defendant to show that the error or misstatement, or insufficient description in the notice, has deprived him of the opportunity of taking advantage of the statute(r). The Christian name of the

attorney need not be written out at full length(s), nor need his private residence be specified; for the place where an attorney abides for the purpose of carrying on his business is his place of abode within the meaning of the statute. "Either will do, the place of residence or the place of business"(t). Care must be taken to address the notice to the right parties, and to serve it in the proper quarter(u). 828 Tender of amends.-The statutes, requiring notice of action to be given, further provide, generally speaking, that no plaintiff shall recover for any wrongful proceeding in execution of the Act, if tender of sufficient amends shall have been made before action brought, and that if the jury at the trial are of opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to damages beyond the sum tendered or paid into court, they are to give a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff cannot elect to be nonsuited.

829 Payment of money into court.-Every constable, officer, and private person who is entitled to the ordinary statutory protection, may, after action commenced, and before issue joined, pay money into court, and give evidence of such payment under the plea of not guilty by statute; and if at the trial the jury are of opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to damages beyond the sum paid into court, they are bound to give a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff cannot elect to be nonsuited, and the defendant's costs are to be paid out of the money paid into court. If the plaintiff accepts such money in satisfaction of the damages, it is to be paid out of court to him, and the defendant is to pay him his taxed costs, and thereupon the action is to be determined(v).

830 Parties to be made plaintiffs-Master and servant.-The person actually assaulted is in general the only person who can maintain an action for damages, unless the assault has caused his death, in which case the action, if maintainable, must be brought by his personal representative (ante, p. 502); or unless the person assaulted is a servant, and the master has lost the benefit of his service by reason of the assault, in which case an action for damages is maintainable both by

(r) Osborn v. Gough, 3 B. & P. 554.

(8) James v. Swift, 4 B. & C. 681.

(t) Roberts v. Williams, 4 Dowl. P. C. 486; 2 C. M. & R. 561.

(u) Hider v. Dorrel, 1 Taunt. 384.

(v) See 11 & 12 Vict. c. 44, ss. 9, 11. And ante, pp. 710, 711.

1

the servant and the master; but the master cannot have an action for the beating unless the battery is so great that, by reason thereof, he loses the services of his servant, but the servant himself, for every small battery, shall have an action; and the reason of the difference is, that the master has not any damage by the personal beating of his servant, but by reason of the loss of service(w).

Where two have a joint interest they may, as we have seen, join in the same action, but they cannot do so where the wrong done to one is no wrong done to the other, as in the case of false imprisonment, or assault and battery, where what one man suffers is altogether different from the injury that accrues to another from the same cause(x). 831 Of the parties to be made defendants.-Every private unofficial person not acting in a judicial capacity, or in the authorized execution of legal process (post, chs. 14, 15), is responsible in damages for a wrongful imprisonment, ordered, directed, or authorized by him(y). He is not responsible for the orders or decrees of judges, and justices, before whom he has laid a complaint or made a charge; but if he officiously interferes and gives orders or directions to police constables for the imprisonment of the plaintiff, he will be responsible in damages if he is unable to excuse or justify the act. Where the defendant out of spite and ill-will, and for the purpose of getting the plaintiff out of the way, went to the place of rendezvous for the impress service near the Tower, and gave information there which caused the plaintiff to be seized by the pressgang and carried on board the tender, where he was detained until it was discovered that the information was false, and that he had never been in a ship before, it was held that the defendant was liable to an action for false imprisonment. "If a person," observes Lord Ellenborough, "causes another to be impressed, he does it at his own peril, and is liable in damages if that person. proves not to have been subject to the impress service. If the defendant in this case had said that she believed the plaintiff had been a sailor, and was liable to be impressed, leaving it to the officer of the pressgang to make the necessary inquiries, and to act as he should think most advisable, she would not then have been amenable to this action, but she took upon herself positively to aver that the plaintiff was compellable to serve in a king's ship, and caused him to be siezed, and she must answer for the consequences"(z). Here the per

(w) Robert Mary's case, 9 Co. 205.

(2) Best, C.J., Barratt v. Collins, 10 Moore, 451.

(y) Ante, pp. 12, 699, 708.

