HIGHWAY.

Upon an indictment against a parish for the
non-repair of a highway, and "Not guilty
pleaded, a former judgment upon a present-
ment against the inhabitants of the same
parish for non-repair of the same road is
conclusive evidence of the defendant's liability
to repair, no fraud being imputed; and any
evidence to show that the road is not situate
in the parish indicted is inadmissible, even
though it should be recited in a local act of
Parliament as a fact that the road was in
another parish, and though the presentment
may, upon the face of it, show some defect,
which would have been fatal on demurrer or
in arrest of judgment, and the fine imposed
upon the inhabitants was not proved to have
been paid. Reg. v. Inhabitants of Houghton,

101

For feloniously stealing and receiving, joinder
of counts, 12

For conspiracy to defraud and false pretences,

38

Amendment of, 194
For indecent exposure, 216
For rescue, 381

For precedents of indictments, see APPENDIX
INSANITY.

Mode of proceeding when prisoner stands mute
from, 326

JUDGMENT.

On prisoners indicted for conspiracy who have
severed in their challenges, 6

JURISDICTION.

JURY.

Upon the trial of an indictment, one of the
jurors, by mistake, delivered a verdict of "not
guilty," which was heard and taken down
by the chairman and the clerk of the peace.
The prisoner was discharged out of the dock,
but other jurymen immediately called at-
tention to the mistake, and the prisoner was
brought back.

Held, that the right verdict might then be
taken. Reg. v. Vodden, 226

LARCENY.

A mortgage deed, and title deeds accompanying
it, constitute a security for money within the
7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 5, which makes it

felony to steal " any debenture, deed, bond,
bill, note, warrant, order or other security
whatsoever for money or payment of
money."

An indictment charging in one count the
larceny of "three deeds being a security for
money, to wit, for 20., of and belonging to
H. W.;" and in another count the larceny
of "three deeds, being a security for the
payment of money, to wit, for 201., of and
belonging to H. W."

Held, to be supported by proof of the
larceny of deeds of lease and release from
A. to B. of real estate, and of a mortgage by
demise of the same property from B. to C.,
and held by the prosecutor as executor
of C. Reg. v. Evan Williams, 49

coals from a wharf, where the master dealt,
went with his master's sacks and cart for that
purpose, and received the coals in the sacks,
which, when filled, were deposited in the
cart. On his way home he fraudulently
abstracted from the cart some of the coals.

Held, a larcency, inasmuch as the original
taking was a trespass, and the trespass con-
tinued up to the time of the fraudulent
appropriation. Reg. v. Riley, 88

The law with regard to the finder of lost pro-
perty does not apply to the case of property
of a passenger accidentially left in a railway
carriage, and found there by a servant of the
company; and such servant is guilty of
larceny if, instead of taking it to the station
or superior officer, he appropriates it to his

own use.

Where the evidence is consistent with the
fact of an article having been abstracted
from a railway carriage, either in the course
of the journey through the county of A.
or after its arrival at its ultimate destination
in the county of B., and the prisoner is in-
dicted in A. under the statute 7 Geo. 4,
c. 64, s. 13, the case must go to the jury,
who are to say whether they are satisfied that
the larcency was committed in the course of
the journey or afterwards. Reg. v. Pierce,

117.

A. having contracted with a gas company to
consume gas and pay according to meter, in
order to avoid paying for the full quantity of
gas consumed, introduced into the entrance
pipe another pipe for the purpose of convey-
ing the gas to the exit pipe of the meter,
and so to the burners for consumption
without passing through the meter itself.

The entrance pipe was the property of A.,
but he had not by his contract any interest
in the gas or right of control over it until it
passed through the meter. A. having been
convicted of a larcency of the gas:

Held, that the conviction was right. Reg.
v. White, 213

A letter carrier, whose duty was ended when
he had delivered the bags to the postmaster
at F., stole a letter containing a shilling,
after he had delivered the bags but whilst
he was assisting at the postmaster's request
in sorting the letters.

