clothes, and only on such goods as are merchantable (merces), i.e., cargo put on board for the purposes of commerce. Such a policy The master's covers, however, an emigrant's equipment,2 but not the ship's the ship's provisions3 or the captain's clothes, these latter being better provisions. described as master's effects.1 person. "In merchandise," says Park, J., "is included all property Money and jewels worn of great value, unless attached to the persons of the pas- or carried sengers." 5 Jewels, therefore, ornaments, cash, &c., not about the designed for trade, but carried about, or belonging to the persons of those on board, do not (as the better opinion seems to be) fall within the general description of goods and merchandise; and, in case of loss, would not be recoverable under a policy on goods in the general form." 66 on goods,' Goods carried on deck, as they are exposed to a greater Goods on deck not covered by hazard than goods carried in the ordinary way, are not general policy covered by a general insurance in the common form on goods unless there is and merchandise; unless it be in virtue of a general custom a usage. of the particular trade, for then the underwriter is presumed to be acquainted with the custom and to have undertaken the additional risk. As it is only a certain description of goods. in any trade that would be thus exposed, it may be doubtful whether, even where sanctioned by usage, the goods ought not to be specifically described in the policy so as to apprize the underwriter of the extra risk that he is to run. In the only case in which the point directly arose, the insurance was declared by the policy to be "on forty carboys of vitriol' 9.8 4 Bing. 119; and the policy in Klein- Duff v. Mackenzie, 3 C. B., N. S. 6 See 1 Park, Ins. 30; 1 Marshall, 7 Backhouse v. Ripley, and Ross v. Thwaites, 1 Park, Ins. 23, 24. * Da Costa v. Edmunds, 4 Camp. 142. So in the instance given by Mr. Phillips, in which an insurance on of Lord Lyndhurst. and the observations of Lord Lyndhurst on this point are Observations well deserving of attention. "Goods carried on deck," he says, "are not in the part of the ship where goods are usually carried; they are in more than usual peril, and a usage that they are not covered by an ordinary policy on goods, but that they require a distinct explanation to the underwriter, of the part of the ship in which they are to be carried, or (where that will imply the same information) of the nature of the goods, is not at variance with any part of the policy, is essential to the information which the underwriter ought to receive, to enable him to estimate the risk and calculate the premiums, and is a portion of that fairness which ought to be rigidly observed upon all these contracts.” 1 The produce of the whale fishery is covered by goods or merchandise. The general conclusion arrived at by Mr. Phillips is, that, if by the description of the voyage, or the character of the article specified in the policy, the underwriter may be presumed to have been apprized of a usage to carry it on deck, the policy will attach to it when so carried. This appears very fairly to represent, if not the actual doctrine of the authorities, at all events the result of established principles. In whaling voyages the only cargo, properly so called, on board the ship, from first to last, is in general the homeward cargo, consisting of the immediate produce and result of the fishing adventure; such proceeds, therefore (i. e., the oil, "outfits and catchings" was held to average; but there is nothing in either case upon the point how far such goods are insurable under the general description. For timber on deck, unless the policy be "in and over all," the insurer is, by usage, not liable, Miller v. Titherington, 6 H. & N. 278; 30 L. J. (Ex.) 217. 1 Per Lord Lyndhurst, C. B., in Blackett v. Royal Exch. Ass. Co., 2 C. & J. 250. 21 Phillips, no. 460 ad finem. The foreign ordinances do not appear to furnish any explicit rules on this point; 1 Nolte's Benecke, 553. whalebone, &c., taken in the fishery), may be, and in practice generally are, covered under the general designation of "goods and merchandise.”1 outfit. Outfit in such voyages principally consists of the apparatus Not so the and instruments necessary for taking fish, seals, &c., and the disposing of them when taken, in such a manner as to bring home the oil, whalebone, and other animal produce of the adventure, with the greatest convenience and advantage; outfit, therefore, in such a voyage, cannot be considered as "goods," in any proper sense of that word; i. e., as Lord Ellenborough defines it, "as part of the wares or cargo for sale laden on board the ship." It cannot therefore be recovered under a general policy on goods.2 3. stock or pro It has been held in the United States, that a general Nor yet live insurance on "C cargo " will not cover provender taken on vender. board for live stock, which constituted a great part of the cargo; nor will it cover the live stock itself. With regard to live stock, the rule seems to be the same in this country, such interest being always in fact described specifically. Thus, where a general