CT. OF APP.]

YOUNGER, L.J.-I am of the same opinion. Although the result of the only construction which I can place upon this agreement is that the payment of this sum of 100,000l. as an instalment of the purchase price before completion is of very little value indeed to the vendors, in the only event in which they would desire to utilise it, I nevertheless can find upon this written contract no inference permissible with reference to the repayment of this sum of 100,000l. than this: That it is repayable to the purchasers so soon as the obligation on the part of the purchaser to pay as purchase money the residue of the purchase price is no longer existent. That in the common law phraseology would be the equivalent of a statement that the money is repayable because the consideration for the payment has wholly failed. I, being less familiar with the common-law principles, prefer to put it as a matter of construction, and it appears to me that as a matter of construction there can be no other inference on this agreement than that when no further purchase price is payable that which has been paid on account of purchase price shall be refunded. Accordingly I agree with the view taken by Lush, J. in the court below. But even if I had been of opinion, accepting his finding, that a reasonable time for obtaining another purchaser not having elapsed, the vendors were entitled to a further period within which to obtain such a purchaser before being called upon to repay this money, I think that one must recognise that that reasonable time has now elapsed and it is not really seriously contended on the part of the appellant that any further time, even if it were open to them to ask for it, would for that purpose be of any real avail. Accordingly, even if they were so entitled when the writ in this action was issued to ask for further time, they are no longer so entitled, and if a fresh action were commenced to-day for the return of this money no defence based upon that contention would prevail. Accordingly, it appears to me that that view of the matter, even if it were open at any time, is now out of the case. But Mr. Upjohn has contended on the authority of Palmer v. Temple (9 Ad. & El. 08; 8 L. J. Q.B. 179), and of observations made in Re Parnell; ex parte Barrell (33 L. T. Rep. 115; L. Rep. 10 Ch. 512), and in Howe v. Smith (0 L. T. Rep. 573; 27 Ch. Div. 89) that even on the construction which I feel was the right construction of this contract his clients would be entitled and that the court would give them the privelege of retaining this money when a demand was made for it until they had by apt and appropriate proceedings against the purchaser sought to recover against him general damages for his breach of contract to the intent that they might when those damages had been ascertained set off against the sum due to them the appropriate part or the whole of this 100,000l. Now I agree with Mr. Upjohn that these statements are made in the cases to which he referred in this court, and if it had been necessary to consider whether they amount to anything more than a statement of a convenient course which seemed to the judges expedient in the particular cases before them, I should have required to give the matter further consideration. in my opinion, whatever be the effect of those statements in the cases to which I have referred, the vendors in this case are not entitled now to ask this court to exercise in their favour any such

But,

[CT. OF APP.

dispensing power and for this reason: It appears to me the vendors have refrained for reasons which one can well understand are very cogent in their own interest from the institution of any such proceedings as those between the month of June when this action was heard by Lush, J. and to-day. To ask now that they should be given the further time necessary from to-day to litigate that matter as between themselves and the purchaser would, I think, be unfair to the purchaser seeing that the delay on their part up to this moment has been a delay conceived in their own interests. The result would be, as it seems to me, unfair to the purchaser because it would unduly delay the right which, as I think, on the contrary he is entitled to have exercised of saying that the money is now payable to him because there is no longer any obligation upon him to pay in respect of this transaction any purchase price at all.

For these reasons, therefore, I think that this appeal ought to be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed. Solicitors for the appellants, Leighton and Savory. Solicitors for the respondent, Wadeson and Malleson.

Nov. 3 and 4, 1921.

(Before BANKES, SCRUTTON, and ATKIN, L.JJ.) FRENCH AND ANOTHER v. GETHING (GETHING, Claimant). (a)

APPEAL FROM THE KING'S BENCH DIVISION.

Bill of sale-Deed of gift-Husband and wifeNon-registration-Furniture-Apparent possession -Order and disposition of husband-Reputed ownership-Bills of Sale Act 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 31), 88. 4 & 8-Married Women's Property Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75), 8. 10.

By sect. 8: "Every bill of sale registered

process

shall be within seven days after the otherwise such

"shall

making or giving thereof bill of sale (as against certain persons) be deemed fraudulent and void so far as regards the property in or right to the possession of any chattels comprised in such bill of sale which, at or after the time of executing such and after the expiration of such seven days are in the possession or apparent possession of the person making such bill of sale. By sect. 10 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882, "Nothing in this Act contained shall give validity as against creditors of the husband, to any gift, by a husband to his wife, of any property which, after such gift, shall continue to be in the order and disposition or reputed ownership of the husband."

