a gentleman, living in Berkley-street, Portman-square, and a man of opulence; but in fact there was no person of that name living there. The prisoner having been found guilty, the case was submitted to the consideration of the twelve judges, who determined that judgment ought to be arrested on the ground that the bill did not in fact purport to be directed to one John King, as stated in the indictment. Buller, J., in delivering the opinion of the judges, said, "it is clear that where an instrument is to be set forth, the description that it purports a particular fact, necessarily means that what is stated as the purport of the instrument appears on the face of the instrument itself. On the face of the bill of exchange in the present case (and the face of the bill is the only thing to be considered) nothing more appears, when we examine the averment, than that it is a bill of exchange drawn by John White on John Ring; therefore, when the indictment says that it was drawn on John King, by the name and description of John Ring, it is absurd and repugnant to itself, for the name and description of one thing cannot purport to be another thing. The drawer of the indictment was led into this blunder by not considering what was the original state of the bill, and what was the appearance of it after the acceptance was put on it; it seems as if he did not recollect under what terms, or by whom, a bill of exchange may be accepted. Though the bill was drawn on Joha Ring, it might have been accepted by John King, for a bill may be accepted by other persons than those to whom it is directed, as when it is accepted for the honor of the drawer, or of any of the indorsers."(u)3

In a case which occurred shortly afterwards, the prisoner was indicted for forging "a paper writing, purporting to be an order for payment of money, dated 11th September, 1794, with the name Thomas Exon thereunto subscribed, purporting to have been signed by Thos. Exon, clerk, and to be directed to George Lord Kinnaird, Wm. Moreland, and Thos. Hammersley, of, &c., *bankers and part

*805] ners, by the name and description of Messrs. Ransom, Moreland, and Ham

mersley, for the payment of the sum of £10, &c. ;" the tenor of which said false writing, &c., is as follows, viz. :

"Messrs. Ransom, Moreland, and Hammersley, please to pay to Mr. Brooks, or bearer, the sum of Ten Pounds, for

"Sept. 11th, 1794"

"THOS. EXON.

with intent to defraud the said Geo. Ld. K., &c. There was a second count, for uttering it; and other counts, charging an intent to defraud other persons. An objection was made in arrest of judgment, that the direction of the bill was improperly described in the indictment; and ten of the judges who met to consider the case, were unanimously of opinion that the judgment should be arrested, on the ground that the word purport imports what appears on the face of the instrument, the apparent and not the legal import; and that the bill in question could not purport to be directed to Lord Kinnaird, because his name did not appear upon the face of it. Buller, J., in delivering their opinion, said, "Old cases have given rise to much learning and argument on the words 'purport' and 'tenor,' and the books are full of distinctions as to the meaning of these words, and the necessity of using the one or the other of them in indictments where written instruments are to be stated; but among the many cases upon this subject, I can find no judicial determination that the purport and the tenor should both be stated in any case whatever. Purport means the substance of an instrument, as it appears on the face of it to every eye that reads it; tenor means an exact copy of it; and, therefore, where an

(u) Reading's case, 2 Leach 590; 2 East P. C. c. 19, s. 56, p. 981. Buller, J., also said, that as the opinion of the judges proceeded merely on the informality of the record, the prisoner might be again indicted for this offence. But no other indictment was preferred: and after remaining in custody till March, 1794, he received a free pardon, and was discharged, 2 Leach 593.

1 Where an indictment alleged that a forged certificate purported to be signed by Bowling Starke, and the signature was B. Starke, and the true name was Bolling Starke; the variance was held to be fatal: Comm. v. Kearns, 1 Virg. Cases 109.

