materially influenced the judgment of the underwriter in assuming the risk.1 A., accustomed to open floating policies on which he declared shipments from abroad as he heard of them, having received intelligence of a shipment for him to be made by The Candida about the same time that an anonymous letter had been received at Lloyd's of an intention to lose that vessel on the ensuing voyage, concealed his expectation of a shipment by her, and his knowledge of the letter respecting her owners when he was opening a fresh policy, but did so on the reasonable belief that he should be able on the coming forward of her bills of lading to declare her shipment on the policy already open. He was disappointed of this expectation by the mere accident of advices of other vessels coming to hand before those as to The Candida, and when intelligence of her did come forward he was obliged to declare her on the fresh policy. Held by the Court of Queen's Bench that by this concealment the policy had been invalidated." rumours. "Loose rumours, indeed, which have gathered together, no Not loose one knows how, need not be communicated:"3 and intelligence may be so general, and its application to the subject insured so doubtful and remote, that the assured need not communicate it, though it may possibly turn out to be related to the subject insured.1 Caution, however, in seeking to be safe will rather trust to a Caution. full disclosure of rumours, as the following case will illustrate. Universal The plaintiff in Liverpool, on the 8th October, wrote to Morrison v. his broker in London to insure 50007. on the ship Cambria, Mar. Ins. Co. and a similar sum on her freight. On the evening of that day his eye met a paragraph in the "Liverpool Mercury," which caused him to write to his broker on the 10th thus: "Since writing on Saturday a paragraph in the Mercury,' 1 Seaman v. Fonnereau, 2 Str. 1183; Lynch v. Hamilton, 3 Taunt. 37, S. C. in error; Lynch v. Dunsford, 14 East, 494. 2 Leigh v. Adams, 25 L. T., N. S. 3 Per Gibbs, C. J., in Durrell v. Bederley, Holt's N. P. 285. 41 Phillips, Ins. no. 610; Ruggles v. General Int. Ins. Co., 4 Mason, R. 74. State of the weather. Nature of cargo. 'Cambria qy., Cameo, from New Orleans, aground on North The assured, in a retrospective policy, is bound to disclose the state of the weather subsequently to the ship's sailing when the voyage commences from a foreign port, if the assured have private information, e. g., of some violent storm at or near the port within so short a period after her sailing as that she might have been exposed to it. If the ship sails from a home port, the underwriter is as well informed as the assured of the state of the weather; and, unless the storm were all the more violent, it would not likely affect his estimate of the risk.2 The nature of the cargo shipped or intended to be shipped may be most material to be communicated. For without exactly rendering the ship unseaworthy, a cargo may be of a nature less desirable for safety than another, owing to the dead weight in proportion to bulk, or its tendency to shift, its unwieldiness for stowage, or its gaseous or other dangerous chemical or inflammable qualities, and the like. In a recent Morrison v. Universal Mar. Ins. 2 See the two American cases, Ely assured's knowledge was precise and case excessive valuation was held a circumstance material to be communicated. valuation. It appeared that part of the cargo insured consisted of Excessive 222 casks of whisky, the cost, charges, and insurance of which amounted to 9737., but which were valued for insurance at 28007. It was in evidence that excessive valuation to such an extent as here was considered by underwriters to be a speculative risk, which one class of underwriters would not take at all, and another class would take only if a sufficient premium were offered; that 25 per cent. added was not unusual; and that in one case 30 per cent. added had been taken by the former class; but that beyond this it became a speculative risk. The excuse offered by the assured, was that the excess represented expected profits at a Russian port, which was not at the time of shipment within the geographical range of the Russian Custom House, but was to be shortly brought within that line; and that a paper containing the insured value was shown to the English underwriter, containing these words, but in German: "On spirits with anticipated profits, however high or low." The underwriter saw the German words, but did not understand them. The jury found that the concealment was without fraud but was material; and the Court refused to disturb their verdict.1 The port of loading is material. Goods were insured "at and from Genoa to Dublin, the adventure to begin from the loading to equip for the voyage," but the goods were actually loaded at Leghorn and not at Genoa, which was an intermediate port into which the ship was obliged to put and wait five months for convoy, and the non-communication of this fact was held to be a material concealment.2 The true port of loading. Hutchinson. Where it was known that the ship was to load at a place Harrower r. called Laguna de los Padres, a mere anchorage in an open 2 Hodgson v. Richardson, 1 W. Bl. 1 Ionides v. Pender, L. R., 9 Q. B. 531. 