(a) Reported by T. W. MORGAN and W. C. SANDFORD, Esgrs., Barristers-at-Law.

CT. OF APP.]

By a deed of gift executed in May 1914, a husband gave to his wife furniture and other effects in and about his dwelling-house for her absolute use and benefit, and as her separate use and property. The deed, after reciting that no settlement had been made on their marriage, stated that the husband made the gift in consideration of the natural love and affection which he had for his wife. The deed was not registered under the Bills of Sale Act 1878, and the furniture remained in the conjugal domicile after the execution of the deed. In 1920 a judgment was obtained against the husband and, as the judgment remained unsatisfied, the judgment creditors proceeded to levy execution at the house occupied by the defendant and his wife, and of which the defendant was the rated occupier. The defendant's wife claimed the furniture under the deed of gift of May 1914. An interpleader issue was thereupon directed.

Held, that the furniture was not in the possession or apparent possession of the husband within the meaning of sect. 8 of the Bills of Sale Act 1878, and that it was not in his order and disposition or reputed ownership within the meaning of sect. 10 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882. Ramsay v. Margrett (70 L. T. Rep. 788 (1894) 2 Q. B. 18) followed.

Quaere, whether sect. 10 of the latter Act applies to

the case of a husband and wife living together, but not carrying on business at the premises where they

live.

Judgment of the Divisional Court (infra; (1921) 3 K. B. 280) affirmed.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Divisional Court affirming the order of a master on the trial of an interpleader issue.

On the 4th May 1914, the defendant, Gething, executed a deed of gift in favour of his wife, whereby, having recited that no settlement had been made upon the marriage of the defendant and his wife, the defendant, in consideration of the natural love and affection which he had for his wife, gave and made over to her the furniture and other effects in and about his dwelling-house for her absolute use and benefit and as her separate property. The deed was not registered under the Bills of Sale Act 1878, and the furniture and effects remained in the house occupied by the defendant and his wife after the execution of the deed, and there was no evidence that the wife did anything to take the furniture out of the order and disposition of the husband. The defendant, the husband, was the rated occupier of the dwelling-house.

In 1920, one Hart obtained a judgment against the defendant for 6201. and costs. The judgment remained unsatisfied, and the plaintiffs, who were the executors and trustees of the estate of Hart (who had obtained the judgment), proceeded to levy execution at the dwelling-house occupied by the defendant and his wife. Thereupon, the defendant's wife (hereinafter called "the claimant ") claimed the furniture and effects by virtue of the deed of gift executed by the defendant, her husband, on the 4th May 1914. An interpleader issue was tried before Master Whately,

The master held that the case was governed by Ramsay v. Margrett (70 L. T. Rep. 788; (1894) 2 Q. B. 18), and that the defendant's wife, the claimant, being in possession of the furniture and effects in the house, was entitled, under the deed of the 4th May 1914, to succeed as against the

[CT. OF APP.

A. Ralph Thomas for the appellants, the execution creditors.

W. J. Disturnal, K. C. and F. C. Wynn Werninck for the claimant.

The following authorities were referred to :

Ramsay v. Margrett, 70 L. T. Rep. 788; (1894) 2 Q. B. 18;

Ashton v. Blackshaw, 22 L. T. Rep. 197; L. Rep. 9 Eq. 510;

Hollinshead v. Egan, 109 L. T. Rep. 681; (1913) A. C. 564;

Re Bainbridge, 38 L. T. Rep. 229; 8 Ch. Div. 218;

Re Emery, 21 Q. B. Div. 405;

Ex parte Saffrey 44 L. T. Rep. 324; 16 Ch. Div. 668;

Ex parte Dorman, 27 L. T. Rep. 528; L. Rep. 8 Ch. 51.

