Suppose two candidates, each to expend fifty pounds at the election in entertaining voters, one of them on the polling day only, and the other on a day antecedent to the nomination day, could the former be declared capable of sitting and the latter ineligible?

There can be little doubt that in a court of law each would be considered equally guilty of treating, and therefore subject to the penalty of fifty pounds. Should this clause remain long unrepealed, there may probably be some judicial interpretation of the two sections. As it is, it can hardly fail of seriously embarassing committees desirous of honestly carrying out the law, and of putting an end to all extravagance and corruption at elections.

When cases of treating are inquired into by a committee of the House of Commons, if the acts charged are not those of the candidate himself, the agency of the guilty parties must be proved before any evidence can be received of the acts themselves. It has been uniformly held that the 4 & 5 Vict. c. 57, which so much facilitates the proof of charges of bribery, does not apply to cases of treating.

In the Cambridge case, B. & Arn. 184, a resolution was come to on the subject. Resolved

"1. That the stat. 4 & 5 Vict. c. 57, cannot be taken to apply to treating, unless such treating can be shown to have influenced some particular vote.

"2. That counsel must not go into evidence as to acts of treating, which cannot be shown to have influenced some particular vote, unless such acts are

35 Geo. 3, c. 29, s. 19, with regard to the distribution of cockades, &c. at Irish elections has been pointed out, ante, p. 116.

charged to have been committed by parties previously shown to be agents of the sitting member, except where the evidence which is intended to prove the treating cannot be separated from that which is intended to prove the agency."

The question of agency in cases of treating is governed by precisely the same principles as it is in cases of bribery, or undue influence. Whenever a candidate has so far entrusted the affairs of his election into the hands of another person, as to become responsible for acts of bribery committed by such person, he will be equally responsible for any acts of treating or undue influence that may be committed by him. The inquiry therefore into the principles, which govern election agency will be postponed until after the consideration of the remaining species of corrupt practices, viz. "undue influence at elec

tions."

2. Undue Influence.

For a long time it has been matter of regret, that no sufficient means existed for punishing divers mischievous practices, which interfered materially with the proper freedom of elections. Voters were often abducted, or carried away, sometimes by force, sometimes by stratagem. A practice has been often resorted to of cooping voters, that is to say, locking them up in a house, and so barricading the entrances, that their friends were unable to obtain access to them. Many voters have often been deterred by threats of

personal violence, or loss of custom from voting, or were, by the same means, compelled to vote against their real inclination and conviction for some other candidate. When cases of this description were mentioned in election petitions, they were inquired into, and were occasionally specially mentioned in the reports of the committee to the House. The validity of the elections, however, were not affected by them, unless, indeed, such a number of voters had been carried away as would have turned the scale against the sitting member. Thus in the Cockermouth case, 1853, Print. Min. 147, the committee reported the sitting member to be duly elected, but they at the same time specially reported "That Mr. R. B., the accredited general agent of Mr. A., the sitting member, was a party to the removal to the house of a relative, of a voter who had promised to vote for General W., with a view of preventing the said voter from voting as he had intended." Two other cases of "undue influence" were also reported by the same committee as having taken place without the sanction or privity of the sitting member or his agents.

Such conduct on one side almost invariably leads to retaliation on the other, and a struggle then takes place as to which side will be the cleverest in kidnapping the voters of the other. In order to remedy this mischief, another practice equally pernicious was called into existence. Bands of men were employed as watchmen to guard voters; these men were quartered all over the place, in different public houses; and a most liberal allowance of meat and drink was constantly supplied to them. This latter practice occasioned a twofold evil-bribery towards the pub

lican, in whose house the voters were placed, and indiscriminate treating of the electors. Often ten or twenty of these guards, or roughs, or fighting men, as they were called, were quartered in a public house as a consideration for the support of the publican. It was very difficult in such a case to trace the corrupt bargain, but the result was obvious-it secured the vote of the publican. Again, as a cloak to treating electors: orders were loudly given by agents, &c., that none but these roughs, or non-electors should receive meat and drink, but the taproom was open to all, the landlord did not take any great pains to ascertain the character of the persons entering his house, and in this way a vast amount of corrupt treating has taken place at elections, and too often with impunity. Many committees have of late perceived the mischief arising from this employment of "protectors," and have made reports on the subject. Thus, in the New Windsor case, 1853 (a), the committee reported, inter alia, "That a practice appears to have prevailed at recent elections for the said borough of hiring, and employing large bodies of men for the purpose of protecting voters and preserving order: the committee are of opinion, that such a practice leads to the incurring of excessive and exorbitant expense, and is, on other grounds, demoralising and pernicious; but they are also of opinion, that this evil has been mainly caused by the insufficiency of the arrangements made at recent elections for the said borough, and by the inadequacy of the police" (b).

(a) Printed Minutes, vi.

(b) Upon this report to the House, a petition was pre

The employment of such bands of men constantly creates disturbance instead of supplying the inadequacy of the police force in the place. Whenever the police force is not sufficient, the returning officer is bound to swear in special constables to keep the peace. In the 1st Clitheroe (1853) (a), the committee reported, "That violent and tumultuous proceedings appear to have taken place at the said election, and that hired bands of men, armed with sticks and bludgeons, were introduced into the said borough for purposes of undue influence and intimidation." Another instance of the same sort of conduct is pointed out in the report in the Bewdley case (1848) (b), "That it was proved before the committee, that a practice prevailed at the borough of Bewdley, in the last election, as well as in that of 1841, of carrying away and treating electors, and that in consequence of this system large bodies of men were employed on both sides for the alleged protection of voters; that almost every public house and beer house in the borough was kept open during the week of the election, and drink given away to a large extent."

Another species of undue influence, which has for a long time seriously interfered with the freedom of

sented by a justice of the borough, complaining of the statement that the police was inadequate; and that he had not been permitted to be examined before the committee to contradict the statements on that subject, on account of his having been in the room. In this petition he alleges that a force of sixty additional constables had been sworn in to protect the borough from these "protectors." See 108 Journals, p. 360.

(a) 2 P. R. & D. 30. (b) 1 P. R. & D. 76.