same. phantasms of patriotic revenge as his colleagues, urged many objections against a quarrel with Great Britain, chief

1 Stevens, op. cit., no. 1316.

2 Turgot, Oeuvres (Daire ed.), vol. ii, p. 551.

of which were the economic reasons. His views were plainly not in accord with those of his colleagues, but his paper, which was certainly the soundest of the three, was without lasting effect on the situation.

In America it was believed that France's desire for revenge would outweigh every other sentiment; and the anxiety to secure her support was increased by the expectation that the negotiations would comprehend Spain as coadjutor, a rôle which the apprehensive Bourbon then on the throne steadfastly refused to perform, although he maintained a nominal adherence to the Family Compact. The Continental Congress, however, decided to send to France an agent, and selected for this purpose Silas Deane, of Connecticut. The instructions given by the Committee of Secret Correspondence, in which was vested the conduct of foreign relations, left nothing to be desired in the way of explicitness. He was directed to appear in Paris in the rôle of a private merchant and arrange for an audience with Count Vergennes, to whom he was to present his letters of credence and

then acquaint him that the Congress, finding that in the common course of commerce it was not practicable to furnish the continent of America with the quantity of arms and ammunition necessary for its defense (the ministry of Great Britain having been extremely industrious to prevent it) you have been dispatched by their authority to apply to some European power for a supply. That France had been pitched on for the first application, from an opinion that if we should, as there is a great appearance we shall, come to a total separation from Great Britain, France would be looked upon as the power whose friendship would be fittest for us to obtain and cultivate. The commercial question was to be expatiated upon, and

1 Wharton, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 78 et seq.

in case the Count should appear reserved, Deane was instructed to make his visit short.

If at some future conference, he should be more free, and you find a disposition to favor the Colonies, it may be proper to acquaint him that they must necessarily be anxious to know the disposition of France on certain points, which, with his permission, you would mention, such as whether, if the Colonies should be forced to form themselves into an independent State, France would probably acknowledge them as such, receive their embassadors, enter into any treaty of alliance with them for commerce or defence or both?

Despite the detail into which these instructions went, it is obvious that the actual powers given Deane were very small indeed. As a matter of fact, he was sent out as a sort of advance agent to prepare the way for such negotiations as the Congress might in future see fit to make. The most interesting part of his instructions refers, of course, to the question of recognition. At the time when this paper was drawn up independence had not yet been declared and there existed some doubt as to whether this measure would be resorted to. Indeed, it appears to have been referred to as a remote contingency for which France's attitude would be of some moment in determining. fact is also to be noted that the acknowledgment of independence was treated as intimately related to the question of alliance-a matter which will stand out more prominently as we proceed.

The

Deane arrived in Paris in July and undertook his duties with much enthusiasm and some success. He at once entered into relations with the celebrated intriguer and dramatist, Beaumarchais, who was then serving in the capacity of confidential agent of the government and who until the arrival of Franklin had exclusive charge of shipments of