June 2, 1921.-LUSH, J.-In this case which has been well argued by counsel on both sides, the execution creditors appeal from the decision of Master Whately, on the trial of of an interpleader issue, and it is contended on their behalf; (1) that the deed of gift of the 4th May 1914, from the judgment debtor to his wife, the claimant in these inter

pleader proceedings, is a bill of sale within the Bills of Sale Act 1878, and that not having been registered under that Act, the deed is void as against the execution creditors; (2) that, even if that is not so, the execution creditors are entitled under sect. 10 of the Married Woman's Property Act 1882, to avoid the gift. We are told that the master gave no decision on the second point, and we are asked to send the case back to him so that he might deal with that question, Now, with regard to the first point, it is clear that the deed of gift of the 4th May 1914 was a bill of sale, but it is clear also that, although not registered, it conferred on the wife a good title to the furniture. All that sect. 8 of the Bills of Sale Act 1878 does is to invalidate an unregistered bill of sale or render it inoperative so far as execution creditors and certain other classes of persons are concerned if the goods affected by the document are, after seven days, in the possession or apparent possession of the grantor. The section does not affect the validity of the deed, and therefore, so far as the title to the goods is concerned, the claimant has succeeded in making it out. The furniture, being in the house in which the judgment debtor and the claimant are residing, it is said on behalf of the claimant that Ramsay v. Margrett (sup.) decides the case in her favour.

On the other hand, it is contended for the execution creditors that the facts in Ramsay v. Margrett (sup.), and in this case are entirely different, as no doubt they are, and that the judgment of the Court of Appeal in that case does not cover this

case.

In my opinion, Ramsay v. Margrett (sup.) covers this case, and the difference in the facts is for this purpose wholly immaterial. It is true that in Ramsay v. Margrett (sup.) the court was not considering the case of a gift by a husband to his wife; in that case there was a sale which the court held to be effective without the aid of the document there in question, which admittedly was a bill of sale within the meaning of the Act; but the majority of the court, Lord Esher, M.R., and

CT OF APP.]

Davey and Lopes, L.JJ., expressing no opinion on the point, distinctly held that upon the hypothesis that there was a bill of sale, and that the wife's title depended on it, still, as the husband and wife were both residing in the house in which the furniture in question was, the furniture was just as much in the possession of the wife as in that of her husband. It was clearly laid down that where the possession is a mixed possession, possession follows the title.

To ascertain who is in possession of the goods after the execution of the deed, one has to ascertain to whom they belong. If the title was in the husband before the execution of the deed the possession was then in him, but if the deed was a good deed and conferred a good title upon the wife, the possession, following the title, became that of the wife.

The same principle applies in the case of any other member of the family of the grantor or in the case of any visitor stopping in the house. Each owner of goods resident in the house is in possession of his goods; he is not required to carry them about with him or to lock them up in a separate part of the house. He cannot do more than allow them to remain where they are, and possession follows the title. Again, the Bills of Sale Act 1878, has nothing to do with the question whether the assurance is a voluntary assurance or an assurance for value; the instrument is just as much a bill of sale in the one case as in the other, and, therefore, the fact that in this case there was not a sale but a gift, affords no ground for distinguishing between the two cases.

In my opinion, it is quite clear that, taking this deed as a good deed, as it is, the goods belonged to the wife upon its execution, and they then came into, and still remain in, her possession.

Sect. 8 of the Bills of Sale Act 1878, provides that an unregistered bill of sale shall, as against certain persons, be deemed fraudulent and void so far as regards the property in, or right to, the possession of any chattels comprised in such bill of sale which, at or after the time of executing such process and after the expiration of such seven days are in the possession, or apparent possession of the person making such bill of sale. And sect. 4, so far as material, says personal chattels shall be deemed to be in the apparent possession of the person making or giving a bill of sale so long as they remain, or are in, or upon any house or other premises occupied by him, or are used and enjoyed by him in any place whatsoever, notwithstanding that formal possession thereof may have been taken by, or given to, any other person."

66

It has been suggested that this part of sect. 4 was not brought to the notice of the court in Ramsay v. Margrett (sup.). The section was certainly called to the attention of the court, which must have been aware of the part of it which I have just read, and it was decided that possession follows the title, and that, therefore, the person who was entitled to the goods had possession of them. It is obvious what the expression "apparent possession" means in sect. 4 and sect. 8. It is used in contradistinction to formal possession, and the word apparent" means open visible possession. No doubt the word is sometimes used in contradistinction to actual, as when an agent is said to have apparent authority, but here, apparent possession is used in express contrast to formal

66

66

CT. OF APP.

possession, which sometimes is taken by symbolical delivery.

