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38.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
1. A State, under its general and admitted power to define and punish offences

against its own peace and policy, may repel from its borders an unacceptable
population, whether paupers, criminals, fugitives, or liberated slaves; and, con-
scquently, may punish her citizens and others who thwart this policy, by har-
boring, secreting, or in any way assisting such fugitives. Moore v. People of

Illinois, 13.
2. It is no objection to such legislation, that the offender may be liable to punish-

ment under the act of Congress for the same acts, when injurious to the owner

of the sugitive slave. lbid.
3. The case of Prigg v. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, (16 Peters, 589,)

presented the following questions, which were decided by the court:
1. That, under and by virtue of the Constitution of the United States, the owner

of a slave is cloched with entire authority in every State in the Union, to
seize and recapture his slave, wherever he can do it without illegal violence

or a breach of the peace.
2. That the government of the United States is clothed with appropriate author-

ity and functions to enforce the delivery, on claim of the owner, and has

properly exercised it in the act of Congress of 12th February, 1793.
3. That any State law or regulation, which interrupts, impedes, limits, embar-

rasses, delays, or postpones, the right of the owner to the immediate pos-
session of the slave, and the immediate command of his service, is void.

Ibid.
4. This court has not decided that State legislation, in aid of the claimant, and

which does not directly or indirectly delay, impede, or frustrate the master in
the exercise of his right under the Constitution, or in pursuit of his remedy

given by the act of Congress, is void. Ibid.
5. It belongs exclusively to the political department of the government to recog-

nize or to refuse to recognize a new government in a foreign country, claiming

to have displaced the old and established a new one. Kennett v. Chambers,
6. Until the political department of the government acknowledged the independ-

ence of Texas, the Judiciary were bound to consider the old order of things as

having continued. Ibid.
7. While the government of the United States acknowledged its treaty of limits

and of amity and friendship with Mexico as still subsisting and obligatory, no
citizen of the United States could lawfully furnish supplies to Texas to enable

it to carry on a war with Mexico. Ibid.
8. A contract made in Cincinnati, after Texas declared itself independent, but be-

fore its independence was acknowledged by the United States, whereby the
complainants agreed to furnish, and did furnish money to a General in the
Texan army, to enable him to raise and equip troops to be employed against
Mexico, wiis illegal and void, and cannot be enforced in a court of the United

States. lbid.
9. The circumstance, that the Texan officer agreed, in consideration of these ad-

vances of money, to convey to them certain lands in Texas, of which he cove-
nanted that he was then the owner, will not make the contract valid, when it
appears upon the face of it, and by the averments in the bill, that the object
and intention of the complainants, in advancing the money, was to assist

Texas in its military operations. Ibid.
10. A contract made in the United States, at that time, for the purchase of land in

Texas, would have been valid even if the money was afterwards used to sup-
port hostilities with Mexico. But in this case it was not an ordinary pur-
chase; but the object of the complainants, as avowed in the contract and the

bill, was to aid Texas in its war with Mexico. Ibid.
11. The contract being absolutely void by the laws of the United States at the time

it was made, the circumstance that it was valid in Texas, and that Texas has
since become a member of the Union, does not entitle the complainants

enforce it in the courts of the United States. Ibid.
12. No contract can be enforced in the courts of the United States, no matter where

made or where to be exccuted, if it is in violation of the laws of the United
States, or is in contravention of the public policy of the government, or in

conflict with subsisting treaties. Ibid.
13. By the law of Pennsylvania, the River Delaware is a public navigable river, held

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued.)

by its joint sovereigns in trust for the public. Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan

Canal Co. 80.
14. Riparian owners, in that State, have no title to the river, or any right to divert its

waters, unless by license from the States. lbid.
15. Such license is revocable, and in subjection to the superior right of the State, to

divert the water for public improvements, either by the State directly, or by a

corporation created for that purpose. Ibid.
16. The proviso to the provincial acts of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, of 1771,

does not operate as a grant of the usufruct of the waters of the river to
Adam Hoops and his assigns, but only as a license, or teleration of his dam.

