of the goods contracted for, gives notice to the vendor not to manufacture any more, as he has no occasion for them, and will not accept or pay for them, the vendor having been desirous and able to complete the contract, he may, without manufacturing and tendering the rest of the goods, maintain an action against the purchaser for breach of the contract. Cort v. Ambergate Railway Company, 17 Q. B. 127 ; 20 L. J., Q. B. 460; 15 Jur. 877.

A declaration stated an executory contract, whereby the plaintiff agreed to sell and the defendant to buy, on arrival by a certain ship, onethird of a cargo of tea, to be consigned to the plaintiff, and delivered in Belfast, from the ship to the defendant, at a certain price, payable after delivery. It averred that the ship arrived at Belfast with a cargo of tea, consigned to the plaintiff; that the plaintiff was ready and willing to deliver the cargo in Belfast to the defendant according to the agreement; yet the defendant before the arrival of the ship with the cargo at Belfast, discharged the plaintiff from delivering the cargo, and thenceforth refused to perform the agreement:-Held, first, that the defendant was not bound before the arrival of the cargo to give the plaintiff a distinct answer whether he would fulfil the contract or not. Ripley v. MClure, 4 Ex. 345; 18 L. J., Ex. 419.

Held, secondly, that a refusal by the defendant, before the arrival of the cargo, to perform the contract, was not a breach of it; but that such refusal unretracted, down to and inclusive of the time when the defendant was bound to receive the cargo, was evidence of a continuing refusal, and a waiver of the condition precedent of delivery, and consequently the defendant was liable for the breach of contract. Ib.

See also SALE.

Non-performance of Executory Contract.] An agreement was executed between a banker of Paris and the directors of a company formed to take over his business. No day was fixed for the completion of the transfer of the business and offices. In fact, the transfer was never carried out; but the company was started, and it transacted business, and the banker admitted a committee of its directors to his offices, which he vacated, removing his clerks to a higher story in the same building, where he continued to transact his business pending the completion of the contract, which he was always anxious and willing to effect by handing over books and executing legal transfers. The contract never was completed by the default of the company. The company came to a winding-up. The banker claimed the full amount of the purchase-money for which he had contracted :-Held, that the contract was in fieri, and as it was owing to the fault of the company that it never became fully executed, an inquiry was directed before the chief clerk as to the damages sustained by the banker through the breach of the contract, he to be allowed to prove for the amount of the damages so ascertained. Lafitte & Company v. Lafitte, 42 L. J., Ch. 716; 29 L. T. 80; 21′ W. R. 750— H. L.

part of the contract. Breach, that before the day for the commencement of the employment the defendant refused to perform the agreement and discharged the plaintiff from performing it, and wrongfully and wholly put an end to the agreement :-Held, that a party to an executory agreement may, before the time for executing it, break the agreement, either by disabling himself from fulfilling it, or by renouncing the contract; and that an action will lie for such breach before the time for the fulfilment of the agreement; and that it sufficiently appeared on the face of this declaration that there was on the part of the defendant not merely an intention to break the contract, of which intention he might repent, but a renunciation communicated to the plaintiff, on which he was entitled to act. Hochster v. De la Tour, 2 El. & Bl. 678; 22 L. J., Q. B. 455; 17 Jur. 972.

A. stipulated that he would as soon as he should become possessed of a public-house, execute a lease thereof to B. from the 21st December, 1825, for fourteen or twenty-one years. At the time of the agreement, the house was upon lease, which would not expire till Midsummer, 1827; the legal estate being in trustees, first, to pay debts, and then to pay an annuity, and subject thereto to the use of A. if he attained twentyfour. In June, 1825, after A. had attained twenty-four, but before the outstanding lease had expired, he and the trustees joined in a lease to C. for twenty-three years-Held, that A. having thereby put it out of his power, so long as the latter lease of 1824 subsisted, to grant any lease to B., had committed a breach of his agreement, and was liable to an action for a breach of that agreement, although the first lease had not expired. Ford v. Tiley, 6 B. & C. 325.

Grant for Life.]-If a parson contracts that a party shall occupy the parsonage lands during a certain term of years, his resignation of the living is a breach of his contract. Price v. Williams, 1 Gale, 362; 1 M. & W. 6.

