K.B. Div.] NATIONAL PROVINCIAL AND UNION BANK OF ENGLAND v. LINDSELL, &C. act in order that he might get dismissed. His idea and hope was that if he got dismissed he could do something better, and accordingly he deliberately and as part of a system declined to do the work, and the learned County Court judge says no selfrespecting master could have continued to do it; but then he does not go on to find as a fact; in my judgment I find on that ground he was justified in putting an end to the contract; he does not say that at all; the ground of decision is not that, on looking at all these facts, I find it comes within the principle (although he did allude to it with approbation) of Learoyd v. Brook (sup.), but he grounds his judgment on an entirely different decision. I am inclined to think that there are cases in which a County Court judge who has to deal with these things may ground his decision, in spite of the earlier cases, if he finds there has been a systematic course of conduct going so much to the root of relationship between the apprentice and his master as renders it impossible that the master's business can be carried on if that system is persevered in; and I think a judge is entitled to say from the past conduct of a plaintiff, I am sure he intended to persevere, because he has manifested that intention, and that renders it impossible to carry it on. What the learned County Court judge did was not to ground his decision on the point that there was in effect an offer by the apprentice, or conduct by the apprentice, which amounted to a suggestion: "I repudiate this contract,' ," which the master was then at liberty either to accept or refuse. This is more or less saying, there was by conduct a new contract made between the apprentice and the employer. I need not add to what has been said by my Lord with regard to that part of the case. Having so found, he could not obviously find in effect that effective repudiation had been made by an infant unless he was satisfied that it was for the benefit of the infant. Curiously enough, although that was not argued, I understand now why it was not mentioned; because the matter argued was the point on which the County Court judge did not give a decision. He hinted what his decision was likely to be, but broke off and gave his decision on another ground. The decision he gave was that this was an offer of repudiation--a repudiation by conduct amounting to an offer to repudiate and put an end to the contract by the infant, and an acceptance of that offer by the defendant. That being in fact the making of a new contract between the parties, one of whom was an infant, I think it is obvious (it does not want authority) but that is not effective unless the court, before whom it comes, holds that it was for the benefit of the infant. Oddly enough, the judge said he thought, in the interests of both of them, it had better be put an end to. He does not decide it. There is evidence upon which he might decide when it goes down. I say there is evidence on which he might find that it was for the benefit of the infant that he should be put at liberty to earn higher wages. That is a matter for the learned County Court judge. I think the matter should go down to him to decide whether the course of conduct which amounted to repudiation which was accepted by the master-or rather whether the rescission of the contract effectuated in that way, or purported to be effected in that way, was or was not for the benefit of the infant. If it was not, it will not be effective and the contract I [K.B. Div. must go on. Solicitors for the plaintiff, Mills, Lockyer, Church, and Evill. Solicitors for the defendant, Joynson-Hicks and Co., for Lyndurst G. Groves, Portsmouth. W. W., the owner of a motor-car, who had an account at the plaintiff bank, sent the car to the defendant L. for the purpose of repairs instructing him to sell it when finished. W.'s account being overdrawn, the plaintiffs agreed to allow him a further overdraft provided he would authorise L. to hold the car or its proceeds to the plaintiffs' order. thereupon wrote to L. instructing him to hold the car to the order of the plaintiffs or the proceeds when sold," and sent a copy of the letter to the plaintiffs. The letter was not registered as a bill of sale, and was not in the statutory form. The car was subsequently sold and the plaintiffs claimed the proceeds. 66 Held, that the proceeds of sale were only assigned with and as representing the car, that if the car had not been sold, the plaintiffs could not have seized it, and that the letter of assignment could not be treated as divided into two parts in respect of the car and of the proceeds, but was a bill of sale which, as it did not follow the prescribed form and had not been registered, was void. 66 was ACTION tried before Lord Coleridge, J. without a jury. The defendant Lindsell a repairer of motor-cars carrying on business at Tunbridge Wells. Early in 1919 the defendant Welding sent the chassis of a "Sava" motor-car to Lindsell's works for repairs and to have a body fitted, and instructed Lindsell to offer the car for sale when finished. Welding had an account at the Tunbridge Wells branch of