The judgment of Lush, J. in Ex parte Saffery (44 L. T. Rep. 324; 16 Ch. Div. 668) points this out. He there said: " With regard to the question which arises upon the Bills of Sale Act 1878, the case has been argued as if apparent possession would defeat the bill of sale, although the actual possession had been taken out of the grantor. But if the grantee of a bill of sale chooses not to register it, but takes actual possession of the goods within the seven days allowed for registration, his title is as good as if the deed had been registered. There used formerly to be a practice of giving symbolical possession under a bill of sale by handing over a chair or something of that sort in the name of the whole of the goods, or putting a person on the premises as one of the bankrupt's family, leaving the grantor as much the apparent owner of the goods as he was before the execution of the bill of sale. It was against such transactions that the words apparent possession in the Act were aimed."

In other words, where the open visible possession still remains in the grantor, it does not matter that some symbolical delivery has been effected. Though formal possession may have been given, the bill of sale is deemed to be fraudulent and void as against execution creditors, or the trustee in bankruptcy if open visible possession continues in the grantor. Therefore, what the execution creditors would have to prove in this case, in order to succeed, is that these goods were in the apparent possession of the husband, in the sense which I have explained. They have failed to prove this, because the title to the goods was in the wife and, possession follows the title. The master was therefore, right in holding that the furniture was not in the apparent possession of the judgment creditor at the time of the seizure.

With regard to the second point, this, so far as I know, is the first occasion on which any question of the meaning of the latter part of sect. 10 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882, has come before the court. After dealing with investments which a wife has made out of her husband's money without his consent, it continues: "Nothing in this Act contained shall give validity, as against creditors of the husband, to any gift by a husband to his wife, of any property which, after such gift, shall continue to be in the order and disposition or reputed ownership of the husband."

66

It will be observed that those words relate only to gifts, and the language differs from that of sect. 8 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, which speaks, not of reputed ownership," but of "apparent possession.' Further, sect. 8 is not confined to gifts. Although. before the earliest of the Married Women's Property Acts was passed, a married woman was permitted, in Courts of Equity, to retain as part of her separate estate, moneys which acquired in carrying on a separate trade or business, and although the right of a wife to carry on a separate trade or business is expressly recognised by the Married Women's Property Acts, it is singular that there is no corresponding provision in sect. 10 dealing with a married woman trader who makes gifts to her husband, of property of which she, as a trader, would be the reputed owner. The language of sect. 10 was obviously borrowed, though not exactly, from the Bankruptcy Acts. For instance, in the Bankruptcy Act 1869, goods are spoken of as being in the possession, order, or disposition of the trader.

CT. OF APP.]

66

The word " possession is omitted in sect. 10 of the Act of 1882. Again, the Bankruptcy Act is confined to cases where the property is in the possession, order, or disposition of the trader with the consent of the true owner. No such expression occurs in sect. 10 of the Act of 1882. What, then, is the meaning of sect. 10? The draftsman clearly had in his mind the proposition which was afterwards applied in Ramsay v. Margrett (sup.), to the case of two persons in the common occupation of premises in which the goods are, that possession follows the title; so he has not said that: Nothing in this Act shall give validity, as against creditors of the husband to any gift by a husband to his wife of any property which, after such gift, shall continue to be in the possession of the husband." If he had said that, the difficulty would at once have arisen that the title decides the possession, and so the section would be rendered ineffective. He has borrowed part of the language of sect. 10 from the Bankruptcy Act and substituted for the word “possession," the expression" in the order and disposition or reputed ownership of

the husband: Those words impart, almost of necessity, that the husband, who, ex hypothesi, has made a gift to his wife, is carrying on a business of some sort. It is clear that property in the mixed possession of two persons, is not property of which the husband can be said to be the reputed owner any more than it can be said to be in the reputed ownership of the wife. Ownership of the goods cannot be inferred from the fact that the husband is rated as occupier of the house in which they are. The meaning of reputed ownership and what must be proved to establish that a person is the reputed owner of goods was discussed by Lord Selborne, L.C. in Ex parte Watkins (28 L. T. Rep. 793; L. R. 8 Ch. 520), and I shall read the passage because it assists in ascertaining the meaning of sect. 10. Lord Selborne said: The doctrine of reputed ownership does not require any investigation into the actual state of knowledge or belief, either of all creditors, or of particular creditors, and still less of the outside world, who are no creditors at all, as to the position of particular goods. It is enough for the doctrine, if those goods are in such a situation as to convey to the minds of those who know their situation, the reputation of ownership, that reputation arising by the legitimate exercise of reason and judgment on the knowledge of those facts which are capable of being generally known to those who choose to make inquiry on the subject. It is not at all necessary to examine into the degree of actual knowledge which is possessed, but the court must judge from the situation of the goods, what inference as to the ownership might be legitimately drawn by those who knew the facts. I do not mean the facts that are only known to the parties dealing with the goods, but such facts as are capable of being, and naturally would be, the subject of general knowledge to those who take any means to inform themselves on the subject. So, on the other hand, it is not at all necessary, in order to exclude the doctrine of reputed ownership, to show that every creditor or any particular creditor, or the outside world who are not creditors, knew anything whatever about particular goods, one way or the other. It is quite enough, in my judgment, if the situation of the goods was such as to exclude all legitimate ground from which those who knew anything about that situation could infer the

