and, consequently, that, where it was proved by an examined copy of the marriage register, and by proof of the respondent's handwriting, that he had married again, leaving his wife, the petitioner should also have proved adultery with the person with whom the form of marriage was so gone through, as that they lived together as man and wife; and that it would not be sufficient to prove a bigamous marriage with one woman and adultery with another. Per Pollock, C. B., Horne v. Horne, 27 L. J., P. & M. 50.

Where a sentence of dissolution of an English marriage has been pronounced by a foreign court on a ground on which it was not liable to be dissolved in England, it was held that such a sentence cannot be recognised in the English courts as a dissolution of the marriage, Rex v. Lolley, R. & R. 237; and, as it is not otherwise a sentence of separation from bed and board and mutual cohabitation than by dissolving the marriage, it cannot be recognized in our courts as equivalent to a 'sentence of judicial separation, Robins v. Dolphin, 27 L. J., P. & M. 24.

Where an Englishman, domiciled in England, Steth married an English lady, afterwards separated

from her by deed, and fifteen years afterwards

went to Scotland, and having there committed law.con

adultery, his wife followed him, and obtained a decree from the Scotch Court dissolving the marriage, on the strength of which he married again,

English Jusion,

Sit was held there being no allegation or evidence that he had given up his English house, or had left England without intention of returning, or gone to Scotland with the intention of remaining there-the case was governed by Rex v. Lolley, R. & R. 237, and Conway v. Beazley, 3 Hagg. 639; and that the marriage was not dissolved, Robins v. Dolphin, 27 L. J., P. & M. 24.

Where adultery and cruelty were both charged in a suit for a divorce promoted by the wife against the husband, it was held unnecessary to prove the cruelty, Smith v. Smith, 2 Phill. 67. It seems, therefore, that the Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes will, in a suit for a divorce promoted by the wife against the husband, under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 27, by reason of incestuous adultery, or of bigamy coupled with adultery, or of adultery coupled with such cruelty as without adultery would have entitled her to a divorce a mensâ et thoro; or of adultery coupled with desertion, on failure of the double proof required for a sentence of divorce, nevertheless pronounce a sentence of judicial separation in the same suit, on proof of adultery only, or of cruelty only, as the case may be; for it has been held that where the suit is for dissolution, judicial separation may be granted, Smith v. Smith, 28 L. J. P. & M. 17.

But where a petition is addressed in the first instance to the "Judge Ordinary" for any matter

within his jurisdiction, there is some difficulty as to obtaining a sentence of divorce, see post, Appendix, note to Form 24.

ERROR.

This is a ground for invalidating a marriage and is canonically of four sorts:

1. Error de Personâ, as the marrying A. in mistake for B.

2. Error Conditionis, as the marrying a slave believing her to be free.

3. Error Fortuna, where one is deceived as to a woman's fortune.

4. Error Qualitatis, where there is some error as to rank or character of one of the parties.

Of these the first is the only one recognised by our law as invalidating a factum of marriage. See post "Nullity of Marriage."

FORCE.

Matrimony contracted by force is, of course, from the very definition and essence of the marriage contract, as arising from the consent of parties, void, ipso jure, for consensus non concubitus facit matrimonium.

The menace or other means employed must, however, be such as would reasonably create an

impression of fear in the mind of a man or woman of average courage and resolution; and such fear, it would seem, must be either of death or some actual bodily harm, otherwise it will not operate to annul the contract. But, further, see Harford v. Morris, 2 Hagg. C. 423, et seq. See also Wakefield's case, McQueen's H. L. Prac. 426.

Matrimony contracted under the influence and by reason of fear is null and void ipso jure. But this must be such a fear as may reasonably happen to a person of fair resolution, and must include either fear of death or else bodily torment; and even then if spontaneous cohabitation be continued for any length of time, the cause of fear is presumed to cease, and the marriage becomes good, Ayliffe Parergon. X. lib. 4, tit. 1. cap. 6 and 21.

IDENTITY.

Identity must be proved by extrinsic evidence, and that more especially when confession forms any part of the evidence, Williams v. Williams, 1 Hagg. C. 305.

It is a clear rule, founded on the necessity of the case, that the identity must be proved by other testimony than that of the parties themselves; it must be proved by witnesses who can speak from their own personal knowledge, Searle v. Price, 2 Hagg. C. 190.

Where a suit is for dissolution of marriage, the Court, having no power under the Acts whereby it is constituted, see 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 45, and the old rules of the Ecclesiastical Courts not applying to such suits, cannot order the attendance of a respondent in order to identification by witnesses, Hooke v. Hooke, 28 L. J., P. & M. 29.

IMPOTENCY.

Of this there are two kinds-Frigidity, or the having a latent incapacity for coition, and Malformation, which affords visible proof of incapacity. In the first case, triennial cohabitation is necessary to found proceedings for a divorce, Lewis v. Lewis, Arches, 1702, quoted 2 Lee, 579. In the second case, triennial cohabitation is not required, Welde v. Welde, 2 Lee. 578.

If there be a doubt, the parties must cohabit three years; and if in that time the marriage be not consummated, the law presumes impotency, Nov. 22, tit. 6, de Impotent.

An inspection on which virginity is returned, and the woman's oath, is full proof. Decret. 4, 15, 7, & 2, 19, de Prob. c. 4; but Judicium obstetricum est fallax. Dec. Rot. Rom. decis, 14.

It is necessary that it should appear to the Court not only that the man is impotent but that he is likely to continue so; for if there is a probability of capacity, the Court cannot separate the par