the plaintiff bank which, in Aug. 1919, was overdrawn to the extent of 3177., but the bank agreed to allow him a further overdraft of 251. on condition that he authorised the defendant Lindsell to hold the car or the cash if the car were sold to the order of the bank, and on the 11th Aug. the defendant Welding sent to Lindsell the following letter: "This is to authorise you to hold the Sava car at present in your hands to the order of the National Provincial and Union Bank of England, Lim., Tunbridge Wells, or the proceeds when sold after deducting your account.' On the same day he sent a copy of the letter to the plaintiffs. The letter was not registered as a bill of sale. The car was ultimately sold for 5151. (a) Reported by FITZROY COWPER, Esq., Barrister-at-Law K.B. Div.] OAKLEY V. MERTHYR TYDFIL CORPORATION. Lindsell deducted 2801. in respect of his charges, and then, as Welding falsely represented that the plaintiffs were willing to accept a payment of 1351. out of the proceeds, sent that sum to the plaintiffs and paid over the balance of 100l. to Welding. The action was brought for a declaration that the plaintiffs were equitable assignees of the proceeds of the sale of the car, after deducting Lindsell's charges, and claiming that they were entitled to recover from Lindsell the 1007. which he had paid to Welding. On behalf of the defendant Lindsell, it was contended that the letter of the 11th Aug. was a bill of sale of the car and was void under the Bills of Sale Acts, not having been registered and not being in the statutory form. The plaintiffs contended that even if the letter was a bill of sale, so long as the car was unsold, it ceased to come within the Bills of Sale Acts upon the sale of the car, and that the good part of the security could be severed from the bad part. The defendant Welding did not appear. Rayner Goddard and F. J. Tucker for the plaintiffs. Neilson, K.C. and Arnold Jolly for the defendant Lindsell. The arguments sufficiently appear from the judgment of Lord Coleridge, J. The following cases were referred to: Burn v. Carvalho, 1839, 4 My. & Cr. 690; Re Burdett; Ex parte Byrne, 58 L. T. Rep. 708; London and Yorkshire Bank v. White, 11 Times Lord COLERIDGE, J. [After stating the facts, continued]:-The question that has arisen in this case is whether the plaintiffs are prevented from succeeding in this action on the ground that the document is within the purview of the Bills of Sale Acts. If it is, then, inasmuch as it does not follow the statutory form and is not registered, the plaintiffs cannot recover; if it is not within the Acts, they can recover. Now the first thing that is clear is this, that the plaintiffs cannot recover in this action without producing the document. There is no oral contract available in law whereby the property passed to them apart from the document. Titles acquired by oral contracts which are complete in themselves are not affected by the Bills of Sale Acts. Again, where there is no assignment of any chattel, but only an assignment of the proceeds of a chattel when sold, such assignment is not affected by the Acts. That is the principle laid down in London and Yorkshire Bank v. White (sup.). The plaintiffs depend for their title upon the document which must therefore be scrutinised. It clearly gives the immediate right to seize as security for a debt. The motor-car was in law in the possession of Welding for he had only deposited it temporarily in Lindsell's garage for the purpose of repairs. Lindsell had a lien on the car for his charges for repairs, but had no right to sell the car. There was no right of sale in Welding without the consent of the plaintiffs. It is clear, and indeed it was admitted, that if the car had not been sold, the plaintiffs could not have seized it under the document of the 11th Aug., as it would undoubtedly have been a bill of sale and void. It is said, however, that the only claim here is, not for the motor-car, but for the proceeds of the (K.B. Div. sale, and that where there is no assignment of a Solicitors for the plaintiffs, Cox and Co., for Solicitors for the defendants, Champness and Co., for Sir Robert Gower, Tunbridge Wells. Oct. 14 and Nov. 2, 1921. (Before Lord TREVETHIN, C.J., SANKEY, and ACTON, JJ.) OAKLEY V. MERTHYR TYDFIL CORPORATION, (a) Private street works-Provisional apportionment— Resolution of approval-Access from street to be made up-"Passage "-Premises not abutting on street-Inclusion-Form of resolution-Private Street Works Act 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 57), 88. 