Oliver v. Oliver, 1 Hagg. C. 364; Lockwood v. by violent and disorderly affections of the mind, it is the same in its effects as if it proceeded from mere malignity alone; it cannot be necessary that, in order to obtain the protection of the Court, it should be made to appear to proceed from malignity, Kirkman v. Kirkman, 1 Hagg. C. 410; Holden v. Holden, 1 Hagg. C. 458; Curtis v. Curtis, 27 L. J., P. & M. 73. Cruelty may be relative and depend on the age, habits, &c., of the party, D'Aguilar v. D'Aguilar, 1 Hagg. 782. Within the range of cruelty, it is obvious that the means and rank of the parties must make some difference. The denial of necessaries and comforts, even of medical assistance, when there are no pecuniary resources, never can be construed into acts of cruelty; but no one could entertain a reasonable doubt that such a denial, when the fortune was ample, might probably, under circumstances, be considered differently: and necessaries and comforts mean very different things in different ranks of life; but the Court will not inquire further than is necessary, in order to ascertain that the ordinary comforts of the wife are preserved, Dysart v. Dysart, 1 Rob. iii. One act of cruelty entitles the wife to relief, Popkin v. Popkin, 1 Hagg. 768. A single violent act occasioning pain and injury to the wife, but unaccompanied by any threat or intentional blow, is not sufficient whereon to found a sentence of separation, unless, under the whole circumstances of the case, the Court feels satisfied that cohabitation may not be resumed without danger to life and limb, Neeld v. Neeld, 4 Hagg. 270; Collett v. Collett, 1 Curt. 684. The. The law does not require many acts. Court has expressed an indisposition to interfere on account of one slight act, particularly between persons who have been under long cohabitation; because if only one such instance of ill-treatment, and that of a slight kind, occurs in many years, it may be hoped and presumed that it will not be repeated. But it is only on this supposition that the Court forbears to interpose its protection, even in the case of a single act; because if one act should be of that description which will induce the Court to believe that it is likely to occur again, and to occur with real suffering, there is no rule to restrain its interference, Holden v. Holden, 1 Hagg. C. 458. Whatever may have been the cause of conduct towards the wife likely to endanger her safety, whether arising from natural violence of disposition or from want of moral control, or from eccentricity, it is for the Court to consider the conduct itself and its probable consequences; the motives and causes cannot hold the hand of the Court, unless the wife be to blame. If conduct dangerous in itself arise from morbid feelings out of the control of the husband, the Court must act if the danger exist, Dysart v. Dysart, 1 Rob. 116. Where an act of violence is committed under the influence of an acute disorder, and it is made clear that the disorder having been subdued, there is no danger of a recurrence, the Court will not interfere; but, if the result has been a new condition of the brain rendering the party liable to fits of ungovernable passion, then the Court is bound to emancipate the wife, Curtis v. Curtis 27 L. J., P. & M. 86. Acts are not necessary. Words of abuse and reproach produce only resentment; but words of menace, intimating an intention of doing bodily harm, and even affecting the security of life, are legal cruelty. The Court must interpose when words have the effect of producing terror, and the apprehension of bodily injury reasonably consequent from their meaning and use, D'Aguilar v. D'Aguilar, 1 Hagg. 775 (note); Harris v. Harris, 2 Hagg. C. 149. It does not differ much whether words of serious menace, importing bodily harm to the wife, be addressed to herself, or to third persons; the test is, if they raise reasonable apprehensions; indeed, they carry some additional weight if they raise apprehension in others, Ib. 776. Where the husband was in the habit of putting himself into passions, of following his wife from room to room, abusing her, calling her by the most opprobrious names, accusing her of adultery and incest, this was held to be not mere abuse, but to imply actual menace, though the Court hesitated whether alone, it would constitute a sufficient ground for a separation, Otway v. Otway 2 Phill. 97. Where the husband threatened to cut his wife's arm off, and beat her brains out with it, and on another occasion within a few days of her confinement, to pull her out of bed and kick her up and down the room, and once seized a red-hot poker and brandished it, and threatened to run her through with it, and often attempted to strike her though the parties had been separated three years, and the husband had been bound over to keep the peace towards her, the Court held that the facts were of a nature to found a case of legal cruelty, Hulme v. Hulme, 2 Add. 27. Where the husband frequently fell into violent passions, at which times he abused her and called her names, by which means he had so excessively frightened her as to occasion several fits of sickness; and when she was sick, he refused her all proper assistance, and in every respect behaved as a very bad husband, except beating her, with which he was not charged; had left her on the day of marriage without consummating, and did not come to cohabit for several months, adultery being also proved, the Court held this sufficient evidence of cruelty coupled with adultery whereon to ground a divorce a mensâ et thoro, Robinson v. Robinson, 2 Add. 27. A wife is not entitled to a divorce for cruelty unless it appear that she is a person of good temper, and has always behaved well and dutifully to her husband, Taylor v. Taylor, 2 Lee, 172; but to found a suit for cruelty it is not necessary that the conduct of the wife should have been entirely without blame. For the reason which would justify the imputation of blame to the wife will not justify the ferocity of the husband, Holden v. Holden, C. 459. There may be cases provoked by the wife, but unduly visited by the husband, in which the Court would not refuse to interfere; but if the conduct of the wife is inconsistent with her duties, and provokes the just indignation of the husband, she must seek the remedy in the change of her own manners. Harris v. Harris, 2 Hagg. C. 155; Best v. Best, 1 Add. 423. Where in a suit for divorce by reason of cruelty, at the instance of the wife, the wife put herself in violent passions, said provoking things to the husband, refused to come to dinner, sent |