Parker's case.

service.

In Parker's case, who was indicted for aiding the king's enemies, -Aiding the by entering into the French service in time of war between France king's enemies by entering and this country, the defence of the prisoner was rested upon the into the French ground of insanity; and a witness on his behalf stated, that his general character from a child was that of a person of very weak intellects; so weak that it excited surprise in the neighbourhood when he was accepted for a soldier. But the evidence for the prosecution had shewn the act to have been done with considerable deliberation and possession of reason; and that the prisoner, who was a marine, having been captured by the French and carried into the isle of France, after a confinement of about six weeks, entered voluntarily into the French service, and stated to a captive comrade that it was much more agreeable to be at liberty and have plenty of money than remain confined in a dungeon. The Attorney General replied to this defence of insanity, that before it could have any weight in rebutting a charge so clearly made out, the jury must be properly satisfied that at the time when the crime was committed the prisoner did not really know right from wrong. And the jury, after hearing the evidence summed up, without hesitation pronounced the prisoner guilty. (w)

Bowler's case.

-Shooting at wounding him.

a person and

Thomas Bowler was tried at the Old Bailey on the 2d July, 1812, for shooting at and wounding William Burrowes. The defence set up for the prisoner was, insanity occasioned by epilepsy; and it was deposed, by the prisoner's housekeeper, that he was seized with an epileptic fit on the 9th July, 1811, and was brought home apparently lifeless, since which time she had perceived a great alteration in his conduct and demeanor; that he would frequently rise at nine o'clock in the morning, eat his meat almost raw, and lie on the grass exposed to the rain; and that his spirits were so dejected that it was necessary to watch him, lest he should destroy himself. Mr. Warburton, the keeper of a lunatic asylum, deposed, that it was characteristic of insanity occasioned by epilepsy for the patient to imbibe violent antipathies against particular individuals, even his dearest friends, and to have a desire of taking vengeance upon them from causes wholly imaginary, which no persuasion could remove, and that yet the patient might be rational and collected upon every other subject. He had no doubt of the insanity of the prisoner, and said he could not be deceived by assumed appearances. A commission of lunacy was also produced, dated the 17th of June, 1812, and an inquisition taken upon it, whereby the prisoner was found insane, and to have been so from the 30th of March last. (x)

Mr. Justice Le Blanc, after summing up the evidence, concluded by observing to the jury, that it was for them to determine whether the prisoner, when he committed the offence with which he stood charged, was incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, or under the influence of any illusion in respect of the prosecutor which rendered his mind at the moment insensible of the nature of the act he was about to commit: since in that case he would not be legally responsible for his conduct. On the other hand, provided they should be of opinion that when he committed the offence he was capable of distinguishing right from wrong, and not under the

(w) Parker's case, tried by a special commission, in Horsemonger-lane, 11th of February, 1812, for high treason, Collis. 477.

(2) The report of this case, in Collison on Lunacy, 673, does not state the day on which the prisoner shot at W. Burrowes.

influence of such an illusion as disabled him from discerning that he was doing a wrong act, he would be amenable to the justice of his country, and guilty in the eye of the law. The jury, after considerable deliberation, pronounced the prisoner guilty. (y)

In Bellingham's case, who was tried for the murder of Mr. Per- Bellingham's ceval, a part of the prisoner's defence, not urged by himself but by case.-Murder. his counsel, was insanity; and upon this part of the case, Mansfield, Chief Justice, is reported to have stated to the jury, that in order to support such a defence it ought to be proved by the most distinct and unquestionable evidence that the prisoner was incapable of judging between right and wrong; that in fact it must be proved beyond all doubt, that at the time he committed the atrocious act with which he stood charged, he did not consider that murder was a crime against the laws of God and nature; and that there was no other proof of insanity which would excuse murder, or any other crime. That in the species of madness called lunacy, where persons are subject to temporary paroxysms, in which they are guilty of acts of extravagance, such persons committing crimes when they are not affected by the malady would be, to all intents and purposes, amenable to justice; and that so long as they could distinguish good from evil they would be answerable for their conduct. And that in the species of insanity in which the patient fancies the existence of injury, and seeks an opportunity of gratifying revenge by some hostile act, if such a person be capable in other respects of distinguishing right from wrong, there would be no excuse for any act of atrocity which he might commit under this description of derangement. (2)

So where on an indictment for murder, it appeared that the pri- Offord's case. soner laboured under a notion that the inhabitants of Hadleigh, and particularly the deceased, were continually issuing warrants against him with intent to deprive him of his liberty and life, the great Judge, who tried the case, told the jury that "they must be satisfied, "before they could acquit the prisoner on the ground of insanity, "that he did not know, when he committed the act, what the effect of it, if fatal, would be, with reference to the crime of murder. The question was, did he know that he was committing an offence "against the laws of God and nature ?" and his Lordship expressed his complete accordance in the observations of C. J. Mansfield in the last case. (a)

In the recent trial of Oxford, for shooting at the Queen, Lord Oxford's case. Denman, C. J., told the jury, " Persons prima facie must be taken "to be of sound mind till the contrary is shewn. But a person may "commit a criminal act, and not be responsible. If some controlling "disease was, in truth, the acting power within him which he could "not resist, then he will not be responsible. It is not more im"portant than difficult to lay down the rule by which you are to be "governed." "On the part of the defence, it is contended that the "prisoner was non compos mentis, that is (as it has been said) unable "to distinguish right from wrong, or, in other words, that from the

(y) Bowler's case, Old Bailey, 2d July, 1812, Collis. 673, in the note.

