should have been given. The answer attempted to be set up, is that the revising barrister has stated facts from which the court must necessarily assume that he was doubting whether he had power to amend, and that therefore we ought to supply the omission: and the 40th and 101st sections are relied on. I take this part of the fortieth section to apply only to a case where the barrister, not being satisfied that the voter, his place of abode, or the nature or description of his qualification is sufficiently described for the purpose of being identified, has expunged the name from the list, and the matter so omitted or insufficiently described is supplied to his satisfaction before the completion of the revision of the list; in which case he is empowered to amend. The party, therefore, should have given the necessary evidence, and called upon the revising barrister to amend the description. As far as the statement of the case goes, we must assume that no such evidence was given, or none that was satisfactory; and therefore the appellant is not now in a situation to avail himself of the *70] fortieth section. The 101st section appears to me to be equally far removed from the subject-matter of inquiry. That section enacts that "no misnomer or inaccurate description of any person, place, or thing named or described in any schedule to this act annexed, or in any list or register of voters, or in any notice required by this act, shall in anywise prevent or abridge the operation of this act with respect to such person, place, or thing, provided that such person, place, or thing shall be so denominated in such schedule, register, or notice, as to be commonly understood." We cannot predicate that of a description like this: there may be 500 houses in Queen Street: how can we say which of the 500 is "commonly understood" by the description here given? Those words would rather seem to apply only in the case of some clumsy description, which, though inaccurate, sufficiently pointed to the house or other thing described. The real question is, whether the statute requires the number of the former residence to be given in a case like this. I think it does, and that the decision must therefore be affirmed.

MAULE, J. I also am of opinion, for the reasons given by the Lord Chief Justice, that the decision of the revising barrister was right.

CRESSWELL, J. I am of the same opinion. The description given of the property, the occupation of which constituted the qualification of the claimant in this case, was not a compliance with the statute. The fortieth section enacts, that, "whenever the Christian name, or the place of abode, or the nature of the qualification, or the local or other description of the property of any person who shall be included in any such list, and the name. of the occupying tenant thereof, shall be wholly omitted, in any *71] case where the same is by this act directed to be specified therein, or if any person whose name is included in any such list, or his place of abode, or the nature or description of his qualification, shall in the judgment of the revising barrister be insufficiently described for the purpose of being identified, such barrister shall expunge the name of every such

person from such list, unless the matter or matters so omitted or insufficiently described be supplied to the satisfaction of such barrister before he shall have completed the revision of such list, in which case he shall then and there insert the same in such list." Now, would the description here given enable any person to identify the house in Queen Street? Certainly not. Then, that being so, the barrister's duty was to expunge the name of the voter from the list, unless the matter omitted or insufficiently described was supplied to his satisfaction. There is no statement in the case that any attempt was made to supply the omission. As to the 101st section, I entirely concur with what has been said by the Lord Chief Justice. To be sufficient, the description must be such as to be commonly understood. But then you must understand all that is required by the statute: and, if the statute requires the numbers of both houses to be given, how can they be understood from the statement here?

ERLE, J. I also think the decision of the revising barrister must be affirmed. The number of the house is omitted in a case in which there was a number. The barrister clearly was right in expunging the name, if he thought the description insufficient, or if it was wholly omitted, and not supplied to his satisfaction before the completion of the revision. I am clearly of opinion, that, if the number had been brought to the revising barrister, he had power under the fortieth section to *insert it, and was bound to insert it. And, if the question intended to be raised for our opinion was, whether or not he had such power, it is very much to be regretted that the case does not properly raise it. But, assuming that the number was not supplied to the barrister's satisfaction, I see no ground for finding fault with his decision. Decision affirmed.

[*72

LANCASHIRE, SOUTHERN DIVISION.

CHARLES EDWARD RAWLINS, jun., Appellant, The Overseers of WEST DERBY, Respondents. Jan. 15.

When the 20th of July falls on a Sunday, service of a notice of claim upon an overseer under the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, s. 4, by leaving it at his place of abode on that day, is good servicee. Semble, that, where the respondent appears, he is precluded from objecting to the form of the service of the notice of appeal required by ss. 62, 64.

THE Overseers of the township of West Derby, in the southern division of the county of Lancaster, objected to the names of George Atkinson, and of thirty-nine other persons-whose names and descriptions were set forth in a schedule annexed to the case,-being retained on the list of claimants to vote in the said township.

