WIFE'S REVERSIONARY INTERESTS.

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but this power does not extend to any reversionary interest which she is restricted from alienating, nor does it enable her to dispose of any interest in personal estate settled upon her by any settlement, or agreement for a settlement, made on the occasion of her marriage.*

There is reason to fear that the next step will be an attempt to repeal the exception, and make the power of alienation extend to all interests. Such a power would lead to constant disputes between husband and wife. Upon any pressure, the husband would call upon her to sell her reversion to assist him, and creditors knowing of the settlement and of the power of alienation, would refuse to show any indulgence unless the wife pledged her reversion for her husband's debts. Many a woman, anxiously provided for by an affectionate father, would be left penniless at her husband's death, when probably her father was no longer alive to assist her. The Act already passed must give great satisfaction to purchasers of reversions, and particularly to companies expressly formed for the purchase of reversionary interests. In providing for your daughter by your will, you can guard against the operation of the Act by making the provision inalienable. Of course the observation applies only to interests in reversion, as far as the Act operates. In other cases you may restrict your daughter from alienation or not, just as you think proper.

* 20 & 21 Vict., c. 57.

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NEW COURT OF DIVORCE.

LETTER XII.

As you desire to know something of the new law of Divorce, and as it affects the rights of property, I will now comply with your wish.

A new court, with high judicial officers, is created to adjudicate on divorce and matrimonial causes in England.* Judicial separation is a new term introduced for the old divorce a mensa et thoro. Either the husband or the wife may obtain a judicial separation on the ground of adultery, or cruelty, or desertion without cause for two years or upwards. And such separation, or a restitution of conjugal rights, may be granted by the Court, or by a Judge of Assize, or counsel named in the commission, and appointed by him; but any order by a Judge of Assize or counsel may be reviewed by appeal to the Judge Ordinary of the Court. Decrees for judicial separation may, for sufficient cause, be reversed by the Court when obtained in the absence of the party applying.

The Court can direct the husband to pay alimonythat is, an allowance to the wife for her support; and if he do not pay it, he may be sued for necessaries supplied to her. She becomes, after the judicial separation, and whilst it continues, a feme sole (a single woman) with respect to property of every description which she may acquire, or which may devolve upon her; and if.

20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, which has come into operation.

JUDICIAL SEPARATION AND

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she die intestate, it will go as if her husband had been then dead. In case of re-cohabitation, the property will continue to be her separate estate, unless some agreement in writing be made between them whilst separate. During the separation she may, as a single woman, enter into contracts, and sue and be sued-and this is a liability which she should keep in view; and her husband will not be liable for her debts or acts. But they may execute any joint power given to them.

I must postpone for a moment stating the other incidents of a judicial separation, whilst I point out to you the cases in which the marriage may be dissolved; and here you will observe that for well-considered reasons the remedies are not reciprocal. The husband may obtain a divorce dissolving the marriage upon the simple fact of his wife's adultery. The wife can obtain such a divorce only where the husband has been guilty of incestuous adultery, or of bigamy with adultery, or of rape, or of foul crimes-for which I must refer you to the statute, and the insertion of which I endeavoured in vain to keep out of the statute-or of adultery coupled with such cruelty as would have entitled her to a divorce a mensa et thoro, or of adultery coupled with desertion, without reasonable excuse, for two years or upwards. If the case is proved, and the Court shall not find that the petitioner has been in any manner accessory to or conniving at the adultery of the other party to the marriage, or has condoned (or forgiven) the adultery, or that there is collusion with either of the respondents, the marriage is to be dissolved by decree. But the Court is not bound to pronounce such decree (observe, it is not said that the Court may not) if it shall find that the petitioner has, during the marriage, been guilty of adultery, or shall, in the opinion of the Court, have been guilty of

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DIVORCES BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE:

unreasonable delay in seeking redress, or of cruelty towards the other party, or of having deserted or wilfully separated himself or herself from the other party before the adultery complained of, and without reasonable excuse, or of such wilful neglect or misconduct as has conduced to the adultery. This provision, therefore, applies equally to the husband and wife. The petition will be dismissed if the petitioner has been accessory to or conniving at the adultery of the other party, or has condoned (or forgiven) the adultery, or there is collusion with either of the respondents.

The Court has power to make interim orders for payment of alimony for the wife, and ultimately to suspend the divorce until the husband has made a proper provision for her.

The husband must, it seems, in every case make the alleged adulterer a co-respondent to his petition, unless the Court excuse him. The wife, in applying for a dissolution of the marriage, may be ordered to make the person with whom the husband is alleged to have committed adultery a respondent. Any of the parties may insist upon having the contested matters of fact tried by a jury. In every case, the petitioner must by affidavit verify the facts so far as he or she is able to do so, and deny collusion. And the Court may examine the petitioner-husband or wife-on oath; but they are not bound to answer any question tending to show that he or she has been guilty of adultery.

There are some important remedies applicable to all cases. As to children, the Court may make such interim or final orders as it may deem just, with respect to their custody, maintenance, and education, and may direct them to be made wards of the Court of Chancery. This is interfering with a strong hand with the parental rights of the father. Where the wife is the guilty

CHILDREN: RIGHT TO MARRY AGAIN.

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party, the Court may order a settlement of her property, either in possession or reversion, for the benefit of the innocent party, and of the children of the marriage, or any of them. This is as powerful an interference with the wife's right of property.

When a decree for dissolving the marriage has become final, the respective parties may marry again as if the prior marriage had been dissolved by death. But no clergyman of the United Church of England and Ireland is compellable to marry any person whose former marriage has been dissolved on the ground of his or her adultery. But in case of his refusal, when but for such refusal the persons would be entitled to have the service performed in his church or chapel, the minister is to permit the marriage to be solemnised in his church or chapel by any other minister in holy orders entitled to officiate within the diocese. The right to marry again could not in my opinion have been denied to the parties, although it was strongly opposed, and is still objected to by a body of the clergy. The desire not to impose upon the clergy a duty which might be contrary to their conscientious feelings, induced the Legislature to excuse those who objected, from performing the marriage ceremony, thus making a law which of course was not deemed inconsistent with the laws of God or man, and yet excusing the clergy who were to give effect to it from obeying it a dangerous precedent, and the exemption has not given satisfaction to the class in whose favour it was introduced. The substitute provided, where a clergyman declines to officiate, is well calculated to lead to disunion between neighbouring clergymen, and ought, as it appeared to many, never to have found its place in our statute law; but still the law should be obeyed.

A remedy has been provided, but not without