(z) Bellingham's case, Old Bailey, 15th May, 1812, Collis. Addend. 636. "I will not refer to Bellingham's case, as there are some doubts as to the mode in which

"that case was conducted." Per Sir J.
Campbell, Atty. Gen. in Reg. v. Oxford,
9 C. & P. 533.

(a) Reg. v. Offord, 5 C. & P. 168,
Lord Lyndhurst, C. B.

Hadfield's case.

-Shooting at the king.

66

"effect of a diseased mind he did not know at the time that the act
"he did was wrong."
Something has been said about the power
"to contract and to make a will. But I think that those things do
"not supply any test. The question is, whether the prisoner was
"labouring under that species of insanity which satisfies you that he
"was quite unaware of the nature, character, and consequences of
"the act he was committing, or, in other words, whether he was under
"the influence of a diseased mind, and was really unconscious at
"the time he was committing the act, that it was a crime?" (b)

James Hadfield was tried in the Court of King's Bench, in the year 1800, on an indictment for high treason, in shooting at the king, in Drury-lane theatre; and the defence made for the prisoner was insanity. It was proved that he had been a private soldier in a dragoon regiment, and in the year 1793 received many severe wounds in battle, near Lisle, which had caused partial derangement of mind, and he had been dismissed from the army on account of insanity. Since his return to this country he had been annually out of his mind from the beginning of spring to the end of the dogdays, and had been under confinement as a lunatic. When affected by his disorder, he imagined himself to hold intercourse with God; sometimes called himself God, or Jesus Christ, and used other expressions of the most irreligious and blasphemous kind; and also committed acts of the greatest extravagance; but at other times he appeared to be rational, and discovered no symptom of mental incapacity or disorder. On the 11th of May preceding his commission of the act in question his mind was very much disordered, and he used many blasphemous expressions. At one or two o'clock on the following morning, he suddenly jumped out of bed, and alluding to his child, a boy of eight months old, of whom he was usually remarkably fond, said he was about to dash his brains out against the bed post, and that God had ordered him to do so; and upon his wife screaming, and his friends coming in, he ran into a cupboard and declared he would lie there, it should be his bed, and God had said so; and when doing this, having overset some water, he said he had lost a great deal of blood. On the same and the following day he used many incoherent and blasphemous expressions. On the morning of the 15th of May he seemed worse, said that he had seen God in the night, that the coach was waiting, and that he had been to dine with the king. He spoke very highly of the king, the royal family, and particularly of the Duke of York. He then went to his master's workshop, whence he returned to dinner at two, but said that he stood in no need of meat, and could live without it. He asked for tea between three and four o'clock, and talked of being made a member of the society of odd fellows; and, after repeating his irreligious expressions, went out and repaired to the theatre. On the part of the Crown, it was proved that he had sat in his place in the theatre nearly three quarters of an hour before the king entered; that at the moment when the audience rose, on His Majesty's entering his box, he got up above the rest, and presenting a pistol loaded with slugs, fired it at the king's person, and then let it drop; and when he fired his situation appeared favourable for taking aim, for he was standing upon the second seat from the orchestra in the pit;

(b) Reg. v. Oxford, 9 C. & P. 525. Lord Denman, C. J., Alderson, B., and Patteson, J.

and he took a deliberate aim, by looking down the barrel, as a man usually does when taking aim. On his apprehension, amongst other expressions, he said that "he knew perfectly well his life was forfeited; that he was tired of life, and regretted nothing but the fate of a woman who was his wife, and would be his wife a few days longer, he supposed." These words he spoke calmly, and without any apparent derangement; and with equal calmness repeated that he was tired of life, and said that "his plan was to get rid of it by other means; he did not intend anything against the life of the king; he knew the attempt only would answer his purpose.

