What is included in "port.' Not necessarily imply an artificial harbour. We have already seen that the terminus "at and from" which the voyage is made to commence, is, generally speaking, taken to include, not different places classed together in legal style, or for the purposes of revenue, as one port, but some one place, which in the more limited and commercial sense is considered the port; in other words, the harbour-town.1 If the policy be "at and from a port or ports" or "port or places" in the alternative, it must be supposed that the insurer underwrote the greater risk of letting the ship sail to several places in order to take in her cargo. But where a ship was insured "at and from her port of lading," the Court held, that the expression "port of lading," pointed to one single place, and did not allow of the ship loading at two distinct places (though both lying within seven miles of one another in the same bay), in either of which there might have been a lading.3 It is not at all necessary to the definition of the term "port," as used in policies, that it should be an artificial harbour shut in with regular moles or piers. If it be a natural basin protected by a headland, or even an open roadstead, provided it be the usual and sole place of loading and unloading, it is sufficient, especially if there be the usual machinery and appendages of a harbour. Thus, in one case, the Court of King's Bench held that the expression "to any port or ports whatsoever," in a time policy, ought to be construed as if it were "place or places," and would protect the ship while anchored in an open roadstead, if that were the usual place for loading and unloading goods.* 1 Constable v. Noble, 2 Taunt. 403; Payne v. Hutchinson, ibid. 405, note; Brown v. Tayleur, 4 A. & E. 241. See, also, as to the meaning of the word "port," Hull Dock Company v. Browne, 2 B. & Ad. 43; Stockton and Darlington Rail. Co. v. Barrett, 7 M. & Gr. 870, in Dom. Proc.; Roelandts v. Harrison, 9 Exch. 444; Van Baggen v. Baines, 9 Exch. 523; Sailing Ship Garston Co. v. Hickie, 15 Q. B. D. 580. 2 Lambert v. Liddard, 1 Marshall, R. 149; and see the discussion in Brown v. Tayleur, 4 A. & E. 241. 3 Brown v. Tayleur, 4 A. & E. 241. 4 Cockey r. Atkinson, 2 B. & Ald. 460; S. P. in the United States, Delonguemere v. Firemen's Ins. Co., v. Gavin. A ship insured "at and from Leith to Shetland, and from Sea Ins. Co. thence to Barcelona, and at and from thence and two other ports in Spain, to a port in Great Britain," was lost while loading at Saloe. The roadstead there was the usual station for vessels of her burden. Saloe town lay at the bottom of a natural basin, protected by a headland, and without any artificial harbour. It was frequented as a port, was usually designated as such, and so was recognized by the Spanish government and also by this country, which had a viceconsul there; it had a custom-house and harbour-master; port dues were levied there, and at the time of the loss, conveniences were erected on the shore for the purpose of loading goods and of protecting smaller vessels from wind and weather. On this evidence the House of Lords, affirming the judgment of the Scotch Court of Session, decided that it was a port within the meaning of the policy.1 from" an island con When the policy is "at and from" an island or other "At and district containing several ports, the risk on ship under the homeward policy commences directly the ship has been taining seve ral ports. moored in good safety at the first port at which she touches in the island, for the purpose of discharging her outward cargo. Hence, where a ship insured for her outward voyage from London to Jamaica "until moored twenty-four hours in good safety," was insured by a homeward policy "at and from Jamaica to London," and was lost in coasting the island, after she had stayed some days at one port there, but before she had delivered all her outward cargo, a special jury found, and Lord Mansfield supported their finding, that this loss on the ship was at the risk of the underwriters on the homeward policy.2 See per 10 Johnson's Rep. 120, cited in 1 Sea Insurance Co. v. Gavin, 2 Dow & Clark, 124. Several additional cases as to the meaning of the word port will be found in the section 2 Camden v. Cowley, 1 W. Bl. 417, 418. Secus, if otherwise described. Continuance and termination of risk on ship. Foreign Law. Alteration proposed by Magens. Ever since this case it has been clear insurance law, that a ship insured for a homeward voyage "at and from" any of the West India Islands, is protected by the word "at" in going from port to port of the island.1 In these cases, the general word by which the terminus a quo of the homeward voyage is described, comprehends all ports and places in the island or district named; the construction of course would be different if the terminus a quo were otherwise described in the policy. Thus, if the policy were on the ship "at and from the ship's port of loading in Jamaica, that would restrict the commencement of the risk to one particular port in the island.2 So much for the commencement of the risk on ship; its continuance is expressly stipulated in all our common policies to be "until the ship hath moored at anchor twenty-four hours in good safety." In Spain and Portugal the rule is the same; in France, by the Code de Commerce, the risk ends "when the ship is anchored or moored to the quay of the port of discharge.' In most of the ordinances and policies of Germany, Holland, and the north of Europe, the risk on the ship is decreed, or stipulated to continue either until the ship has entirely discharged her cargo, or for a certain specified number of days after her arrival.5 Magens advises, for the protection of the ship while unloading, the insertion of a clause prolonging the continuance of the risk for twenty-one working days after commencing to discharge. In the absence of any special clause of this kind, 1 Cruickshank v. Janson, 2 Taunt. 