suffering and the injury to limb or health sustained by the servant.

Technically speaking, the action for seduction falls under the principle we are now discussing; but we do not propose to treat of it here, since, although nominally, it is not substantially a part of the Law of Master and Servant.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE MASTER'S LIABILITY ON

CONTRACTS MADE

BY HIS SERVANTS IN HIS NAME.

Ground and extent of liability.-Authority to servant; in writing or verbal, express or implied.-Ratification of servant's acts by master.-Master holding out servant as his agent.—Right of third persons to assume that servant is master's agent.-Limitation and revocation of servant's authority.

A MASTER may be liable to third persons for the acts of his servants, on the ground that they have either entered into contracts, or committed wrongs, for which he is responsible. In the present chapter, we shall deal exclusively with the liability of the master in respect of contracts.

That liability is based solely and entirely on the ground that the servant is the agent* of the master, and that he has his authority, either express or implied, for doing the act or entering into the contract for which it is sought to make the master answerable.

* Many persons, such as infants and married women, who cannot make valid contracts on their own behalf, may nevertheless, as agents for others, do acts which will be binding upon the persons whom they represent. A master may, therefore, be liable upon the contract of his servant (provided that it was in other respects binding), although such servant were an infant or a married woman.

Before we proceed to inquire in what manner servants may become agents of, or may bind, their masters, there is one general proposition which it may be convenient to lay down. It is, that it makes no difference in the master's liability whether a contract is made, or an order given,* in his name or in that of his servant, supposing that the latter were in fact acting as his agent, or that he contracted under circumstances which warranted a third person in assuming him to be his agent. It will in all such cases be a question of fact, to be decided, like any other question of the same kind, by evidence whether the servant acted on his own account or on that of his master.

No agent can bind his principal beyond the scope of his authority; but this proposition requires to be supplemented by another:-That in certain circumstances the general public, or some part of them, or a particular individual, may, from the acts of the master, have a right to assume, as against him, that such authority exists, whether it has or has not in fact been given. It is, therefore, in order to avoid confusion, requisite to consider separately each mode in which a master may incur liability for the contract

of his servant.

* Where, however, a servant or other agent has signed a written contract in his own name, he cannot give parol evidence to discharge himself from liability on the contract. That, however, will not prevent the other party from giving parol evidence to charge the master, by showing that it was really on his behalf that the contract was entered into, or the order given.

In the first place, a servant may, either in writing* or by word of mouth, be authorized by his master to do a particular thing or to make a particular bargain. It is clear that, in this case, his authority is strictly limited by the letter of his instructions, and supposing that he is dealing with a person who has had no previous transactions with him on account of his master, the latter will not be responsible for anything he does inconsistent with his orders. It is the duty of a person to whom another comes for the first time, professing to be the agent of another, to ascertain whether he really has that character, and with what amount of authority he is entrusted. If he does not ascertain these facts correctly, or chooses to give the agent credit beyond his authority, he must accept the consequences. In this case, at all events, the liability of the principal will be strictly confined to the authority he has expressly conferred upon the agent.

But then a master may give his servant express authority to act for him, not merely in reference to one transaction, but in all transactions of a particular kind. For instance, a merchant may give his manager authority to buy and sell goods on his account, or to

If the fact that a servant is acting under a written authority from his master is disclosed to or becomes known to the person with whom he purposes to deal on behalf of his master, such third person should insist on seeing the written authority; because, after he has become aware that it exists, he will only be justified in giving credit to the master according to its terms, and will not be able to charge him in respect to anything inconsistent with or beyond those terms.

do these and other things usually done by the manager of a given business; or the master of a house may give one of his servants authority to buy goods of a particular kind-say, for instance, a butler to buy wine, or a coachman to buy hay and corn for his horses. In that case the servant will be considered to have all the authority necessary for transacting the business entrusted to him, and which is usually entrusted to agents employed in the like capacity. The authority will not, however, be held to go further. If the butler were to take to buying corn and provender for the horses, or the coachman were to go and order wine, the master would not be liable; and, on a similar principle, an authority to buy or to sell goods on the part of the master will not cover any transactions or engagements, wholly collateral to the sale, into which the servant may choose to enter. For instance, it has been held that a servant sent to sell a horse had authority to bind the master by a warranty of soundness given at the time of the sale, in order to effect it, and as part of the transaction; but that, on the other hand, the master would not be liable on a warranty given after the sale, and as a wholly independent transaction.

In order to render the master liable upon a bargain made, or contract entered into, by his servant on his account, it is not necessary that authority should have been given to the servant before the transaction. If, after a servant has entered into a contract in the name of his master, the latter adopts, recognizes, and ratifies it, he will be liable upon it exactly in the same