factorily proved. It is still necessary, however, with a view to the trial of cases under the preceding clause, to mention the decisions on the former clause in the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, s. 8.

If rioters, after proceeding a certain length, leave off of their own accord before the act of demolition be completed, that is evidence from which a jury may infer that they did not intend to demolish the house.

A party of rioters came to a house about midnight, and in a riotous manner burst open the door, broke some of the furniture, all the windows, and one of the window frames, and then went away, there being nothing to hinder them from doing more damage; it was held that, although the breaking and damage done was a sufficient beginning to demolish the house, yet unless the jury were satisfied that the ultimate object was to destroy the house, and that, if they had carried their intentions into full effect, they would, in point of fact, have demolished it, it was not a beginning to demolish within the Act.(z) So where a mob pursued a person to a public-house, where he took refuge, and the doors and windows were all secured, and the mob demanded that he should be given up to them, or they would pull the house down, and the front door and lower windows were beaten in, and the shutters and frames of some of them much broken, and part of the mob

entered the house and did much damage to the furniture, *but in about [*384 twenty minutes, being unable to find the person who had there taken refuge, and a rumor being spread that the mayor was coming, they went away; it was held that this offence was not within the Act; for the persons committing the outrage must have the intention of destroying the house, before they can be charged with a felonious beginning to demolish, and here they had no such intention, but their intention was to get possession of the person who had entered the house. (a)

But if rioters are interrupted in the work of demolition by the police or any other force, that is evidence to show that they were compelled to desist from that which they had designed, and the jury may well infer that they had begun to demolish within the meaning of the Act. A party of coal-whippers having a feeling of ill-will to a coal-lumper, who paid less than the usual wages, created a mob, riotously went to the house where he kept his pay-table, cried out that they would murder him, threw stones, brick bats, &c., broke windows and partitions, and threw down part of a wall in a yard, and continued, after his escape, throwing stones at the house, till they were compelled to desist by the threats of the police; it was held that this case was distinguishable from R. v. Thomas, because the mob did not leave off voluntarily, but after the threats of the police, and that they might be convicted of beginning to demolish the house, though their principal object was to injure the lumper, provided it was also their object to demolish the house (b) The beginning to pull down means not simply a demolition of a part, but a part with an intent to demolish the whole. The prisoners were indicted for beginning to demolish a building used in carrying on a trade. It appeared that they began by breaking the windows and doors, and having afterwards entered the house, they set fire to the furniture, but no part of the house was burnt. Park, J., told the jury "the beginning to pull down means not simply a demolition of a part, but a part with an intent to demolish the whole. It is for you to say if the prisoners meant to stop where they did, and do no more; because if they did they are not guilty; but if they intended, when they broke the windows and doors, to go farther, and destroy the house, then they are guilty of a capital offence. If they had the full means of going farther, and were not interrupted, but left off of their own accord, it is evidence from which you may judge that they meant the work of demolition, to stop where it did. If you think that they originally came there without intent to demolish, and the setting fire to the furniture was an afterthought, but with that intent, then you must acquit, because no part of the house having been burnt, there was no beginning to destroy the house. If they came originally without such intent, but had afterwards set fire to the house, then the offence would be arson.

(z) Rex v. Thomas, MS. C. S. G. and 4 C. & P. 237 (19 E. C. L. R.), Littledale, J. See also Reg. v. Howell, 9 C. & P. 437 (38 E. C. L. R.).

(a) Rex v. Price, 5 C. & P. 510 (24 E. C. L. R.), Tindal, C. J. (b) Rex v. Batt, 6 C. & P. 329 (25 E. C. L. R.), Gurney, B.

If you have doubts whether they originally came with a purpose to demolish, you may use the setting fire to the furniture under such circumstances, and in such manner, as that the necessary consequence, if not for timely interference, would have been the burning of the house, as evidence to show that they had such *385] *intent, although they began to demolish in another manner.(c) Upon an indictment under the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, s. 8, for riotously and tumultuously assembling together, and beginning to demolish a house, the jury could not convict unless they were satisfied that the prisoners intended to leave the house no house at all in fact; for if they intended to leave it still a house, though in a state however dilapidated, they were not guilty of the offence. To have left off the work of devastation without interruption would lead to the inference that the prisoners did not intend to destroy the house; but even if they were interrupted, the question still remained, what was their ultimate intention? If they had been some time at their work of ruin before they were interrupted, it was for the jury to say, looking to the nature of the things which they had destroyed, whether their purpose was to demolish the house itself. (d)