Ibid.
17. As, by the laws of his own State, the plaintiff could have no remedy against a

corporation authorized to take the whole waters of the river for the purposc of
canals, or improving the navigation, so, neither can he sustain a suit against a
corporation created by New Jersey for the same purpose, who have taken part

of the waters. lbid.
18. The plaintiff's

, being but tenants at sufferance in the usufruct of the water to the
two States who own the river as tenants in common, are not in a condition to
question the relative rights of either to use its waters without the consent of

the other. Ibid.
19. This case is not intended to decide whether a first license, for private emolument,

can support an action against a later licensee of either sovereign or both, who,

for private purposes, diverts the water to the injury of the first. Toid.
20. The case of League v. De Young & Brown, (ii 'How. 185,) considered and

again established, 79.
21. Under the tenth article of the treaty of 1842, between the United States and

Great Britain, a warrant was issued by a commissioner, at the instance of the
British Consul, for the apprehension of a person who, it was alleged, had com-

mitted an assault, with intent to murder, in Ireland. In re Kaine, 103.
22. The person being arrested, the Commissioner ordered him to be commited, for

the purpose of abiding the order of the President of the United States. ibid.
23. A habeus corpus was then issued by the Circuit Court of the United States, the

District Judge presiding, when, after a hearing, the writ was dismissed, and

the prisoner remanded to custody. lbid.
34. A petition was then presented to the Circuit Judge, at his chambers, addressed

to the Justices of the Supreme Court, and praying for a writ of habeas corpus,
which was referred by the Circuit Judge, after a hearing, to the Justices of
the Supreme Court, in bank, at the commencement of the next term thereof.

Ibid.
25. At the meeting of the court, a motion was made, with the papers and pro-

ceedings presented to the Circuit Judge annexed to the petition, for writs
of habeas corpus and certiorari to bring up the defendant and the record from
the Circuit Court, for the purpose of having the decision of that court ex-

amined. Ibid.
26. The motion was refused; the writs prayed for denied, and the petition dismissed.

Ibid.
27. Where the Supreme Court of a State certified that there was “ drawn in ques.

tion the validity of statutes of the State of Ohio," &c., without naming the
statutes, this was not enough to give jurisdiction to this court, under the 25th

section of the Judiciary Act. Lamb v. Walker, 149.
28. Nor, in this case, would the court have had jurisdiction if the statutes had been

named, because,
29. In 1816, the Legislature of Ohio passed an“ act to prohibit the issuing and circu-

lation of unauthorized bank paper,” and, in 1839, an act amendatory thereof;
and the question was, whether or not a canal company, incorporated in 1837,
was subject to these acts. In deciding that it was, the Supreme Court of
Ohio only gave a construction to an act of Ohio, which neither of itself, nor
by its application, involved in any way a repugnancy to the Constitution of

the United States, by impairing the obligation of a contract. lbid.
30. The case of the Commercial Bank of Cincinnati v. Buckingham's Executors,

(5 How. 817,) examined and sustained. Ibid.
31. The State of “Texas was admitted into the Union on the 29th of December,

1845, and from that day the laws of the United States were extended over it.
Calkin v. Cocke, 227.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued.)
32. Consequently, on the 30th of January, 1846, the revenue laws of Texas were

in force there, and goods seized for a non-compliance with those laws, were

illegally seized. Ibid.
33. In 1804, Congress passed an act, (2 Stat. at Large, 277,)“ making provision for

the disposal of the public lands in the Indiana Territory, and for other pur.
poses," in which it reserved from sale a township in each one of three districts,
to be located by the Secretary of the Treasury, for the use of a seminary of

learning. Trustees &c. v. Indiana, 269.
34. In 1806, the Secretary of the Treasury located a particular township in the Vin-

cennes district, for the use of that district; and when, in 1806, the territorial
government incorporated a “ Board of Trustees of the Vincennes University,"
the grant made in 1804 attached to this Board, although for the two preceding

years there had been no grantee in existence. Ibid.
35. Under the ordinance of 1787, made applicable to Indiana by an act of Congress,

the territorial government of Indiana had power to pass this act of incorpora-

tion. Ibid.
36. The language of the act of Congress, by which Indiana was admitted into the

Union, did not vest the above towoship in the legislature of the State. Ibid.
37. The Board of Trustees of the University was not a public corporation, and had

no political powers. The donation of land for its support was like a donation
by a private individual; and the legislature of the State could not rightfully

exercise any power by which the trust was defeated. Ibid.
38. In 1848, the Legislature of Maine passed an act declaring that no real or mixed

action should be commenced or maintained against any person in possession
of lands, where such person had been in actual possession for more than forty
years, claiming to hold the same in his own right, and which possession should
have been adverse, open, peaceable, notorious, and exclusive. This act was

passed two years after the suit was commenced. Webster v. Cooper, 489.
39. The effect of this act was to make the seisin of the occupant during the life-

time of Elizabeth, adverse against her son, when he had no right of possession.