6, 10. The respondents, an urban authority, passed a resolution under sect. 6 of the Private Street Works Act 1892 to make up a street which ran between two blocks of houses, known as a terrace, the appellant being the owner of the house at that end of one of the blocks which was farthest from the street to be made up. The street in front of the terrace had been taken over by the authority as a public highway, and from this highway a lane passed along the side of the appellant's house and along the back of the terrace, thus crossing the street to be made up, and leading again into the aforesaid highway at that end of the terrace which was farthest from the appellant's house. The lane, which was 10 ft. wide, had been constructed for the convenience of the tenants of the houses in the terrace and had been open to the public since the houses were built but had not been taken over by the respondents. There was a back entrance from the appellant's house into the lane. The foregoing resolution directed the surveyor to prepare a provisional apportionment, and stated that the authority deemed it just to have regard to the value of work already done by the owners of abutting premises (a) Reported by J. F. WALKER. Esq.. Barrister-at-Law. Printed and Published by THE FIELD PRESS LTD., Windsor House, Bream's Buildings, London, E.C. 4, in the County Sole Agents in U S.A and Canada, Messrs. THE CARSWELL COMPANY LTD., 145-149, Adelaide Street West, Toronto. of Middlesex, Saturday, March 11, 1922. THE LAW TIMES REPORTS, March 18, 1922. Registered at G.P.O. Postage within the United Kingdom, One Penny; and to Canada at Canadian Magazine Rate.] March 18, 1922.] K.B. Div.] THE LAW TIMES. OAKLEY V. MERTHYR TYDFIL CORPORATION. and to the benefit to be derived therefrom. The provisional apportionment included and was served on the owners of the houses in the terrace, including the appellant, and the authority, under sect. 6 (3), passed a further resolution approving the apportionment. Neither resolution stated that the authority deemed it just to include such houses, although sect. 10 provides that: "They may also, if they think just, include any premises, which do not-front, adjoin, or abut on the street or part of a street, but access to which is obtained from the street through a court, passage, or otherwise, and which in their opinion will be benefited by the works." The second resolution was duly published, objection was taken thereto by the appellant, and the magistrate held that the lane was a passage through which access to the appellant's house was obtained from the street to be made up, and that, although the first resolution made no reference to the houses in the terrace and did not state that the authority had thought it just to include them, the resolutions were sufficient. Held, that though the second resolution ought, strictly speaking, to have stated expressly that the authority thought it just to include the houses in the terrace, yet it must be assumed from their inclusion that the authority thought it just; but that the lane, which was meant to be a back and side lane for the houses in the terrace, was not a passage by which access from the street to be made up was obtained within sect. 10, and therefore the magistrate's decision must be reversed. CASE stated by the stipendiary magistrate for the county borough of Merthyr Tydfil, being the court of summary jurisdiction sitting at a petty sessional court house at the Town Hall, Merthyr Tydfil, under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts 1857 and 1879. 1. At a court of summary jurisdiction sitting at the Town Hall, Merthyr Tydfil, on the 25th Jan. 1921, an application was made by the respondents to determine the matter of certain objections made by the appellant to a provisional apportionment of expenses made by the respondents under sect. 10 of the Private Street Works Act 1892 in respect of certain works proposed to be executed in a certain street called Cross-street, Awelfrynterrace, Penydarren, which apportioned a portion of such expenses on the appellant. 2. The facts proved or admitted on the hearing were as follows: (A) The respondents were an urban authority who had duly adopted the Private Street Works Act 1892 and within whose district was a street called Cross-street, Awelfryn-terrace, Penydarren. (B) Awelfryn-terrace consisted of two blocks, each of ten houses, numbered 1 to 10 and 11 to 20, and Cross-street lay between the gable ends of numbers 10 and 11 Awelfryn-terrace. (C) The said houses were built about the year 1898 and fronted upon Awelfryn-terrace, which was subsequently taken over by the urban authority as a public highway. (D) There was a lane at the back of the premises passing from Awelfryn-terrace along the side of No. 1, Awelfryn-terrace, and then behind numbers 1 to 10 to the said Cross-street and behind numbers 11 to 20, returning at the side of No. 20 into Awelfryn-terrace. The said lane was 10 ft. wide and was constructed for the convenience of the tenants of Awelfryn-terrace. It had not been Vol. 126.-3253. [Vol. 126.