to define the proper limits of treating. A similar view was taken in the House of Lords in the session of 1852; and it was on that occasion contended by several noble lords, that there was no legal definition of treating, and that there were forms of it entirely innocuous. During the discussion on the North Cheshire case, before alluded to, Sir R. Peel is reported to have said, "As to the distribution of 2s. 6d. tickets, he ventured to say that before the enactment of the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 102, s. 22, the same question which then agitated the House would equally have arisen, namely, the question whether it be rational to admit this moderate degree of treating or no, a question and a difficulty which had been engendered and left unsettled by the state of the law, as it existed for 150 years." If a strict interpretation of the statutes as to what constituted treating, was to be sought for in the decisions of committees, and in the expression of opinion by individual members of the Legislature, there might be considerable difficulty in defining what it was. There must ever be a great variety of opinions among the many members of either House. Some have openly declared, that they think the distribution of a moderate amount of liquor and other entertainments at elections, a thing rather to be approved of than blamed. And in estimating the value of the conflicting decisions of committees, it is necessary to bear in mind what are the functions which they have to discharge. A committee act as judges of the law as well as of the fact; and it is seldom possible to ascertain whether they consider the facts not sufficiently proved to establish the guilt of the parties, or whether they consider the facts proved as not coming within the law. The recent statute may be said to define treating, as the corrupt giving by a candidate, or his agent, of meat, drink, or entertainment before, during, or after an election, in order that the candidate may be elected, or in order that the votes of the persons receiving the entertainment may be thereby influenced, or in order that the votes of some other persons should be thereby influenced. In order to become liable to the pecuniary penalty, the candidate must either himself authorise the entertainment, or be accessory to it, or give it a subsequent sanction by paying for the whole or some part of the expenses incurred in such treating. Whether the seat of a member may not be avoided by the illegal acts of an agent, done without his knowledge or sanction, is another question, which will be considered afterwards in the section, "what corrupt acts will avoid an election." It will be seen that the new statute speaks of a candidate "corruptly giving" meat, &c., and of his doing so "for the purpose of corruptly influencing persons with regard to their votes." It is proposed, therefore, to consider what acts will be deemed corrupt, and what will be the evidence of a corrupt intention. In the first place, as to what acts are corrupt, the statute prohibits the giving of any meat, &c., whatever the amount may be, if it be given to the voters in order to influence their votes. As yet, no judicial interpretation has been put upon this section; but several cases have come before the Courts of law, in which questions have been raised as to the liability of candidates to pay for refreshments ordered by themselves or their agents. These cases, however, have in general turned upon the point whether the credit was given to the candidate, or to some person unconnected with him, and it has not been necessary to decide what acts were corrupt. In one case, Ribbans v. Crickett (a), where an innkeeper brought an action to recover the amount of a bili for provisions furnished to voters at the request of the candidates, the Court, in deciding that the action could not be maintained, stated their view of what acts would be illegal. Eyre, C. J. "This action is apparently founded on a contract to disobey the law, being to provide entertainment for voters during an election. The contract is bottomed in malum prohibitum, of a very serious nature in the opinion of the Legislature, as appears by the preamble of 7 & 8 Wm. 3, c. 4; how then can we enforce a contract to do that very thing which is so much reprobated by the act? I am perfectly aware that great difficulties may arise from construing this act rigidly, but perhaps still greater will arise if it be not so construed. It is true that a voter who comes from a distance may have reason to complain, if he is not provided with necessaries; but it is also obvious that if the candidate can supply him, he may supply himself. If any exception is to be allowed for voters not resident, the whole mischief complained of in the act will necessarily follow. It will be impossible for the candidate to make a distinction between those voters who reside at a distance, and those who live within half a mile of the place of voting. The Legislature has drawn a strict line which is not to be departed from; it says, that after the teste of the writ no meat or drink shall be given to the voters by the candidate; and that (a) 1 Bos. & Pul. 264. being the case, this Court cannot give any assistance to the plaintiff, consistently with the principles which have governed the Courts of justice at all times, and with the cases which have been cited this day. Persons who engage in this kind of transactions must not bring their case before a Court of law." Were a penal action to be brought against a candidate for corruptly supplying electors with provisions, in order thereby to influence their votes, a jury would probably be told, that the amount of refreshment given to each elector was immaterial, for the statute has prohibited the giving of any refreshment. It is clearly impossible to draw a line, and say how much meat and drink may be allowed to be given without infringing the law. A pint of beer may have as strong an influence on the vote of one man as a gallon upon another. When a statute prohibits any refreshment to be given, it cannot possibly sanction the giving of any quantity. An opinion, however, has prevailed that the distribution of 2s. 6d. tickets, or small amounts of refreshment, is not a violation of the law. Such a view of the law is entirely at variance with the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas in the case of Ribbans v. Crickett (a), before cited. In the later case of Hughes v. Marshall (b), Lord Lyndhurst, C. B., in delivering the judgment of the Court of Exchequer, that an innkeeper might recover the cost of provisions supplied to voters, which had not been ordered by the candidate, or by any one acting for him, but were supplied at the request of, and on the individual (a) 1 Bos. & Pull. 264. : credit of the defendant, proceeded afterwards to consider whether there was any evidence that the treating there disclosed, though not falling within the statute of Wm. 3, might nevertheless amount to bribery at common law and he there observes, "It does not appear that the parties to whom these refreshments were furnished had not previously voted; in the next place, it does not appear whether they resided in the town, or came from a distance, which might make it requisite for them to have moderate refreshment. It is to be remarked also, that the expenses are inconsiderable when compared with the number of persons who shared the refreshments. There is nothing, therefore, to shew that bribery took place to influence the election." It must be remembered, that the learned judge does not say that in a case under the statute it would have been necessary to shew that the parties had not voted, or that they resided in the place, or that the refreshments were extravagant. The court had already decided that the case was not within the Treating Act, as the candidate was in no way, directly or indirectly, connected with the ordering of the entertainments, and then the court proceeded to consider whether there was any evidence of the transaction having amounted to bribery at common law. According to the state of the law with regard to bribery when this case was decided, gifts after an election, without a precedent promise, did not amount to bribery. The opinion, therefore, recently expressed in both Houses of the Legislature, that there is a description of treating not forbidden by statute, and that moderate refreshment may be given to voters coming from |