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resolution that the plaintiff's conduct on the 30th November, 1881, and in the club generally, in publicly disparaging the committee before strangers and the club servants, was injurious to the character and interests of the club, and that the plaintiff be requested to resign. The majority included G., without whose vote it would not have been complete. The plaintiff moved to restrain the committee from expelling him, alleging that the resolution was solely the result of ill-will towards him on the part of some of the committee, and particularly of G., and not of a bonâ fide regard for the interests of the club. The court declined to interfere, holding that there was nothing to shew that the resolution of the committee was not bonâ fide, the reason given not being of itself evidence of malice. Lambert v. Addison, 46 L. T. 20.

Interference of Court.]-The court will not interfere against the decision of the members of a club professing to act under their rules, unless it can be shewn either that the rules are contrary to natural justice, or that what has been done is contrary to the rules, or that there has been mala fides or malice in arriving at the decision. One of the rules of a club provided that a general meeting might alter any of the standing rules affecting the general interests of the club, provided this was done with certain formalities and by a certain majority :-Held, that a rule providing for the expulsion of members who should be guilty of conduct injurious to the interests of the club was within the regulation, and could be validly passed by a general meeting. Dawkins v. Antrobus, 17 Ch. D. 615; 44 L. T. 557 29 W. R. 511-C. A., affirming M. R.

I. COALS.

COALS.

II. COAL MINES.-See MINES & MINERALS.

I. COALS.

under 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 57, for delivering Delivery of short Weight.]—In an action coals short of weight, the declaration must aver that the coals were carried, for delivery, from a ship, wharf or place in London or Westminster, office in London; it is not sufficient to allege or within twenty-five miles of the General Postthat they were sold and delivered at such place. Frend v. Butterfield, 11 A. & E. 838.

The 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 57, imposes a penalty not exceeding 51. on the seller of coals for every sack that shall be found deficient on its being weighed in pursuance of the act :-Held, that, where several sacks are sent out to a purchaser at the same time under one contract, one penalty only is incurred in respect of a deficiency and, therefore, where seventeen sacks were so in weight, though every sack is so deficient; found deficient, that the penalties were recoverable by action in one of the superior courts, notwithstanding s. 77, which directs that all penalties imposed by the act not exceeding 251. shall be levied and recovered before justices of the peace. Collins v. Hopwood, 15 M. & W. 459; 16 L. J., Ex. 124.

Non-delivery of Vendor's Ticket.]-In an action for the sale and delivery of coals exceeding in quantity 560 pounds, the omission to deliver the vendor's ticket is a bar to the action under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 101, s. 3. Cundell v. Dawson, 4 C. B. 375; 17 L. J., C. P. 311; 11 Jur.

upon neglect, not exceeding 201., and enacted that all penalties not exceeding 251. should be levied and recovered before any justice or justices of the peace. The 1 & 2 Vict. c. 101, repealed as much of the former act as related to the delivery of a seller's ticket, and required a seller's ticket to be delivered, under a penalty not exceeding 207., but the act was silent as to any mode of recovering the penalty :-Held, that an action for the penalty by the buyer was not maintainable. 1b.

One of the rules of a club provided that in case the conduct of any member should, in the opinion of the committee, be injurious to the character and interests of the club, the committee should be empowered to recommend such member to resign, and if he should not comply, | 634. the committee should then call a general meet- The act also provided for the delivery of a ing, and if a majority of two-thirds of the meet-seller's ticket with coals, imposing a penalty ing agreed by ballot to the expulsion of such member, he should be expelled :-The plaintiff, a member of the club, sent a pamphlet which reflected on the conduct of S., a gentleman in a high official position, also a member of the club, to S., at his official address, enclosed in an envelope, on the outside of which was printed, "Dishonourable conduct of S." The committee being of opinion that this action was injurious to the character and interests of the club, called upon the plaintiff for an explanation, which he refused to give. They then called on him to resign, and as he did not comply with their recommendation, they duly summoned a general meeting, at which a resolution was passed by the requisite majority expelling the plaintiff from the club :-Held, that the court would not interfere to restrain the committee from excluding the plaintiff from the club. Ib.

Evidence of Malice.]—The fact that a decision is unreasonable may be strong evidence of malice, but is not conclusive, and may be rebutted by evidence of bona fides. lb.

Erroneous.]-Semble, that even if the decision of the club had been erroneous, but given bonâ fide and in accordance with the rules, the court would not have interfered. Ib.

The 1 & 2 Vict. c. 101, s. 4, which requires that with any quantity of coals exceeding 560 pounds delivered" by any lighter, vessel, barge, or other craft," within London, the seller shall deliver a ticket stating the quality and quantity of the coals, and other particulars, and imposes a penalty for omission, does not apply where a cargo is delivered on the wharf of the purchaser directly from a coal brig in which it was shipped, without the intervention of any other vessel. Blandford v. Morrison, 5 Q. B. 724 ; 19 L. J., Q. B. 533 ; 14 Jur. 1130-Ex. Ch.