-321 [K.B. DIV. ballasted, metalled, and rolled. There was a back entrance to No. 1, Awelfryn-terrace, and anybody taking coal, &c., to this back entrance would have to use the road to be repaired. (E) The appellant was the owner of No. 1, Awelfryn-terrace. (F) At a meeting held on the 24th Aug. 1920 the respondents passed the following resolutions :Resolved that the street known as Cross-street which lies between the pine ends of numbers 10 and 11 Awelfryn-terrace, Penydarren, Merthyr Tydfil, be levelled, ballasted, metalled, gravelled and otherwise made good, and that the borough surveyor in accordance with the provisions of the Private Street Works Act 1892, prepare as respects such street :(a) A specification of the work with plans and sections, (b) An estimate of the probable expenses of the works; (c) A provisional apportionment of the estimated expenses among the persons liable to be charged therewith under the Act. Resolved further that the council deem it just and accordingly do order that in settling the apportionment of the expenses among the several owners of the houses and lands fronting, adjoining or abutting on the above-mentioned street, regard should be had to the following considerations :-(a) The amount and value of any work already done by the owners or occupiers of such premises; (b) The greater or lesser degree of benefit to be derived by any premises from such works. (G) The respondents' surveyor prepared an estimate of the probable expenses of the said works, and the provisional apportionment was served on the owners of the houses in Awelfrynterrace, including the appellant, requiring each to contribute 2l. 1s. 6d. (H) At a meeting held on the 28th Sept. 1920 the respondents passed the following resolution, namely: Resolved that this council hereby approve of the plans, specification, estimate and provisional apportionment prepared by their surveyor with reference to certain street works required to be executed at Cross-street between pine ends of numbers 10 and 11 Awelfryn-terrace, Penydarren, in pursuance of the resolution to execute such works passed by us on the 24th day of Aug. 1920. (I) On the 29th Sept. 1920 a copy of the last resolution was duly published and copies thereof duly served upon the owners of the premises shown as liable to be charged in the provisional apportionment and amongst them was the appellant as the owner of No. 1, Awelfryn-terrace, access to which it was alleged by the respondents was obtained from the said street through a passage or otherwise within the meaning of sect. 10 of the Act of 1892. 66 court (J) On the 12th Oct. 1920 the appellant served on the respondents a notice of which the following was a copy : We have been instructed by Mrs. Jane Oakley, owner of No. 1 Awelfryn-terrace, Penydarren, to give you notice that she objects to the provisional apportionment served upon her in connection with the street works proposed to be executed in Crossstreet between the pine ends of numbers 10 and 11 Awelfryn-terrace on the ground that the premises owned by her do not front, adjoin or abut on the street in respect of which the expenses are to be incurred. She further objects on the grounds given in paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of sect. 7 of the Private Street Works Act of 1892. K.B. Div.] OAKLEY V. MERTHYR TYDFIL CORPORATION. (K) On receipt of the notice the respondents applied to the court to appoint a time for determining the matter of such objections and on the 5th Jan. 1921 duly served notice on the appellant of the date of the hearing. (L) It was admitted by the respondents that the primary reason for making Cross-street was to give access to certain lands and premises which they had acquired with a view of laying out such land for building purposes. The total expense of making up the said street amounted to 787. and was equally apportioned between the respondents and the twenty premises forming Awelfryn-terrace. The appellant was the only objector and the amount apportioned to her was 21. 18. 6d. (M) The said lane had never been taken over by the respondents under the Private Street Works Act 1892 or otherwise, but had been open for the use of the public since it was laid out and the houses were built. 3. It was contended on behalf of the appellant: (A) That the resolutions passed by the respondents were insufficient to enable a provisional apportionment to be made on premises which did not front, adjoin, or abut upon the premises which were to be made up. (B) That the specification prepared by the borough surveyor did not contain the information required by the Private Street Works Act 1892 and part 1 of the schedule thereto. (C) That assuming the resolutions to be valid and sufficient the means of access to the premises of the appellant from the said street were not through a court, passage, or otherwise," within the meaning of sect. 10 of the Act. 4. It was contended on behalf of the respondents: (A) That the resolutions were sufficient to enable the borough surveyor to apportion part of the expenses on premises, which though not fronting, adjoining, or abutting, nevertheless obtained access to the said Cross-street by means of a "court, passage, or otherwise," within the meaning of the Private Street Works Act 1892. 5. The magistrate came to the following conclu sions: (a) That the resolutions of the 24th Aug. and the 28th Sept 1920 were sufficient for the purposes of the Private Street Works Act 1892. (b) That access was obtained to No. 1, Awelfrynterrace from the street in which the works were to be executed, through a passage made for the purpose of giving such access thereto. (c) That No. 1, Awelfryn-terrace would be benefited by the proposed works. 6. The magistrate made an order against the appellant for payment of 21. 18. 