Page 194, line 16, for "2 Hagg. 321," read 2 Hagg. Con. 321.

195, line 5, add, The Court cannot now order any case to be heard in camerâ. Barnett v. Barnett, 1 Sear. & Sm. 20; Hall v. Castleden, Ib. 29.

197, line 15, for "1 Hagg. 414," read 1 Hagg. Con. 414. ,, 207, line 16, dele “1 Hagg. 393."

210, line 7, for "184," read 684.

,, 210, line 18, for "809," read 309.

216, line 9, for "1 Curt." read 2 Curt.

216, line 18, for "1 Hagg. Con." read 2 Hagg. Con. 217, line 5, for "1 Hagg. Con." read 2 Hagg. Con.

217, line 8 from bottom, add, Where the man's name was "Bower," but the banns were published in the name of "John," both parties knowing the fact, the marriage was declared null. Midgeley v. Wood, 1 Sear. & Sm. 70.

231, line 1, for "sparated," read separated.

231, line 14, for " 3 Curt. 233," read 3 Curt. 235.

THE

LAW OF DIVORCE.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE.

THE COURT.

THE the New Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes consists of two branches, one of which is now presided over by the Right Honourable Sir Cresswell Cresswell, who is called the Judge Ordinary of this Court, and who, at the same time, is the Judge of the Court of Probate, 20 & 21 Vict. c, 85, s. 9; and the other consisting of the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Queen's Bench, the Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, the Lord Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer, or any of the Puisne Judges for the time being in each of the three last-mentioned courts, and the Judge of her Majesty's Court of Probate, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 8; 22 & 23 Vict. c. 61. s. 1, two at least of whom, besides the Judge Ordinary, are by sec. 10 of the first Act required to form the Full Court. It becomes therefore necessary for counsel, proctors, or solicitors, when drawing petitions, or any other

A

pleadings, motions, or applications to consider whether they should address them to "The Judge Ordinary of her Majesty's Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes," or to "The Judges of her Majesty's Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes," Evans v. Evans and Robinson, 6 W. R. 356; 1 S. & T. 79, 27 L. J. 31; Wright v. Wright, 27 L. J. 32, 31 L. T. 370 (a).

We will now, therefore, briefly point out,1stly, what cases, &c. the Judge Ordinary is authorized to take cognizance of; and, 2ndly, what come within the cognizance of the Full Court, as we, for the reasons stated in the note to this page, shall call that branch which alone has power to dissolve the marriage tie.

THE JUDGE ORDINARY.

The 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 9, confers authority upon the Judge Ordinary, either when sitting alone, or with one or more of the other Judges of the Full Court, to hear and determine all divorce and matrimonial matters, except petitions for dissolving or annulling marriages, applications for

(a) Evans v. Evans and Robinson is reported differently. In S. & T. 79, the form is, "the Court;" also in 6 W. R. 356; while 27 L. J. 31, gives "the Full Court:" which latter term for the Court authorized to dissolve marriages is expressly used in 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, ss. 55, 56, in 21 & 22 Vict. c. 108, ss. 13 and 18, and in 22 & 23 Vict. c. 61, s. 2. The form in the text is the one most used in practice.

new trials of questions or issues before a jury (a), bills of exception, special verdicts, and special cases; so that he, either sitting alone, or with one or more other judges in open court, can and does grant protection orders to deserted wives, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 21, 21 & 22 Vict. c. 108, s. 6; or at chambers in simple cases, rule 39: decides applications for restitution of conjugal rights, Hope v. Hope, 27 L. J. 43; Cherry v. Cherry, 32 L. T. 198; or for judical separation, Curtis v. Curtis, 6 W. R. 409; Marchmont v. Marchmont, 6 W. R. 870; 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85 s. 17: or for jactitation of marriage; hears appeals against protection orders granted to deserted wives by police magistrates and justices in petty sessions, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 21: and also could, by s. 20 of the same Act, have heard appeals against the orders made by judges at assizes in cases of judicial separation and restitution of conjugal rights, hitherto cognizable by them, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 18; but these clauses are now repealed by 21 & 22 Vict. c. 108, s. 19, inasmuch as they were not in a single instance taken advantage of, probably owing to the many difficulties and obstacles which would necessarily have arisen in endeavouring to carry them into

(a) Applications may now, by 21 & 22 Vict. c. 108, s. 18, be made to the Judge Ordinary to grant a rule nisi for a new trial in jury cases, either tried before him or before the full court.

operation: also, in cases where personal service cannot be effected, decides upon motion (a) in open court, whether there may be substituted service, or whether service may be dispensed with altogether, rule 10: grants or refuses amendments to any petition, answer, or subsequent statement or pleading, rule 19, Evans v. Evans & Robinson, 27 L. J. 32, 6 W. R. 356; Pyne v. Pyne, 6 W. R. 507: and when the proceedings have raised the questions of fact necessary to be determined, directs the truth of any question of fact arising in the proceedings to be tried by a jury upon the wish of either party, rule 20; or himself determines whether the same shall be tried by a jury, or before the court itself, or whether by oral evidence or upon affidavits, rule 21: and when a case is to be tried before a jury, directs the questions at issue to be stated in the form of a record, to be settled by one of the registrars, rule 22, somewhat after the form given in the Appendix, page 77, and can allow the

(a) Motions in open court must be made by counsel when the petitioner is acting through a proctor, solicitor, or attorney: Drake v. Morgan, 27 L. J. 1, 4 Jur. 32. And, moreover, in the absence of counsel the court will not allow the proctor, solicitor, or attorney employed in the suit to open the case, but will either allow the case to be postponed to the next sittings, on payment of costs of the day, or allow the petitioner to conduct his own case entirely, but not until the arrival of counsel, and for the latter then to conclude the case: Lentge v. Lentge and Hopson, MSS.