for nonpayment of a fine imposed for a second offence of dog-stealing, "clearly shows the defectiveness of the section;" and he arrives at this conclusion thus. After stating the punishment for the first offence, he proceeds: "then in default of payment he may, under Jervis's Act, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 19, be committed to prison with or without hard labour." In which short passage there are two misstatements. That section only applies where by the statute in that behalf no mode of enforcing the payment of the penalty is provided. Now sec. 107 of the Larceny Act does provide for enforcing the payment of the penalty for dog-stealing; and consequently Jervis's Act has nothing to do with the But even if it did apply, a distress warrant must be issued in the first instance, unless its issuing would be ruinous to the defendant, or it appeared that he had no goods. It is therefore incorrect to state generally that the defendant may under that section be committed at all. So that we have both a wrong statute cited, and that statute wrongly stated. It is true that a similar argument might have been founded on sec. 107 of the Larceny Act, but it would be completely answered by what we have said here and in the Introduction.

case.

5. Next, Mr. Saunders said that "the Court will have no authority to take the recognisance of one surety only, since the statute speaks only of sureties." Now the Court of Queen's Bench never takes less than two sureties in any case, and generally four in cases of felony, and with very good reason, for one surety may die, become insolvent, or quit the country; but it is much less likely that two or more sureties should do Therefore there was an excellent precedent founded on good reason for requiring more than one surety. The Select Committee of the Commons introduced the power to take the offender's own recognisances. Mr. Saunders in reply admits "that the Queen's Bench usually requires two sureties," but thinks that circumstances may occur, particularly in the case of a young

so.

person, where one surety (the parent) need alone be required." We reply that the admitted practice, invariably followed from time immemorial by the Court of Queen's Bench, was an infinitely better guide to follow than any other.

Lastly, Mr. Saunders said that the proviso, which was introduced by the Committee of the Commons, "means that if any person is required to find sureties for more than a year, he shall not be imprisoned for not doing it." According to this reading every person required to find sureties for a less term than a year would be liable to be imprisoned for life unless he found them: whilst a person required to find them for more than a year would not be liable to be imprisoned at all. The objector, therefore, may well admit that that cannot be the intention of the section. The Committee of the Commons thought that the clause clearly meant that no one was to be imprisoned for more than a year for not finding sureties. They framed it, and they are at least as competent as the objector to understand its meaning.

In reply Mr. Saunders says, that Mr. Greaves admits that the meaning of the Legislature was "that no person shall be imprisoned under this clause for any period exceeding one year for not finding sureties. That being so, we will only add, that it is very much to be regretted that the British Legislature has not said what it meant, instead of saying what it did not mean." But has it done so? The words are, "No person shall be imprisoned under this clause for not finding sureties for any period exceeding one year," and the objection rests on reading "sureties" together with "for any period exceeding one year." Now "sureties to keep the peace or to be of good behaviour for any term," is a perfectly well known expression; but "sureties for any period" is a very unusual, if not an altogether unknown expression, and it therefore ought not to be supposed to be used in any case, especially where it makes nonsense of a sentence. Again, in pronouncing sentence

If

nothing is more common than to insert the cause of imprisonment between the word "imprisoned" and the term of imprisonment awarded, e.g. "The sentence of the Court, is that you be imprisoned for this your offence for the term of one year," and if the clause be so read it is perfectly free from objection. the clause had run "imprisoned for not paying a fine for any period exceeding one year," no doubt would have existed as to its meaning, and there is equally little as to the meaning of the clause as it stands; for where a clause is capable of being read in two ways, one of which leads to a manifest absurdity, and the other makes perfectly good sense, it is obvious that the latter is the right reading.

We said, and repeat, that there was nothing whatever in any one of these numerous objections, and unquestionably nothing to justify a writer in saying that the clause was "so slovenly drawn ;" "it is astonishing that a section so loose as this one should have been permitted to have found its way into this Act;" "taken altogether this section is a most unfavourable specimen of legal workmanship, and will cause very great embarrassments to those whose duty it will be to carry it into effect."

Not satisfied, however, with "attacking" this clause in the Law Times, Mr. Saunders returns to the charge in his and Mr. Cox's edition of The Statutes, p. 97, where he starts the additional objection, that "the section contains new and very extensive powers." Surely Mr. Saunders cannot but know that the power to fine and require sureties for keeping the peace and being of good behaviour on a conviction for misdemeanor is one of the oldest powers known to the common law. Then Mr. Saunders says, "it may well be questioned whether when a criminal has suffered his appointed punishment, it is judicious to impose upon him the further inconvenience of providing bondsmen for his future good behaviour." It would be enough to answer that such has been the case in common

law misdemeanors from time immemorial, and no one ever heard a complaint against it; but it may be well to add, that neither fines nor sureties are ever awarded "when a criminal has suffered his appointed punishment;" on the contrary, the Court always considers them as part of the punishment, and this power is always used in mercy towards the criminal, and a less term of imprisonment awarded where it is exercised. In fact, instead of the clause being open to this objection, it is a most humane and merciful provision founded on that "nursing mother," the common law.

Mr. Saunders again returns to the charge, p. 244, with the further objection that this clause "in effect amounts to a bestowal of unlimited powers of mitigation of punishment, and when we find that unlawfully and maliciously wounding, &c., &c., are all misdemeanors, the powers thus given to impose a fine in lieu of any other punishment, looks very like jesting with criminal punishment." This is a note to sec. 71, of the Offences against the Person Act. Had Mr. Saunders forgotten that by sec. 5 of the same Act any person convicted of manslaughter (a crime infinitely greater in many cases than any misdemeanor) may be sentenced to pay a fine either in addition to or without any other punishment? So under the 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 9, the Court might have awarded a fine on a conviction for manslaughter without any other punishment.

amend the Statute Law of England and Ireland g to accessories to and abettors of indictable es: Be it enacted by the Queen's most ExcelHajesty, by and with the advice and consent of ords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, 3 present Parliament assembled, and by the ity of the same, as follows:

s to accessories before the fact:

Whosoever shall become an accessory before et to any felony, whether the same be a felony mon law or by virtue of any Act passed or passed, may be indicted, tried, convicted, and ed in all respects as if he were a principal

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Note. This clause is taken from the 11 & 12 ict. c. 46, s. 1, upon which it was held, that it as no objection to an accessory before the fact eing convicted that his principal had been acitted. Hall and Hughes were jointly indicted r stealing certain cotton. Hall was acquitted ad called as a witness against Hughes; and it early appeared that Hall had stolen the cotton the instigation of Hughes, and in his absence.

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