case. Lyme, 1848 (a). It is usual to keep the cases of bribery distinct from those of treating. Each case of bribery should as far as possible be concluded before another is commenced, and committees usually require some special reason to be assigned for calling additional evidence upon a case which has been quitted (b). Sometimes the several cases of bribery, and also the charges of bribery and treating, are so mixed up together that it is impossible to keep them distinct.

In the 2nd Sligo case (c), where there were allegations of bribery, treating, outrage, abduction, and misconduct of returning officer, the committee determined that the cases of bribery should be gone through and completed and decided upon in the first instance, and that they would not call upon the counsel for the petitioners to state what course he would pursue as to the other allegations of the petition. This, however, is not the course usually followed. In general all the cases of treating are heard before any decision is come to upon the charges of bribery, and it may be expected that the same rule will be adopted as to charges of undue influence. The whole of these are now classed together as corrupt practices.

In one case the committee, at the commencement of their proceedings, came to the following resolution on this subject, which is unusual: "Inasmuch as the law applicable to the evidence necessary to establish a charge of treating differs from that applicable to

(a) 1 P. R. & D. 28-30.

(b) Bridgenorth, 2 P. R. & D. 20.
(c) 2 P. R. & D. 297.

bribery, the committee are of opinion that the part of the petition which relates to treating shall be proceeded with previous to any evidence being adduced with regard to bribery. They therefore request that counsel will confine themselves in the first instance to the charge of treating." Cockermouth, 2 P. R. & D. 165.

Where the charges of bribery had been abandoned on the part of the petitioners by the counsel in his opening statement, the committee refused to allow evidence of an act of bribery to be given when they were subsequently inquiring into a case of treating. N. Cheshire, 1 P. R. & D. 219.

Where the allegation in the petition was want of qualification, the counsel for the petitioner proposed that the committee should decide in the first instance on the sufficiency of the qualification, as it appeared on the particular, reserving to himself the right of calling witnesses to disprove the qualification if they should decide against him. The committee decided that the petitioner should proceed and go through with Lincoln, P. & K. 378 (a).

his case.

In one case, where bribery was charged and a scrutiny prayed, the scrutiny was proceeded with in the first instance. The petitioner had by striking off votes obtained a majority, and on his requiring that his majority should then be attacked, it was objected for the sitting member that the petitioner should then proceed upon the charge of bribery, and the committee instructed them to do so. Galway, P. & K. 516. This, however, is neither an expedient nor the usual

(a) Dublin, 1 P. R. & D. 204.

course of proceeding; in the case here quoted the charge of bribery failed, and the scrutiny was then resumed. In a recent case, in the middle of the scrutiny the counsel for the sitting member applied to the committee to direct the petitioners to proceed with or abandon the charges of bribery against the sitting member or his agents, before the sitting member attacked the votes of the petitioner, but the committee determined to proceed with the scrutiny. 1st Harwich, 1851 (a).

The manner of proceeding in cases of scrutiny will be considered hereafter. CHAPTER ON SCRUTINY.

When return amended.] Petitions against the return only are less frequent now than formerly. They usually arise when the returning officer has either accidentally or wilfully added up the votes incorrectly, and so returned the wrong candidate, or when he has improperly rejected votes which he ought to have received at the poll. The Middlesex case, 2 Peck. 338, and the Carnarvon case, P. & K. 106, are instances of improper adding up of the poll. The Canterbury case, K. & O. 131; the Waterford case, Bar. & Aust. 648; the Athlone, Bar. & Aust. 670, are instances of the improper rejection of votes. In such cases, when the mistake has been rectified, if the petitioner is thereby placed in a majority on the poll, the return is ordered to be amended by substituting the name of the petitioner for that of the sitting member; but leave is then given to the party so ousted, and to other persons entitled so to do, to question the election within fourteen days. See Athlone, Bar. & Aust. 670; Athlone, Bar. & Arn. 115.

(a) 1 P. R. & D. 311.

It is only when the return has been thus amended by correcting the errors committed in taking of the poll that time will be given to petition against the amended return. If the first petition had claimed the seat on the ground that persons improperly on the register or disqualified by some legal incapacity had voted for the sitting member, the committee appointed to try such petition would have been bound to go into the whole case of scrutiny if evidence had been offered, and also to hear charges of recrimination against the candidate on whose behalf the seat was claimed. In the cases cited above the seat was claimed on the ground of the erroneous return by the returning officer, and therefore the committee had no jurisdiction to enter upon the general merits of the election .Carnarvon, P. & K. 108; Waterford, B. & Aust. 649; Athlone, ib. 668.

This distinction between a petition against an election and one against the return only is of considerable importance, and was strikingly exemplified in a recent case. 2nd Peterborough, 1853 (a). In this case the sitting member was petitioned against on the ground of personal disqualification, this having been established by evidence, and notice thereof to the electors having been satisfactorily proved, the committee decided that the petitioner ought to have been returned. Upon that inquiry the unseated candidate did not offer any evidence in recrimination as he might have done, but allowed the return to be amended without bringing any charges of corrupt practices against the petitioning candidate. The return was amended by the Clerk of the Crown in the usual manner on the 15th August,

(a) 2 P. R. & D. 287.

Q

1853 (a). The prorogation of Parliament took place five days afterwards, on the 20th August. On the 31st January, 1854, being the first day of the next session (b) a petition was presented from certain electors of Peterborough praying for leave to question the return of the member who had been seated, and alleging excuses for not having gone into a case of recrimination at the time. When a motion was afterwards made, on the 3rd February, to allow these parties to present a sub-petition the motion was negatived without a division (c).

Witnesses how summoned.] Before the meeting of the committee, witnesses are summoned by the Speaker's warrant; after the meeting of the committee, the select committee also have authority (sect. 83 of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 98) to summon witnesses, and send for papers and records. The chairman who signs the summons for the attendance of a witness, can do so only when the committee is sitting; he has no power to do so during an adjournment. Reading, Bar. & Aust. 424, for the power is given to the select committee to send &c. (d).

It appears to have been agreed by the House of Commons in the session of 1842, that a Speaker's warrant had no vitality after the expiration of the session in which it was granted. In that year a Mr. Mabson had been committed to the custody of the Serjeant-at-Arms for disobedience to a Speaker's warrant, directing him to produce certain documents

(a) 108 Jour. 826.

(b) 109 Journ, 5.
(c) 130 Hansard, 219.

(d) See form of summons in Appendix.