Page images
PDF
EPUB

been very great; and, in that of Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell and other officers, whose names are therein included, greatly to be regretted.1

A MEMORANDUM ON THE BATTLE OF ASSYE.

(Subsequently transmitted.)

3

1. The information which we obtain regarding the position of an enemy whom we intend to attack is in general very imperfect. We cannot send out Natives in the Company's service, who, from long habit, might be able to give an accurate account, because they, being inhabitants of the Carnatic, or Mysore, are as well known in this part of the country as if they were Europeans ; and we cannot view their positions ourselves, till we can5 bring up the main body of our armies, because the enemy are always surrounded by immense bodies of horse. The consequence is, that we are obliged to employ, as hircarrahs, the natives of the country, and to trust to their reports.

2. All the hircarrahs reported that the enemy's camp, which I had concerted with Colonel Stevenson to attack,8 was at Bokerdun. I was to attack their left, where we knew the infantry was posted; and Colonel Stevenson their right. Their camp, however, instead of being at Bokerdun, had its right to that village, and extended above six miles to 10 Assye, where was its left: it was all 11 in the

[blocks in formation]

district of Bokerdun, which was the cause of the mistake.

3. My march of the 23rd was so directed as that 2 I should be within twelve or fourteen miles of the enemy's camp on that day,3 which I supposed to be at Bokerdun. Instead of that, by the extension of their line to the eastward, I found myself within six miles of them. I there received intelligence that they were going off; at all events, whether they were about to go or to stay, I must have reconnoitred.6 I could not have reconnoitred' with

out taking the whole of my small force; and, when I got near them, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to retire in front of their numerous cavalry. But I determined to attack them, as I really believed the intelligence I received at Naulniah to be true.10

4. When I found the intelligence I received at Naulniah was false, that I had their whole army in my front,11 and that they had a most formidable position, three or four times my number of infantry only,12 and a vast quantity of cannon,13 I deliberated whether I should withdraw, and attack on the following morning, according to the plan.

5. The consequence of my withdrawing 14 would have been, that I should have been followed to Naulniah by their cavalry, and possibly should have found it difficult

1 See page 28, note 10, and page 117, note 14. We also use causer (to cause, to occasion): être la cause de, &c., may, however, be used, and the rule 10 of page 28 is not absolute in this case; but, before que, the article must be left out, as, vous êtes cause que je me suis brûlé les doigts (I have burnt my fingers through you '). 'which; see page 7, note 17.

2 so as that,' de telle façon que. 3 See page 14, note 5, and page 22, note 7. -'within,' à environ.

There I received (page 254, note 1) intelligence.' intelligence,' avis, in this sense, preceded by no article.

5 de toute manière.

6 il m'aurait fallu reconnaître (or, faire une reconnaissance). 7 See page 44, note 2, and page 38, note 3: Observe that 'could' is here conditional (for 'should be able'), not imperfect indicative (for was able') as at page 38, note 3.

8 Use the compound of the conditional. to get,' here, arriver.

en face. 10 Simply, sur la foi des renseignements que j avais reçus à N—. en face de moi.

...

12 une infanterie seule (or,
à elle seule) trois ou quatre fois plus
forte que la mienne.

13 Use the plural.
14 See page 21, note 3.

to get there. They would have harassed me all that day; and, as I had only ground fortified by myself to secure my baggage in, it was ten to one whether I should not have lost a part of it during the attack on the following morning; and, at all events, I should have been obliged to leave more than one battalion to secure it. During the attack of the 23rd, the enemy did not know where the baggage was: and, although it was so close to them, they never went near it.2

6. Besides this, on the other hand, there was a chance, indeed 3 a certainty, that the enemy would hear that Colonel Stevenson also would move upon them on the 24th, and would withdraw their infantry and guns in the night. I therefore determined to make the attack.

7. The plan concerted, you will observe,5 failed, from the deficiency of our information regarding the enemy's position, and, consequently, my coming too near them on the 23rd, with my camp, baggage, &c.