Ibid.
40. This act, which thus purported to take away property from one man and vest it

in another, was contrary to the constitution of the State of Maine, as ex-
pounded by the highest courts of law in that State. And as this court looks
to the decisions of the courts of a State to explain its statutes, there is no rea-

son why it should not also look to them to expound its constitution. Ibid.
41. The River Penobscot is entirely within the State of Maine, from its source to

its mouth. For the last eight miles of its course it is not navigable, but crossed
by four dams erected for manufacturing purposes. Higher up the stream there

was an imperfect navigation. Voazie v. Moor, 568.
42. A law of the State, granting the exclusive uavigation of the upper river to a

company who were to improve it, is not in conflict with the 8th section of the
Ist article of the Constitution of the United States, and a license to carry on
the coasting trade did not entitle a vessel to navigate the upper waters of the

river. Ibid.
CONTRACTS.

For ante-nuptial contracts, see CHANCERY.
1. It belongs exclusively to the political department of the government to recog.

nize or to refuse to recognize a new government in a foreign country, claiming
. to having displaced the old and established a new one. Kennelt v. Chambers, 38.
2. Until the political department of the government acknowledged the independ.

ence of Texas, the Judiciary were bound to consider the old order of things

as having continued. Ibid.
3. While the government of the United States acknowledged its treaty of limits

and of amity and friendship with Mexico as still subsisting and obligatory, no
citizen of the United States could lawfully furnish supplies to Texas to enable
it to carry on the war against Mexico. Toid.
A contract, made in Cincinnati, after Texas declared itself independent, but
before its independence was acknowledged by the United States, whereby the
complainants agreed to furnish, and did furnish money to a General in the
Texan army, to er able him to raise and equip troops to be employed against
Mexico, was illegal and void, and cannot be enforced in a court of the United
States. Ibid.

CONTRACTS (Continued.)
5. The circumstance that the Texan officer agreed, in consideration of these ad.

vances of money, to convey to them certain lands in Texas, of which he
covenanted that he was then the owner, will not make the contract valid when
it appears upon the face of it, and by the averments in the bill, that the object
and intention of the complainants in advancing the moncy was to assist Texas

in its military operations. Ibid.
6. A contract made in the United States at that time for the purchase of land in

Texas, would have been valid even if the money was afterwards used to sup-
port hostilities with Mexico. But in this case it was not an ordinary purchase;
but the object of the complainants, as avowed in the contract and the bill,

was to aid Texas in its war with Mexico. Ibid.
7: The contract being absolutely void by the laws of the United States at the time

it was made, the circumstance that it was valid in Texas, and that Texas has
since become a member of the Union, does not entitle the complainants to

enforce it in the courts of the United States. Ibid.
8. No contract can be enforced in the courts of the United States, no matter where

made or whcre to be exccuted, if it is in violation of the laws of the United
States, or is in contravention of the public policy of the government or in

conflict with subsisting treaties. lbid.
9. Where there was a judgment at law against a defendant in Mississippi, and he

sought relief in equity, upon the ground that the consideration of the contract
was the introduction of slaves into the State, and consequently illegal; a court
of equity will not grant relief, because the complainant was in pari delicto with

the other party. Sample v. Bernes, 70. .
10. Morcover, such a defence would have been good at law, and the arcrments, that

deception was practised to prevent the complainant from making the defence,
are not sustained by the evidence in she case. And, further, after the judge
ment, the complainant gave a forthcoming bond, thus recognizing the validity

of the judgment. Ibid.
11. In 1834, Burden obtained a patent for a new and useful improvement in the

machinery for manufacturing wrought nails and spikes, which he assigned to
the Troy Iron and Nail Factory, and also covenanted that he would convey to
that company any improvement which he might thereafter make. Troy Iron

and Nail Fuctory v. Corning, 193.
12 In 1840, he made such an improvement, for making hook and brad-headed spikes,

with a bending lover, which he assigned to the Troy Iron and Nail Factory, in

1848. Ibid.
13. Before this last assignment, however, riz., in 1845, Burden made an agreement

with Corning, Horner, and Winslow, in which, among other things, it was
agreed, that both parties might thereafter manufacture and vend spikes of such
kind and character as they saw fit, notwithstanding their conflicting claims.

