no new writ be iffued for the election of a member for Aylesbury, in the room of Mr. Bent, till Monday, 14th May. The Dublin police bill was read a third time, and paffed. Mr. Vanfittart prefented feveral accounts relating to his Majefty's foreign fettlements. Ordered to lie on the table. Mr. Calcraft put off till Monday, in the Committee of Supply, the motion of which he had given notice for Friday, relative to the pay and clothing of the volunteers.

Mr. Kinnaird put off till the fame day a motion relative to the half-pay of officers engaged in volunteer corps, of which he had given notice for Friday.-Adjourned.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

THURSDAY, APRIL 19.

Counsel was heard in continuation for the appellants in the chancery appeal, Richardfon against the universities of Oxford and Cambridge. Poftponed till Wednesday. The bills on the table were forwarded.

MOTION FOR DISPATCHES RELATING TO HOSTILITIES, SENT TO INDIA.

The Earl of Car ifle obferved, that as the fate of the country, as connected with the conduct of Minifters, muft, at no very diftant day, be brought under their Lordfhips' confideration, he would not then trefpafs on their time by any obfervations on that fubject. He rose merely to make a motion for certain papers, to the production of which he did not apprehend Minifters would oppofe any reafonable objections. He fhould therefore move without further preface, That an humble addrefs be prefented to his Majefly, praying that he may give orders that the dates of all difpatches tranfmitted either by land or fea, by Government to India, previous to his Majefty's meffage of the 10th of March 1803, be laid on the table for the information of their Lord hips; and the dates alfo when they were received by the perfons to whom they were feverally addreffed and that the dates of the difpatches tranfmitted between that period and the commencement of hoftilities, together with the dates of the receipt of fuch in India, be alfo laid on the table.

Lord Hawkesbury thought it his duty to refift the motion of the noble Earl, not that there could be any great objection to grant the information he feemed anxious to obtain, but that it was contrary to all precedent, and the conftant practice

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of the executive government. He would not deny but many occafions might arife, on which it would be imcumbent on Minifters to accede to propofitions for the production of pub lic documents. On all queftions relating to the public revenue, to the application of the expenditure of that revenue, or to the magnitude and difpofal of the public force, it was competent for any noble Lord to move for fuch papers as tended to explain them, and it would be indecorous in Minifters to oppofe the production of them. But where no ground of accufation had been laid down, and where the motives for producing them were only to be difcovered in vague and uncertain rumour, he thought it neither parliamentary nor prudent to trouble his Majefty with an addrefs. for fuch purposes; he would therefore give his diffent to the motion of the noble Earl.

The Earl of Carlife could not agree with the noble Secretary of State as to the principle which he had laid down, that Minifters were to communicate or withhold information at their difcretion, on all public occafions, except fuch as arofe out of matters that were fairly before Parliament. They, the hereditary council of his Majefty, had a right to demand information, whenever the in'ereits of either the Sovereign or the State were concerned; and it was the duty of Ministers to communicate it, except the publicity of it might operate to the difadvantage of the public fervice. He would even

maintain, in oppofition to the noble Lord, that public rumour may be fometimes a good ground for requiring information. He asked, was it not notorious, that in all the circles, from the highest to the lowest in this country, it was ru moured, and generally believed, that Minifters had been extremely remifs in conveying intelligence to India of approach. ing hoftilities? It was easily to be ascertained, so negligent had they been in this refpect, that information of the war had been received from England, by private merchants in India, Seventeen days before the difpatches of Government arrived there. To what but this negligence, on the part of Government, was the efcape of the French fquadron at Pondicherry owing? Admiral Linois, with an inferior force, was at anchor within the British fleet under the command of Admiral Rainier, and from fome information he had received, he had cut his cables, and was, perhaps, at this very moment, engaged in active and fuccefsful hoftility against fome of the most valuable of our fettlements in that part of the world. Surely if the English Admiral had been apprized of the probability, much

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lefs the actual commencement of a war, he would, as it would have been his duty to have done, detained the whole of the French fquadron. The public had a right to be fatisfied on this point, and therefore, unless Minifters produced fome better arguments against his motion, he muft perfevere in it.

Lord Hawk bury muft ftill perfift in oppofing the motion; however, he had no hesitation in faying, that pending the negociation, and previous to his Majefty's meffage, difpatches had been fent to India with all poffible celerity, and by every means of communication, to apprize our naval and military commanders there, of the state of it, and the probable refumption of hoftilities. His Majesty's Government, at least that department of it, had also, in a fubfequent period of the negociation, made fimilar communication; and when hoftilities actually commenced, they tranfmitted intelligence of it, by all means in their power, to India.