301; Warre v. Miller, 4 B. & Cr. 538. 2 Per Patteson, J., in Brown v. Tayleur, 4 A. & E. 241, 248. 3 For the older laws, see 2 Benecke, pp. 234-238; for the more recent, Id. par Nolte, vol. i. pp. 268-671. Code de Commerce, art. 382, 5 By the German Code it continues until the discharge of her cargo, art. 826. The older ordinances are collected by Magens, vol. ii. passim, and by Benecke, old and new quâ supra, p. 394. 6 Magens, 47; accord. Mercantile Marine Ins. Co. v. Titherington, 34 L. J. (Q. B.) 11. the underwriters, in an ordinary policy, are not responsible for any loss that happens after the ship has once been "moored twenty-four hours in good safety." The question has generally been what constitutes a mooring What is a in good safety. The effect of the cases appears to be, that a ship is not considered to have been moored for twenty-four hours in good safety, unless moored for that space of time in the harbour of her port of discharge: 1-in such a state of physical safety that she can keep afloat while her cargo is being unloaded; 2-in such a state of political safety as not to have been subjected during that time to any embargo, seizure, or capture on the part of the government of the port or of strangers; and, 3-under such circumstances as to have had an opportunity of unloading and discharging. "mooring in good safety." Felton. 1. As to her state of physical safety during the period of 1. Physical safety. twenty-four hours. A ship arrived at Demerara, her port of destination, a Shaw v. perfect wreck, having received her death-wound at sea, and was with the utmost difficulty kept afloat by lashing her to a hulk, till all the people on board were landed, and a few days afterwards, in trying to move her, she sank in the harbour; Lord Kenyon held, that the risk was still continuing when she sunk, "for though arrived at Demerara she was never moored twenty-four hours, nor a moment in safety."1 2. As to her state of political safety during that time. 2. Political safety. An English ship, the day after arrival at Rouen, was laid Minett v. under an embargo then existing there against all English Anderson. ships, and her captain and crew treated as prisoners of war; Lord Kenyon held, that the risk was still continuing, for she could not be said, under the circumstances, to have been twenty-four hours, or even a minute, moored in safety, 1 Shawe v. Felton, 2 East, 109. Horneyer v. Lockyer v. 3. So moored as to have an opportunity having been immediately she entered the port, to all intents and purposes, captured by the French.1 Where immediately on the ship's arrival at Riga (which was her port of discharge under the policy), her hatches were sealed down and her papers sent to St. Petersburg to be examined, on which examination the ship and cargo were seized, and afterwards condemned; it was held, that as there had been an incipient seizure immediately on the ship's arrival, which ended in condemnation, this was not a mooring twenty-four hours in good safety.2 But our Courts have refused to regard a seizure as having a relation back to the moment of arrival merely on the ground of the ship's liability to seizure from that moment onwards. A ship insured, " from Hamburg to London," had become liable to forfeiture under our revenue laws for smuggling committed during the voyage; she arrived at London on the 1st of September, was not seized by the revenue officers for the said smuggling till the 27th, having been all that time safe at her moorings in the river Thames, and the Court held that the risk was at an end twenty-four hours after the ship's arrival.3 3. The ship must have been so moored as to have an opportunity of unloading and discharging; otherwise, whatand discharg- ever time may have elapsed since her arrival, the risk will be deemed to be still continuing. of unloading ing. Waples v. A ship from Leghorn to London arrived on the 8th July at Fresh Wharf and moored, but, that same day, was ordered back into quarantine for a fortnight, and her crew thereupon deserted her; she did not ultimately get into quarantine till the 30th July, having in the meantime remained at her moorings; and was burnt on the 23rd August, before she could get permission to leave the quarantine ground. The Court held that, though so long at her moorings before going 1 Minett v. Anderson, Peake's R. 211. 2 Horneyer . Lushington, 15 East, 46. 3 Lockyer v. Offley, 1 T. R. 252. |