the increase was owing to the munificence of the Sovereign, De Blaquiere v. De Blaquiere, 3 Hagg. 331.

Permanent alimony is decreed from the day of sentence, Cooke v. Cooke, 2 Phill. 40.

Where the Court decreed a dissolution of marriage, on the ground of the wife's adultery, the Court ordered that the husband should pay an annuity of 150%. during their joint lives, quamdia casta vixerit, on condition of her relinquishing a power vested in her by a marriage-settlement of appointing by will 2000l. consols, and that 1000l. damages assessed by a jury against the co-respondent should be paid towards the husband's costs, Keats v. Keats and Montezuma, 28 L. J., P. & M. 57.

BESTIALITY.

See title "Rape," post.

COLLUSION.

Collusion is where two or more parties join together in promoting an act of adultery for the purpose of deceiving the Court, or entrapping a third party. Where it is committed by the husband and wife it has been defined to be " an agreement between the parties for one to commit, or

appear to commit a fact of adultery in order that the other may obtain a remedy at law, as for a real injury." There is then no real injury, and the law, therefore, requires that that there should be no co-operation for such a purpose, and does not grant relief where the adultery has been committed with any such view. It is a fraud difficult of proof, since the agreement may not be known to any one but the two parties in the cause, who alone may be concerned in it, for the adulterer may be ignorant of the understanding. However, it is no decisive proof of collusion that after the adultery has been committed both parties desire a separation; it would be hard that the husband should not be released, because the offending wife equally wishes it; she may have honest or dishonest reasons, innocent or profligate, and it would be unjust to make him dependent on her for his release, Crewe v. Crewe, 3 Hagg. 130.

Long duration of a criminal intercourse is a strong presumption against collusion; for if there had been a preconcerted scheme, an original design to separate, the purpose would have been more speedily effected, Crewe v. Crewe, 3 Hagg. 132; so also if the proofs are inconclusive, Ib.

There being no defence on the part of the wife is no proof of collusion, though it may arise from it, Ib. 133.

F

The Court will not presume collusion without something to raise such a presumption, Pollard v. Wybourn, 1 Hagg. 726. Vide last Act.

CONDONATION.

Condonation is a forgiveness of a conjugal offence with a full knowledge of all the circumstances, and is a question of fact for the jury. It is for the Court to direct the jury what will constitute condonation, and for the jury to determine whether, subject to that direction, the circumstances of the particular case amount to condonation, Peacock v. Peacock, 27 L. J., P & M. 71.

Condonation is a blotting out of the offence imputed so as to restore the offending party to the same position which he or she held before the offence was committed, Keats v. Keats and Montezuma, 25 L. J., P. & M. 57.

Condonation is of two kinds remissio expressa, by express words and succeeding reconciliation; the other remissio tacita, which includes a return to connubial intercourse, Orme v. Orme, 2 Add. 382; Dunn v. Dunn, 3 Phill. 9; Snow v. Snow, 2 No. Ca. Supp. xii.

There can be no condonation which is not followed by conjugal cohabition, Keats v. Keats and Montezuma, 28 L. J., P. & M. 78.

Condonation is a pardon, not necessarily abso

lute, but which may be accompanied by conditions, Ib. 79.

Where the condonation rises on the face of the petition, it was unnecessary in the old Court to plead it in bar, Snow v. Snow, 2 No. Ca. Supp. xii.

If condonation is not pleaded it might in the old Court nevertheless be proved in evidence, but the Court will not help it out; it must be clearly proved, as it would otherwise operate as a surprise to the other party, Beeby v. Beeby, 1 Hagg. 795.

Condonation by the Husband of Adultery.— Condonation is where a husband or wife, cognizant of the adultery of the other, is voluntarily reconciled, Ayliffe Parergon, 226. It is a conditional forgiveness, which does not take away the right of complaint in case of a tontinuation of adultery, Ferrers v. Ferrers, 1. Hagg. C. 130.

Condonation is accompanied with an implied condition; the condition implied is that the injury shall not be repeated. A repetition at least of the same injury does away the condonation, and revives the former injury. But, if nothing but clear proof of adultery would do away condonation of adultery, the rule of revival becomes useless; for the revival is unnecessary in the face of the new fact: something short of clear proof

of the actual fact of subsequent adultery will therefore suffice to remove the bar. But the new injury need not even be ejusdem generis, for it is difficult to suppose that the implied condition on which forgiveness takes place could be solely of abstinence from a repetition of adultery. The plainer reason and the good sense of the implied condition is that the adulterer should in future not only abstain from adultery, but treat the innocent and condoning party in every respect (in the words of the law), "with conjugal kindness," Durant v. Durant, 1 Hagg. 762. It may be express or implied, as by the husband cohabiting with a delinquent wife; for it is to be presumed he would not have taken her to his bed unless he had forgiven her.

Condonation and connivance are very different. If the husband has discovered improper conduct between his wife and some one living in his house, he may be induced to forgive his wife, but would certainly remove the adulterer: no other conduct could be reconciled with a due care for his own honour. If he did not do so, it would amount almost to consent, Lovering v. Lovering, 3 Hagg. 86. Condonation bars sentence, but not necessarily where there is subsequent adultery, though it will induce the Court to look with particular jealously into the case for if the adultery is forgiven with such extreme facility