Held, that he was at the time of the
larceny a person employed under the post-
office, within the meaning of the 7 Will. 4 & 1
Vict. c. 36. Reg. v. Reason, 227

Held, that as soon as the coals, which
were the property of the master, had been
deposited in the master's cart, the exclusive
possession of the servant was determined,
and that a constructive possession of the
master began, the servant, thenceforward,
having only the mere charge or custody of
the coals as a servant; consequently the
servant committed a trespass in taking them
from the cart, and was properly convicted of
larceny. Reg. v. Reed 284

Upon the trial of an indictment for larceny,
if the circumstantial evidence satisfies the
jury of the guilt of the prisoner, he may be
convicted, though the prosecutor is unable
to swear that he has lost the thing charged
to have been stolen. Reg. v. Burton, 293
A farm bailiff, who was authorized to receive
money and make payments on behalf of his
master, and who kept a book containing
entries of such receipts and payments, which
was from time to time examined by his
master, made false entries in the book,
giving himself credit, in several instances,
for larger payments than he had in truth
made, and, when the book was examined
received from his master a sum of 27. as the
balance due to him upon that account.

Held, that he was not guilty of larceny.
Quære, whether he was not guilty of ob-
taining money by false pretences? Reg. v.
Green, 296

An unstamped agreement is within the rule of
the common law, which prevents choses in
action from being the subject of larceny.

So held (Parke, B., dissentiente), where,
upon an indictment for stealing a piece of
paper, it appeared that the paper stolen,
though unstamped, contained the terms of
a subsisting written agreement. Reg. v.
Watts, 304

On the same day on which A., a workman, left
his master's service, his brother-in-law B.,
was found selling some of the master's pro-
perty. A portion of it was usually kept in a
place to which all the workmen might have
access, and the rest in an inner place much
less accessible; but to which A. frequently
went for purposes connected with his em-
ployment. Two months before, B. had been
employed as a labourer at the premises, and
had had access to the outer but not to the
inner place. When he sold the property he
gave his name, and stated that he had

received it from A.'s wife to sell. A. and B.
were jointly indicted for stealing and re-
ceiving; and upon the trial, B. in his defence,
repeated his former statement.

The question being reserved whether there
was any evidence to go to the jury against A.:
Held, that there was not. Reg. v. Walker
and Morrod, 310

A., having executed an assignment of all his
goods and effects to trustees for the benefit
of his creditors, took to pieces some machines
included in the assignment, and secretly re-
moved them from the premises, with intent
to defraud the creditors. But the trustees
had not at that time taken possession; and
the jury found that the property was not in
the care and custody of A. as agent for the

1. The silling beneath an engine employed in
crushing puddled balls of iron, and rolling
them into bars, is a part of a machine or
engine within the stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30,
s. 4, which makes it felony if any person
shall unlawfully and maliciously cut, break,
or destroy, or damage with intent to destroy
or to render useless, any threshing machine,
or any machine or engine, whether fixed or
movable, prepared for or employed in any
manufacture.

2. A displacement of a machine is within
the same statute; therefore placing a sledge-
hammer within the jaws of the squeezers of

the machine, which had the effect of dis-
placing and depressing the silling and birck-
work underneath, causing a trifling injury,
but not preventing the working of the ma-
chine, is a damage within the statute.

3. The intent to destroy or to render
useless is a question for the jury, and may
be inferred from the mere act causing the
damage.

4. It is unnecessary, under this statute, to
prove express inalice, for everything wilfully
done, if injurious, must be inferred to be done
with malice. Reg. v Foster, 25

MALICIOUS INJURIES.

To machinery, 198
Throwing stones on railway, 202

MALICIOUS TRESPASS.

Upon an indictment for damaging trees and
shrubs in a hedge to an amount exceeding
51., a valuer proved that he estimated the
injury to the trees at 11., but that it would
be necessary to stub up the old hedge, and
that it would cost 51. 14s. 6d. to replace

it:

Held, that upon this evidence the in-
dictment could not be sustained. Reg. v.
Whiteman, 370

MANSLAUGHTER.

See MURDER.

MURDER.

If a blow without provocation is wilfully in-
flicted, the law infers that it was done with
malice aforethought, and if death ensues, the
offender is guilty of murder, although the
blow may have been given in a moment of
passion.

Irritating language by the deceased forms
no provocation in law, so as to reduce the
crinie to manslaughter.