805 instrument is stated according to its tenor, the purport of it must necessarily appear. The forms of indictments for forgery have varied, and been different from each other at different periods of time; and of late years they have been much more complicated than they were formerly; and, in my opinion, they have been, for that reason, much worse. I have seen the precedent of an indictment of forgery stating, 'the prisoner to have forged a certain false paper writing, in the name of J. S. and others, bearing the form of a warrant of attorney, which said writing follows in these words; that is to say, &c.,' setting it out verbatim; and if indictments for forgery were now merely to state that the prisoner 'forged a paper writing to the tenor and effect following, &c.,' and the instrument set out appeared on the face of it to be a bond or bill of exchange, or any other of the instruments described in the statute, I should, as at present advised, see no objection to such a form.(v) If, in the present case, the indictment had stated that the prisoner had forged a certain paper writing, in the name of T. Exon,(w) purporting to be a bill of exchange, and then set out the bill to the tenor and effect following, it would, I think, have been quite enough; for the words 'purporting to be a bill of exchange,' are only necessary to show that the instrument supposed to be forged is one of the instruments mentioned [*806 in the statute; and, in order to show that it is one of those instruments, it cannot be necessary under the word 'purporting to recite all the contents of the instrument; for an exact copy of the instrument itself being set forth, all its contents thereby appear; and the law requires an exact copy of the instrument to be inserted in the indictment, in order that the court may see that the instrument is the subject of forgery within the meaning of the statute. The blunder in the present indictment seems to have arisen from the circumstance of Lord Kinnaird and Messrs. Moreland and Hammersley carrying on the banking business under the firm of Messrs. Ransom, Moreland, and Hammersley. The pleader who drew it, forgetting that it was wholly immaterial whether such a firm as Ransom, Moreland, and Hammersley ever existed, or who were the persons who constituted that firm, and conceiving it to be material that the names of the real partners interested in the business should be mentioned, has taken great pains to show that a bill, drawn on 'Ransom, Moreland, and Hammersley,' was drawn on Lord Kinnaird, Moreland, and Hammersley;' and in order to do that, he has averred in the indictment that the bill purports to be drawn on Lord Kinnaird, Moreland, and Hammersley.' But the purport of an instrument, as I have already observed, is that alone which appears on the face of it; and on the face of this bill, Lord Kinnaird's name does not appear, and therefore the averment is not true."(x)

This doctrine was again acted upon in a case where the indictment charged the prisoner with forging a certain paper writing, purporting to be an inland bill of exchange, and to be drawn by one C. W. Wright, bearing date, Winchester, 14th Nov., 1796, and to be directed to Richard Down, Henry Thornton, John Freer, and John Cornwall the younger, bankers, London, by the name and description of Messrs. Down, Thornton, and Co., bankers, London, requiring them, ten days after date, to pay to Mr. Wm. Simmons or order £8 108., &c., and then setting out the tenor, by which the bill appeared, as the fact really was, to be directed, "Messrs. Down, Thornton & Co.," bankers, London.(y)

In a case which occurred about the same time, the indictment, which was for forging a scrip receipt, charged that the prisoner forged it "with the name C. Olier thereunto subscribed, purporting to have been signed by one Christopher Olier;" and it was objected that this must necessarily be bad, as C. Olier "did not, on the face of it, purport to be Christopher Olier, but might be Charles, &c. ;" but the court thought that this case differed in some degree from the two cases cited in support

(e) But see Rex v. Wilcox, ante, p. 798.

(w) But it would not have been good to have averred that the paper writing was signed by T. Exon, such signature being a forgery, and the paper, therefore, not in fact so signed. See Carter's case, ante, p. 801.

(z) Gilchrist's case, East T. 1795; 2 Leach 657; 2 East P. C. c. 19, s. 56, p. 982.