S. was lord of a manor, and the office of steward of the manor was in his gift. The former steward resigned his office upon the lord agreeing to execute a bond to him for an annuity for his life. The defendant, in consideration of S. permitting the defendant to hold the office at the will of S., promised to pay out of the fees of the office the annuity to the former steward during his life, and to indemnify S. therefrom, so long as the defendant should execute the office, either by himself, or deputy to be approved of by S. S. appointed the defendant accordingly, and afterwards appointed him by deed for life; S. died, and the defendant refusing to pay the annuity to the former steward, on the ground that his promise only extended to his continuing in office at the will of S., which had been terminated by the grant for life; he was thereupon sued by the executors of S. :-Held liable. Mattock v. Kinglake, 1 P. & D. 46; 8 A. & E. 795; 1 W., W. & H. 667.

express negative stipulation not to sell to any other manufacturer. The court granted an injunction to restrain the breach of the negative stipulation, although the contract was one of which specific performance would not have been granted. Wolverhampton and Walsall Railway Company v. London and North-Western Railway Company (16 L. R., Eq. 433) considered. Donnell v. Bennett, 22 Ch. D. 835; 52 L. J.. Ch. 414; 48 L. T. 68; 31 W. R. 316; 47 J. P. 342.

CONTRACTOR.

See NEGLIGENCE-WORK AND LABOUR.

CONTRIBUTION.

I. OF SURETIES.-See SURETY.

II. ON WINDING-UP COMPANIES.-See COM

PANY,

CONVENT.

See CHARITY.

CONVERSION.

See TROVER.

CONVICTION.

See CRIMINAL LAW-JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.

CONVOY.

See INSURANCE-SHIPPING.

II. RIGHTS OF COPYHOLDERS.
1. Nature of Tenure and Grant.
a. Generally, 1060.

b. Customary Freeholds, 1064.
c. Quasi Tenancy by Curtesy, 1066.
d. Validity of Customs, 1067.

e. Mode of barring Entails, 1068.
f. Descent of Copyholds, 1068.
2. Surrender and Admission.
a. Construction, 1070.
b. Operation, 1072.

c. Mode of, 1075.
d. Necessity of, 1078.

e. Enforcing, 1082.
f. Evidence of, 1084.
3. Enfranchisement, 1086.

III. ALIENATION, 1089.

IV. ENCROACHMENT, 1091.

I. LORD OF MANOR.

1. RIGHTS OF.

a. Trees and Timber.

Extent of Rights of Lord and Tenant.]-The lord of a manor has not by law, independently of custom, any such property or interest in the timber growing on the copyhold premises of a tenant as entitles him to enter and cut. Whitechurch v. Holworthy; 19 Ves. 213; 4 M. & S. 344.

Generally, if there is no custom for the tenants of a manor to cut timber, it belongs to the lord. Ib.

A copyholder may by custom have such an interest in the timber that he may himself cut; so he may have a special interest to prevent the lord's cutting, but such a custom ought to be proved by extremely strong evidence. Ib.

The lord of a manor has no right to enter on a copyhold of inheritance, and cut timber for his own use, leaving sufficient for botes and estovers, if there is no custom in the manor. Ib.

Where a copyhold estate is granted for three lives to a man and his heirs, and he has no power of compelling the lord to renew on the falling in of the lives, he cannot cut timber growing on the estate. Mardiner v. Elliott, 2 T. R. 746. And see Blewitt v. Jenkins, 12 C. B., N. S. 16.

Where by agreement, dated 1656, between the lord and certain tenants of customary tenements within a manor, the tenants covenanted that they, their heirs or assigns, would not cut down, sell, or dispose of any wood standing or growing, or thereafter to stand or grow, without

the licence of the lord, and the lord covenanted to set out yearly, upon request of the tenants, sufficient for the repairing of their houses, and other necessary uses in and about the tenements; and that in case any of the tenants, their heirs or assigns, should plant any wood upon the tenements, it should be lawful for them to cut down, use, or dispose of all or any such wood for repairing their houses, or for any other their necessary uses, without disturbance of the lord: -Held, that a tenant of one of the customary tenements comprised in the agreement, was not entitled without the licence of the lord to cut down and sell wood which had been planted on the tenement by another tenant since the agreement, and that, having so done, the lord might maintain trover against her for the wood. Blackett v. Lowes, 2 M. & S. 494.

Inclosure of Woods.]—In a manor where there were certain commonable rights a question was raised whether the owner of the woods was entitled to inclose the coppices and woods, so from time to time to be cut down, and exclude therefrom all the commonable cattle for seven successive years, for the preservation of the wood and underwood:-Held, that the owner of the woods was not so entitled; the 22nd Edw. 4, c. 7, does not apply to woods wherein rights of common exist; and 35 Hen. 8, c. 17, s. 8, which provides, that the space where the wood is intended to be cut may be inclosed and kept in severalty for seven years, only applies to woods in which immemorial rights of common exist, and not to rights of common claimed by grant. Dibbin v. Anglesey (Marquis), 2 C. & M. 722; 4 Tyr. 926.