The 47 Geo. 3, sess. 2, c. 68, made it imperative on the vendor of coals to deliver a vendor's ticket, signed by the meter, and the act having been passed to protect the buyer against the frauds of the seller, a vendor of coals, who had delivered a vendor's ticket to the purchaser,

which was not signed by the meter, could not |--By a local act a rate or duty was imposed upon recover the price of coals from such purchaser. coal imported and landed at the town of HarLittle v. Poole, 9 B. & C. 192.

What constitutes being Vendor.]-A person generally employed on commission to buy coals for a retail coal merchant, but who sometimes before the receipt of such orders bought coals, and then let his employer have what he pleased of them, paying him at the same rate as when he had ordered them beforehand, was not to be considered, even with respect to the latter coals, as the vendor of them, so as to be liable to the coal-meter for the inspection fee under 47 Geo. 3, c. 68, s. 95. Bigg v. Megarey, 1 M. & Rob.

35.

Weighing.]-The 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 54. directs coals delivered in sacks to be weighed, if required, each sack "with the coals, and afterwards to weigh in like manner each sack without any coals therein." A weighing by putting the sacks of coal successively in one scale of the weighing-machine against weights equal to the weight each sack should contain, and an empty sack in the other scale, is not a weighing according to that section. Meredith v. Holman, 16 M. & W. 798; 16 L. J., Ex. 126.

26 & 27 Vict. c. 32, s. 8-What amounts to a "Dealing" under.]-A. bought coals at a pit, and conveyed them in his own keel to Hull, where they were transferred into a steam vessel also belonging to him for the purpose of being used by him :-Held, that this amounted to a dealing with the coal so as to render him compellable to shew a pit note, and to pay a tax under 26 & 27 Vict. c. 32, s. 8, Schedule, Kingston-upon-Hull. Wilson v. Kingston-upon-Hull Local Board of Health, 12 Jur., N. S. 706; 14 W. R. 638.

Sale of inferior Quality.]-The 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 45, imposes a penalty on coal dealers who knowingly sell one sort of coals for another within a certain district of the metropolis, and the penalty is recoverable under s. 85 "by the person or persons who shall inform and suc for the same:"-Held, that a Board of Guardians, being a corporation, did not come within the terms of s. 85, and therefore could not sue for the penalty. St. Leonards (Guardians), Shoreditch v. Franklin, 3 C. P. D. 377; 47 L. J., C. P. 727; 39 L. T. 122; 26 W. R. 882.

The offence of selling coals of a different description from those contracted for, upon the 3 Geo. 2, c. 26, s. 4, was complete in the county where the coals were delivered, and not where they were contracted for; the contract not being for any specified parcel of coals, but for a certain quantity of a certain description. Butterfield v. Windle, 4 East, 385; 1 Smith, 66.

Action against Shipper for Non-delivery of Certificate of Price.]-The statement in a declaration in a penal action against a shipper of coals, that the defendant did not deliver a certificate "containing the price paid by the master of the ship for coals that the defendant so delivering coals then sold and loaded," is not a sufficient averment that the coals had been sold. Grant v. Mathewson, 2 D. & L. 75; Scott, N. R. 135; 13 L. J., C. P. 149; 8 Jur. 517.

wich, or otherwise brought or delivered within the limits of the town: provided that in every case where any coals shall have been landed or unloaded within the town, and which shall have paid the rate or duty hereby imposed, and which shall have been so landed or unloaded for the purpose of being forwarded to any other place or places, and not to be consumed within the town, a drawback of the whole rate or duty is to be paid to the coal owners for coals so landed or unloaded, which shall have been forwarded to any other place for sale or consumption :-Held, that this provision for the payment of a drawback did not relate to coal sold by retail in the town, although set apart from its arrival for the consumption only of persons living out of the town; and that the drawback actually allowed under these circumstances through a mistake could be recovered back. Vaux v. Chapman, Harwich (Mayor, &c.) v. Vaux, 27 L. T. 758.

Where a local act for the improvement of a harbour authorized certain commissioners to make an order for payment of duties on coals brought or delivered within certain limits, and they accordingly imposed a duty of three shillings per chaldron :-Held, that it was payable for coals brought in less quantities than a chaldron. Mills v. Furnel, 2 B. & C. 899; 4 D. & R. 561.

Patent fuel, an article composed of coal-dust mixed with thirty per cent, of pitch and lime, is not liable to the duties imposed upon coals imported into the port of London, notwithstanding that there is no purpose to which ordinary pitcoal can be applied to which coal-dust without the admixture of pitch and lime could not also be applied. London (Mayor) v. Parkinson, 10 C. B. 228.

