whatever loss that interest may sustain. If the value of his interest exceeds the sum insured, the excess of interest is said to be "uncovered by the policy," and the assured to be "his own insurer to that extent." When the liability of the underwriter commences under the contract, the technical mode of expressing this is by saying that "the policy attaches," or "the risk begins to run,' from that time. pli d might M. C Ship. of interest unnecessary WHAT things are insurable, considered in themselves, and irrespective of their owners, is the first practical question, and naturally falls to be considered here, the first in order. The ship was probably not the earliest subject covered by this contract. Important and indispensable though it be to commerce, it is yet no more than subservient and therefore secondary to the purpose of commercial intercourse, the distribution, namely, among distant nations of the products of nature and skill. Merchandise, therefore, in its importance as the chief thing in view is not unlikely to have been the earliest in course of time of the subjects underwritten by the insurer, yet the ship would soon follow as a subject of insurance; and all the sooner that in those times the merchant was also the shipowner uniting in himself the interests of both, and preventing those jealousies that might have arisen if these interests had already appeared divided and conflicting. The term ship, technically taken, designates a particular policy on ship, species of sea-going vessel, square-rigged throughout, which What is covered by carries three masts with tops and yards to each of them. It has also a generic sense, as designating a vessel of burden, irrespective of rig, and without regard to the particular means of locomotion. The common popular use of it is in this generic sense; and in policies of marine insurance, where nothing appears to qualify the meaning, it has the same acceptation. In the statutory form, indeed, of the Lloyd's Policy1 this term when first used is identified in effect with that other most general term vessel, and as if the purpose of explanation had thus been satisfied, the alternative designation is afterwards dropped, and the term ship alone is used throughout the rest of the document. I believe, however, this explanatory addition to have been inserted ex majore cautelâ, and to be superfluous rather than necessary.2 At the same time there are cases involving a serious increase of risk, in which the common designation might mislead, and might in consequence amount perhaps to such a misrepresentation as would invalidate the policy. For instance, it would not be advisable to propose The Thetis for insurance and to effect a policy on her by the words on ship without specifying in the proposal or the policy, or in both, that she was a steamship. This, however, is a case of representation founded indeed on description, and the inquiry would be as to whether there had been such consensus of the parties as is indispensable to the existence of any contract between them. So much as to the meaning of the simple designation, and as to the question what species of craft is comprised within it. Another question, much more agitated than this, is as to whether certain of the details which are borne by the 130 & 31 Vict. c. 23, Sched. E. 2 Emerigon (c. vi. § vii.) says, "The word navire comprehends every structure of carpentry fit for floating and making way on the water. Shallops and the smallest vessels are comprehended under the same denomination. Rafts are also comprised therein. According to all our dictionaries, the word vaisseau is not less generic than navire." For the older authorities who explain the use in modern commerce of the Latin terms, I refer the reader to Emerigon's work. floating structure thus designated be legally comprised within the term, and consequently be covered by a general insurance on ship. In our common printed forms the policy, after stating that it is effected "upon any kind of goods and merchandises," proceeds thus-"and also upon the body, tackle, apparel, ordnance, munition, artillery, boat, and other furniture, of and in the good ship or vessel called the," &c. When the insurance is intended to be confined to the ship alone, this is generally effected by inserting, either at the foot or in the margin of the policy, the words "on ship;" or by stating in the valuation clause that, as between the assured and underwriters on the particular policy, the subject of insurance is agreed to be the ship, or as many sixty-fourth shares thereof as the assured owns. The effect of either mode of specifying the subject of insurance is to obliterate, as it were, such other words of the general form às are inapplicable to the specified subject; and therefore the interest of a mortgagee, for instance, if misdescribed as bottomry, would remain uncovered by the policy, although, but for this rule of construction affecting other parts of the instrument, there are printed words in it which would cover a mortgage notwithstanding the misdescription in manuscript.2 Not any part It is hardly necessary to remark, that a policy in this form on ship alone, even when effected by one who is owner both of the ship and cargo, cannot extend to protect the latter.3 of the cargo. Provisions comprised as part of the ship, under the word In the next place, it may now be laid down as certain, that the provisions put on board the ship, when she sails, for the use of the crew on the voyage, are comprehended under the "furniture." word "furniture," and would be protected by an insurance on the "body, tackle, apparel, ordnance, furniture," &c., of 1 See the general principle which subordinates the printed portions of the policy to the effect of those in manuscript, laid down in Robertson v. French, 4 East, 130, 140, 141; Haughton v. Ewbank, 4 Camp. 89; per Lord Penzance, Dudgeon v. Pembroke, 2 App. Cas. 284, 293. 2 See Simonds v. Hodgson, 6 Bing. 114; and S. C. in error, per Lord Tenterden, 3 B. & Ad. 50. 31 Marshall, Ins. 328. the ship, as in the common printed forms.1 The contrary position had been erroneously inferred from the case of Robertson v. Ewer, which decided no such point, but merely established that the underwriter on ship could not be liable for the consumption of such provisions, while the ship was detained by an embargo.2 the sense of The word outfit is sometimes used to denote the necessary And outfit, in stores and provisions put on board the ship for the use of stores and the crew on the voyage; and, in this sense, outfit is included provisions. in a general insurance on ship. It is in this sense that Lord Ellenborough uses the word when he says, that "hull and outfit are both protected by an insurance on ship."3 In whaling voyages, however, the word outfit has a peculiar Not so the fishing stores sense, and means the fishing stores of the ships so employed; for whaling namely, the harpoons, lances, spears, and whale lines, for the voyages. purpose of catching whales and seals on the voyage, and the casks, cisterns, boilers, &c., for preparing and containing the oil and blubber; in a word, all the instruments and apparatus necessary for taking the fish, and preparing and bringing home the animal produce. It is now established by decision that outfits in this sense are not protected by a general insurance in the common form on the "body, tackle, apparel, &c., of the ship";" and the practice in the United States, Mode of insuring whalaccordingly, is to describe the different interests insured in a ing risks in fishing voyage, as "ship, outfit, and cargo." ."6 Yet the Courts have, notwithstanding, held that these fishing stores were to be valued as part of the "ship," under the former statutes for limiting the responsibility of owners in certain cases." 206. Brough v. Whitmore, 4 T. R. 2 Robertson v. Ewer, 1 T. R. 127; and see per Buller, J., 4 T. R. 210. 3 Per Lord Ellenborough in Hill r. Patten, 8 East, 375; per id. in Forbes v. Aspinall, 13 East, 323, 325. + 8 East, 375; Gale v. Laurie (The Dundee), 5 B. & Cr. 156. 5 Hoskins v. Pickersgill, 3 Dougl. 222; 1 Marshall, Ins. 241; 1 Park, Ins. 126. Admitted in case of The 1 Phillips, Ins. no. 496, 497. the United States. |