whom I could name, have done, in defence of such doctrines as seem to put Christianity on a new and clearer footing; but tend, in the conclusion, entirely to overturn it.

Shep. Whether you are in jest or earnest, this, I am afraid, would seem somewhat base and disingenuous; though now I think on it, if I could once heartily close with the principles you recommend, I should probably make but little scruple or difficulty of using some art in the support of opinions so soothing and beneficial to me.

Dech. Ah parson! you are very sly. However, I am ready to defend the deistical creed against all your objections, and shall leave your future conduct to your own discretion. But as this defence will take up a good deal of time, are you willing we should pass a few mornings together for so good a purpose?

Temp. O, by all means. Mr. Shepherd does not seem to be so diffident of his cause as to decline it. If I was well enough acquainted with the gentleman to ask a favour, I would beg his compliance with this overture, as a singular kindness to me.

Shep. Sir, I do most readily agree to it, both for your satisfaction, and my own information.

DIALOGUE II.

DECHAINE, TEMPLETON, CUNNINGHAM, SHEPHERD.

Shep. GENTLEMEN, I am very glad to see you here so early. It is however matter of surprise to me, that you should be abroad at this hour, when some others of your rank are but going to bed.

Dech. I have been always an early riser in the country; in town I am a conformist.

Temp. For my part, I am never so cheerful as the day I rise betimes. Lying long in bed relaxes the spring both of body and mind. As early hours in the morning are impossible without early hours over night, and as most of our excesses are committed by candle-light, I do not know any thing that would contribute more to virtue, than a rule, or

some call of business, that could rouse one every day at five or six in the morning. I had formerly a settled prejudice against positive duties; but the great service, that might be drawn from such a duty for this purpose, reconciles me a little to institutions of that nature; so that I begin to doubt whether we do not really stand in need of them, and to wish we were obliged, by sufficient authority, to rise always at five in the morning. It would deliver us from a custom infinitely prejudicial to health and virtue, and give us a longer and a happier life. I honour him much who said, 'he that lengthens his nights shortens his days.'

Dech. When you make a revelation, Templeton, you may take care to put in this new positive institution; and that you will not in time become a prophet, or a revealer, I am by no means certain. You was seized with some slight symptoms of enthusiasm in this very place on Tuesday last; and they seem to grow upon you so fast, that I am really not altogether free from apprehensions of a new Templetonian testament or dispensation. Virtue consists not in rising either late or early, nor in any artificial methods of managing ourselves, but in following nature, whose light is sufficient, according to the first article of our creed, to discover to every man, without instruction or institution, all that is necessary for him, as a moral agent, either to know or practise.

Shep. Will you be so good, sir, as to tell me in what the light of nature consists?

Dech. It consists in two things, sentiment and reason. By sentiment I mean, first, that impression made on the heart of every man, by which he is naturally led to seek his own good, and to preserve himself; secondly, that love of the sexes, by which they are prompted to propagate and preserve the species; thirdly, that storge by which the parents are moved to cherish and preserve their offspring; fourthly, that benevolenee, by which one human creature is inclined to benefit and preserve another; and lastly, that perception of beauty in a good, and of deformity in a bad, action, which every man feels in himself. By reason I mean that divine faculty of the mind, by which all men are enabled to judge and direct themselves in the choice of such means, as are necessary to bring about the ends suggested

to them by their natural sentiments, to decide between them according to the fitnesses of things, when they interfere; and to restrain them within due bounds, when at any time they tend to excess or irregularity. This, sir, is what I mean by the light or law of nature, implanted in the breasts of all men, and adequate to all their moral purposes. As every one must acknowledge there is such a law within him, independent of all instruction, there can be no need of a revelation. It was in full confidence of forcing you to own this, that I suffered you to carry your arguments relating to the history of miracles and resurrections, to their full length, knowing well, that as soon as the natural and universal revelation came to be considered and demonstrated, all your talk about the proofs of a particular dispensation, and the necessity of it, would come to the ground. Pray, sir, do you own the clearness of this law, as I have described it, within yourself?

Shep. I do not.

Dech. You do not! Then you deny, I suppose, you have any desire to preserve yourself, to propagate your species, to cherish your offspring, to do good to mankind, to cultivate virtue, and extirpate vice from your mind; you deny the existence of a rational faculty within you; you deny, in a word, that you are a man.

