wife; and dismissed the suit on the ground of delay, Betcher v. Betcher, Cons. Court of London, Mich. 1787, cited 2 Phill. 155.

Where the suit began Michaelmas term, 1812, and no further proceedings were taken until Michaelmas term, 1813, this was said to be such a delay as might have induced the Court ex mero motu to have dismissed the suit; but that it was certainly sufficient to do so the case being weak and the form imperfect, Walker v. Walker, 2 Phill. 155.

It has been held admissible in the Ecclesiastical Courts to plead facts which will account for the husband's delay in instituting proceedings, and as furnishing ground why the husband should not be precluded by reason of laches or acquiescence in his wrong, from proceeding in his suit; but it is not necessary to give evidence in support of such allegations, unless the wife set up such a defence as may render it necessary, Richardson v. Richardson, 1 Hagg. 10.

A husband who, on discovering his wife's adultery, commences a suit against her for divorce, but abandons it for want of funds, is not thereby barred from seeking a divorce at a subsequent period, Coode v. Coode, 1 Curt. 755.

Where a fact of improper behaviour, not absolutely criminal was alleged in 1820 to have occurred "in the latter end of 1810," the Court "She can cross-examine. The Court will

said,

scrutinize with due strictness, and with fair allowance for the difficulties of her case; and it might deem such a fact, if it stood alone, hardly sufficient to induce its admission; but, after all, it is the duty of the Court to consider how the delay originated, so as to produce this laxity in description, and whether she has not herself, in a great degree, created the difficulty of which she now complains." Mortimer v. Mortimer, 2 Hagg. C. 314.

Mere lapse of time is no bar in a woman, as various considerations may induce her to submit. It is no condonation, Popkin v. Popkin, 1 Hagg. 766. Vide, however, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 91. A woman not bringing her complaint immediately on discovery of the adultery is not barred from afterwards laying her case before the Court, Ferrers v. Ferrers, 1 Hagg. C. 135. (See also the cases there cited).

Where the parties separated under articles in 1853, and the husband went away and never violated the conditions of the articles, and the wife petitioned the New Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty, Cresswell, J. O., said, either she had no ground for then presenting a petition to the Old Court, or she advisedly abstained and preferred a private arrangement, I do not say the lapse of time is an absolute bar, but, I think that this, taken in connection with the deed of separation, is not a bonâ fide applica

tion for the wife's protection. Petition dismissed. Matthews v. Matthews, 34 L. T. 61.

There is no legal limitation of the time within which the husband may bring his suit, Nash v. Nash, 1 Hagg. C. 142; but it is matter for the observation of the Court, Mortimer v. Mortimer, 2 Hagg. C. 313.

Even in the case of the husband it is not invariably expected that he should show the time when the misconduct first came to his knowledge. It might be prudent and expedient to the success of his suit that he should do so, but it is not absolutely necessary; but forbearance in the wife unless where living in the same house with the husband's concubine, or some other equally glaring act, will not bar her remedy, Kirkwall v. Kirkwall, 2 Hagg. C. 279.

DESERTION.

Malicious desertion or "desertion without cause for two years or upwards," is a ground of judicial separation (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 16); but it was held before the passing of that act that such desertion is no bar to a divorce a mensâ et thoro, and the Court added: "In some countries desertion is a substantive ground of divorce at the prayer of the wife against the husband; but not even there, that I am aware of, does it license adultery on the part of the wife, or preclude

the husband from a sentence of divorce on proof of its commission, Sullivan v. Sullivan, 2 Add. 302; Reeves v. Reeves, 2 Phill. 125; Morgan v. Morgan, 2 Curt. 691; Dillon v. Dillon, 3 Curt. 94.

The authority to decree a judicial separation on the ground of desertion is a new one created by the statute 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 16.

And in that it differs from cruelty and adultery; and, therefore, if a husband who had deserted his wife before the Act, made, also before the Act, a bona fide offer to return, he would thereby bar the wife of any remedy by petition; but it would, of course, be otherwise since the passing of the Act. In other words section 16, is not retrospective, Brooks v. Brooks, 28 L. J., P. & M. 38.

The word desertion may not in all places mean the same thing. By section 21 provision is made for the protection of a deserted wife's earnings. There it means that the husband has absented himself, but has left the wife unprovided for, and such desertion must continue at the time of the protecting order: so that a bonâ fide offer to return and provide for her would take away her right to the order. By section 27, provision is made for dissolution of marriage on proof of "adultery coupled with desertion, without reasonable excuse, during two years and upwards." Here the Legislature could not have meant that the wife should be deprived of the right which had accrued by a subsequent offer of the husband

to return and cohabit with her, for by so doing she would condone the adultery. This is a compound offence, no part of which could be blotted out without condonation by the wife The 16th section gives a minor remedy for either portion of the compound offence, viz.: judicial separation for adultery, or for desertion without cause for two years; and there is no ground for saying that the husband can obliterate either, without condonation by the wife, when separate more than when they are combined. Either gives the wife a right of which she cannot be deprived without her concurrence; and the bonâ fides of any offer to return makes no difference, Cargill v. Cargill, 27 L. J., P. & M. 69.

Desertion without cause for two years and upwards, is a ground for judicial separation at the suit of either husband or wife.

The word "Desertion " necessarily implies that the act relied on is done contrary to the will of the person charging it. Per Cockburn, C. J., Ward v. Ward, 27 L. J., P. & M. 64, and Cresswell, J. O., Thompson v. Thompson, 27 L. J., P. & M. 68.

The fact of separation is not conclusive proof of desertion, though it is evidence of it, Ward v. Ward, ubi sup. Nor is the fact of a man leaving his wife to live with another woman, Ib.

In November 1843, C., who resided at Birkenhead, went to Birmingham, where his wife joined him, and after living with him a few days at an