[CT. OF APP.

ownership to be in the person having actual possession."

In most if not all of the cases in which this question of reported ownership has been discussed, a business has been carried on, and it seems clear that when the legislature used this language in sect. 10 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882, and spoke of property continuing to be "in the order and disposition or reputed ownership of the husband," it was dealing with cases in which a man and his wife are living together on premises where the husband is carrying on business. I find it difficult to think of any case in which husband and wife are living together in a house where no business is carried on, in which it could properly be said that the husband any more than the wife was the reputed owner of the property in the house. Sect. 10 is, I think, intended to deal with such a case as where a man and his wife are living in an hotel and the husband is carrying on the business of an hotel keeper. He is known to be the proprietor of the business and one would naturally presume that the business being his, he would be the owner of the furniture in the rooms let to the guests. If in such a case as that, the husband were to make a gift bonâ fide, but secretly, to his wife, of the furniture in the hotel, his creditors would be protected by sect. 10. Here there was no evidence to justify a finding that the judgment debtor had the order and disposition of this furniture, or that he was the reputed owner of it, even if one treats the section as applying to cases in which no business is being carried on. There was nothing to create the impression in the minds of those who knew anything of it that the judgment debtor, rather than his wife, was the owner of the furniture. That being so, this point also fails, and the appeal must be dismissed.

SANKEY, J.-The first point made on behalf of the execution creditors was that the furniture in question was in the apparent possession of the husband, that the deed of gift of the 4th May 1914, was a bill of sale which ought to have been registered, and that, therefore, the furniture was not protected from seizure. On this point, the question is whether the furniture was in the apparent possession of the husband. As to this, I think that the question is concluded against the execution creditor, by Ramsay v. Margrett (sup.). In that case Lord Esher, M.R. said (70 L. T. Rep. 788; (1894) 2 Q. B., 18 at p. 25): "When she (the wife) bought these goods from her husband and paid him the price, they became her separate property. The goods were in the house in which the husband and the wife were living together, and in that state of things you could not say which of them had the actual possession of the goods."

In the present case, the execution creditors have not shown that this furniture was in the apparent possession of the husband; they have merely proved a state of facts which may show either that it was in the apparent possession of the husband or that it was in the apparent possession of the wife. That would be sufficient to dispose of the point, but counsel for the claimant is, I think, right in saying thtt he can put his case higher by relying on what was said by Lord Esher, M.R. in Ramsay v. Margrett (sup.) in the sentences following the one which I have read. He said: "What is the rule of law as to possession in such a case? When the possession is doubtful, it is attached by law to the title. Therefore, in such circumstances, the law

Cr. OF APP.]

considers the goods to be in the possession of the wife, who has the legal title to them."

In this case, the wife had the legal title to the furniture by reason of the deed of gift of the 4th May 1914. Apart from that deed it might be difficult to say in whose possession this furniture was, but when the fact is added that the wife had the title to it, the possession in law is in her. That disposes of the first point.

The second point taken on behalf of the execution creditors turns upon the meaning of the latter part of sect. 10 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882. It is impossible to say that this furniture was in the order and disposition or reputed ownership of the husband. It may be I express no opinion on it that all that has been proved is that the furniture was in the order and disposition or reputed ownership, either of the husband, or of the wife, but I think it desirable to give a decision upon sect. 10 on which, so far as we can learn, there has been no decision. I desire to add nothing to what has been said by Lush, J. on the doctrine of reputed ownership. I think it is probably right to say that the furniture settled on the wife was not in the reputed ownership of the husband, but giving the best interpretation I can to sect. 10, I think its meaning is this: where a husband and wife are living together, goods can only be in the order and disposition or reputed ownership of the husband when he has acquired, by something more than mere possession, the reputation of being the owner, as, for example, where the husband and wife are living together in an hotel where he carries on the business of an hotel keeper; but even in such a case it may be that the doctrine does not apply to the goods in the private rooms as distinguished from the public rooms.