Earl Spencer expreffed much furprife at the determination of Ministers to oppofe the motion of his noble Friend. They had, if he was well-informed, and he drew his information from a fource which, though not official, was, notwithftanding, in his opinion, too authentic to be queftioned, been guilty of unpardonable neglect in not conveying the earliest intelligence of the war to our fettlements in India. The official dispatches were tranfmitted by a frigate which had to fee a convoy, that was put under her protection, fafe into Lifbon; by which means an unavoidable delay of at least 16 or 18 days was produced. If he would credit authority he had no reafon to doubt, Admiral Rainier was not apprized, on the 12th of August, of what had taken place in Europe on the 10th of March, full five months before. Suppofe the circumstances of the two fleets had been different, and that Admiral Rainier, with an inferior force, had been anchored infide the French fquadron, could any one imagine that Admiral Linois, on the 12th of Auguft, on the night of which he flipped his cables, would have hesitated on the capture of the British fquadron? There was certainly great blame imputable to fome quarter, and it was the duty of the Houfe to examine it thoroughly.

Lord Hobart oppofed the motion, and maintained that there had been no negligence on the part of Minifters. The frigate which carried out difpatches, failed direct for India, and made an extraordinary quick paffage. Our commanders there had timely notice of the fate of affairs in Europe, and inftructions for their conduct in cafe of the resumption of hoftilities. As to the efcape of Admiral Linois' fquadron, he

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was fure no blame could attach either to the Executive Government, or to his Majefty's Commander in thofe feas upon that account. In fact, Admiral Rainier was apprifed of the probability of the recommencement of the war when the French fquadron arrived at Pondicherry, and it was actually under confideration to detain Admiral Linois, when he was fo fortunate as to make his escape.

The Earl of Carnarvon-If there was no argument adduced but what may be drawn from the unwillingness in Government to produce papers whofe dates of tranfmiffion and reception are the principal objects defired, and against which the flightest objection is not pretended, I fhould ftrongly be of opinion that the Houfe fhould require their production; but more fubftantial grounds to fupport my noble Friend's mo tion cannot exift than that of a general prevalent opinion that Admiral Rainier was left till the 12th of Auguft, without an official communication of the fituation in which this country was involved, and without instructions for his conduct, and that this omiffion enabled Admiral Linois to escape with his fquadron from the fituation in which he might have been detained. The noble Secretary of State has fufficiently confirmed the fuppofed fact, by confining his affirmation to the information which he fays Admiral Rainier had of the rupture with France, without ftating it to be official; and certainly it was not accompanied with inftructions how to act; for the noble Secretary infers the knowledge of Admiral Rainier, from the uncertainty and doubt prevailing in his mind how he fhould act, under the circumftances of probable hoftility, Admiral Linois' fquadron being in his power. The refult of this is, that report has probably accurately ftated the fact, that Admiral Rainier received private infor mation of a rupture, long before he received official difpatches, which were fent by a frigate impeded by its convoy, and directed to touch at various places in its way; and that he did not receive official information and instructions till Admiral Linois had received official information, and in confequence departed fuddenly and privately at midnight. This, if true, is a grofs neglect, which merits the molt ferious inquiry. The capture of the French fleet commanded by Admiral Linois muft have been of the utmost importance. The mifchief which our trade may fuffer from their efcape is the probable confequence of this criminal neglect; and strong reports exift that our India trade has greatly fuffered; other mifchiefs which may follow are incalculable. It is admit

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ted by the noble Secretary that private information did arrive in time, but not of fufficient authority to enable Admiral Rainier to have detained Linois' fquadron in port. It is clear from his acknowledged doubts and uncertainty, that he had no inftructions how to act, which occafioned his uncertainty and the lofs of that advantage. That Admiral Linois received his official information fooner, his efcape and a midnight departure pioves. Private information received (which could have no other ef fect than strong and probable report) is a proof that official information might have been received; and private or even official information received, which left him in uncertainty how to act, is a proof that no proper instructions were sent. I am therefore fully fatisfied, that the motion of my noble Friend fhould be fupported, and that the minifterial motive for withholding the information is the criminal matter they will expofe.

Lord Harrowby declared, that on the first view of the matter he was inclined to think the motion not fufficiently warranted. From the grounds, however, which had fince been ftated in fupport of it, he could not help giving it his decided fupport.

The Houfe then divided on Lord Carlife's motion:

Lord Hobart, previous to the fecond reading of the bill to enable his Majefty to accept the fervices of the Irish militia, moved that his Majefty's meffage on the loyal and spirited offers of the Irish militia fhould be read. His Lordship then declared, that he prefumed there would be no difference of opinion in that Houfe, with refpect to the principle which gave rise to the prefent bill, and which, carried to a further extent, would fan&tion the policy of occafional interchanges of the militia of the two countries. But that was

not the question now before them. The prudence or neceffity of fuch reciprocity was not now to be difcuffed; but as it appeared on the face of the bill before the Houfe, they were called upon merely to determine, whether they would

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