another in' anything but 'favourable weather' | they would be dangerous ships. The SubCommittee recommend for their safety a superstructure. With this, they state, 'these ships would be both safe and steady amongst waves of a period not longer than 10 seconds. Amongst waves of a longer period they would roll considerably; but with superstructures they would not be unsafe.' The Committee on Design publish the Report of the scientific Sub-Committee, which reports these ships unsafe under certain ordinary conditions without superstructures; but finding that these superstructures would interfere with the all-round fire of the guns, recommend that no superstructure shall be added. Truly valuable ships, which, if left able to fight-the purpose for which they are intended-must run the risk of rolling over if employed in going from port to port; or, if made safe for a coasting voyage, will be incapacitated for fighting an action in stormy weather in the narrow seas! Shade of Drake! what would he have thought of such a condition for ships to attack a Spanish Armada? Is the Duke of Somerset not more than justified in his friendly criticism on the SHIPS THAT WON'T SWIM'? He cover their reputation, determine to show what stror men they are, and sacrifice both the admirals to save themselves. In the first place, it must be obvious to the public conscience, that it is wrong to punish any one without giving him an opportunity to defend himself. This, unless the Prerogative is again to set up the Star Chamber, is still the privilege of every Englishman. The sacrifice of Admiral Wellesley is probably the meanest act ever perpetrated by public men. A year ago he was Commander-in-Chief in North America; a command was, however, required for an excellent officer, the brotherin-law of the Secretary of State for War. The command of the Channel Fleet falling vacant, a telegram was sent to Admiral Wellesley, asking him to resign the most important command in peace, except the Mediterranean, which an Admiral can hold, and to take command of the Channel Fleet. declined; a further communication was madé to him, that there was a possibility of war, and that he was looked to as the man to command the Channel Fleet. Under these circumstances he had no alternative but to accept the command forced upon him; and the brother-in-law of the minister was cleverly provided for in a pleasant command. Admiral Wellesley came home and found that our Ministry had determined not to go to war, and that he had been juggled out of his command under false pretences. The change of station brought, of course, its expenses, and the Channel command was less highly paid than the North American. The Admiralty were so afraid of exposure, however, that they increased the pay, especially, for Admiral Wellesley, in command of the Channel Fleet. And now this man, on whom a year ago they relied (or said they relied), above all others, to command a fleet in war, is deprived of his command without trial for what is at the worst but one slight error in judgment, which could not have happened if he had been well supported by the officers appointed for this special purpose. Our chronicle of naval events would not be complete if we omitted to notice the grounding of the Agincourt,' and the mode in which it has been dealt with by the Admiralty. The squadron is coming out of the bay of Gibraltar. To save coal (one of the chief hobbies of this Admiralty) it is to be kept well out of the strong current running through the Straits. The squadron is what, with a single ship, would have been called well clear of all danger. Admiral Wellesley's ship was clear of danger, and it is idle to say that the second in command was so rigidly bound by the prescribed order of steaming to run stem on to a well-known danger, any more than he would have been bound to run over a P. and O. steamer if he had met her in the Straits steering across the path of the squadron. Admiral Wellesley was no doubt shaving it close, but he had no right to expect from an able, experienced officer like Admiral Wilmot such unreasoning pipeclay obedience, to the manifest risk of the line he was leading. However, the mistake being made, and a display of vigo-ble to the country should have the selection rous and active seamanship having saved the ship, a court-martial investigates the matter, tries the captain and two officers of the Agincourt,' and inflicts on them what it considers sufficient punishment. The Admiralty, who feel that with the Megæra,' and 'Slaney,' and Psyche,' and 'Captain' lost, and the general course of their administration much discredited, something must be done to re Two points of detail here arise for consideration; and first, we think that the old plan, which allowed an Admiral to select his staff officers, should be revived. It is for the public good that the officer who is responsi of those who are to carry out his orders. Á complete chain of responsibility can never be established unless all the staff are men whose peculiarities are known to the Commanderin-Chief, and on whose zealous and friendly co-operation he can fully rely. The same argument holds good with regard to the second officer, be he commander or first lieutenant, in every ship. The captains should select, Smollett's famous advice: When the sick sailor complains, give him the key of the medicine chest and stop his grog, and he will be sure to give you no more trouble.' But the surgical duty cannot be so easily disposed of. It will not do to hand the surgical instruments to the wounded man. We have one slight glimpse of the rage had occurred in the Straits of Malacca. Fifteen persons claiming British protection had been murdered. Captain Robinson, of the 'Rinaldo,' was called upon by the Governor of the Straits to inflict the necessary punishment upon these freebooters. He at once proceeded to perform his duty in a manner that shews that there is not any decay of spirit in the officers and men of the Navy. Condign punishment is inflicted, and