In my view it must ultimately turn on a question of fact. I think that the Master was right in the conclusion at which he arrived. Therefore the appeal must be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

The execution creditors appealed.

Schiller, K.C., Lightwood, and A. R. Thomas, for the appellants. These goods were in the apparent possession of the husband within sect. 8 of the Bills of Sale Act 1878, for they remained, after the gift, in the house occupied by the husband who gave the bill of sale, and were used and enjoyed by him. Goods can be in the possession of the wife, and still be in the apparent possession of the husband, for the words of the section covers such a case. Here the husband was the rated occupier of the house, secus in Re Satterthwaite (2 Mans. 52). The deed of gift, therefore, not being registered, is void as against the appellants:

Ex parte Jay, 31 L. T. Rep. 260; L. Rep. 9 Ch. 697.

Secondly, the goods were in the reputed ownership of the husband within sect. 10 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882. Those words are general and are not limited to the case of a husband and wife carrying on business in the premises where they live. The words in that Act have a differing meaning to those used in the Bankruptcy Acts, where they are used in connection with other phrases. Where the husband is the occupier, goods are primâ facie in his reputed ownership:

Ex parte Brooks, 48 L. T. Rep. 453; 23 Ch. Div.
261;
Chappell v. Harrison, 103 L. T. Rep. 594.

They referred also to:

Re Emery, 21 Q. B. Div. 405;

[CT. OF APP.

Lingard v. Messiter, 1823, 1 B. & C. 308; Shannon v. Mason, 81 L. T. Rep. 485; (1899)

2 Q. B. 679;

Ex parte Watkins, 28 L. T. Rep. 793; L. Rep. 8 Ch. 520;

Hollinshead v. Egan, 109 L. T. Rep. 681; (1913) A. C. 564.

Disturnal, K.C. and F. C. Wynn Werninck, for the respondent, were not called upon.

BANKES, L.J.-The respondent was the wife of a judgment debtor. She lived with her husband in what Davey, L.J., in Ramsay v. Margrett (70 L. T., at p. 790; (1894) 2 Q. B., at p. 27) called the conjugal domicil. The judgment creditor put in execution on the household goods in the house. The wife claims the goods. In her affidavit she stated that a considerable part of the goods had always been her property, and had never been her husband's, but had been given to her by her father; the rest had been given to her by her husband by a deed of gift. There is no suggestion that the deed is invalid, or that it was not completed by the handing over of the last-mentioned goods. It was for all purposes a valid deed, which passed the property in the goods. But it is said that the deed was a bill of sale, and was not registered; and, therefore, the judgment creditor had a right to say that, notwithstanding the deed, he was entitled to seize the goods in execution-first, by sect. 8 of the Bills of Sale Act 1878; and secondly, by sect. 10 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882. The Divisional Court refused to accept either contention, and held rightly that the case was covered by Ramsay v. Margrett (sup.). That was a claim by an execution creditor of a husband who was living with his wife, as the husband was in this case. There the wife had bought the goods from her husband, and that is the only difference between the cases. Counsel for the appellants contended that the difference between a purchase by a wife and a voluntary gift to a wife was very material. In my opinion, there is no material difference. In either case the goods become the absolute property of the wife, and absolute property in the wife is the basis of the decision in Ramsay v. Margrett (sup.). It is immaterial to consider how the goods became her property. That case decided two things-first, that where the husband and wife are living together in the conjugal domicil there is no presumption that the household goods are in the apparent possession of the husband; and secondly, that the doctrine laid down in Littleton's Tenures, sect. 701, and Jones v. Chapman (1849, 2 Ex. 803), that possession follows title, applies to chattels as well as to land. Lopes, L.J. expressed a doubt how far it would operate to take goods out of the apparent possession of the husband; but Lord Esher, M.R. said (70 L. T., at p. 790; (1894) 2 Q. B., at p. 25): “So in this case the money which the plaintiff had was her money, and the furniture was her husband's, and she had the right to buy with her money whatever she chose. When she bought these goods from her husband and paid him the price, they became her separate property. The goods were in the house in which the husband and the wife were living together, and in that state of things you could not say which of them had the actual possession of the goods. What is the rule of law as to possession in such a case? When the possession is doubtful it