The prisoner was indicted for the murder
of his wife, and it appeared that on his
return home late at night, drunk, the de-
ceased made use of some taunting language
to him, upon which he took down a sword
from the shelf, and unsheathed it, and struck
her with the flat part of it, and she then
attempted to reach the door of the room
through which her daughter, who was on
the outside, endeavoured to pull her, the
prisoner following her. She immediately
afterwards screamed, and on being pulled
out of the room by her child, a wound
on the left side was observed, of which
she died in a few hours. The defence

was, that the deceased in resisting the
efforts of her daughter to remove her from
the room, fell back on the sword, which the
prisoner was too much intoxicated to know
was unsheathed. Cresswell, J. directed the
jury, that if the prisoner used the weapon
wilfully, that was such malice aforethought
as the law required, and he was guilty of
murder; but if the deceased rushed on the
sword accidentally, he must be acquitted
altogether, and if the wound was inflicted
in a struggle at the door, the prisoner having
the sword in his hand, but without any in-
tention on his part, to use it, then there was
a careless use of the sword, which made him
guilty of manslaughter. Reg. v. Noon, 137
Upon an indictment under the 7 Will. 4 & 1
Vict. c. 85, ss. 3, 5, for administering poison
with intent to murder, a previous acquittal
on an indictment for murder founded on the
same facts cannot be pleaded in bar. Reg.
v. Connell, 178

On a trial for murder alleged to have been
committed on the 24th August, semble, that
evidence of acts done by the prisoner on the
13th August, unaccompanied by any declar-
ation to explain them, is not admissible.
Reg. v Mobbs, 223

NEGLIGENCE.

Neglect on the part of a parent to provide
an infant child with necessary food and
clothing is not a misdemeanor at common
law, unless some actual injury is done to the
child; and in an indictment for that offence,
an averment that the child was actually in-
jured is a necessary and material allegation,
and must be proved.

Whether actual injury has been occasioned
is a question of fact for the jury; but where,
upon a case reserved, it appeared that a
mother had left her children for several days
without food or clothing, so that, but for
the attention of a neighbour, they might
probably have died; but that, in conse-
quence of that attention, they did not suffer
any serious injury, though the neighbour
thought that they did suffer in
degree; and the question was put to the
court whether the injury was sufficient in
degree to constitute the offence :

some

Held, insufficient. Reg. v. Philpott, 140

PENALTY.

By sect. 26 of 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, it is provided,
that so much of any penalty imposed under
that act, as is not awarded to the prosecutor,

is to be paid to the treasurer of "the county
or place" for which the justice was acting
when the penalty was imposed:

Held, that the word "place" in that sec
tion means a place for which a Court of
Quarter Sessions is held.

Where, therefore, a penalty was imposed
by two justices of a borough, which had a
commission of the peace, but no Court of
Quarter Sessions, and a moiety only was
awarded to the prosecutor, the treasurer of
the county was held entitled to the remain-
ing moiety. Reg. v. Dale, 93

PERJURY.

The defendant was indicted for perjury alleged
to have been committed by him on the
hearing before justices of a summons charg-
ing him with being the father of an illegiti-
mate child:

Held, that, to support the indictment, it
was necessary to give evidence of the charge
made by the mother, either by production
of the original order made thereon, or by
giving secondary evidence of the summons
after notice to the defendant to produce it;
and that, in the absence of such notice, it
was not sufficient to produce the minutes of
the proceedings by the clerk to the justices,
those minutes being of no greater authority
than the notes of a short-hand writer. Reg.
v. Newall, 21

The defendant was indicted for perjury alleged
to have been committed by him on the trial
of an action in the County Court, by swear-
ing that the signature to a document was
not in his handwriting. The judge of the
County Court made the defendant write his
name in court, and impounded the genuine,
as well as the alleged forged signature.

Semble, that on the trial for perjury, the
jury might look at and compare the two
signatures. Reg. v. Taylor, 58

In an indictment for perjury, the perjury was
alleged to have been committed on the trial
of an indictment against B., for setting fire
to a certain barn of one P. In support of
the averment, a certificate of the trial and
conviction of B. was produced, but the of-
fence there mentioned was setting fire to
"one stack of barley." It appearing that
the offence was, in fact, the same, the barn
and the stack having been destroyed by one
fire:

Held, that the indictment might be
amended under the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 1.