Although setting fire to a house is a substantive felony, yet if fire is made the means of attempting to destroy a house, it is as much a beginning to demolish as if any other mode of destruction were resorted to, and the indictment may be for that offence, (e) for it is impossible that there can be any greater element of destruction than fire. Whether, therefore, the intention of the parties be to demolish or destroy by pulling down the materials of a house, or by reducing a house to a useless state for habitation by the agency of fire, the offence is completely the same.(ƒ) If a person forms part of a riotous assembly at the time the act of demolition commences, or if he wilfully joins such riotous assembly, so as to cooperate with them whilst the act of demolition is going on, and before it is completed, in either case he comes within the description of the offence, although he may not have assisted with his own hand in the demolition of the building.(g) Where a house was demolished by rioters by means of fire, which was lighted before one o'clock in the night, and there was no evidence to show that the prisoner was present at the time when the house was set on fire, but it was proved that he was there between two and three o'clock whilst the house was burning, and whilst the mob, who set it on fire, were still there; it was held that the prisoner was properly convicted as a principal. For although it was possible, if this had been an indictment for burning the house, that the prisoner could not have been convicted as a principal, yet this was an offence under an enactment that made it a felony if persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together to the disturbance of the public peace, and when so assembled destroy a house; therefore it was not simply the fact of destroying a house by fire, but it was the combined fact of riotously assembling together and whilst the riot continued demolishing the house. Now to make a party guilty of that he must be shown to be one of those who were present at the offence, or he could not be aiding and abetting. But as it was not only the burning, but also the *386] riotously assembling together, the whole of the prisoner's *conduct on that day was left to the jury; and it was distinctly left to them that unless they were satisfied that the prisoner had by his language excited the mob to the act which was the subject matter of the inquiry, and afterwards been present at it, he was not guilty.(h)

Where on an indictment under the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, s. 8, for feloniously demolishing a house, it appeared that some of the prisoners set fire to the house itself, and the others carried furniture out of the house and burnt it on the gravel walk in front of the house, the jury were directed that, in order to convict the latter, they must be satisfied they, being on the spot at the time, were taking such

(c) Ashton's case, 1 Lewin 296, Park, J.

(d) Reg. v. Adams, C. & M. 299 (41 E. C. L. R.), Coleridge, J.

(e) Reg. v. Simpson, C. & M. 669 (41 E. C. L. R.); Reg. v. Harris, C. & M. 661, Tindal, C. J., Parke, B., and Rolfe, B.

(f) Per Tindal, C. J., Reg. v. Harris, supra.

(g) Per Tindal, C. J., Bristol Special Commission, 5 C. & P. 265 (38 E. C. L. R.), note. (h) Reg. v. Simpson, C. & M. 669 (41 E. C. L. R.), Tindal, C. J., Parke, B., and Rolfe, B.

steps in the transaction that they might be said to have encouraged and assisted, and by their acts to have aided and abetted, in the object and design of destroying the house.(i)

Upon an indictment on the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, s. 8, for riotously and feloniously demolishing a house, it was a sufficient demolishing of the house if it were so far destroyed as to be no longer a house; and the fact that the rioters left the chimney standing made no difference.(k)

The 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, s. 8, not having given any definition of what should be a riot within the meaning of that enactment, the common law definition of a riot was resorted to, and in such a case, if any one of Her Majesty's subjects were terrified, this was a sufficient terror and alarm to substantiate that part of the charge.(1)

If persons riotously assembled and demolished a house, really believing that it was the property of one of them, and acted bona fide in the assertion of a supposed right, this was not a felonious demolition of the house within the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, s. 8, even though there were a riot.(m)

In order to prove that there was a beginning to demolish the house, it must be proved that some part of the freehold was destroyed; it is not therefore sufficient to prove that the window-shutters were demolished.(n)

The 33 Geo. 3, c. 67, s. 1, reciting that seamen, keelmen, &c., had of late assembled themselves in great numbers, and had committed many acts of violence; and that such practices, if continued, might occasion great loss and damage to individuals, and injure the trade and navigation of the kingdom, enacts, "that if any seamen, keelmen, casters, ship-carpenters, or other persons, riotously assembled together to the number of three or more, shall unlawfully and with force prevent, hinder, or obstruct, the loading or unloading, sailing or navigating, of any ship, keel, or other vessel, or shall unlawfully and with force board, any ship, keel, or other vessel, with intent to prevent, hinder, or obstruct, the loading or unloading, or the sailing or navigating of such ship, keel, or other vessel, every seaman, keelman, caster, ship-carpenter, and other person" (being lawfully convicted of any of the offences aforesaid *upon any indictment found in any court of oyer [*387 and terminer, or general or quarter sessions of the peace for the county, division, district, &c., wherein the offence was committed), shall be committed either to the common gaol or to the house of correction for the same county, &c., there to continue and to be kept to hard labor for any term not exceeding twelve calendar months, nor less than six calendar months. By sec. 4, the Act shall not extend to any act, deed, &c., done in the service or by the authority of his Majesty. By sec. 7, offences committed on the high seas shall be triable in session of oyer any and terminer, &c., for the trial of offences committed on the high seas within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty. And by sec. 8, the prosecution for any of the said offences is to be commenced within twelve calendar months after the offence committed.(0)

