candidate had placed no other trust in him. In the Ipswich case (a), the committee appear to have attached importance to the circumstance of canvassing. In a recent case, Yarmouth (1848) (b), the committee held repeated acts of canvassing with the sitting members to amount to proof of agency. Other committees, however, have considered further evidence to be necessary, before they will make a candidate responsible for the acts of a person who has convassed for him, 2nd Sligo (1848) (c); Cockermouth (1853) (d). When a candidate takes little part in the business of the election, but intentionally delegates the duty of soliciting the support of the constituency to others, canvassing becomes strong evidence of agency. Committee, how far Agents.] The question whether a candidate is responsible for the acts of his committee collectively, and also for those of each member of the committee, is one on which different opinions have existed. In the case of Ridler v. Moore and Francis (e), Lord Kenyon told the jury that "the committee were collectively and individually agents, and that the defendants were answerable for every act done by any of them, in relation to the election." The accuracy of this position has been questioned, and it has been said that the rule has been laid down too broadly, and that a candidate ought only to be bound by the acts of his committee as a body, as there (a) K. & O. 343, 345. (d) Minutes, pp. 38 & 41, as to Wilson's agency, and 188 as to the agency of Senhouse and Rapley. (e) Clifford, 371. may be those on the committee in whose individual discretion he would feel no confidence (a). Committees of the House of Commons have on several occasions attached little weight to the mere fact of a person being on the committee; Cirencester case, 1 Peck. 466. So in the Oxford case, P. & K. 61, the committee resolved: "That no evidence should be given of what passed in the committee-room, without previous proof having been given of the agency of the parties concerned." The important points to be considered are these: was the committee selected by the candidate himself or his accredited agents? or, on the other hand, was it a self-constituted body? Again, was the candidate often present at the committee-room, was the business of the election conducted by the committee with the knowledge and assent of the candidate? Should a candidate take but a small share in the work of the election, and leave the main business to others, he thereby increases his responsibility for their acts. If he knew of the committee, and allowed them to give orders and incur expense for his advantage, he would probably, at the present day, be made liable for their acts. The case of Honeywood v. Geary (b) is an authority in support of the rule laid down in Ridler v. Moore and Francis. This was an action brought to recover from Sir W. Geary, a candidate, a part of the expenses of the plaintiff, who had also been a candidate at the election. During the polling, a proposition had been made by a friend of Mr. Honeywood to a Mr. Larkins, (a) Rogers on Com. 225. who was at the head of Sir W. G.'s committee, that Sir W. G. should have the benefit of Mr. Honeywood's second votes, if he would contribute to the expenses of Mr. H. at the election. This was agreed to. It was objected by Best, Serjt., for the defendant, that such a conversation could not be given in evidence: no direct communication with Sir W. G. was proved: he might have delegated a power to his committee to enter into such an agreement, but the committee constituted one body, and any orders to bind him should be the act of the majority of the committee; this was the act of Mr. Larkins only, and could not be obligatory either on the committee at large, or on Sir W. Geary. Shepherd, Serjt. for the plaintiff, contended, that each member of the committee had authority; they were delegated by Sir W. G. to act for him. He then cited the case of Ridler v. Moore; and relied on the fact, that Larkins was the chairman of the committee, and that he had given orders for every part of the conduct of the election; and evidence was then given to that effect. Mansfield, C. J., allowed the evidence as to the arrangement by Larkins to be given he observed, "That it had been proved that the committee had full authority to act for Sir W. G., that they had ordered chaises, and gave general orders respecting the election, which Sir W. G. adopted, and had the benefit of; he should, therefore, hold Sir W. G. bound by the agreement so made by Mr. Larking acting in that capacity." When a candidate thus delegates all authority to his committee, he will probably be held to be bound as in this case of Honeywood v. Geary, for their acts collectively and individually. In a case before cited, Mayo, 1853 (a), the sitting members had agreed to the nomination of a committee, to consist mainly of Roman Catholic priests, and they were to decide upon the claims of the candidates upon the representation of the county, and the whole business of the election was to have been delegated either to them, or to an independent club; there could be but little doubt that they filled the character of agents. Club, how far Agents.] This question must be governed by the same considerations as in the case of a committee. Did the candidate recognise the club as acting for him? did he attend their meetings? did he leave any portion of the legitimate business of the election in their hands? did he authorise them to spend money on his behalf? If he did, he ought to be made responsible for their acts. If it be said, that there might be members in the club in whose individual discretion the candidate would have placed no confidence, the answer is, that he can only blame himself for not having more carefully selected the persons who were to endeavour to secure his return. In the Newry case, P. & K. 151, where it appeared, that a club consisting principally of voters, had invited the candidate to stand; that the business of the election was carried on at the club; that several members of the club accompanied the candidate on his canvass; that the candidate attended meetings of the club almost every evening, on which occasions from thirty to fifty members were assembled ; the committee nevertheless decided, that the members of this club were not the agents of the candidate. A special report (a) Ante, p. 153. was made against the club for bribery, but the candidate was declared duly elected. In another case, Bristol (a), in the same year (1833), the committee resolved: "That judging from former precedents, they will not allow any act of the Operative Conservative Association to affect the sitting members, unless their connection be distinctly proved. They are, however, perfectly willing to hear any evidence that can be adduced, in order to prove that this society has, or has not, exercised an undue interference at the last election for the city of Bristol." The petitioners were unable to show any connection between this association and the sitting members, who were in consequence declared to be duly elected. Were a candidate at the present day to leave his affairs in the hands of a club, as was done at this Newry election, there can be little question that his seat would be in considerable jeopardy. Special Agency.] Where a person has been employed for a particular purpose only, his agency will not extend beyond the duties for which he has been engaged; when the particular service is completed, he will cease to be the agent of the candidate. In the case of Fenn v. Harrison (b), Mr. Justice Buller says: "There is a wide difference between general and particular agents. If a person be appointed a general agent, as in the case of a factor for a merchant residing abroad, the principal is bound by his acts. But an agent, constituted so for a particular purpose, and under a limited and circumscribed authority, cannot (a) P. & K. 574. |