in doing so eleven of our men are wounded, and there is no medical officer to attend to their wounds. It is gratifying to believe that, so soon as this was known at the Admiralty a medical officer was appointed to the Rinaldo.' under certain restrictions, and we should then | see discipline maintained in a more harmonious manner. Secondly, we earnestly trust that no ignorant popular outcry will lead to the abolition of the class of Navigating Of ficers. It is a mistake to suppose that, because one carefully trained officer is appointed to take charge of the details of navigation, therefore all the other officers, from the cap-working of this economy. A piratical outtain downwards, must be supposed to know nothing about it. The captain ought to be a good seaman, a good navigator, a good gunner, a good drill; but he has to superintend all, and time would fail him for his other duties if he were to attempt personally to perform the hourly duties which devolve upon the navigating officer. Constant observations for the latitude and longitude by day and night, constant observations to correct the compasses and establish their deviation, variation, and local attraction; the care of all the sounding apparatus, the certainty that men can steer and take the lead, the care of the anchor-gear and groundtackle and steering apparatus; the care of the charts, of the instruments, and of the winding and rating of the chronometers; the care of the stowage of the hold, of the economical issue and use of stores, and of the accurate survey of unknown anchorages, the due record of every occurrence in the ship's log; at sea constant attention to the position on the chart, and, in going in and out of harbour, the supervision of the pilotage, give him quite enough for one man to attend to. If you make the captain do all these duties personally, you must appoint another captain to do captain's work; if you leave it to be done by any lieutenant, it will not, in many cases, be so well done as at present, because a young lieutenant will ordinarily be selected for the duty, and the duties named require practice and experience. Besides, the navigating officer is expected to be a pilot for the English Channel, and, in war, ships will be lost if you have not an officer so qualified. We trust, therefore, that this valuable class will not be improved out of the English Navy. The Admiralty, however, if not prepared to add the details of the navigating duties to the already serious labours of a captain, seem to have determined that he shall at least be responsible for the duties of the medical officers. Among the economies of the present Ministry has been a reduction of the numbers of medical naval officers, and their want may be seriously felt at any moment. But in the Navy, not only medical but surgical duties are required. The medical duty may perhaps be performed if the Admiralty will only reprint, for the use of officers, The wasted time of Parliament this Session prevented that inquiry into the supply of stores for the Navy, and especially of coal, which is so necessary; but the fright which Government received last year has led them to do something to replenish the foreign coal depôts, though we fear the quality is still very inferior. Fortunately, too, for the country, Mr. Childers and Mr. Baxter have left the Admiralty. We may hope for honest and straightforward information from Mr. Goschen, so far as he knows; and we have a political Secretary who is not likely. to undertake, on his own unchecked responsibility, the duties of purchase and sale. The present Government have, however, added nothing to the ironclad navy since they came into office, except completing, in a dilatory manner, the ships commenced by their predecessors. We have FIRST CLASS. Hercules, built by the Duke of Somerset. Royal Alfred, built by the Duke of Somerset. | best men of all ranks are arbitrarily compel Repulse Duke of Somerset. led to retire. Take two cases. Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Kellet is Commander-in-Chief in China,-n -no man more active, or, looking to his great reputation and experience in those seas, more difficult to replace. Yet on a given day he becomes sixty-five, and his command ends, to the great loss of the country. In the spring certain information was required as to some of our ironclads, which were unjustly suspected. Captain Richard Ashmore Powell, who had recently served as Commodore in the Pacific, was an officer who had great general and special experience in the service and in command of ironclads. His opinion was justly looked upon as exceptionally valuable. He was appointed to the 'Vanguard,' to report upon that ship and others of her class. Within a month or two of his appointment, and before he had reported, he became fifty-five. He was anxious to serve, he is hale and active, and no better or more trusted officer exists; but the Admiralty, before they could receive a Report from an officer appointed by them a short time before, with the approbation of the profession, suddenly cut this experienced officer short in his career and send him into retirement. The command of the Channel Fleet itself The Monarch' is the Duke of Somerset's also, and 'Glatton' and 'Hotspur' are the creation of the Conservative Admiralty. The Rupert' is, indeed, the only vessel which is the creation of Mr. Childers's Administration. For we have already discussed the monstrosities which, under the names of 'De--which was to be a school for admirals, as vastation,' 'Thunderer,' Cyclops,'' Hecate,' Gorgon,' and 'Hydra,' disfigure alike the Navy List and the sea, and have been reported on so unfavourably by the Committee on Design, and none of which are yet ready for commission, We must, however, admit that this Government has done something to increase our gunboat classes. The 'Staunch,' built by Mr. Corry, is an admirable example, and some ten, at least, of a similar type are in course of construction which will do good service in the