a twofold purpose, partly connected and partly unconnected with the adventure contemplated by the policy, will not amount to a deviation, if there be no additional delay or variation of the risk caused by the unjustifiable purpose. Miller. Thus, where a vessel sailing outwards from London to Warre v. Grenada was insured on freight homewards "at and from Grenada to London," and on arriving at the island, where there is but one custom-house, proceeded to deliver her outward cargo in different bays there, and was lost in entering one of these bays for the two-fold purpose of delivering the remainder of her outward, and taking in a homeward, cargo, it was held that this was no deviation, and the underwriters were liable for the loss of the homeward freight.' The line of distinction between the class of cases of which Distinction. Hammond v. Reid is the leading authority and those which are governed by Raine . Bell, though not at first sight obvious, is, nevertheless, clear and intelligible. In Hammond r. Reid, and cases of that class, the ship would not have touched at the port at all except for some purpose totally unconnected with the main object of the voyage insured; and the execution of which purpose was itself the sole cause of the delay. In Raine v. Bell, and the cases decided on the authority of it, the ship had originally put in, and was actually staying at, the port for a purpose connected with the voyage; and during her justifiable and necessary stay there, an act was done, which, though in itself unconnected with the adventure, and not originally contemplated by the parties to the policy, was held not to be a deviation, because there was no material variation of the risk, and no additional delay in consequence. In Hammond v. Reid, the ship would never have touched at St. Bartholomew's at all, except for the purpose,-wholly alien to the object of the voyage insured,-of procuring information for the guidance of another adventure. 1 Warre v. Miller, 4 B. & Cr. 538; 1 Car. & P. 237. In Result. Rainer. Bell, the ship, when the dollars were put on board, was actually staying at Gibraltar for provisions, without which the voyage insured could not have been prosecuted, and no extra delay or risk was incurred by taking the dollars on board. The principles of law, therefore, applicable to the interpretation of these clauses, appear to be,- 1. That the extent of the powers they confer on the ship is to be judged of, not so much by verbal criticism of their terms ("to call," "to touch," or "to touch and stay"), as by reference to the true scope and nature of the adventure contemplated in the policy. 2. That, however extensive the language of these clauses may be, they can never confer a power of visiting ports out of what, upon a fair construction of the whole policy, appears to have been the course of the voyage insured as contemplated by the parties; nor can they justify the ship in visiting any port, even though within the local limits of the voyage insured, for any purpose unconnected with the main object of the adventure. 3. If the ship visits an allowed port for an allowed purpose, trading, breaking bulk, landing, or loading cargo, however alien to the main object of the adventure, is held to be no deviation, if completed during the period of the ship's justifiable stay in the port, without additional delay, or substantial variation of the risk in consequence. 4. If, however, there be trading such as gives rise to delay that would not otherwise have been incurred, it will, on that ground, amount to a deviation. Deviation by reason of delay. As the sole ground on which a deviation discharges the underwriter is that it varies the risk, and as that may be brought about as much by delay in commencing or prosecuting the voyage as by local divergence from its prescribed course, it follows that every such delay, if unreasonable or unexcused, will discharge the underwriter. In the words of Tindal, C. J., "The voyage in the commencement or prosecution of which any unreasonable delay takes place, becomes a voyage at a different period of the year, at a more advanced age of the ship, and, in short, a different voyage than if it had been prosecuted with reasonable and ordinary diligence; the risk is altered from that which was intended by all parties when the policy was effected."1 To begin with the commencement of the voyage,-any un- Delay in reasonable delay under an insurance "at and from," between the voyage. commencing the time when the policy attaches "at" the port, and the time when the ship sails on her voyage, will discharge the underwriter.2 As long, indeed, as she is bonâ fide preparing for her voyage, by repairs, or the like, the delay will be excusable and the underwriter liable; but if all thoughts of the voyage be laid aside, and the ship still detained in port, the underwriter is discharged.3 So, although the voyage be not abandoned, yet any waste of time, or unnecessary delay in port, not excused by justifying cause, nor in any degree connected with the purposes of the voyage insured, is held to vary the risk; as where a yacht lying in Bristol harbour was insured on a voyage “at and from Bristol to London," and did not sail for five months after the policy was effected.