6d. and five guineas costs. [K.B. Div. nelled, made good, and lighted to the satisfaction of the urban authority, the urban authority may from time to time resolve with respect to such street or part of a street to do any one or more of the following works (in this Act called private street works); that is to say, to sewer, level, pave, metal, flag, channel, or make good, or to provide proper means for lighting such street or part of a street; and the expenses incurred by the urban authority in executing private street works shall be apportioned (subject as in this Act mentioned) on the premises fronting, adjoining, or abutting on such street or part of a street. Any such resolution may include several streets or parts of streets, or may be limited to any part or parts of a street. (2) The surveyor shall prepare, as respects each street or part of a street-(a) a specification of the private street works referred to in the resolution, with plans and sections (if applicable); (b) an estimate of the probable expenses of the works; (c) a provisional apportionment of the estimated expenses among the premises liable to be charged therewith under this Act. Such specification, plans, sections, estimate, and provisional apportionment shall comprise the particulars prescribed in part 1 of the schedule to this Act, and shall be submitted to the urban authority, who may by resolution approve the same respectively with or without modincation or addition as they think fit. (3) The resolution approving the specifications, plans, and sections (if any), estimates, and provisional apportionments, shall be published in the manner prescribed in part 2 of the schedule to this Act, and copies thereof shall be served on the owners of the premises shown as liable to be charged in the provisional apportionment within seven days after the date of the first publication. Sect. 7: Any owner may, by written notice served on the urban authority, object to the proposals of the urban authority on any of the following grounds; (that is to say) (f) that the provisional apportionment is incorrect in respect of some matter of fact to be specified in the objection or (where the provisional apportionment is made with regard to other considerations than frontage as hereinafter provided) in respect of the degree of benefit to be derived by any persons, or the amount or value of any work already done by the owner or occupier of any premises. Sect. 8 (1): The urban authority apply to a court of summary jurisdiction to appoint a time for determining the matter of all objections made as in this Act mentioned and at the time and place so appointed any such court may proceed to hear and determine the matter of all such objections in the same manner as nearly as may be as if the urban authority were proceeding summarily to enforce payment of a sum of money summarily recoverable. The court may quash in whole or in part or may amend the provisional apportionments. . may Sect. 10: In a provisional apportionment of expenses of private street works the apportionment of expenses against the premises fronting, adjoining, or abutting on the street or part of a street in respect of which the expenses are to be incurred shall, unless the urban authority otherwise resolve, be apportioned according to the frontage of the respective premises; but the urban authority may, if they think just, resolve that in settling the apportionment regard shall be had to the following considerations; (that is to say) (a) the greater or less degree of benefit to be derived by any premises from such works; (b) the amount and value of any work already done by the owners or occupiers of any such premises. They may also, if they think just, include any premises which do not front, adjoin, or abut on the street or part of a street, but access to which is obtained from the street through a court, passage, or otherwise. and which in their opinion will be benefited by the K.B. Div.] OAKLEY V. MERTHYR TYDFIL CORPORATION. works, and may fix the sum or proportion to be charged against any such premises accordingly. Part I. of the schedule includes the following: Provisional Apportionments.-These shall state the amounts charged on the respective premises and the names of the respective owners or reputed owners and shall also state whether the apportionment is made according to the frontage of the respective premises or not, and the measurements of the frontages, and the other considerations (if any) on which the apportionment is based H. du Parcq, for the appellant. Joshua Scholefield, for the respondents. Cur. adv. vult. The arguments sufficiently appear from the judgment of the court. Lord TREVETHIN, C.J. read the following judgment of the court: In pursuance of resolutions passed on the 24th Aug. and the 28th Sept. 1920, and acting under the Private Street Works Act of 1892, the respondents decided to make up a street known as Cross-street within their borough, and approved of the specification, estimate, and provisional apportionment prepared by their surveyor with reference to the work to be executed. This case is stated by the learned stipendiary of Merthyr Tydfil to obtain the decision of the court on two points: (1) Whether the premises of the appellant were liable to be included in the apportionment, as they have been by the respondents, under sect. 10 of the above-mentioned Act, which