protection of our ports. We have not space to go into the evil effects of Mr. Childers's scheme of Naval Retirement. Suffice it to say that it has arrested all promotion, and entirely destroyed the spirit of just expectation of promotion which formerly encouraged, in ever so slight a degree, the zealous naval officer. The country was persuaded into the belief that the considerable sum it had to pay for compulsory retirement would give a flow of promotion and younger officers. The reply is, that there is literally now hardly any promotion, and that in the year now elapsed only 1 flag-officer, 6 captains, 13 commanders, and 27 lieutenants have been promoted, and there have been 71 cadets entered; whilst 977 officers in the lower ranks pine hopelessly for expected advancement. And yet still the well as other officers and seamen-is given in a manner which shews that all the boast about obtaining an efficient list of flagofficers, by a costly and cruel retirement scheme, has ended without effecting the desired result. Mr. Childers's private secretary commands the Flying Squadron; Sir Sydney Dacres' flag-captain is appointed to sueceed the ill-used Admiral Wellesley in command of the Channel Fleet, this officer having been constantly employed in good commands for many years past. The whole profession is in a state of ferment. There is no longer the happy aspiration, 'Shall I live to fight a successful action? Shall I enrol my name on the record of fame? Shall I too achieve a peerage or Westminster Abbey?' but the sole question is, 'How soon shall I be forced to retire? how soon will my neighbour be forced to retire? and which of the manifold schemes of retirement will be the most profitable?' The Admiralty, as administered by Mr. Childers, has signally failed; but we hope to see, even if the Liberals continue in office, that the Navy shall again become an honourable profession, and not a grasping, cheeseparing trade. Unless this happens, and hap pens speedily, the public spirit which has animated in happier days our naval councils is gone for ever. ART. VI.-1. Report on Turnpike Trusts. | characteristics which they possess in common, 1871. so that we may be able to recognise and 1868. 2. Return of Railway Amalgamations. define them. It is a matter of much more serious and practical interest to ascertain what is the best way in which they may be managed and regulated so as to obtain the greatest possible advantage from them. 3. Annual Railway Statistics. Public General Acts relating to Railways. Tramways Act. 1870. 4. Gas and Waterworks Clauses Acts. 1847. THERE is always danger that a new principle, when it has once found acceptance, will be invested with a degree of absoluteness and universality which no principle of human action can deserve; and that it will be applied without reference to the circumstances under which alone it is true, or to the modifications to which, under all circumstances, it is subject. And there is the further danger, that when this is found out, a re-action may set in against the principle itself, and cause it to be abandoned in cases to which it properly applies. The latter danger is, perhaps, the more serious of the two. It would be difficult and probably fruitless to attempt to deal with these questions à priori or by way of deduction. The more practical and satisfactory, though more tedious, plan, is to take the several undertakings of which we are speaking in detail, to ascertain their several characteristics, and then to examine the manner in which they | have been hitherto dealt with, and the manner in which it may be possible to deal with them hereafter. The following is, so far as we can ascertain, a tolerably complete list of these undertakings:-Harbours and natural Navigations, Canals, Docks, Lighthouses, Roads, Bridges and Ferries, Railways, Tramways, Gasworks, Waterworks, the Post-office, and Telegraphs. In some of these, e. g. Docks, Railways, Gasworks and Telegraphs, competition has been attempted; whilst others have either in the hands of private undertakers or of Government been monopolies from their commencement. But in none of them has competition proved to be successful, or even, in the long run, possible. It is of great importance that this point should be kept steadily in view, since it is only in those cases which competition cannot regulate, and in which monopoly is inevitable, that the questions we are discussing can arise. Something of this kind seems to have happened in the case of one of the leading principles, if not the leading principle, of political economy; viz. the doctrine that individual interest, if let alone, will do more to produce wealth than any organised action of Government,' and of the inference that this motive power, coupled with its natural governor, competition, is sufficient to regulate all cases where one man produces what another wants. The great masters of the science have, of course, always recognised, more or less distinctly, the limits of this Is there, then, any general characteristic principle; but in practice and common opi- by which these undertakings, or others of a nion it has often been carried too far. At similar kind, may be recognised and disthe present moment we are exposed to all tinguished from undertakings which are gothe dangers of reaction. There is a strong verned by the ordinary law of competition? tendency on the part of the public to call for Government interference on all sorts of pretences in all sorts of cases, in many of which it can do nothing but harm. At such a moment it is not inopportune to endeavour to ascertain in one special and exceptional department of human industry how far the above principle is applicable; what are its limitations; and, where it fails, what can be substituted for it. No one can doubt that there is a large and constantly increasing class of industrial undertakings, which are of the utmost value to the public, and which return ample profit to the capital and industry bestowed on them, but which