(y) Edsall's case, 2 East P. C. c. 19, s. 56, p. 984; 2 Leach 662, note (a). In East P. C. Ibid., it is said that the judges held the indictment bad, upon the authority of Gilchrist's case, though Buller, J., disapproved much of that determination, which, however, be admitted could not be distinguished from the present case.

of the objection, namely, Jones's case,(z) and Gilchrist's case; (a) inasmuch as the note in Jones's case did not purport to be a bank note, and, therefore, the indictment, charging that it did so purport, was bad; and in Gilchrist's case, as the name *807] of Lord Kinnaird did not appear on the face of the bill, it could not purport to be directed to him; but that, in the present case, this scrip receipt being subscribed with the name C. Olier, and the indictment charging that it purported to be signed in the name of Christopher Olier, a cashier of the Bank of England, it was not, upon the face of it, repugnant to the bill, or inconsistent with itself. (b)

We have already considered the purpose of fraud and deceit, to the prejudice of another's right, which makes a part of the definition of forgery.(c) Such purpose or intent to defraud must formerly have been stated in the indictment, and pointed at the particular person or persons against whom it is meditated. (d)

In stating this intent to defraud, it was, however, sufficient to describe the party intended to be defrauded with reasonable certainty.

Where after conviction a motion was made in arrest of judgment that the indictment charged the forged order as being drawn on Messrs. Drummond and Company, Charing Cross, by the name of Mr. Drummond, Charing Cross,(e) instead of mentioning the names of the respective partners, which ought to have been inserted in the place of the short description Drummond and Company, all the judges held that the indictment was good. They were of opinion that, if the words, "Messrs. Drummond and Company, Charing Cross," when taken together, had been so senseless and unintelligible as not to import a certain description of persons, the indictment would have been bad; but they said that, understanding those words as every body else did, namely, as meaning the partners in the partnership of the banking-house, they considered them as a sensible and certain pointing out of the persons intended by the draft, and as conveying with legal certainty a notification of the party intended to be defrauded. That it was not necessary in this part of the indictment to describe the party meant with more particularity; for, if any person could be intended from the words, who that person was, and whether he was the meditated object of the fraud, were matters for the consideration of the jury.(ƒ)

*808] Thus, where it was objected, on a motion in arrest of judgment, that it was not averred that T. Barrow, whose name appeared to be signed to the forged receipt, meant Taylor Barrow (with intent to defraud whom the forgery was laid in one of (z) Ante, p. 762.

*It was holden not to be necessary to state in the indictment the manner in which the party was to have been defrauded.

(a) Ante, note (x).

(b) Reeves's case, cor. Heath and Lawrence, J., and Thomson, B.; 2 Leach 808, 814; 2 East P. C. c. 19, s. 56, p. 984. The point was saved for the consideration of the twelve judges; but it does not appear what their opinion was, there being other objections to the conviction of the prisoner, who was afterwards tried and capitally convicted on another indictment pending for the same offence.

(c) Ante, p. 709, et seq.

(d) 2 East P. C. c. 19, s. 58, p. 988. Mr. Drummond, Charing Cross.

(e) The order was in the following form :

25 August, 1782. Please to pay the bearer, or order, on demand, £10 10s., and place it to account, per me, H. H. ASTON.

(f) Lovell's case, 1 Leach 248; East P. C. c. 19, s. 60, p. 990. It should be observed that those counts of the indictment which stated the intent to defraud Messrs. Drummond and Co., laid such intent in the concluding parts of the counts to be to defraud Robert Drummond, and the other partners in the house, by name. But that which Gould, J., is reported to have said (2 East P. C. Ibid.), would seem to lead to the conclusion that it is not necessary to specify the names of the partners in any part of the count, viz.: “That to require the particularising of all the partners would be of dangerous consequence to such prosecutions; some of them might not be known." With respect to the statement in that part of the indictment which came in question in Lovell's case, it appears to have been the opinion of Buller, J., and the other judges, that if the words "Messrs. Drummond and Company, Charing Cross," had been omitted, and the indictment had only stated, according to the fact, that the bill was directed to "Mr. Drummond, Charing Cross," ante, note (e), it would have been sufficient: 2 East P. C. c. 19, s. 60, p. 991. And see now 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 14, as to the description of partners.