(z) Flewster v. Royle, 1 Campb. 188.

son giving the information was the sole moving cause of the arrest, and herself trumped up a false story for the very purpose of wrongfully depriving the plaintiff of his liberty. There is a wide distinction, therefore, between this case and the case of a man who gives bonâ fide information, or makes a bona fide charge against another to a police-constable, leaving the constable to make inquiry into the circumstances, and act as he may think fit in the matter.

Where a felony had been committed in the house of the defendant, and the latter sent for the police and complained of the robbery, and stated various circumstances of suspicion which had come to his knowledge, and the policeman made inquiry into those circumstances, and on his own authority arrested the plaintiff and took him to a policestation, and at the same time requested the defendant to come to the station and sign the charge-sheet, which he did, charging the plaintiff with the felony, it was held that these facts did not render the defendant responsible for a trespass, as charging a person with an offence was a different thing from giving him into custody. "The arrest and detention of the plaintiff," observes Pollock, C.B., "were the acts of the police-officer; and the defendant did nothing more than he was, under the circumstances, bound to do, viz., sign the charge-sheet. He might have been liable, if he had acted malá fide, but not otherwise. We ought to take care that people are not put in peril for making a complaint when a crime has been committed. If a charge be made malá fide, there are ample means of redress "(a). But if the defendant gives the plaintiff in charge(b), or directs the policeman to take him into custody, he will be answerable in damages for the imprisonment if he cannot establish a justification(c), and the signing of a charge-sheet by the defendant is primâ facie evidence against him that he ordered and directed the arrest(d).

All persons aiding and assisting in the unlawful 'confinement of another are responsible in damages for the trespass, although they had nothing to do with the original arrest, and had no knowledge that the arrest and imprisonment were unlawful at the time they had a hand in it(e).

(a) Grinham v. Willey, 4 H. & N. 499; 28 Law J., Exch. 242. Brown v. Chapman, 6 C. B. 374. See Burns v. Erben, 40 N. Y. 463; Peckham v. Tomlinson, 6 Barb. 253; Von Latham v. Libby, 38 Barb. 339; Brown v. Chadsey, 39 Barb. 253.

(b) Hopkins v. Crowe, 4 Ad. & E. 774. Wheeler v. Whiting, 9 C. & P. 262.

(c) Warner v. Riddiford, 4 C. B., N. S. 200. Ashurst, J., in Morgan v. Hughes, 2 T. R. 281. Stonehouse v. Elliott, 6 ib. 315.

(d) Harris v. Dignum, 39 Law J., Exch. 23.

(e) Griffin v. Colman, 28 Law J., Exch. 137; 4 H. & N. 265. Pow v. Beckner, 3 Ired. 475. Vinton v. Weaver, 41 Me. 430.

If a person has been arrested and imprisoned under the authority of legal process which has been set aside as irregular, both the attorney who sued out the process and the client who set the attorney in motion are responsible in damages in an action for an assault and false imprisonment; for as the client gives to the attorney the right to represent him in the conduct of a cause, he is responsible for whatever the attorney does within the scope of his authority. The writ is a justification to the officer of the court who acted under it, and had no option but to obey it (post, ch. 14), but it is no protection, after it has been set aside, to the attorney who sued it out(f), or to the client who set the attorney in motion(g). But a person causing process to be issued is not responsible for anything that is done under it where the process is afterwards set aside, not for irregularity, but for error. In the one case a man acts irregularly and improperly without the sanction of any court. He therefore takes the consequences of his own unauthorized act. But where he relies upon the judgment of a competent court he is protected(h). And so if a judgment, regularly

signed, be acted on, and the plaintiff taken on a ca. sa. issued under it, the defendant will not be liable if the judgment be set aside, not for irregularity or bad faith on the part of the defendant, but in the. exercise of the equitable jurisdiction of the court, because judgment has been signed for too much, and as a favor to the plaintiff(i). 832 Liability of a corporation to an action for an assault.—An action for an assault and battery will lie against a corporation whenever the corporation can authorize the act to be done, and it has been done by their orders or authority(j). But it is otherwise if the corporation cannot legally authorize the act to be done. Where, therefore, a station-master arrests a person travelling by a railway in charge of a horse for not paying for the carriage of the horse on demand, and there was no power in the railway company by law to arrest a person

(f) Parsons v. Lloyd, 2 W. Bl. 844. See Sleight v. Leavenworth, 5 Duer, 122.

