a distance, is quite at variance with the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas in the case of Ribbans v. Crickett, and is certainly not supported by what fell from the Court of Exchequer in the case of Hughes v. Marshall.

As has been already observed, it is not easy to determine what has been the view of election committees on this matter, for it is seldom possible to extricate the judgment on the law from the verdict on the facts.

In the Herefordshire case, 1 Peck. 184, it was admitted by the counsel for the sitting members, "that the smallness of the sum, or of the entertainment given, is a circumstance of no importance as to the crime, provided they had the effect of influencing the election, or were given with a corrupt intent" (a). In the Middlesex case, 2 Peck. 32, the charge of treating was held to be established, although "the entertainment afforded to the voters was not proved to have been by any means extravagant, nor was it at all charged, or insinuated, that it was given them for the purpose of influencing their votes, or for any other purpose, than merely for their necessary refreshment." In this case the committee took the same view of the statute as the Court of Common Pleas in the case of Ribbans v. Crickett.

The smallness of the amount of refreshment given is in general brought forward to show that the conduct of the candidate or his agents could not have been

(a) It was said that the sum paid being divided among the number of voters entertained, left about 9d. for each man; 1 Peck. 197.

corrupt, or for the purpose of corruptly influencing voters. The defence of the system of giving dinners, or 2s. 6d. tickets to voters on the day of election after they have voted, has usually been rested on this ground. It is said, how absurd to suppose that a voter can be influenced by a dinner given after he has voted.

This leads to the second point for consideration, what evidence will be required of the act having been done in order to be elected, or for the purpose of influencing the voter or other person, and it is probably the most important question connected with the law of treating. The words, "in order to be elected," are the same as those used in 7 Wm. 3, c. 4; and in the cases of Ribbans v. Crickett and Hughes v. Marshall, it appears that the court in each case did not consider it necessary to shew any corrupt intention towards the voters. Lord Lyndhurst, in the latter case, points out the distinction, "if the provisions were furnished with a view to influence the election, such conduct would be illegal at common law, and no action would be maintainable. If bribery is brought home to the party, he is guilty of an offence at common law, and can maintain no action."

In the Herefordshire case (a) already cited, the whole question was very fully and ably argued. It was contended for the sitting member, "that the Legislature had distinctly pointed to the guilty purpose and intention of the offender as a constituent part of the crime; and that he must have committed it in order to be elected; so that the intention was essential to

(a) 1 Peck. 184.

the offence, and must be proved. That the statute was passed to prevent bribery by treating-that where the amount of entertainment given was small, and could not bias the voters, it was not reasonable to suppose it was given for a corrupt purpose-that the tickets given at the election in question could not have been given in order to influence the votes, because they had been given by all the candidates, agreeably to a plan previously concerted between them." On the other hand, it was argued on behalf of the petitioners that, "An act wilfully committed against the law, is of itself sufficient evidence of an intention to break the law; that where any act is malum prohibitum the intent to do that act, is an unlawful intent, and it is no answer for a man to say he did not intend the mischief against which the law has endeavoured to guard. That the giving anything to a voter during an election was forbidden; but, that the gift of money to a physician, a manufacturer, or an object of charity, or entertainment to a friend, who happens to be also an elector, is not criminal, because it is not given to them as voters, but as persons standing in other relative situations to the giverthat it was not pretended in that case, that the persons who received the money and provisions received them in any other character than as voters-that the argument that the acts could not have been done in order to be elected, because all the candidates did the same, was an extraordinary one to excuse a crimethat no doubt all of them did it, but they all of them did it "in order to be elected"-that as to the smallness of the sums given, the maxim de minimis non

curat lex, was never before applied to a crime, or to an act of disobedience to the law." The committee adopted the view contended for by the petitioners, and avoided the election.

In the Middlesex case (a), the provisions were distributed to voters at an inn by the orders of the agents of the candidate, other persons also agents undertook to pay for these refreshments. The entertainment was not by any means extravagant, and it was not charged or even insinuated that it was given to the voters for the purpose of influencing their votes, or for any other purpose, than merely for their necessary refreshment; the counsel for the candidate, thus implicated by the conduct of his agents, considered the charge so clearly made out, that he declined to address the committee in his defence. It does not appear that there was any evidence to affect the candidate personally, but the committee reported, that W. M. did by his agents commit acts of treating, whereby he was incapacitated to serve upon such election.

There are several reported cases, where committees have refused to avoid the election, although there has been evidence given of the distribution of meat and drink to the electors. It is impossible to ascertain from the finding "that the sitting member was duly elected," whether the committee disbelieved the evidence, or thought there was no sufficient proof of agency, or took a merciful view from feelings of commiseration, or whether they were of opinion that the

(a) 2 Peck. 31.

entertainment, though given in contravention of the statute, was not done with a corrupt intention (a).

In a recent case, New Windsor, 1853, the committee reported "that Lord C. W. was duly elected""that treating to a considerable extent appeared to have existed at the last election, but that such treating was not proved to have taken place for the purpose of corruptly influencing voters, or to have been by the order or with the sanction of Lord C. W. or his agents."

If the treating was not proved to have been ordered, or sanctioned by the sitting member or his agents, there can be no doubt that the committee were right in upholding the election. The former part of the resolution, that there was no proof of a corrupt purpose seems to proceed on an incorrect view of the law. It is submitted that the view taken by the counsel for the petitioners in the Herefordshire case, is the correct one. The intention to corruptly influence voters is evidenced by the giving of the entertainments. In this very case of New Windsor, the agent of the sitting member stated the object of certain meetings at public houses, where drink was given away, to be, "to counteract the large meetings that the other parties were holding at public houses, and to ascertain the feelings of the different voters" (b). The existence of improper practices on behalf of one party at an election, constantly begets similar conduct

(a) Radnorshire, 1 Peck. 494; Shaftesbury, F. & F. 376; Chester, C. & D. 68; Wigan, B. & Arn. 788. (b) Printed Minutes, p. 112.