463. M. PP Any service of danger. Serious damage to the ship. Aggravated consequences of loss. roadstead, which was unknown to underwriters as a port of loading for Europe, and the risk when express mention of that place was made had been already refused, it was held to be a vicious concealment, if not moral fraud, to effect a policy on the same risk without further description of it than "at and from the port of Buenos Ayres and port or ports of loading in the province of Buenos Ayres."1 So is any service of peculiar danger a subject of material concealment, if it cannot be inferred from the terms of the policy, e. g., to employ the ship in the foreign smuggling trade.2 Neglect by the captain of a ship, aware of her having met with an accident that might be the cause of serious damage, to inform his owners of it before effecting the policy, will at least prevent them recovering on the policy for loss resulting from the accident.3 The Thames lightermen at the port of London, finding that the law of common carriers bore hard upon them when it gave insurers recourse against them for loss which had not been the consequence of negligence, formed an association for the purpose of doing the lighterage on the terms of being subject to liability for loss only in case of negligence, briefly called by them "no recourse terms." Insurers, upon this becoming public, published their disapproval of that course, and thenceforward refused to subscribe policies containing craft risks, except on a higher scale of premium wherever the "no recourse terms" had been adopted by the assured. Policies on goods containing the craft risk were effected for the plaintiffs with the defendant. Before the policies had been effected, the plaintiffs had agreed with a particular lighterman that he should lighter all their goods on the "no recourse terms." This was not made known to the defendant 1 Harrower. Hutchinson, in error, L. R., 5 Q. B. 584, reversing the judgment below, L. R., 4 Q. B. 523. 21 Emerigon, 172; and see his opinion in 2 Valin, liv. 3, t. 6, art. 49, pp. 127, 128. 3 Gladstone v. King, 1 M. & Sel. 35; Stribley v. Imperial Mar. Ins. Co., 1 Q. B. Div. 507. Ante, p. 558. at the time of negotiating the policies, which were underwritten, therefore, on the same terms as formerly, that is, for a lower premium than would have been demanded for craft risk coupled with no recourse terms. A loss having occurred under these policies in the course of the lighterage, this action was brought, and it was held that this suppression of any mention of the agreement with the lighterman was concealment of a material fact which a fair and reasonable underwriter would have taken into account in fixing the terms on which he would accept the risk, and therefore vitiated the policies.1 "The assured need not mention what the underwriter Matters that need not be knows, what way soever he came by that knowledge; or communiwhat he ought to know; or takes upon himself the know- cated. ledge of; or waives being informed of; or what lessens the risk agreed and understood to be run; or general topics of speculation; or every cause which may occasion natural perils, as the difficulty of the voyage, kind of seasons, probability of hurricanes, earthquakes, &c.; or every cause which may occasion political perils, from the rupture of states, from war, and the various operations of it, upon the probability of safety from the continuance and return of peace, or from the imbecility of the enemy."2 underwriter know. For instance, facts comprised in the general usages of What the trade, such as the usage of the Newfoundland trade for ships ought to arriving on the coast either to be employed for some time in fishing on the banks (called banking), or to make intermediate voyages in the American seas, before beginning to take in their homeward cargo.3 1 Tate v. Hyslop, 15 Q. B. D. 368 (C. A.). 2 Per Lord Mansfield, in Carter v. Boehm, Burr. 1909. Ougier v. Jennings, ibid. 505; King- 3 Vallance v. Dewar, 1 Camp. 503; |