covering that the railway company was wrong, and that a pecuniary compensation is the only satisfaction you can receive for the injury "”(c). Thus, where a local board of health withdrew its opposition to a railway bill, on the insertion of a clause that the bridges within their district were to have a certain gradient, and the company could not make the bridges of such a gradient without encroaching on adjoining lands, against which the adjoining proprietor obtained an injunction, and the company consequently made the bridges of a steeper gradient, the court granted a mandatory injunction to the company to alter the bridges(d). So where, by a local Act, commissioners were appointed to pave, drain, and otherwise improve a certain district, and to levy rates for that purpose, the court granted an injunction to restrain them from applying the moneys produced by such rates towards the promotion of a bill in Parliament, the object of which was the extension of their district, although the bill had received the approval of the ratepayers(e).

And whenever public bodies, acting in the exercise of statutory powers, have failed to comply with any condition imposed by statute for the protection of the public, the Court of Chancery will, as we have seen, by injunction prevent the exercise of the statutory authority until the condition precedent has been strictly fulfilled(f) Thus, it will restrain a railway company from using land for which, and the injury to it, the compensation assessed under the Lands Clauses Act has not been paid, although the railway has been opened for public use(g); although in cases where the effect of such an injunction would be to make the land useless to both parties, an injunction will be refused and a receiver appointed instead(h); nor will an injunction be granted from running trains over the land until its sale, which has been ordered by the court(i). The Court of Chancery has also, it seems, jurisdiction

(c) Dun. Nav. Co. v. North Mid. Rail. Co., 1 Rail. C. 154.

(d) Att.-Gen. v. Mid. Kent Rail. Co., L. R., 3 Ch. App. 100.

(e) Att.-Gen. v. West Hartlepool Improvement Commissioners, L. R., 10 Eq. Ca. 152. See Reg. v. Mayor of Sheffield, L. R., 6 Q. B., 652.

(ƒ) Gibson v. Hammersmith Rail. Co., ante, p. 895. Cosens v. Bognor Rail. Co., L. R., 1 Ch. App. 594. See Kent Coast Rail. Co. v. Lond., Chat. & Dover Rail. Co., L. R., 3 Ch. App. 656. The company would also be liable in trespass if they had taken the plaintiff's land, without performing the statutory conditions. Cranwell v. Mayor, etc., of London, L. R., 5 Exch. 284. (g) Walker v. Ware, etc., Rail. Co., L. R., 1 Eq. Ca. 195. Field v. Carnarvon & Llanberris Rail. Co., L. R., 5 Eq. Ca. 190. St. Germans (Earl of) v. Crystal Palace Rail., L. R., 11 Eq. Ca. 568. Stretton v. Gt. Western Rail., L. R., 6 Ch. App. 751. The vendor, however, has no lien for the costs of the arbitration. Ferrers (Earl of) v. Staff. & Utt. Rail. Co., L. R., 13 Eq. Ca. 524.

(h) Pell v. Northampton & Banbury Rail., L. R., 2 Ch. App. 100. Munns v. Isle of Wight Rail., L. R., 8 Eq. Ca. 653; 5 Ch. App. 414.

(i) Lycett v. Staff. & Uttox. Rail., L. R., 13 Eq. Ca. 261.

to restrain an application to Parliament to enable a company to abandon the formation of certain lines, and the statutable contracts that they have made thereunder, or to restrain an improper application to Parliament for a private Act, though such a jurisdiction can hardly ever be exercised(k). "You cannot restrain a man from going to Parliament on public grounds, .. but if he is going on in violation of a plain contract, which is personal to himself, with which the public interests have nothing whatever to do, you cannot, under the pretence that he is going to Parliament, refuse the relief which, if there were no question about Parliament, this Court would be bound to give "(?).

(k) Stenle v. North Metrop. Rail. Co., L. R., 2 Ch. App. 237. Re Lond., Chat. & Dover Rail. Ex parte Hartridge, L. R., 5 Ch. App. 671.

(1) Per Bacon, V. C., Telford v. Met. Board of Works, L. R., 13 Eq. Ca. 594.

CHAPTER XVII.

OF LIBEL AND SLANDER(a).