the counts), that the manner in which the forged receipt of stock was to operate in prejudice of Mr. Barrow ought to have been averred in the indictment, by a statement of T. Barrow being a proprietor of so much stock, and being personated by the prisoner, who transferred it, &c.; and that it was not sufficient merely to state that the forgery was committed with intent to defraud T. B. generally; the judges held that it was sufficient if the offence was described in the words of the Act; and that, whether it were or were not meant to defraud T. Barrow, was matter of evidence.(g)

And in another case, where Buller, J., upon a conference with the rest of the judges, stated, as an objection to an indictment, that it was not alleged that the bill was uttered or tendered to the persons whom it was laid the prisoner meant to defraud; and, therefore, that it did not appear to the court, on the face of the indictment, that those persons could be defrauded by the transaction, which always appeared where the name of a drawer, acceptor, or indorser was forged; all the other judges held that the indictment was good in this respect, as it was sufficient to pursue the words of the Act, which constitute the offence; and it was matter of evidence, whether the prisoner intended to defraud the persons named by tendering the bill in payment to them, or how otherwise.(h)

The following case relates to the property of the party against whom the intent to defraud is aimed, in the moneys, &c., sought to be obtained by the forgery.1

Jones and Palmer were indicted for the forgery of an indenture of apprenticeship, and also of a receipt for money, with intent to defraud A. B., C. D., &c., the stewards of the feast of the sons of the clergy. The charitable fund of the sons of the clergy was raised by voluntary contributions, and allotted by the secretary equally among all the stewards, to be disposed of by them to the widows and children of deceased clergymen, according to their discretion; the prisoner Jones was a clergyman's widow, and pretending, by means of the indentures in question, and the receipt indorsed thereon, that she had placed her son as an apprentice, she obtained, in concert with the other prisoner, an order from one of the stewards, on the treasurer of the society, for 207, as an apprentice-fee. The prisoners, having been found guilty, it was submitted that the offence amounted only to a misdemeanor at common law, and that this was not such a species of property *as fell within any of the Acts relating to forgery. But Eyre, B., said, that [*809 the several stewards were the absolute owners of their respective shares of the fund; that it was their money, put into their hands upon a trust; and if they had sunk it improperly, or paid it wrongfully, they would perhaps be answerable; and that unquestionably it was their money, as against all the world, except the subscribers. (i) With respect to the statement of partners, trustees, &c, the provision in the 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 14, has been already introduced, and it is sufficient to refer to it, and the decisions on it which have been already stated.(j)

Where a member of a friendly society was indicted for uttering a warrant for the payment of money with intent to defraud J. C. (a member of the society)" and others;" Erle, J., held that the word "others" would include or exclude the prisoner according as it was necessary to include or exclude him in order to support the indictment.(k)

Where the prisoner was indicted for forging a receipt for county rate; which had

(9) Powell's case, 2 East P. C. c. 19, s. 59, p. 989; 1 Leach 77. In East, a further ground for the opinion of the judges is thus stated: "Besides, there was a second count, wherein the offence was laid with intent to defraud one Sykes. If, therefore, there was no such person as Taylor Barrow, or if he had no stock; yet as the receipt had in form the constituent parts of a receipt for the transfer of East India stock, that was sufficient." (h) Elsworth's case, 2 East P. C. e. 19, s. 59, p. 989, and s. 58, p. 986.

(i) Rex v. Jones, 1 Leach 366; 2 East P. C. c. 19, s. 60, p. 991.

(j) Harrison's case, 1 Leach 180; 2 East P. C. c. 19, s. 59, p. 988. The statutes referred to were repealed by the 1 Will. 4, c. 66, s. 31.

(k) Reg. v. Tuberville, 4 Cox C. C. 13. See this case, post.

1 An indictment for forging a deed, need not set forth the interest of the person alleged to be defrauded in the land conveyed; it is sufficient if it appear that by possibility the party may be defrauded: West v. State, 2 N. J. 212.