Women are punishable as rioters; but infants under the age of discretion are not.(P)

II. By some books the notion of a rout is confined to such assemblies only as are occasioned by some grievance common to all the company; as the enclosure of land in which they all claim a right of common, &c. But, according to the general opinion, it seems to be a disturbance of the peace by persons assembling together with an intention to do a thing, which, if it be executed, will make them rioters, and actually making a motion towards the execution of their purpose. In fact, it generally agrees in all the particulars with a riot, except only in this, that it may () Reg v. Harris, C. & M. 661 (41 E. C. L. R.), Tindal, C. J., Parke, B., and Rolfe, B. (k) Reg. v. Phillips, 2 M. C. C. 252; s. c. Reg. v. Langford, C. & M. 602. (2) Ibid.

(m) Ibid.

(n) Reg. v. Howell, 9 C. & P. 437 (38 E. C. L. R.), Littledale, J.

(0) This statute was made perpetual by 41 Geo. 3, c. 19.

(p) 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 65, s. 14; ante, 6, et seq. and 39. But an infant above the age of discretion is punishable; and, though under the age of eighteen, need not appear by guardian, but may appear by attorney: Reg v. Tanner, 2 Lord Raym. 1284.

be a complete offence without the execution of the intended enterprize (q) And it seems, by the recitals in several statutes, that if people assemble themselves, and afterwards proceed, ride, go forth, or move by instigation of one or several conducting them, this is a rout; inasmuch as they move and proceed in rout and number.(r)

III. An unlawful assembly, according to the common opinion, is a disturbance of the peace by persons barely assembling together with an intention to do a thing which, if it were executed, would make them rioters, but neither actually executing it nor making a motion towards its execution. Mr. Serjeant Hawkins, however, thinks this much too narrow an opinion; and that any meeting of great numbers of people with such circumstances of terror as cannot but endanger the public peace, and raise fears and jealousies among the King's subjects, seems properly to be called an unlawful assembly. As where great numbers complaining of a common grievance meet together, armed in a warlike manner, in order to consult together concerning the most proper means for the recovery of their interests; for no one can foresee what may be the event of such an assembly.(s) So in recent cases it has been ruled that an assembly of great numbers of persons, which *from *388] its general appearance and accompanying circumstances is calculated to excite terror, alarm, and consternation, is generally criminal and unlawful.(t) And it has been well laid down by a very learned judge, that " any meeting assembled under such circumstances as, according to the opinion of rational and firm men are likely to produce danger to the tranquillity and peace of the neighborhood, is an unlawful assembly: and viewing this question, the jury should take into their consideration the way in which the meetings were held, the hour at which they met, and the language used by the persons assembled, and by those who addressed them; and then consider whether firm and rational men, having their families and property there, would have reasonable ground to fear a breach of the peace, as the alarm must not be merely such as would frighten any foolish or timid person, but must be such as would alarm persons of reasonable firmness and courage."(u) And all persons who join an assembly of this kind, disregarding its probable effect and the alarm and consternation which are likely to ensue, and all who give countenance and support to it, are criminal parties.(v)

The difference between a riot and unlawful assembly is this: if the parties assemble in a tumultuous manner, and actually execute their purpose with violence, it is a riot; but if they merely meet upon a purpose which, if executed, would make them rioters, and having done nothing, they separate without carrying their purpose into effect, it is an unlawful assembly.(w)

An assembly of a man's friends for the defence of his person against those who threaten to beat him if he go to such a market, &c., is unlawful; for he who is in fear of such insults must provide for his safety by demanding the surety of the peace against the persons by whom he is threatened, and not make use of such violent methods, which cannot but be attended with the danger of raising tumults and disorders to the disturbance of the public peace. But an assembly of a man's friends in his own house, for the defence of the possession of it against such as threaten to make an unlawful entry, or for the defence of his person against such as threaten to beat him in his house, is indulged by law; for a man's house is

(g) 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 65, s. 8.

(r) 19 Vin. Abr. tit. Riots, &c. (A.) 2, referring to 18 Edw. 3, c. 1, 13 Hen. 4, c. ult., and 2 Hen. 5, c. 8.

(8) 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 65, s. 9. There may be an unlawful assembly if the people assemble themselves together for an ill purpose contra pacem, though they do nothing, Br. tit. Riots, pl. 4. Lord Coke speaks of an unlawful assembly as being when three or more assemble themselves together to commit a riot or rout, and do not do it: 3 Inst. 176.

