Payments or

Rewards given after an Election.] rewards of any kind given after an election, in pursuance of a promise made before the election, were corrupt at common law, and also fell within the statute 2 Geo. 2, c. 24. The payments, &c., here intended to be prohibited, are payments made after the election where there has been no contract, express or implied, before the vote was given. It is in fact extending the penalties of bribery to that species of mischief which Bayley, J., held not to be within the 2 Geo. 2, c. 24 (a).

The words of the present statute are, or shall corruptly do any such act as aforesaid, on account of such voter having voted or refrained from voting at any election."

It is clear, Every reward

The use of the word "corruptly" in this part of the section may give rise to an argument that the statute only intended to prohibit payments where some arrangement express or implied had been made with. the voter before he voted; and, that unless some such understanding existed between the parties, the transaction cannot be deemed corrupt. however, that that is not the intention. given in pursuance of a previous arrangement is included in the earlier part of the section, which forbids the offering, promising, or agreeing to procure any reward for the voter, &c. This word "corruptly" in this part of the section is altogether unnecessary; if the reward is given on account of the voter having voted or refrained from voting, it is corrupt by force of the statute, and is made bribery. The evil intention exists in disobeying the statute and giving the reward

(a) 1 B. & C. 297.

to the voter, on account of the way in which he has behaved with regard to his vote.

This enactment is not altogether new, though it has been much extended. The 5 & 6 Vict. c. 102, s. 20(a), declared "the payment, or gift of money, or other valuable consideration whatsoever, to any voter before, during, or after any election, or to any person on his behalf, or to any person related to him by kindred or affinity, and which was so paid or given on account of such voter having voted, or having refrained from voting, whether the same was paid under the name of head-money, or any other name whatsoever, and whether such payment was in compliance with any usage or practice or not, to be bribery." This act was passed expressly to put an end to the practice of giving money to voters or their families after an election on account of their having voted for a candidate. This was not an offence before the passing of that enactment (b). The word "corruptly" is not used in the section at all. In the Durham case (c), which

(a) Repealed by 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102.

(b) Newcastle-under-Lyme, B. & Aust. 453, and see 1 B. & C. 297, sup. p. 90; Sudbury, 2 Doug. 137; Cirencester, 1 Peck. 466.

(c) B. & Arn. 201. The principal difficulty in this case arose from the form of the petition, which alleged the payments to have been made in pursuance and furtherance of bribery prevailing at the election. This was necessary in consequence of the sessional order, passed to enable petitions to be presented after the usual time, in the case of payments made after the election. That order required the petition to allege specifically that the payment was made in pursuance or in furtherance of bribery or corruption. This order did not agree with the enactment. As a similar sessional order will probably be passed, it is to be hoped that this difficulty may be avoided.

was tried soon after the passing of the act, it was argued that payments made to voters after an election were not within the statute, unless there had been a previous promise, express or implied, and that none such had been proved in the case; the committee, however, decided that such payments were bribery under the statute, and avoided the election.

As the object of the new statute is to amend the existing laws, and to make further provision for securing the freedom of elections, it can hardly be contended that the Legislature intended to relax the law in this respect, and to leave that unpunished which was an offence before. It will be seen when we come to consider the question of bribery as affecting the roter, that the 3rd section of this statute omits this word "corruptly" in speaking of a voter receiving money or valuable consideration after an election, on account of his having voted, or refrained from voting. If it is bribery on the part of a voter to receive a reward after an election on account of the way in which he exercised his franchise at an election, although there was no understanding at the time of the election on the subject, it surely can be no less so on the part of the other party, who for the same reason and with the same motive makes the gift.

It must be observed that it is not the gift of money, or other valuable consideration only, after an election, which is here prohibited, but also the gift, or promise of a situation or employment to a voter after an election, if made from what the statute declares to be a corrupt motive. In short, every transaction that would amount to bribery at common law if it had taken place before the election, falls within the statutable definition of

bribery when taking place after the election. It will be no answer hereafter, either to a penal action or to an indictment, to say, that the voter was uninfluenced by any sordid or corrupt consideration at the time he voted, for the statute has said, you shall do no "such act" after the election.

There is no limitation as to the time within which such acts must be done in order to amount to bribery. In the section relating to the voter (section 3), the words "after any election" are used; but in the 2nd section there are not these words. The prohibition however is quite general-every person who shall corruptly do any such acts as are forbidden in the earlier parts of the section, on account of a voter having voted, or refrained from voting, is guilty of bribery. These acts must be subsequent to the election; and they would probably be considered equally criminal though they occurred some months, or years even, after the election.

Supposing a candidate or his agents were to distribute a small sum of money on the polling day after the election, to each of the voters who had supported such candidate, would it amount to bribery within this statute? Probably, no doubt would be entertained on this subject by any one. Liverpool, 1853. But what, if the sum of money, say five shillings, was given to each voter, without any previous bargain, in order that the voter might get some refreshment on the polling day after having voted? This was exactly the mischief which was intended to be suppressed by the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 102, s. 22, commonly called the Head Money Act. There can be no doubt, moreover, that such a distribution of money would fall within the plain

meaning of the words "gifts on account of a voter having voted." And yet, clear as this seems to be, and as it ought to be, a considerable amount of confusion is introduced by the 23rd section of the new act (a).

This section, after reciting that doubts had arisen whether the giving of refreshment to voters on the days of nomination and polling was illegal, enacts, among other things, that the giving of money or tickets to voters on account of their having polled, to enable them to get refreshment, is to be deemed an illegal act, subjecting the party offending to a penalty of forty shillings for each offence. The offence of bribery is an indictable misdemeanor, and also subjects the guilty party to a penalty of 1007. The offence, therefore, of giving money on the nomination day or the polling day for refreshment, is something different from bribery. Such gifts to voters on days prior to the nomination day would amount to bribery under the statute; nay more, would be, and are bribery at common law, being given, as is supposed, on account of their votes (b). If such a distribution of money were to take place a week after the election, from the same motive, it seems equally clear that that would amount to bribery. It is very difficult, therefore, to understand, upon what principle it is, that gifts immediately before and immediately after an election are less criminal than those at a more distant time (c).

(a) This section will be further considered under the head of Treating.

(b) Reg. v. Thwaites, 22 L. J., Q. B. 238, post.

(c) The great confusion introduced into the well established rules of law with regard to treating by this section will be considered hereafter.