policy on goods was intended to cover live stock, the insurance was declared, at the foot of the policy, "to be on thirty mules, ten asses, and thirty oxen,' &c.; and in another case, where a policy was effected "on goods, as per annexed statement, valued at 2,8007.," the horses, a loss on which was claimed under this policy, were specially valued in the statement." Although the interests and commodities already mentioned General practice to specify, comprise the greater number of those which must be speci- when. fically designated in the policy, yet the almost invariable practice, whenever the cargo consists of few commodities, or on 1 Hill v. Patten, 8 East, 373, 375. So held also in the United States, in a case where the insurance was 66 the cargo of a ship for a whaling voyage;" Wolcott v. Eagle Ins. Co., 4 Pickering, 429. 2 Hill v. Patten, 8 East, 373, 375, 3 Wolcott v. Eagle Ins. Co., 4 Pickering, 429; and see Brown v. Stapylton, 4 Bing. 119. 4 Ibid. 5 Lawrence v. Aberdein, 5 B. & Ald. 107. Gabay v. Lloyd, 3 B. & C. 793. Caution as to specifying Hats not covered by piece goods. Nor a manu factured article by the separate in where the goods are valued by the hogshead, pipe, bale, &c., Yet it must be carefully borne in mind, that whenever the negligently. goods are specifically described in the policy, if no property of the assured be on board which fairly answers the description, the policy will not attach.2 If an insurance, for instance, be made on goods, described in the policy as piece goods, and by the invoice it appears that the goods really shipped were hats, the underwriter is not liable for loss on the hats. So, an insurance on tortoise-shell will not cover a loss on indigo,+ &c. If an insurance purports to be effected on several ingredients, described nominatim in the policy, which enter into gredients of it. the composition of a manufactured article, such policy will not cover a loss on the manufactured article itself, if that be a new product, and have a distinct appropriate name. Oil and barilla both enter into the composition of soap, yet an insurance on oil and barilla will not cover a loss on soap.5 It is said that an insurance on the raw material of a simple fabric, or utensil, into which no other ingredient enters, will cover a loss on such fabric or utensil: as, e. g., an insurance on "gold" or "silver" covers the loss of a gold cup or of silver spoons; but it is doubtful whether the instance given be not of so exceptional a nature as to yield no general rule. 6 1 De Symonds v. Shedden, 2 B. & P. 153. 2 Si dans la police on avait spécifié la chose qu'on a voulu faire assurer, et qu'elle n'eut pas été chargée, l'assurance serait nulle, quoiqu'on on eut pour son compte d'autres marchandises abord; 1 Emerigon, c. x. s. 1, p. 293. 3 Hunter v. Prinsep, 10 East, 378; 1 Marshall, Ins. 323. 41 Emerigon, c. x. s. 1, p. 294. 5 1 Emerigon, c. x. s. 3, p. 306. 6 Ibid. I suspect that this is a solitary instance of a peculiar usus loquendi as to the precious metals, and that it will not bear to be extended. The next subject demanding our attention is Freight. Freight. According to the general law of shipping, freight, as between the shipowner and the shipper, is, strictly speaking, the price to be paid by the latter to the former for the carriage of goods by ship, and is not earned or payable till the arrival and delivery of the goods at their port of destination.1 in marine insurance. In the law of marine insurance it has a far wider signifi- Meaning of, cation, comprising all that is implied in "the benefit derived by the shipowner from the employment of his ship."2 In this sense, therefore, it includes not only freight properly so called as above defined, but likewise that which is often called freight, being the chartered hire of the ship or part of her,3 and also, thirdly, the benefit accruing to the shipowner from the carriage of his goods by his own ship in the shape of their increased value to him at the port of delivery. As Lord Tenterden observes, "If the term freight, as used in policies of insurance, imports the benefit derived from the employment of the ship, it is the same thing to the shipowner whether he receives that benefit of the use of his ship (1st), by a money payment from one person, who charters the whole ship; or (2nd), from various persons who put specific quantities of goods on board; or (3rd), from persons who pay him the value of his own goods at the port of delivery, increased by their carriage in his own ship." 595 freight is a lawful subject of insurance in this In whichever of these three senses the word is used, it is Expected a clearly-established principle in this country, that expected freight is a lawful subject of marine insurance. "It would, indeed, be extraordinary," says Chambre, J., in the case of country. Lucena v. Craufurd, "if freight could not be made the subject of protection by an instrument, which had its origin in 1 Maclachlan on Shipping, c. x. p. 452. 2 Per Lord Tenterden in Flint v. Flemyng, 1 B. & Ad. 45, 48. 3 Per Lord Tenterden in Winter r. Haldimand, 2 B. & Ad. 649; per Lord Ellenborough in Forbes v. Flint r. Flemyng, 1 B. & Ad. 45; |