1848, allowed the statement of the wife of a voter, said to have been bribed, to be given in evidence; 1 P. R. & D. 266. See also similar cases in the same volume of Reports, 1 P. R. & D. pp. 16, 29, 217, 249.

During the session of 1853 the decisions of committees on this subject were very conflicting. In the Bridgenorth case, 2 P. R. & D. 18, the committee decided that the statement of a voter that he had received money for his vote was admissible evidence that he did receive money for his vote. The chairman afterwards intimated, in explanation of their resolution, that the words "admissible evidence" were intended to apply only to the evidence as against the voter himself. The evidence could not be given against the voter, because he was no party to the inquiry; the only person against whom the evidence was given was the sitting member. In the 2nd Taunton, 1853, Minutes, p. 21, such evidence was also received. In the case of the Wigton Burghs, 2 P. R. & D. p. 137, the committee refused to receive such evidence, and decided "that hearsay evidence ought not to be admitted, proof not having been given to the committee of the impossibility of producing, as evidence before the committee, the person to whom such hearsay evidence applies." Had it been impossible to produce the voter, on account of his absence from the country, or sickness or death, it would not have made this hearsay evidence admissible. The declaration was not of such a nature as to become evidence on the death of the declarant (a). In the

(a) 1 Taylor on Evidence, 438. A statement is only admissible in evidence on the death of the party making it, when it is against his interest, and that interest must be of a pecuniary nature; Sussex Peerage, 11 Cl. & Fin. 110.

Guildford case, 1853 (a), it was proposed to establish the whole charge of bribery by means of these declarations of voters, but the committee held that such evidence was inadmissible; and the case for the petitioner being thereupon abandoned, the committee decided that the charges were frivolous and vexatious, and that the costs of them should be paid by the petitioner. In cases of treating and undue influence, the agency of the parties engaged therein must be proved before. any evidence can be received of the corrupt acts themselves, or of any declarations made with regard to them. An exception has been made to this rule, that, when the circumstances which go to establish agency are so mixed up with the evidence of treating that they cannot conveniently be separated, the committee will allow the general evidence to proceed before the agency is established. They usually, however, intimate that they expect that counsel will prove agency as soon as possible; Cambridge, B. & Arn. 185; Wigan, B. & Arn. 790; Aylesbury, Bewdley, 2nd Cheltenham, 1848.

When once the agency of a party has been established all his acts may be given in evidence, and also all declarations made by him relative to the proceedings at the election; Kingston-upon-Hull, 2 P. R. & D. 97. In the Durham case, 1853 (b), it was proposed to give in evidence a conversation between the witness and the agent of the sitting member which had taken place some months after the election. This was objected to on the ground that the agency of the party holding the conversation terminated with the election, and that conversations with him as agent to the sitting

(a) 2 P. R. & D. 111.
(b) Printed Minutes, p. 52.

member, subsequently to that period, could not be received in evidence; it was answered, that, Mr. Ward having acted as agent during the election, admissions made by him were admissible. The committee allowed the questions to be put.

General Corruption.] An election might be avoided in consequence of corrupt practices, in which neither the candidate nor his agents took any part, if it could be established that the corruption was of so universal a character as to have influenced the result of the election; Rogers on Elections, 263. It is not probable, however, that such corrupt practices could take place at an election, without the candidate or his agents becoming cognisant of them, and being more or less implicated in them. Such might be the case when the corrupt practices used were those of undue influence only. An election might be secured by the exertion of undue influence by a mob, or some particular body of persons who might be altogether unconnected with the candidate; under these circumstances, there can be no doubt that the election would be void at common law. The candidate who had been returned by the use of such undue influence, exercised by persons, strangers to him, would probably not undergo the statutable disqualification of being incapable to represent that place during the Parliament. Whether he would under such circumstances be eligible to fill the vacancy created by his election being declared void seems very doubtful; probably he would not, because the second election being looked upon as a continuation of the first, the undue influence which secured his first election might be held to operate in his favour on the second.

5. How and when Corrupt Practices can be inquired into by a Committee.

It is proposed to consider in this section, when, and in what manner, it is competent for an election committee to inquire into the existence of corrupt practices at an election. The entire jurisdiction of election committees is limited and defined by the provisions of the statute (a) which calls them into existence. Some committees have shown a desire to extend their inquiries beyond these proper limits, and it is therefore essential that it should be clearly understood how far they ought to go.

And first, as to corrupt
This is the most usual

Inquiry on first Election.] practices at the last election. form of the inquiry. It is that which occupies the attention of committees immediately after a general election. The inquiry is then in the first instance, whether this election of the members returned was void by reason of the commission of corrupt practices by them or their agents. If the committee find that either bribery, treating, or undue influence were prac tised at that election, either by the sitting members themselves or their agents, they will report to that effect to the House; and then the statutable disqualification to represent that place for the remainder of the Parliament will follow.

(a) The statute at present in force for the trial of what are properly designated as election petitions is the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 98. The 5 & 6 Vict. c. 102, authorises an inquiry in certain cases into bribery at elections, but in such an investigation the validity of the election is not in question.

any can

Section 36 of 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102. "If didate at an election for any county, city, or borough, shall be declared by any election committee guilty by himself, or his agents (a), of bribery, treating, or undue influence at such election, such candidate shall be incapable of being elected or sitting in Parliament for such county, city or borough, during the Parliament in existence" (b).

It will be seen that the ineligibility for the remainder of the Parliament, is created by the candidate having been "declared" guilty of corrupt practices by himself or his agents. This declaration of guilt can only be pronounced by a committee legally constituted, to inquire into the circumstances. No committee can be appointed so to inquire, unless the petition praying for the investigation has been presented to Parliament in accordance with the statute; that is to say, within the time limited by the sessional orders of the House of Commons. If this time has been allowed to elapse, no inquiry can afterwards take place before an election committee into the conduct of the sitting member at that election. Whatever corrupt practices may have occurred, they cannot afterwards be brought forward so as to affect the seat of the sitting member.

Candidate not Returned.] The conduct of an unsuccessful candidate at an election may also be inquired into by the committee who are trying the

(a) It was proposed in the House of Commons to insert after the word agents in this clause, the words "with his cognisance," but the amendment was negatived. 109 Journ. p. 448.

(b) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102, s. 36.