The barrister struck out the names of the said claimants from the said list, subject to the opinion of the court of Common Pleas on the following case:All the said claims were delivered at the dwelling-house of one of the overseers of the said township of West Derby, in his absence, about

9 o'clock of the evening of Sunday, the 20th of July last. The overseers, nevertheless, published such claims in the list of claimants, but inserted opposite to each name the word "objected;" and at the revision of the said list, they contended that such service of the said claims respectively was insufficient and invalid, having been made *on a Sunday, and *73] the following day being too late by law for the service of such notices; and that such claimants therefore were not entitled to have their names retained on the said list.

The barrister allowed the objection, and consolidated the several cases. Arnold, for the respondents, took a preliminary objection-that the notice of the appellant's intention to prosecute the appeal had not been given or sent to the proper parties; the barrister having, under the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, s. 43, nominated the overseers of the township of West Derby to be the respondents, and the notice being headed "Edward Rawlins, appellant, and Thomas Augustus Granville Dolling, overseer of West Derby, respondent," and served upon Dolling only. He submitted, that, though a notice addressed to the overseers generally, and served upon one of them, might be sufficient, the notice in question clearly was not so, for non constat that Dolling was in office at the time the overseers were named respondents. [MAULE, J. Do you appear?] In the case of affidavits informally headed, the party presenting the objection is not therefore taken to appear. [MAULE, J. Does that apply to an affidavit of service?]

Crompton, contrà, submitted that taking the sixty-second section and the interpretation clause (s. 101) together, the notice was sufficient.

TINDAL, C. J. If the respondents appear, there is no necessity for proving the service of the notice under sect. 64. If they do not, we must deal with the case as we best may.(a)

*74]

*Arnold elected to appear.

Crompton, for the respondents. By the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, s. 4, persons desirous of having their names inserted in the register for the county, are required to give notice of their claims to the overseers "on or before the 20th of July" in every year. The question is, whether words are to be inserted in the act that the legislature has not thought fit to place there, viz., "unless such day shall be Sunday." Wherever it has been intended to except Sunday in the act, it is done by apt and express words, as, amongst other instances, in sections 5, 8, 12, 18, 20. It would be strange indeed if the legislature had intended to except Sunday for such a purpose as this, seeing that the overseers are required (s. 23) to publish these lists on the church doors. [TINDAL, C. J. That is because it is supposed to be a common centre.] At common law, all acts except those of a judicial nature might be done on a Sunday. In Mackally's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 66 b, it is said that "no judicial act ought to be done on that day, but ministerial acts may be lawfully executed on the Sunday; for,

(a) See Colvill, app., Lewis, resp., antè, p. 60.

otherwise, peradventure, they can never be executed. Before the Reformation, fairs and markets were commonly held on Sunday: and their legality seems to have been recognised after the Reformation; for, in Comyns v. Boyer, Cro. Eliz. 485, it was held that "a fair holden upon the Sunday is well enough, although by the statute (a) there is a penalty inflicted upon the party that sells upon that day; but it makes it not to be void."(b) [TINDAL, C. J. A re-entry for condition broken on a Sunday is [*75 good.] So also is a demand of possession on that day.(c) This is clearly not an exercise of the party's ordinary calling, within the first section of the 29 Car. 2, c. 7; nor is it the service of any "writ, process, varrant, order, judgment, or decree," within the sixth section. Even a c ›ntract, per se, is not necessarily void, if made on a Sunday. In The Fing v. Whitnash, 7 B. & C. 596, 1 M. & R. 452:(d) a contract of hiring nade on a Sunday between a farmer and a labourer was held not to be within the statute of Charles. So, in Begbie v. Levi, 1 Cr. & J. 180, a I ill of exchange drawn on a Sunday was held not to be avoided by that statute. So, in Peate v. Dicken, 1 Cr., M. & R. 422, an agreement entered into by attorney for the settlement of his client's affairs, on a Sunday, was beld good. A sale of goods on a Sunday, not made in exercise of the vendor's ordinary calling, as, for instance, the sale of a horse by a banker, is not within the statute: Drury v. Defontaine, 1 Taunt. 131. In Alanson v. Brookbank, Carth. 504,(e) service of a citation, by fixing it on the church door, on a Sunday, was held to be good. And in Bedoe v. Alpe, W. Jones, 156, it was held to be no ground of error that an information was alleged to have been exhibited on a Sunday. In Comberbach (page 462) it is said,(f) that "the delivery of a declaration in ejectment upon a Sunday is good, per curiam.(g) It was likewise said, that to have an attachment for non-performance of an award, there must be personal service, which, if it be on a *Sunday, though it is not good to have an [*76 attachment for non-payment on that day, yet it is for refusal on any other." [MAULE, J. The award being retained, the party has notice of it on the Monday. Here, you cannot avail yourself of that, because the Sunday was the last day.] There was nothing to be done by the overseers on the Sunday. In Walgrave v. Taylor, 1 Lord Raym. 705, Lord HOLT, C. J., seemed to think the delivery of a declaration on a Sunday bad, because the 29 Car. 2, c. 7, s. 6, intended to restrain all legal pro