yet are not and cannot be regulated by competition. It is a matter of some speculative interest to ascertain what these undertakings are, and what are the It is not large capital, for though most of them require large capital, some gas and water companies, which are complete monopolies, have capitals of not more than two or three thousand pounds; whilst other enterprises, with enormous capitals, e. g. banks, insurance offices, shipping companies, are not monopolies. It is not positive law, for few of them have a monopoly expressly granted or confirmed by law; and in most, if not all, of the cases where such a monopoly happens to have been so granted or confirmed, it would have existed without such grant or confirmation. They all agree in supplying necessaries. But this alone is no test, for butchers and bakers supply necessaries. Most, if not all, of them, have exclusive possession or occupation of certain peculiarly favourable portions of land,-e. g. docks, of the river-side; gas and water companies, of the streets. But this is only true in a limited sense of such undertakings as the postoffice, telegraphs, or even of roads and railways; and a mine, a quarry, or a fishery, has equally possession of specially favoured sites without generally or necessarily becoming a monopoly. The article or convenience supplied by them is local and cannot be dissevered from the possessor or user of the land or premises occupied by the undertaking. The undertaking does not produce an article to be carried away and sold in a distant market, but a convenience in the use of the undertaking itself, as in the case of harbours, roads, railways, post-office, and telegraphs; or an article sold and used on the spot where it is produced, as in the case of gas and water. Again, in most of these cases the convenience afforded or article produced is one which can be increased almost indefinitely, without proportionate increase of the original plant; so that to set up a rival scheme is an extravagant waste of capital. There is also in some of these undertakings, and notoriously in the cases of the Post-office, of telegraphs, and of railways, another consideration, viz., the paramount importance of certainty and harmonious arrangement. In the case of most industries -e. g. in that of a baker—it would be easier to know what to do if there were one instead of several to choose from; but this consideration is in such a case not paramount to considerations of cheapness. In the case of the Post-office and Telegraphs, certainty and harmony are the paramount considerations. The inconvenience would be extreme if we had to consider and choose the mode of conveyance every time a letter is dispatched, or if a telegram sent from any one station could not be dispatched to all other stations. The following then appear to be the characteristics of undertakings which tend to become monopolies : 1. What they supply is a necessary. 2. They occupy peculiarly favoured spots or lines of land. 3. The article or convenience they supply is used at the place where and in connection with the plant or machinery by which it is supplied. 4. This article or convenience can in general be largely, if not indefinitely, increased, without proportionate increase in plant and .capital. 5. Certainty and harmonious arrangement, which can only be attained by unity, are paramount considerations. These conclusions are neither as clear or as complete as could be wished. And though interesting in a speculative point of view, they do not lead immediately to any important practical consequence. But the further question which we proposed to consider, viz., what is the best mode of dealing with these undertakings, is one which has a direct bearing on many problems-economical, political, and social-which are pressing for immediate solution. The two great alternatives seem to be: (1.) Ownership and management by Private Enterprise and Capital. (2.) Ownership and management by Government, Central or Local. In the former we include all cases in which those who undertake the work derive personal gain from capital which they invest in it; and in the latter all cases, whether of management by the central government, by municipal bodies, by local boards, or by pub. lic trusts or commissions, in which no private capital is invested, except by way of loan, and no profit made by individuals. Before entering in any detail upon the examination of these two alternatives, it will be interesting to see how they have been regarded by competent authorities in this country and in France respectively. The following are Mr. Mill's observations on this subjeet (Political Economy,' vol. ii. chap. xi. s. 11): 'The third exception which I shall notice to the doctrine that Government cannot manage the affairs of individuals as well as the individuals themselves, has reference to the great class of cases in which the individuals can only manage the concern by delegated agency, and in which the so-called private management is, in point of fact, hardly better entitled to be called management by the persons interested, than administration by a public officer. Whatever, if left to spontaneous agency, can only be done by joint-stock associations, will often be as well, and sometimes better done, as far as the actual work is concerned by the State. Government management is, indeed, proverbially jobbing, careless, and ineffective; but so likewise has generally been joint-stock management. The directors of a joint-stock company, it is true, are always shareholders; but also the members of a government are invariably tax-payers; and in the case of directors, no more than in that of governments, is their proportional share of the benefits of good manage ment, equal to the interest they may possibly ing the interest of their ease. have in mis-management, even without reckonIt may be ob jected, that the shareholders, in their collective character, exercise a certain control over the directors, and have almost always full power to |