A witness for the prosecution called to
prove that B. was not at the barn at the time
it was set on fire (and consequently that the
evidence of the defendant who swore at the

trial that he had seen B. set it on fire, was
false), admitted on cross-examination that
he had given a different account on the
former trial, and had on that occasion cor-
roborated the testimony of the present de-
fendant, but now alleged that he was per-
suaded by W. (who had left England) to
forswear himself on the former trial:

Held, that on re-examination the witness
might be asked whether he had made a
statement to C. immediately after the trial
respecting his evidence and respecting W.,
and that C. might be called to corroborate him
as to the general fact, but that the particulars
of the statement to C. were inadmissible, and
that a person who was present at the inter-
view between the witness and W. might be
called to prove the fact of the conversation,
but not the particulars. Reg. v. Neville,
69
The prisoner was charged with perjury, for
having falsely sworn before magistrates at
petty sessions, that one D. R. was the father
of her illegitimate child. At the trial of the
prisoner the imputed father, D. R., swore that
he never had intercourse with her. In corro-
boration of D. R., a witness was called who
swore that the prisoner had told witness, at
a time when she generally denied being with
child, that "D. R. had never touched her
clothes."

Held that, as the negation was made by
the prisoner at a time when she generally
denied being with child, it was so far a part
of such general denial that, although it could
not be altogether withdrawn from the jury,
it was not a corroboration of D. R.'s testi-
mony, on which alone they convict her.

Another assignment" of perjury was that,
on the same occasion, the prisoner had falsely
sworn that her master, who was uncle of
D. R., promised her that he would raise her
wages, and allow her to lie in at his house,
if she would swear the child to a person
other than his nephew, D. R.

Held, that such statement was not material
to the issue so as to constitute the crime of
perjury. Reg. v. Owen, 105

In support of an indictment for perjury, com-

mitted on the trial of a plaint in a County
Court, it is not necessary to produce the
judge's notes if proof of the perjury can be
established by witnesses who were present at
the trial.

Semble, that it is no objection to a witness
called for that purpose, that he acted as
advocate and attorney against the prisoner
at the trial of the plaint in the County Court.

An indictment for perjury committed by
a party examined at the hearing of a plaint
in a County Court as a witness in his own

behalf, need not conclude against the form
of the statute. Reg. v. Morgan, 107
An information on oath is not necessary to
give a justice jurisdiction to convict of an
offence under sect. 24 of stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4,
c. 30, the provision in sect. 30 being cumu-
lative.

A

Where, therefore, upon an indictment for
perjury it was proved that the defendants
had sworn falsely before two justices of the
peace upon the hearing of an information
not upon oath, for an offence under sect. 24:

Held, that they were properly convicted.
Reg. v. Thomas Millard and Henry Millard,

150.

question as to the sufficiency of an indict-
ment raised in the course of a trial may be
reserved for the Court of Criminal Appeal,
under 11 & 12 Vict. c. 78.

It is not necessary in an indictment for
perjury, committed before an Inferior Court,
to set out all the facts which show the autho-
rity of such court of limited jurisdiction, and
it will be sufficient to aver that "the case
came on to be tried, in due form of law,"
before the judge of the Inferior Court, "he
having then and there sufficient and com-
petent authority to administer the said oath
to the said E. L." (the prisoner). Lavey v.
The Queen (5 Cox Crim. Cas. 529), approved
of and acted on.

"Jurisdiction" in 31 Geo. 3, c. 18, s. 111,
means local jurisdiction, and, accordingly,
under that act, Courts of Quarter Session
have jurisdiction to try cases of perjury by
statute as well as at common law. Reg. v.
Lawlor, 187

A Master Extraordinary of the Court of Chan-
cery has no authority to administer an oath
and take an affidavit to be used in a suit in
the Admiralty Court, although the practice
of that court is to receive affidavits so sworn ;
and the offence of perjury cannot be com-
mitted in an affidavit so taken, but to make
such an affidavit falsely with a view to its
being used in the Admiralty Court, would
be a misdemeanor at common law. Reg. v.
Stone, 235

Where perjury is assigned upon evidence given
before an arbitrator, upon a reference at
Nisi Prius, of a cause and all matters in
difference between the parties, it must be
distinctly shown whether the evidence was
material in respect of the matters in issue in
the cause, or of the other matters in differ-
ence between the parties.

Quare, whether the production of the
order of reference is sufficient evidence of
the authority of the arbitrator, without pro-
ducing the Nisi Prius record? Reg. v. Ball,

360