(g) Barker v. Braham, 2 W. Bl. 865; post, ch. 17, s. 2. Collett v. Foster, 2 H. & N. 361. See Deyo v. Van Valkenburgh, 5 Hill, 242; Chapman v. Dyett, 11 Wend. 31.

In Sleight v. Leavenworth, 5 Duer, 122, it was held that where an attorney for the plaintiff issued an execution against the body on a judgment clearly not authorizing it, the plaintiff was liable with the attorney for the false imprisonment, although wholly ignorant of the issuing of the execution.

(h) Williams v. Smith, 14 C. B., N. S. 590. Cooper v. Harding, 7 Q. B. 928. Philips v. Biron, 1 Str. 509. Lanett v. Hilts, 19 Barb. (N. Y.) 283.

"One who applies to a judge to issue an attachment for the arrest of another, and who receives and delivers it to a sheriff for service, is liable for the arrest in case the attachment is void for want of jurisdiction in the judge or for any other cause." Miller v. Adams, 52 N. Y.

29.

(i) Smith v. Sydney, L. R., 5 Q. B. 203.

"

j) Goff v Gt. North. Rail. Co., 30 Law J., Q. B. 148. Ante, p. 707-8.

for such non-payment, but only to detain the goods, it was held that no authority could be implied to the station-master, and that the railway company were not responsible(k). So if a foreman porter, in temporary charge of a station, or a ticket clerk, arrests a servant of the company, or a stranger, on a charge of stealing the company's goods, or robbing the till, as they have no implied authority so to arrest, the company are not responsible for it(). So where one of the defendant's servants, a constable, after the conclusion of a scuffle in a station yard, wrongfully gave the plaintiff into custody, and all that the constable was authorized by the regulations of the company to do, was to interfere in any fight or affray occurring at any of the stations, for the purpose of stopping it, it was held that the company were not responsible(m). On the other hand, where the plaintiff, who refused to show his ticket, was removed from the station with unnecessary violence by order of the inspector, the company were held responsible(n). 833 Subsequent ratification of wrongful imprisonment rendering the ratifying party responsible for the wrong.-An action will lie against every person who has ratified and adopted an act of imprisonment effected or ordered by his servant or agent for his use and benefit, although the imprisonment was effected in the first instance without his knowledge. "But he that agreeth to a trespass after it be done, is no trespasser unless the trespass was done to his use or for his benefit(o), and then his agreement subsequent amounteth to a commandment "(p).

(*) Poulton v. Lond. and S.-Western Rail. Co., L. R., 2 Q. B. 534. In the Monument National Bank v. Globe Works (101 Mass. 59), Mr. Justice Hoar said: "No corporation is empowered by its charter to commit an assault and battery, yet it has frequently been held accountable in this commonwealth for one committed by its servants."

In Orr v. Bank of the United States (1 Ham. 36), it was held that an action cannot be maintained against a corporation aggregate for an assault and battery. A contrary doctrine was asserted in Brokaw v. New Jersey, etc., R. R. Co., 3 Vroom (N. J.), 328.

Where a railroad conductor attempted to enforce the payment of fare by seizing articles of property in the hands of a passenger the corporation were held liable to an action of assault and battery. Ramsden v. Boston & Albany R. R. Co., 104 Mass. 117.

In St. Louis, Alton & Chicago R. R. Co. v. Dalby (19 Ill. 353), it was held that while an action of trespass for assault and battery will lie against a railroad corporation, the corporation is not responsible for any excess of beating or violence used by its agents beyond what was necessary to carry out its orders. See also Isaacs v. Third Avenue R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 122; Little Miami R. R. Co. v. Wetmore, 19 Ohio St. 110. This doctrine has not however been generally accepted in other States. But it must be observed that while a railroad corporation may be liable for the wilful assault of its servant on a passenger, it may not be liable for a similar assault on one to whom the company owes no duty arising from contract. See Goddard v. Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 57 Me. 202; Angell & Ames on Corp. s. 388.

(1) Edwards v. L. & N.-W. Rwy., L. R., 5 C. P. 445. Allen v. L. & S.-W. Rwy., L. R., 6 Q. B. 65.

(m) Walker v. South-Eastern Rway. L. R., 5 C. P. 640.

(n) S. C.

(0) See Walker v. South-East. Rwy., supra.

(p) 4 Inst. 317.

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