(a) 27 H. 6, c. 5, which enacts that "all manner of fairs and markets on the principal feasts, and Sundays and Good Friday, shall clearly cease from all showing of any goods or merchandise, (necessary victual only excepted,) upon pain of forfeiture of all the goods aforesaid so showed, &c., the four Sundays in harvest except."

(b) The exception of the four Sundays in harvest is the reservation of an old, not the creation of a new right.

(c) Selw. N. P. p. 712.

(d) And see Sandiman v. Bridge, ib. 457, n.

(e) S. C. per nom. Allen v. Brookbank, 2 Salk. 625; Anonymous, 5 Mod. 450.

9 Will. 3, ut videtur.

(g) Such a service was held to be void within the 29 Car. 2, c. 7, s. 6, in Doe d. Warren v. Roe, 8 D. & R. 342. And see Doe v. Roe, 5 B. & C. 764, S. C. nom. Goodtitle d. Mortimer v. Notille, 2 D. & R. 232; Doe v. Roe, 8 D. & R. 592.

ceedings on that day. But Powys and GOULD, JS., held otherwise, because such delivery was quasi a notice, and as a letter, and not a process. [CRESSWELL, J. In Roberts v. Monkhouse, 8 East, 547, service of a notice of plea on a Sunday was held bad, and in Hughes v. Budd, 8 Dowl. P. C. 315, service on Sunday of a notice to produce was also held void. MAULe, J. Service of a subpoena duces tecum on a Sunday would be a void service. That is very much like this case.] A subpoena duces tecum is in the nature of process, and therefore within the letter of the act. The question whether a service on Sunday of a notice of appeal was good, was raised in The Queen v. The Justices of Middlesex, 12 Law J., N. S., M. C. 59, but the court gave no opinion upon it.

Arnold, for the respondents. The decision of the revising barrister was right. The question here is, whether the service of the notices of claim was affected within the time required by the act of parliament. By the fourth section of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, the notice of claim must be delivered to the overseers on or before the 20th of July. It is not necessary to contend that a service on Sunday is absolutely void, either at common law or by the statute 29 Car. 2, c. *77] 7; for, it may be *conceded that it is neither a work of the ordinary calling of the party, so as to be affected by section 1, nor a writ, process, &c., within section 6. It may also be conceded, that, if Sunday had been the 19th, a service on that day might have operated as a good service on the Monday. But, the 20th of July being the last day on which the notice could, by law, be served, and that day being Sunday, the question is, whether a service on Sunday was in time. The receipt of these notices was a matter which the overseer was not bound to attend to on a Sunday; he was not bound to open the letters until Monday, and then the notice would have been too late. The 101st section authorizes a service of these notices by leaving them at the place of business of the overseer; could it be contended for a moment, that a service at the place of business on a Sunday, the overseer being absent, would, under the circumstances, be sufficient, seeing that it could not come to the hands of the overseer until the following day? There is some parity of reasoning between this case and the case of a notice of dishonour of a bill of exchange; the ground of that rule being, that a party is not bound to attend to any matter of business on a Sunday: Byles on Bills, p. 184; Wright v. Shawcross, 2 B. & Ald. 501, n. So, as to the days of grace, if the last of the three happens to be Sunday, the payment must be made on Saturday-for the same reason, viz., that no man is bound to attend to his ordinary calling on the Lord's day.(a) [CRESSWELL, J. That is regulated by the law merchant, which engrafts upon the days of grace the condition that the last shall not be Sunday. MAULE, J. Here we have a positive law, that a certain act shall be done on or before the 20th of July; and there is no exception. According *78] to your argument, the party for whose benefit the number of days (a) Byles on Bills, 133.