The counsel for the prisoner (c) in his very able address to the jury, put the case as one of a species of insanity in the nature of a morbid delusion of the intellect, and admitted that it was necessary for them to be satisfied that the act in question was the immediate unqualified offspring of the disease. And Lord Kenyon held that as the prisoner was deranged immediately before the offence was committed, it was improbable that he had recovered his senses in the interim; and although, were they to run into nicety, proof might be demanded of his insanity at the precise moment when the act was committed; yet, there being no reason for believing him to have been at that period a rational and accountable being, he ought to be acquitted. (d)

The application of the rules and principles laid down in these Application of cases to each particular case as it may arise, will necessarily in many the rules and instances be attended with difficulty; more especially with regard to the foregoing principles of the true interpretation of the expressions, which state that the cases. prisoner, in order to be a proper subject of exemption from punishment on the ground of insanity, should appear to have been unable “to distinguish right from wrong," or to discern " that he was doing a wrong act," or should appear to have been "totally deprived of his understanding and memory;" as even in Hadfield's case his expressions when apprehended, that "he was tired of life," that "he wanted to get rid of it," and that "he did not intend anything against the life of the king, but knew that the attempt only would answer his purpose;" seem to show that he must have been aware that he was doing a wrong act, though the degree of its criminality might have been but imperfectly presented to him, through the morbid delusion by which his senses and understanding were affected. But it is clear that idle and frantic humours, actions occasionally unaccountable and extraordinary, mere dejection of spirits, or even such insanity as will sustain a commission of lunacy, will not be sufficient to exempt a person from punishment who has committed a criminal act. And it seems that though if there be a total permanent want of reason, or if there be a total temporary want of it when the offence was committed, the prisoner will be entitled to an acquittal; yet, if there be a partial degree of reason, a competent use of it, sufficient to have restrained those passions which produced the crime; if there be thought and design, a faculty to distinguish the nature of actions, to discern the difference between moral good and

(e) The late Lord Erskine, then at the bar.

(d) Hadheld's case, Collis. 480. The verdict of the jury was "Not Guilty, it ap

VOL. L

pearing to us that he was under the in-
fluence of insanity, when the act was
committed."

Proceedings with respect to lunatic offenders.

evil; then, upon the fact of the offence proved, the judgment of the law must take place. (e)

In Alison's Principles of the Criminal Law of Scotland, (ƒ) and there is no difference between the law of England and the law of Scotland with reference to insanity, it is said, that "to amount to a complete bar of punishment, either at the time of committing the offence, or of the trial, the insanity must have been of such a kind as entirely to deprive the prisoner of the use of reason, as applied to the act in question, and the knowledge that he was doing wrong in committing it. If, though somewhat deranged, he is able to distinguish right from wrong, in his own case, and to know that he was doing wrong in the act which he committed, he is liable to the full punishment of his criminal acts." (g)

If a man in his sound memory commits a capital offence, and before arraignment for it he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner become mad, he shall not be tried, as he cannot make his defence. If, after he is tried and found guilty, he loses his senses before judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced; and if after judgment he becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed; for, peradventure, says the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory, he might have alleged something in stay of judgment or execution. (h)

And, by the common law, if it be doubtful whether a criminal, who at his trial is in appearance a lunatic, be such in truth or not, the fact shall be investigated. (i) And it appears that it may be tried by the jury, who are charged to try the indictment (k) by an inquest of office to be returned by the sheriff of the county wherein the Court sits (7) or, being a collateral issue, the fact may be pleaded and replied to ore tenus, and a venire awarded returnable instanter, in the nature of an inquest of office. (m) And if it be found that the party only feigns himself mad, and he refuses to answer or plead, he would formerly have been dealt with as one who stood mute, (n) but now a plea of not guilty may be entered under the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 28, s. 2.

But in case a person in a phrenzy happen, by some oversight, or by means of the gaoler, to plead to his indictment, and is put upon his trial, and it appears to the Court upon his trial that he is mad, the Judge in his discretion may discharge the jury of him and remit him to gaol to be tried after the recovery of his understanding, especially in case any doubt appear upon the evidence touching his guilt,

(e) Per Yorke, Solicitor-General, in Lord Ferrers' case, 19 Howell's St. Tri. 947, 948, et per Lawrence, J. Rex v. Allen, Stafford Lent Assizes, 1807, MS. And see also upon the subject of insanity, Lord Thurlow's judgment in the AttorneyGeneral v. Parnther, 3 Br. Cha. Ca. 441. (ƒ) P. 654.

(g) Cited by Sir J. Campbell, Att.-Gen. in Reg. v. Oxford, 9 C. & P. 532.

(h) 4 Bla. Com. 25. 1 Hale, 35.

(i) 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 1, s. 4. If there be a doubt as to the prisoner's sanity, a jury ought to be sworn to try the question.

Ley's case, 1 Lewin, 239. Hullock, B.

(k) Bac. Abr. Idiot (B.) 1 Hale, 33, 35, 36. 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 1, s. 4, note (5). (1) Hawk. P. C. c. 1, s. 4. Somerville's case, 1 And. 107. 1 Sav. 50, 56. 1 Hale, 35.

(m) Fost. 46. Kel. 13. 1 Lev. 61. 1 Sid. 72. And the proceeding by inquest ex officio is recommended in cases of importance, doubt, or difficulty. 1 Hale, 35. Sav. 56. 1 And. 104. See 1 Hawk, P. C. c. 1, s. 4, note (5).

(n) 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 1, s. 4.