* That an unreasonable delay in performing the voyage insured is equivalent to a deviation, was expressly ruled by Lord Mansfield, in the case of Hartley v. Buggin, in which, the ground of defence being the detention of the ship as a floating slave dépôt on the African coast, his Lordship said, "The single point before the Court is, whether there 1 Per Tindal, C. J., in Mount v. Larkins, 8 Bing. 108, 122. 2 Delay, when it prevents the policy attaching, properly belongs to the subject of the preceding chapter, and is considered there. 3 Per Lord Hardwicke in Motteux v. London Ass. Co., 1 Atkyns, 545; Chitty v. Selwyn, 2 Atkyns, 359. 317. Palmer v. Marshall, 8 Bing. 79, Samuel v. Hamilton r. Deviation of necessity. has not been what is equivalent to a deviation-whether the risk has not been varied, no matter whether the risk has or has not been thereby increased."1 Where a ship insured "at and from Sierra Leone to London" was delayed in the Thames, off Deptford Dockyard, from the 18th to the 27th of February, before she was admitted into the dock to unload her cargo, it was not disputed that this delay, if unexcused or unnecessary, would amount to a deviation at that, as at any other, stage of the voyage.2 On the same ground, where a vessel engaged in the African palm oil trade, with liberty to act as a tender to other ships in the same employ, was kept thirteen months in the Benin river, this was found by the jury to be an unreasonable delay, and the Court refused to disturb their verdict.3 In short, whenever the delay exceeds a reasonable time, though for a justifiable purpose, or is incurred for purposes unconnected with the true object of the voyage insured, it will amount to a deviation. This rule is so strictly observed, that, even where the ship quits from necessity the course prescribed by the policy, she must compass this inevitable detour by the most direct course, and in the shortest time, ctherwise it will amount to a deviation.1 The Carnatic, a French East Indiaman, was insured "at and from Port L'Orient to Pondicherry, Madras, and China, 1 Hartley v. Buggin, 2 Park, Ins. 652. See the case of a fire policy distinguished on this particular from a voyage policy, in Pearson v. The Commercial Union Ass. Co., 15 C. B., N. S. 304; 33 L. J. (C. P.) 85; on appeal, L. R., 8 C. P. 548; and in the Lords, 1 App. C. 498: per Kelly, C. B., "This is not the case of an insurance on a voyage, but an insurance against fire for a certain period of time in certain specified places." Therefore a loss by fire during a and at and from thence back to the ship's port or ports of discharge in France." On her arrival at Pondicherry she was found to be so much damaged that it became necessary for her to go to Bengal for repairs, that being the only place where the repairs could be properly done. The usual time in which the direct voyage from Pondicherry to Bengal is performed is about six or seven days; but The Carnatic, by touching and trading at different intermediate ports, consumed six weeks in going to Bengal, and about two months in returning thence to Pondicherry. Lord Mansfield said, that even if necessity were admitted to have been the sole motive for substituting the voyage to Bengal in the place of that to China, still it was incumbent on the assured to have pursued that voyage of necessity directly, in the shortest and most expeditious manner, and that the delay in going from Pondicherry to Bengal, and the repeated stoppages by touching at different places and trading there, were deviations which discharged the underwriter.1 If a vessel is driven out of her course, it is not necessary that she should retrace her route to the point of divergence; but she must prosecute her voyage by the safest and most direct course from the point to which she may have been so driven.2 As every special clause contained in the policy must be Limit of exstrictly construed, it follows that, if express permission be press leave. given in the policy to delay for a given time specified in the policy, that delay cannot lawfully be prolonged. Thus, where liberty was given in the policy "to wait two months at Monte Video if needful," a longer delay than two months was held to discharge the underwriters.3 It is only, however, an unreasonable or inexcusable delay, Justifiable i. e., a wilful and unnecessary waste of time, that will amount 1 Lavabre v. Wilson, 1 Dougl. 284. 2 Harrington v. Halkeld, 2 Park, Ins. 639; Delaney v. Stoddart, 1 T. R. 22. 3 Doyle v. Powell, 4 B. & Ad. 267. delay no deviation. |