8. The enemy's first position was as shown in the plan. The Kaitna is a river with steep banks, impassable for carriages everywhere, excepting at Peepulgaum and Waroor. I determined, from the ground on which the cavalry was first formed, to attack the enemy's left flank and rear, and to cross the river at Peepulgaum. I intended at that time to throw my right up to9 Assye.

9. For a length of time10 they did not see my infantry, orll discover my design. When they did discover it, they altered their position, and threw their left up to Assye,

1 'myself,' moi. - 'in;' leave out this word.-'it was ten,' &c., il y avait dix à parier contre un que j'aurais perdu.

2 Simply, auprès.

7 à, followed by no article.Notice this use of d, instead of avec in the same way we say, un homme à cheveux blancs, l'Homme au masque de fer, la Poule aux

3 je dirai même.-Construct, it œufs d'or, &c.-If, however, the was likely, indeed certain.'

'to give.'

5 remarquez-le bien.-'to fail,' here, échouer.-'from;' see page 137, note 6.

6such as it is (se trouve,-to avoid the awkward repetition of être) indicated on.'

Kaitna has high as well as steep banks, the French epithet for it will be rivière encaissée.

8 See page 126, note 17.
9 to throw up to,' porter jus-
qu'à.

10 Pendant assez longtemps.
11 See page 42, note 8.

and formed across the ground between the Kaitna and Assye; but in more than one line. Luckily, they did not occupy the ford at Peepulgaum : if they had,2 I must have gone lower down; and possibly I should have been obliged to make a road across the river, which 5 would have taken so much time, that I should not have had day enough for the attack.

4

10. When I saw that they had got their left to Assye, I altered my plan; and determined to manoeuvre by my left, and push the enemy upon the nullah, knowing that the village of Assye must fall when the right should be beat. Orders were given accordingly.

6

8

11. However, by one of those unlucky accidents which frequently happen, the officer commanding the piquets, which were upon the right, led immediately up to the village of Assye: the 74th regiment, which was on the right of the second line, and was ordered to support 9 the piquets, followed them. There was a large break in our line 10 between these corps and thosell on the left. They were exposed to a most terrible 12 cannonade from 18 Assye, and were charged by the cavalry belonging to the campoos; consequently, in the piquets and the 74th regiment, we sustained the greatest part of our loss.15 One company of the piquets, of one officer and fifty rank and file,16 lost the officer and forty-four rank and file. This company belonged to the battalion left at Naulniah.

14

1 'on the ground which separates the K- from A-.''

2 Supply the ellipsis, which, as we have repeatedly seen above, is not allowed in French.

3 il m'aurait fallu (or, j'aurais été obligé de-j'aurais eu à) descendre plus bas. See page 44, note 2, and page 38, note 3. chemin.

5 See page 7, note 17.

6 Use the imperfect tense. 7' who commanded.'

8 and which; see page 56, note 3.-' was ordered; turn, had order-or, the order' (page 21,

[blocks in formation]

6

12. Another bad 1 consequence resulting from this mistake was, the necessity of introducing the cavalry into the action at too early a period.2 I had ordered it to watch the motions of the enemy's cavalry hanging upon our right; and, luckily, it charged in time to save the remains of the 74th, and the piquets. It was thus brought into the cannonade; horses and men were lost it charged among broken infantry, and separated; the unity of the body was lost, and it was no longer possible to use it, as I had intended' when I placed it in the third line, to pursue and cut up the defeated and broken enemy, and thus makes the victory still more complete than it was. 9

13. As I had foreseen, the corps at Assye was not defeated till worked upon 10 by the centre and left of our line, notwithstanding the movement of the piquets, the 74th, and the cavalry; and then it went off directly, and was cut up.

N.B. The Juah river, or nullah, has steep banks, impassable for carriages, scarcely passable for horses.

[merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small]
« EelmineJätka »