Shep. I deny none of these things; but I doubt indeed whether any, or all of these, can be properly called a law.

Dech. Do they not oblige and bind the actions of men? And is not that which binds the actions of moral agents, a law?

Shep. Does the law of nature consist in sentiment, or in reason?

Dech. In both.

Shep. So far as it consists in sentiment, the brutes, having those instincts, which you call sentiments, are móral agents,

as well as men.

Dech. By no means. Brutes are not struck with a moral sense of good and evil, as men are. Brutes are destitute of reason and choice, and therefore their instincts are not laws but man being directed by his reason to act in conformity to his sentiments, and being free to obey its dictates, those sentiments become a law to him.

Shep. No sense, perception, or instinct, can be called moral, till some higher faculty enjoins obedience to it as a duty. It is reason therefore in which the law of nature consists; for men are only accountable for their actions, so far as they are rational creatures; and that man, who is wholly deprived of reason, is, for the time, neither a moral, nor an accountable agent. But pray, sir, have all men one and the same law of nature? or hath every man a distinct natural law of his own?

Dech. All men have the same natural law. The sentiments I mentioned, and the faculty of reason, are the same in every man.

Shep. As men are to deal with one another, and live in community, they ought certainly to have but one universal law; for if this man were to act by one law, and that by another, it is easy to see, that great mischiefs and clashings would arise from thence. You know better than I do, that no trial can be had, nor a judge determine in any cause, but upon a common law, which parties on both sides must submit to. If men had different laws, that which is right by one man's law, might be wrong by another's, and consequently right or wrong could never be distinguished. Now, sir, it is a common observation, that the sentiments and reasonings of mankind are very different. Although all men have those sentiments you speak of, and reason too, yet this sentiment is stronger in one man, and that in another; and reason, which is clear and strong in some men, is weak and ill-informed in others. Hence it comes to pass, that Mr. Templeton may do a thing, which you think right, and I wrong, though both you and I are perfectly unprejudiced in the matter. In this respect, therefore, the mere sentiments and reasons of men cannot be a perfect law. Were it not for this great diversity, the breast of every man might be appealed to, as containing the common law, and no judge could ever mistake in his decrees. But as the contrary is evident to experience, mankind are forced to form themselves into societies, and determine what shall be the common law of all the members.

Dech. Yet if reason were not able to direct, the society could frame no common law, capable of answering the end. Shep. Although it should mix unjust with equitable

laws, which all societies have done, partly by mistake, and partly with design; yet those who are to be judged by those laws, are in a better condition, than if every man were left to be his own lawgiver.

Dech. When you say, this or that law of society is unjust, is it not reason that tells you so?

Shep. I cannot tell whether it be or not. My reason says one thing, that of the society says another; and two societies are as apt to differ, as two men. But if reason were never so uniform in all men, yet I cannot see what authority it hath to set up for a legislator. If any man should deny its authority, and act against reason; and, as it often happens, be powerful enough to defend himself against all the consequences of such a procedure; what could reason do to enforce or vindicate its laws? A law is a rule of action imposed on a free and moral agent, by a known superior, whose authority cannot be questioned, with a reward or penalty, or both annexed; and if the law is perfect, it must be just, and its sanctions must be adequate to the just and good end proposed by it. Be pleased to shew, sir, that the dictates of mere reason are supported by such authority, and by rewards and punishments of weight and cogency equal to the security and happiness of all mankind.

Dech. To act against nature is shocking to a rational being, and therefore the authority of nature is sufficient. As to the rewards and punishments annexed to the law of nature, they too seem to be sufficient. No man can be more surely rewarded for a good action, than he who hath his reward in his own hand, and can bestow it as plentifully on himself as he pleases, in that greatest of all pleasures, the pleasure of doing good. Nor can any man be more terribly punished, than by being left, after doing an evil action, to the severe stings of his own guilty conscience.

Shep. Every man therefore is subject to the law of his own heart, and that law is founded on the mere authority of his own nature, He is likewise his own judge, rewarder, and punisher. By this, which we may call the self-sufficient scheme, a man must either be subject to no law of nature, that is, in any proper sense of the word law; or else he must be superior to himself; for every law is the will of some superior imposed upon one, who is inferior and subject.