Forfeiture for Cutting.]-Where a copyholder for life cut trees, though none were applied to the repair of the premises till several months after and after ejectment brought as for a forfeiture, and most of them still remained unapplied, but parts of the premises were still out of repair, it is a question for the jury whether they were cut bonâ fide for the purpose of repair, and were in a course of application for that purpose; and there being no evidence that they were to be applied to any other purpose, the court refused to set aside a verdict for the defendant. Doe d. Foley v. Wilson, 11 East, 56.

Where a copyholder of inheritance, having power by custom to cut timber, surrendered to the use of his will and devised to A. for life, without impeachment of waste, with remainders over, though there was no instance in fact of a copyholder for life in the manor cutting timber, yet the right being annexed to the fee and inheritance, the copyholder in fee, in carving out his estate, may make a tenant for life dispunishable of waste; and at any rate, the lord cannot enter upon the copyholder for life's estate, as for a forfeiture, upon his cutting timber; for the injury, if any, is to the remainderman of the inheritance. Denn d. Joddrell v. Johnson, 10 East, 267.

And see Eardley v. Granville, infra.

b. Mines and Minerals. Property in.]-In an ordinary estate of copyhold the property in the trees and minerals is in the lord, the possession in the copyholder. If a stranger or the copyholder cuts trees or takes

minerals the lord can bring trover; if a stranger or the lord cuts trees or takes minerals, the copyholder can maintain trespass. Eardley v. Granville, 3 Ch. D. 826 ; 45 L. J., Ch. 669; 34 L. T. 609; 24 W. R. 528.

When the trees are cut or the minerals taken. the copyholder becomes entitled to the possession of the space where the trees or minerals were. and is entitled to use of it at his will and pleasure. Ib.

On the other hand, if a freeholder grants lands excepting mines, he severs his estate vertically, i.e., he grants out his estate in parallel vertical layers, and the grantee only gets the parallel layer granted to him. The freeholder retains the reserved stratum as part of his ownership, and whether or not he takes the minerals out of the stratum, such stratum still belongs to him as part of the vertical section of the land. Ib.

G. was lessee of manorial mines, with right to work them and enter on the surface of the copyhold; these mines were worked from the deep pits. Between the deep pits and the North Staffordshire Railway lay, first, copyhold of A.; next, freehold of S.; next, freehold of A. G. took a lease of the S. mines, and, ten days after, a lease of part of A.'s freehold for the purpose of completing a railway then in course of construction over A.'s copyhold from the deep pits to the North Staffordshire Railway. This lease provided for the carriage over A.'s freehold by G. of the produce of mines belonging to or occupied by G. or belonging to S. Shortly afterwards G. drove a crut from the S. mines under A.'s copyhold to the deep pits, and so carried the S. minerals to the deep pits, and thence by the railway over A.'s copyhold to the North Staffordshire Railway :-Held, that A.'s successors in title were entitled to an injunction to restrain G. from carrying the S. minerals under or over A.'s copyhold, and that there had been no acquiescence on A.'s part to disentitle them. 1b.

A lord may drive carriages along a tramway under copyholds of the manor, for the purpose of working mines within the manor, but not of working mines beyond its limits. Bowser v. Maclean, 2 De G., F. & J. 415.

A prescription or a custom in a manor to work mines under houses, without making compensation for any damage occasioned to such houses, is bad, as being unreasonable. Hilton v. Granville (Earl), D. & M. 614; 5 Q. B. 701.

In Customary Freeholds.] Customary freeholds, held by copy of court roll, but not at the will of the lord, and passing by surrender and admittance, are copyholds by tenure, and the freehold of them is in the lord, and he is entitled to the minerals. Portland (Duke) v. Hill, 2 L. R., Eq. 785; 35 L. J., Ch. 439; 12 Jur., N. S. 286; 15 W. R. 38.

Shingle.]-In an action by the lord of a manor for taking shell-fish and shingle on the foreshore of the manor, between high and low-water mark, his title being under a royal grant of the manor, with anchorage and groundage, but with no express mention of the shore:-Held. that this grant afforded of itself a presumption that it included the soil of the shore; and the jury was directed that, upon matters of that nature, they would properly be guided by the opinion of a judge. Le Strange v. Rowe, 4 F. & F. 1048.