SA ION I.-Of libel or written slander.-Distinction between slander by word of mouth and slander in a published writing-Oral slander rendered actionable by being printed and published-Exemption of the author, and liability of *he publisher-What writings are libellous and actionable Of malice-Privileged writings and communications-Defamatory writings in courts of justice -Defamatory petitions to the Queen, to Parliament, or to ministers or officers of state-Criminatory communications made in discharge of a public or private duty-Criminatory pastoral letters-Defamatory letters respecting clergymen-Privileged communications between relations and friends-Privileged communications by persons specially interested in the subject-matter of the communication-Reckless and inconsiderate communications-Disclosures made at the plaintiff's request-Answers to inquiries-Communications between subscribers to a charity-Privileged communications respecting the character of servants-Comments in excess of the privilege-Effect of addressing privileged communications to the wrong person-Reports in newspapers of trials and proceedings preliminary thereto-Reports of speeches in Parliament, or at public meetings-Reviews and criticisms in public papers -Comments upon the public character of public men-Disparaging criticisms by one journalist or tradesman upon another. SECTION II.-Of oral slander.-Defamatory words not actionable without proof of special damage-Defamatory words actionable per se-In what cases actionable words are rendered not actionable by precedent or subsequent words-Defamatory words concerning tradesmen and professional men— Words imputing official misconduct-Words rendered actionable by reason of special damage-Slanderous denunciations from the pulpit, causing loss of situation or employment-Effect of the dismissal being a wrongful dismissalUnauthorized repetition of verbal slander-Privileged communications by word of mouth-Privileged charges and accusations of felony-Privileged statements before magistrates and judicial tribunals-Privileged comments by magistrates and judges-Of the interpretation and application of slanderous words-Slander of title.

SECTION III.-Of actions and indictments for libel and slander.—Consolidation of actions-Parties, pleadings, defences and evidence-Damages recoverable -Indictment for libel.

(a) See Starkie on Slander and Libel, 3rd ed. (1869).

SECTION I.

OF LIBEL AND WRITTEN SLANDER.

1087 Of the distinction between slander by word of mouth and slander in a published writing.-Slander in writing or in print has always been considered in our law a graver and more serious wrong and injury than slander by mere word of mouth, inasmuch as it is accompanied with greater coolness and deliberation, indicates greater malice, and is in general propagated wider and further than oral slander. Hence words. of a depreciatory character, which, if spoken only, would not be actionable, may become so by being put into writing or print and published(aa). "There is a very material distinction," observes Gould, J., "between libels and words. A libel is punishable both criminally and by action, when mere speaking the words would not be punishable in either way." For speaking the words "rogue" and "rascal" of any one, an action will not lie; but if these words were written and published of any one, an action would lie(b). Merely to call a man a swindler, or a cheat, or dishonest person by word of mouth, is not actionable(c), unless it be spoken of him in his trade or business, so as to have damaged him with his customers(d); but if such words are published in writing or printing, they are actionable per se(e). Verbal reflections upon the chastity of a young lady are not actionable, unless they have prevented her from marrying, or have been accompanied by special damage(ee); but if they are published in a newspaper, they are at once actionable, and substantial damages are recoverable(ƒ). Before, therefore, a person gives general notoriety to oral calumny,

Lansing v. Carpenter, 9 Wis. 540.

(aa) Bennett v. Williamson, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 60. (b) Villiers v. Mousley, 2 Wils. 403; 5 Co. 125 b. Oakley v. Harrington, 1 Johns. Cas. 129. Idol v. Jones, 2 Dev. 162. Sturgenegger v. Taylor, 2 Brevard, 480. Williams v. Carnes, 4 Humph. 9. Ford v. Johnson, 21 Geo. 399.

(c) Savile v. Jardine, 2 H. Bl. 532. Stevenson v. Hayden, 2 Mass. 406.

Chase v. Whitlock,

3 Hill, 139. Wierbach v. Trone, 2 Watts & Serg. 408. Neil v. Allenhofen, 26 Wis. 708. (d) Bac. Abr. SLANDER, B. Nelson v. Borchenius, 52 Ill. 236. See Fowles v. Bowen, 30 N. Y. 20.

(e) Janson v. Stuart, 1 T. R. 748.

(ee) Berry v. Carter, 2 Stew. & Port. 387. Buys v. Gillespie, 2 Johns. 115. Brooker v. Coffin, 5 Johns. 188; W. & L., 2 N. & M. 204. Elliot v. Ailsbury, 2 Bibb, 473. McQueen v. Fulgham,' 27 Texas, 463. Underhill v. Welton, 32 Vt. 40. Linney v. Maton, 13 Texas, 449.

But to the contrary, see Mayer v. Schleichter, 29 Wis. 646; Haynes v. Ritchey, 30 Iowa, 76 ; Cleaveland v. Detweiler, 18 Iowa, 299; Smith v. Silence, 4 Iowa, 321; Wilson v. Beighler, id. 427; Truman v. Taylor, id. 424; Beardsley v. Bridgman, 17 Iowa, 290; M'Brayer v. Hill, 4 Ired. 136. Snediker v. Poorbaugh, 29 Iowa, 488; Richardson v. Roberts, 23 Ga. 215; Guard v. Risk, 11 Ind. 156; Patterson v. Wilkinson, 55 Me. 42; Downing v. Wilson, 36 Ala. 717; Adams v. Rankin, 1 Duvall (Ky.), 58; Miles v. Vanhorn, 17 Ind. 245.

(f) Bl. Com., by Christian, 123, n. 6.