done by an agent on behalf of a candidate will avoid the election and disqualify the candidate, whether he sanctioned them or not, and whether he pays for them or not. There will be no distinction between the responsibility for cases of treating and for cases of bribery. It seems hardly necessary to insist upon so wellknown a rule of Parliamentary law, except that, as has been already pointed out (a), a contrary opinion has been recently put forth. And it has been contended by an able author, that committees require proof that the treating went on, not only with the knowledge, but by the desire and at the charge of the candidate (b). This doctrine is certainly not consistent with any reported decisions of committees. In a recent case, Huddersfield (c), it was argued, that the law was less stringent now than it used to be, and that since the passing of the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 102, s. 22, it was necessary for the petitioners to show that the treating, which had been carried on by the agents of the sitting (a) Ante, p. 119. (b) Warren on Elect. Com. 531. Two authorities are cited in support of this position, the Newcastle-under-Lyme, B. & Aust. 445, and Lyme-Regis, ib. 529. In the first of these cases the committee came to no resolution on the subject of treating, probably because, as stated in the case (p. 445), the evidence was confused and contradictory, and the quantity of refreshment consumed was very small. The Lyme-Regis case was one of scrutiny, and the vote in question was struck off the poll, whether for bribery or treating is not clear. (c) 2 P. R. & D. 128. This decision or resolution was given after much consideration by the committee, which was presided over by a learned chairman conversant with the law of elections. The Right Hon. S. Walpole, Q. C. member had been paid for wholly or in part by him. This argument was then correct, so far as treating anterior to the teste of the writ was concerned; but it was pointed out on behalf of the petitioners, that the treating in the case had taken place after the teste of the writ, and was therefore governed by the statute 7 Wm. 3, c. 4. The committee resolved "that they are of opinion that the provisions of the 7 Wm. 3, c. 4, are neither repealed nor abridged by the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 102, s. 22. That they are also of opinion, that if any meat, drink, entertainment, or provision, shall, after the teste or issuing of the writ for any election, be directly or indirectly given, presented, or allowed by any candidate in any of the following ways: viz. first, by himself; or secondly, by any other ways or means on his behalf; or thirdly, at his or their charge, such acts are and must be deemed to be treating, within the provisions of the first mentioned statute." In this case the sitting member was unseated for the acts of bribery and treating done by his agents, although "it was not proved to the committee that either the bribery or treating were committed with the knowledge and consent of the sitting member." One committee seems to have sanctioned the correctness of this doctrine, that treating will not vitiate an election unless the candidate authorised it, or knowingly allowed it. The committee in the Dungarvan case, 1854 (a), reported inter alia, "that previous to, and during the election of 1852, several tierces of porter were ordered and paid for by James Boland, and supplied for the use of the tenants and voters on (a) Printed Minutes. different town lands, who were the friends and supporters of Mr. Maguire; and that the same James Boland was the person principally entrusted with the payment of the expenses of the election on behalf of Mr. Maguire; that the order, payment, and supply of this porter were without the knowledge of Mr. Maguire, and neither authorised nor knowingly allowed by him." The committee reported Mr. Maguire to be duly elected. They seem to have been alarmed at the extent of the disqualification created by the statute 5 & 6 Vict. c. 102, s. 22, for they state at the end of their report: "That it appeared to the committee that the disability (for the remainder of a Parliament) created by the peculiar language of the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 102, s. 22, was intended to be imposed only in the cases in which the candidate, by his own act, his own suggestion, his intentional allowance, or unequivocal adoption, made himself a party or privy to the act of corrupt treating." No doubt this was so; but the committee created the difficulty for themselves by entering on the inquiry (a). It appears from the report that the treating went on during the election, and the evidence shows that it continued even beyond the close of the poll (b). This therefore (a) This committee was also presided over by a learned member of the legal profession, the Right Hon. J. Napier, Q.C. The decisions of this committee were come to after long deliberation, but, though conscious of the weight that will be justly attached to the opinions of the learned chairman, it is submitted with all deference, that in the matter mentioned in the text, as well as in the matter hereafter to be considered, of jurisdiction, the decisions of this committee were at variance with the law of Parliament. (b) A supper was given to voters by the sitting member, fell within the statute of 7 Wm. 3, c. 4, under which act it was never necessary to show assent or payment on the part of the candidate. If then they had any jurisdiction to inquire into the proceedings at all, in 1854, the election of 1852 ought at once to have been declared void by reason of the treating during that election. But as this statute did not create a disqualification for the whole Parliament, which was first created by the act of Victoria, and as this latter act required proof of assent, or payment on the part of the candidate, the committee seem to have excluded all treating from their consideration that fell within. the act of William, that is to say, all that was subsequent to the teste of the writ. The new enactment entirely removes any difficulty that might have been created by this decision. Any act of treating done on behalf of a candidate, before, during, or after an election by an agent, without the knowledge or assent of the candidate, will disqualify him on that election; and a decision to that effect will disqualify him for the remainder of the Parliament (a). The same rules will no doubt be applied by committees in cases of "undue influence." And an election hereafter will be avoided in consequence of after the election, on the polling day, for which he paid, and at which he was present, ante, p. 136. (a) When the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act was under discussion in the House of Commons, it was proposed to limit the extent of this disqualification for the remainder of the Parliament, to cases where the treating had taken place with the cognisance of the sitting member, but this amendment was rejected, 109, Journ. 448. Here therefore is another recognition by the Legislature of the principle contended for in the text. I any act of violence, restraint, intimidation, abduction, or other description of undue influence committed by the agent of the candidate. Who are Agents?] Who shall be considered agents in an election is rather a question of fact than one of law. There are, however, a number of decisions upon the point as to what shall be sufficient evidence of agency. It is admitted on all hands that it is impossible that an election can be carried on without the employment of agents. Further, it is generally acknowledged "that the principles of agency derived from the transactions in private life cannot be applied with strictness to cases of electioneering agency" (a). And when the principles of general and special agency, as bearing upon mercantile affairs, or as administered by courts of justice, have been discussed at some length, it is generally admitted that these principles can only be applied in election transactions with essential modifications. There is this striking distinction between the rules governing common agency and electioneering agency, viz. that in the former, though a principal may be liable for the consequences of all legal acts done by his agent, he cannot be made responsible for illegal acts done by the agent unless they are done with his express authority. Thus, a master is answerable in trespass for damage occasioned by his servant's negli gence in doing a lawful act in the course of his service; but not so, if the act is in itself unlawful, and is not proved to have been authorised by the master; Lyons v. Martin (b). In an election inquiry, on the other (a) Rogers, p. 221, n. |