bind the principal by any act in which he exceeds his authority; for that would be to say, that one man may bind another without his consent." To a certain extent the doctrine of limited agency has been recognised as applicable to election agency.

In the Durham case, 2 Peck. 185 (a), it having been proved that a person of the name of Brand had been employed by the sitting member at Durham to pay for the subsistence of non-resident voters, evidence was offered of some orders which he (Brand) had given respecting the employment and payment of certain resident voters. The evidence was objected to, on the ground that the proof of a particular authority did not let in evidence of acts not within the scope of that authority, and the committee desired the petitioners to call further evidence of general agency.

So also in the Cockermouth case, 1853, where it was proved that a person of the name of Rapley, who was the butler of General W., the sitting member, had been employed to pay the band and flag-bearers, the committee decided "that sufficient evidence had not been given to establish the general agency of Rapley" (b). In the New Windsor case (c), the petitioners gave in evidence that a person named Mander was managing clerk to the solicitor, the accredited agent of the sitting member; that this Mr. Mander had taken an active part in treating the electors. On the part of the sitting member the

(a) In this case it seems to have been admitted that the payment for the subsistence of non-resident voters was legal, but that it became illegal if they were resident. (b) Minutes, passim, and p. 102.

(c) Minutes, passim, and p. 109.

solicitor was called, and he thus described Mander's duty at the election: "He carried my bag with cards in it, and he directed circulars; he had the management of all the messengers; he paid the messengers, and Bunker and his men (a), and that, I think, is about the whole of his duty." The committee declared Lord C. W., the sitting member, to be duly elected; but whether they disbelieved the evidence, as to Mander's participation in the treating, or looked upon him as having only a limited authority at the election, does not appear. In the 2nd Taunton case, 1853, evidence was given that a man named Rollings had been engaged in bribery at the election. The only evidence to connect him with the sitting member was, that he had been employed by his accredited agent to look after and pay certain men employed as runners or watchers at the election. The committee upheld the election. Here also it does not appear whether they considered that Rollings was not a general agent, or whether they disbelieved the evidence as to the bribery.

This distinction between general and special agency can only be adopted in election inquiries with very great caution. It would be the constant defence for a candidate, when a person employed by him to do certain legal acts had been guilty of illegal ones, that the agent was employed solely and specially for the legal object. If this defence were generally allowed, it would put an end to the whole law with regard to election agency. In the case of Fenn v. Harrison,

(a) Ante, p. 149.

Buller, J., after saying that one man ought not to bind another against his consent, goes on to say: "There is a class of cases which have been thought to bear extremely hard upon masters, who are held liable for the misfeasance of their servants in driving their carriages against those of third persons; but those cases have been determined on the ground, that it must be presumed that the servants have acted under the orders of their masters. But suppose a master ordered his servant not to take his horses and carriage out of the stable, and the latter went in defiance of his master's orders; there is no authority which says that the master shall be liable for any injury done to another by such an act of the servant." In an election inquiry, however, the rule would be very different; one man can bind another against his consent; and if an agent disregards the injunctions of his principal and engages in illegal practices he will thereby render the candidate ineligible; Hertford, P. & K. 544; 2nd Cheltenham, 1848, Mins.

Where two candidates stood upon the same interest at an election, and had the same committee-room and managers, it was held that acts of bribery committed by an agent employed by one of the candidates, disqualified the other; that under such circumstances the agent of one was the agent of both; Ipswich, K. & O. 371.

It has been held that the general agency of one attorney at an election will not afford any evidence of the agency of his partner; Norwich, P. & K. 565. Where a person having canvassed a borough resigned in favour of his brother, who then made use of the same colours and houses, and employed the same

persons in the management of the election as the first candidate had done, it was held that these circumstances did not establish such a case of agency on the part of the first candidate as to allow his letters to be read in evidence against his brother; East Retford, 1 Peck. 479.

Agency, how proved.] Agency must be established in all cases, either by showing the authority given by the principal, or by the proof of acts on the part of the agent from which the authority can be inferred. It cannot be proved by the declarations of the agent. "One man cannot be charged with the offence of another because he calls himself agent." Per Buller J., Petrie's Cricklade case, 372. In the Dunfermline case, 1 Peck. 15, the committee refused to allow agency to be proved by the declaration of the alleged agent. "The agency ought to be proved by acts done." In the Great Grimsby case, 1 Peck. 76, a question was asked, "Who acted as agents for the sitting members ?" It was objected to as too general, and that agency ought to be proved, either by the declarations of the principal, or the specific acts of the supposed agent, from which the committee are to draw the conclusion whether he acted as agent or not. The committee decided, that the question should not be put. So also in the Shrewsbury case, 1807, Mins. 16th Feb., the committee refused to allow this question to be put : "Who were the active agents of the sitting member?"

The 4 & 5 Vict. c. 57, introduced an important change in the law with regard to the order of proof in cases of bribery. That statute refers to bribery only. Committees can now receive evidence upon the charge

of bribery before the agency of the parties engaged in it is established. This statute was not intended to make any alteration in the rules of evidence, so as to render that legal evidence which was not evidence before. All that was done was to invert the order of proof. This matter has been frequently discussed of late years before committees, when an attempt has been made to give in evidence declarations of parties in order to affect the candidates thereby. If these declarations are those of agents, they would have been legal evidence against the candidate by common law after the agency had been proved; and now by force of the statute 4 & 5 Vict. c. 57, they are evidence, as part of "those facts whereby the charge of bribery is to be sustained," and can be proved before the agency of the declarants is established. Nottingham case, B. & Arn. 168.

Some committees have imagined that this statute has allowed them to receive in evidence declarations of voters that they have been bribed. Such declarations never were legal evidence at any period of the inquiry, unless the voters could be proved to be agents. The committee in the Sudbury case, B. & Aust. 249, allowed the declarations of voters to be given in evidence, before agency had been proved, " inasmuch as they might have to report to the House upon facts of bribery, although not committed with the knowledge or consent of the sitting member or his agents." Even if this were so, the fact of the bribery must be established by legal evidence, which hearsay never can be, unless it proceed from a party to the suit. The 2nd Horsham committee, 1848, received these hearsay statements; Lyme Regis, 1848, also; 1 P. R. & D. 32. And the Kidderminster committee,