(1) Per Bayley, J., in Rex v. Hunt, York Spring Assizes, 1820; and per Holroyd, J., in Redford v. Bierley, Lancaster Spring Assizes, 1822, 3 Stark. N. P. C. 76 (3 E. C. L. R.). (u) Reg. v. Vincent, 9 C. & P. 91 (38 E. C. L. R.), Alderson, B. See Reg. v. Neale, 9 C. & P. 431 (38 E. C. L. R.), Littledale, J.

(v) Per Holroyd, J., Redford v. Birley, supra.

(w) Per Patteson, J.; Rex v. Birt, 5 C. & P. 154 (24 E. C. L. R.).

looked upon as his castle.(x) He is not, however, to arm himself and assemble his friends in defence of his close.(y)

An assembly of persons to witness a prize fight is an unlawful assembly, and every one present and countenancing the fight is guilty of an offence.(z) Where sixteen persons, with their faces blackened, and armed with guns and sticks, met at a house at *night, intending to go out for the purpose of night poaching, [*389 Holroyd, J., held, that it was impossible that a meeting to go out with faces thus disguised, at night, and under such circumstances, could be other than an unlawful assembly.(a)

The conspiring of several persons to meet together for the purpose of disturbing the peace and tranquillity of the realm, of exciting discontent and disaffection, and of exciting the King's subjects to hatred of the government and constitution, may be prosecuted by an indictment for a conspiracy.(b)

Unlawful assemblies and seditious meetings having in many instances appeared to threaten the public tranquillity and the security of the government, several statutes have been passed for the purpose of their more immediate and effectual suppression.

The 1 Geo. 1, st. 2, c. 5, s. 1, reciting that many rebellious riots and tumults had been in divers parts of the kingdom, to the disturbance of the public peace and the endangering of his Majesty's person and government, and that the punishments provided by the laws then in being were not adequate to such heinous offences; for the preventing and suppressing such riots and tumults, and for the more speedy and effectual punishing the offenders, enacts, "that if any persons to the number of twelve or more, being unlawfully, riotously, and tumultuously assembled together, to the disturbance of the public peace, and being required or commanded by any one or more justice or justices of the peace, or by the sheriff of the county, or his under-sheriff, or by the mayor, bailiff or bailiffs, or other head officer, or justice of the peace of any city or town corporate, where such assembly shall be, by proclamation to be made in the King's name, in the form hereinafter directed, to disperse themselves, and peaceably to depart to their habitations or to their lawful business, shall, to the number of twelve or more (notwithstanding such proclamation made) unlawfully, riotously, and tumultuously remain or continue together by the space of one hour after such command or request made by proclamation, that then such continuing together to the number of twelve or more, after such command or request made by proclamation, shall be adjudged felony without benefit of clergy, and the offenders therein shall be adjudged felons, and shall suffer death as in case of felony without benefit of clergy." (c)

Sec. 2, the justice of the peace, or other person authorized by the Act to make the proclamation, shall, among the said rioters, or as near to them as he can safely come, with a loud voice command, or cause to be commanded, silence to be while proclamation is making, and after that shall openly and with loud voice make, or cause to be made, proclamation in these words, or like in effect:-" Our sovereign lord the King chargeth and commandeth all persons being assembled, immediately. to disperse themselves, and peaceably to depart to their habitations, or to their lawful business, upon the pains contained in the Act made in the first year of King George, for preventing tumults and riotous assemblies. God save the King." And every justice, *sheriff, &c., within the limits of their respective jurisdictions, are authorized and required, on notice or knowledge of any such unlawful [*390 assembly of twelve or more persons, to resort to the place, and there to make or cause such proclamation to be made.

(z) 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 65, ss. 9, 10; 19 Vin. Abr. tit. Riots, &c. (A.) 5, 6. And by Holt, C. J., in Reg. v. Soley, 11 Mod. 116, though a man may ride with arms, yet he cannot take two with him to defend himself, even though his life is threatened; for he is in the protection of the law, which is sufficient for his defence.

(y) By Heath, J., Rex v. The Bishop of Bangor, Shrewsbury Summer Ass. 1796.

(2) Rex v. Billingham, 2 C. & P. 234 (12 E. C. L. R.), Burrough, J. See Rex v. Perkins,

4 C. & P. 537 (19 E. C. L. R.), per Patteson, J.

(a) Rex v. Brodribb, 6 C. & P. 571 (25 E. C. L. R.), ante, p. 187.

(b) Rex v. Hunt, 3 B. & A. 566 (5 E. C. L. R.).

(c) See post, p. 391, as to the present punishment.