VOL. II.-40

been paid out of the poor rate of a parish, it was held that a count laying the intent to be to defraud one of the parishioners, by name," and others," was good.()

We have seen that certain provisions are made as to the mode of framing indictments in cases of certain stock banks by the 7 Geo. 4, c. 46.(m) and that it is not imperative upon the banking companies formed under that Act to prosecute in the name of one of their public officers.(n)

Where one count of an indictment alleged the intent to be to defraud “Robert Bell and others," who were shareholders in a joint stock bank, in which the prisoner was also a shareholder; Patteson, J., was inclined to think that it would not be safe to convict upon that count.(0) The 3 & 4 Vict. c. 111, seems, however, to do away with any doubt in such a case.(p)

If the indictment proceeds upon a statute, the charge must, in general, be set forth (according to the established rule applicable as well to other cases as to forgery) in the very words of the statute describing the offence.(q)

But an indictment for forging a stamp on foreign muslins, which stated the duty to be chargeable for, on, and in respect of, foreign muslin, was holden good; though the words of the statute in the clause imposing the duty were, for and upon; in other clauses, for; in others, on; and in others, upon.(r)

It is said that a superfluous description does not appear to be objectionable.(s) And a case is cited where, upon an indictment on the 2 Geo. 2, c. 25, for *810] forging, "a bond and writing obligatory," it was objected that, as the statute uses the term bond as well as the term writing obligatory, the indictment ought to have described the offence more particularly, either as a forgery of the one or the other; that it should have described the instrument in this case as a writing obligatory, as it had neither a defeasance nor penalty annexed to it; and that, although a bond were a writing obligatory, yet the converse did not hold; but by the opinion of the judges the indictment was holden good.(t) With respect to the inference from this case, that a superflous description does not appear to be objectionable, a learned writer says that he is by no means satisfied that the term bond is not properly applicable to an obligation without a condition, although for the sake of distinction, it is more usually called a single bill.(u)

Where an indictment charged the prisoner with having forged "a certain warrant and order for the payment of money," which was as follows:

"Worcester Old Bank, Hanbury Hall, Nov. 28, 1828. "Messrs. Berwick, Wall, Isaac, and Lechmere, pay to Mr. John Perkins or bearer twenty-five pounds ten shillings.

"£25 10s. Od.

"JOHN PHILLIPS”—

it was held that the indictment was good, for the instrument was both a warrant and order; a warrant authorizing the banker to pay, and an order upon him to do so.(r) On an indictment for forging "a certain warrant and order for the payment of money," which was as follows:

"Messrs. Wilkins & Co., Bankers, Merthyr, please to advance the bearers, Samuel Richards the sum of two hundred and fifty pounds, and place the same to my

account.

"MORGAN THOMAS, "Cold Merchant, Uniscoy"

(1) Reg. v. Vaughan, 8 C. & P. 276 (34 E. C. L. R.), Gurney, B. (m) Ante, p. 306.

(0) Reg. v. Cooke, 8 C. & P. 586 (34 E. C. L. R.). (g) 2 East P. C. c. 19, s. 58, p. 985.

(n) Ante, p. 307.
(p) Ante, p. 308.

(r) Rex. v. Hall, 2 East P. C. c. 19, s. 19, p. 895, and s. 58, p. 988, post, Chap. Of Forging. &c., Stamps; and an indictment at common law was holden bad for uncertainty, which stated that the defendant forged, or caused to be forged, a bill of lading: Rex r. Stocker, 5 Mod. 137; 1 Salk. 342, 371; and see Walcot's case, Holt's R. 345.

(8) 2 East P. C. c. 19, s. 58, p. 985.

(t) Dunnett's case, 2 East P. C. c. 19, s. 58, p. 985.

(u) 6 Ev. Col. Stat. Pt. V. Cl. xii. p. 481. And he refers to 2 Black. Com. 340.

(v) Rex v. Crowther, C. & P. 316 (24 E. C. L. R.), MS. C. S. G. Bosanquet, J. And see Reg. v. Gilchrist, C. & M. 224 (41 E. C. L. R.), post.