provides, amongst other things, that the authority, if they think just, may include any premises access to which is obtained from the street through a passage and which in their opinion will be benefited by the works, although not fronting, abutting on, or adjoining the street; (2) whether the resolutions were in order and complied with the terms of the Act. The facts are as follows: The appellant is the owner of No. 1, Awelfrynterrace, which consists of two blocks, each of ten houses, numbers 1 to 10 and 11 to 20. Between No. 10 and No. 11 a street known as Cross-street lies. Awelfryn-terrace has been taken over by the authority as a public highway. There is a lane at the back of the premises, passing from Awelfrynterrace along the side of No. 1, Awelfryn-terrace and then behind numbers 1 to 10 to the said Crossstreet and behind numbers 11 to 20, returning at the side of No. 20 into Awelfryn-terrace aforesaid. The said lane is 10 feet wide, and was constructed for the convenience of the tenants of Awelfryn-terrace. It has not been ballasted, metalled, and rolled. There is a back entrance to No. 1, Awelfryn-terrace, from the lane. On the 24th Aug. 1920 the respondents passed the following resolution : 66 Resolved that the street known as Cross-street, which lies between the pine ends of Nos. 10 and 11, Awelfryn-terrace, Penydarren, Merthyr Tydfil, be levelled, ballasted, metalled, gravelled, and otherwise made good, and that the borough surveyor, in accordance with the provisions of the Private Street Works Act 1892, prepare as respects such street: (a) a specification of the work, with plans and sections; (b) an estimate of the probable expenses of the works; (c) a provisional apportionment of the estimated expenses among the persons liable to be charged therewith under the Act. [K.B. Div. Resolved further, that the council deem it just, and accordingly do order, that, in settling the apportionment of the expenses among the several owners of the houses and lands fronting, adjoining, or abutting on the above-mentioned street, regard should be had to the following considerations: (a) the amount and value of any work already done by the owners or occupiers of such premises; (b) the greater or lesser degree of benefit to be derived by any premises from such works." The respondents' surveyor prepared an estimate of the probable expense of the said works, and the provisional apportionment was served on the owners of the houses in Awelfryn-terrace, including the appellant, requiring each to contribute £2 1s. 6d. Upon the 28th Sept. the respondents passed the following resolution: 66 Resolved that this council hereby approve of the plans, specification, estimate, and provisional apportionment prepared by their surveyor with reference to certain street works required to be executed at Cross-street, between pine ends of Nos. 10 and 11, Awelfryn-terrace, Penydarren, in pursuance of the resolution to execute such works passed by us on the 24th day of Aug., 1920." This said resolution was duly published, objection was taken thereto by the appellant, and the matter came before the learned stipendiary. It was contended on behalf of the appellant: (1) That the side and back lane in question was not, within the meaning of the said section, a passage through which access to No. 1, Awelfrynterrace was obtained from Cross-street. (2) That the resolutions referred to were insufficient to enable a provisional apportionment to be made, because the first of them made no reference to the houses in Awelfryn-terrace, and did not show that the respondents had, in the words of sect. 10, thought just to include such houses. The learned magistrate decided both contentions against the appellant. As to (1), was this side and back lane, within the meaning of sect. 10, a passage through which access to No. 1, Awelfryn-terrace was obtained from Cross-street? It might be suggested that this was a question of fact for the magistrate himself, but he has stated it, and it was argued as a point of law, a course which was apparently taken in the two cases which have been decided upon these words (Newquay Urban District Council v. Rickeard, 105 L. T. Rep. 519; (1911) 2 K. B. 846; and Chatterton v. Glanford Brigg Rural District Council, 113 L. T. Rep. 746; (1915) 3 K. B. 707). It was pointed out by the Lord Chief Justice in the Newquay case (sup.) at p. 852), that in a provisional apportionment under sect. 10 of the Act there may be included premises access to which is obtained through a private road made primarily for the purpose of giving access thereto, but not premises access to which is obtained through a road which is, or is intended for, a public street. Pickford, J. further lays down that some limitations must be placed upon the word access in the section, and he says (at p. 853): "I agree that access from a street to premises by means of another public street is not access within the meaning of sect. 10. If it were, there would be practically no end to the premises to which access may be obtained. By such means as that, access may be had from the Strand to the Chelsea Embankment. The effect of the words must be restricted by excluding cases of that description." |