Ibid.
14. Owing to the peculiar attitude of the parties to each other at the time of making

this agreement, and the language used in it, it cannot be construed into pr.
mission to Corning, Horner, and Winslow, to use the improved machinery
patented by Burden in 1840; and the right to use it, having passed to the
Troy Iron and Nail Factory, a perpctual injunction upon Corning, Ilorner, and

Winslow will be decreed. Ibid.
15. Where the marshal of the District of Columbia engaged the services of a clerk

for a stipulated sum per annum, and the service continued without any new
agreement, and the jury were instructed that they might imply a new agree.
mcnt to pay the clerk at a different rate, this instruction was erroneous. There
was nothing in the evidence from which the jury could imply such new agree-

ment. Nult v. Minor, 464.
COPY-RIGHT.
1. Where the copy-right of a map was taken out under the act of Congress, and

the copperplate engraving seized and sold under an execution, the purchaser
did not acquire the right to strike off and sell copies of the map. Stephens y.

Cady, 528.
2. The court below decided that an injunction to prevent such striking off and

selling, could not issue, without a return of the purchase-money. This de-

cision was erroneous. Ibid.
3. A copy-right is a "property in notion, and has no corporeal tangible substance,”

COPY-RIGHT (Continued).

and is not the subject of seizure and sale by execution. It can be reached by
a creditor's bill in chancery, but in such case, the court would probably have

to decrec a transfer in the inode pointed out in the act of Congress. Ibid.
DEED.
In the State of Ohio, it is not a sufficient description of taxable lands to say,

“ Cooper, James, 5 acres, section 24, T. 4, F. R, 1." A dced made in conse
quence of a sale for taxes under such a description, is void. The courts of
Ohio have so decided, and this court adopts their decision. Raymond v. Long.

worth, 76.
DELAWARE RIVER.

See PENNSYLVANIA.
DEVISES.

Sce Wills.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
1. For some of the principles which govern sureties in bonds before the Orphans'

Court, sec Ennis v. Smith.
2. A master builder, undertaker, or contractor, who undertakes by contract with

the owner to ercet a building, or some part or portion thereof, on certain terms,
does not come within the letter or spirit of the act of Congress passed March
2, 1833, (4 Stat. at Large, 659,) entitled an act to secure to mechanics and
others, payment for labor done and materials furnished in the erection of

buildings in the District of Columbia. Winder v. Caldwell, 434.
DOMICIL.
1. General Kosciusko was sojourning in Switzerland when he died, but was domi-

ciled in France, and had been for fifteen years. Ennis v. Smith, 401.
2. His declarations are to be received as proof that his domicil was in France.

Such declarations have always been received, in questions of domicil, in the
courts of France, in those of England, and in the courts of the United States.

Ibid.
3. The presumption of law is, that the domicil of origin is retained, until residence

elsewhere has been shown by him wbo alleges a change of it. But residence
elsewhere repels the presumption, and casts upon him who denies it to be á
domicil of choice, t' e burden of disproving it. The place of residence must
be taken to be a domicil of choice, unless it is proved that it was not meant to
be a principal and permanent residence. Contingent events, political or other-
wise, are not admissible proofs to show, where one removes from his domicik
of origin for a residence elsewhere, that the latter was not meant to be a prin-
cipal and permanent residence. But if one is exiled by authority from his
domicil of origin, it is never presumed that he has abandoned all hope of
returning back. The abandonment, however, may be shown by proof. Gene-
ral Kosciusko was not exiled by authority. He left Poland voluntarily, to
obtain a civil status in France, which he conscientiously thought he could not

enjoy in Poland, whilst it continued under a foreign dominion. Ibid.
DUTIES - CUSTOM-HOUSE.
1. The State of Texas was admitted into the Union on the 29th of December,

1845, (9 Stat. at Large, 108,) and from that day the laws of the United States

were extended over it. Calkin & Co. v. Curke, 227.
2. Consequently, on the 30th of January, 1846, the revenue laws of Texas were not

in force there, and goods seized for a non-compliance with those laws, were ille-

gally seized. Ibid.
EJECTMENT.
1. In the State of Ohio, it is not a sufficient description of taxable lands to-say,

“ Cooper, James, 5 acres, section 24, T. 4, F. R. 1." A deed made in conse-
quence of a sale for taxes under such a description is void, The courts of
Ohio have so decided, and this court adopts their decision. Raymond v. Long-

worth, 76.
2. This court decided, in 8 Howard, 223, that the recitals in a patent for land, refer-

ring to titles of anterior date, were not of themselves sufficient to establish the

titles thus recited. Ibid.
3. The titles themselves being now produced, it is decided, that a permit given by

the Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Louisiana, in 1799, to a person to form an

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