Duty on Exportation of Coals.]-By the Tyne Coal Dues Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 13), s. 3, there shall be payable to the commissioners in respect of coals and other articles exported from the port of Newcastle-upon-Tyne the following dues, that is to say, in respect of coals, one penny per ton of twenty hundredweight-Held, that coals carried away from the port for the purpose of being consumed beyond the limits of the port, although on board, and for the use of the ship carrying them, are coals exported within the meaning of the act. Muller v. Baldwin, 9 L. R., Q. B. 457; 43 L. J., Q. B. 164; 30 L. T. 864; 22 W. R. 909. See Stockton and Darlington Railway Company v. Barrett, 8 Scott, N. R. 641; 7 M. & G. 870.

sell coals makes a bargain in his own name with Sale of, by Agent.]-If an agent employed to a tradesman to furnish him with coals on credit, for which in return he is to receive goods on credit, and both the coals and goods are de livered; the real seller of the coals may recover the price from the tradesman if his name be in the ticket sent with the coals as seller, because the tradesman, after that, is bound to inquire into the nature of the agent's situation, and should not continue to treat him as a principal. v. Willey, 2 C. & P. 350.

Pratt

Evidence of Sale.]-The production of an entry

Duty on Importation or Landing in a Town.] of a contract purporting to be signed by the

buyer and factor, is not evidence of the sale in an action brought for the price of the coals, unless the buyer is proved aliunde to have signed the contract. Brown v. Capel, M. & M. 374.

-

Purchase by Club Action for Penalties by Members.]-Where several persons in a club join to buy a quantity of coals, and afterwards subdivide their shares, and the coals are delivered to each short of measure, each person cannot maintain an action for the penalty against the seller, for the contract of sale is joint. Everett v. Tindal, 5 Esp. 169.

Custom-Corporation of London.]-The right of the corporation of London, by custom, to measure coals imported into London is not converted by 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 63, into a right to weigh. Smith v. Cartwright, 6 Ex. 927; 20 L. J., Ex. 401.

CODICIL.

See WILL.

COGNIZANCE.

See REPLEVIN.

COGNOVIT.

See WARRANT OF ATTORNEY.

COINAGE.

Sovereign Prerogative.]-The right to regulate the coinage and paper money of a state is part of the sovereign prerogative recognized by the law of nations, which is part of the common law of England, and therefore such right will be protected by the courts of this country. Emperor of Austria v. Kossuth, 2 Giff. 628; 7 Jur., N. S. 483. Affirmed on appeal, 30 L. J., Ch. 690; 7 Jur., N. S. 483.

Criminal Law relating to]-See CRIMINAL LAW.

COLLEGE.

See UNIVERSITY.

COLLIERY.

See MINES AND MINERALS.

COLLISION.

I. ON ROADS OR RAILWAYS.-See NEGLIGENCE.

II. ON HIGH SEAS.-See SHIPPING.

COLONY.

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

1. Introduction and Applicability of English Law, 118.

2. Bankruptcy, 120.

3. Church and Clergy, 122.

4. Governors and Public Officers, 125.
5. Judges and Courts, 126,
6. Lands, 129.

7. Legislatures, 131.
8. Other Points, 134.

II. PARTICULAR COLONIES.
1. Australia.

a. New South Wales, 137.

b. Queensland, 141.

c. South Australia, 143.

d. Victoria, 144.

e. Western Australia, 150.

2. British Guiana, 150.

3. British North America, 151.

4. Cape of Good Hope, 177.

5. Ceylon, 181.

6. Honduras, 183.

7. Hong Kong, 184.

8. Jamaica and West Indies, 185.

9. Jersey and Guernsey.

a. Operation of English Laws, 187.
b. Constitution, 187.

c. Laws, 189.

10. Malta, 191.

11. Mauritius, 193.

12. New Zealand, 195.

13. Sierra Leone, 196.

14. Straits Settlement, 197.

15. Indian Possessions.-See INDIA.

III. APPEALS TO PRIVY COUNCIL.

1. When an Appeal lies generally, 197. 2. Appealable value, 200.

3. Leave to Appeal, 201.

4. Jurisdiction of Privy Council, 206.
5. Principles on which Privy Council
acts, 206.

6. Practice relating to, 209.
7. Appeals in Ecclesiastical Matters.—
See ECCLESIASTICAL LAW.
8. Appeals in Maritime Matters.-See
SHIPPING.

IV. SUING ON COLONIAL JUDGMENTS.-See
INTERNATIONAL LAW.

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

1. INTRODUCTION AND APPLICABILITY OF ENGLISH LAWS.

When English Law is the Law of the Colony.] -An uninhabited country newly discovered, and inhabited by the English, is to be governed by the laws of England. Mem., 2 P. Wms. 75; S. P., Blankard v. Galdy, Salk. 411.

A conquered country is to be governed by such

laws as the conqueror will impose, but until the English Statutes, when extending to Colonies.] conqueror gives new laws, the country is to be-By 2 & 3 Vict. c. 41, s. 78, the movable estate governed by its own laws, unless where these laws are contrary to the laws of God or are silent. Ib.

Where Englishmen establish themselves in an uninhabited or a barbarous country, they carry with them not only the laws, but the sovereignty | of their own state, and those who live amongst them and become members of their community become partakers of and subject to the same laws. Adv.-Gen. (Bengal) v. Rance Surnomoye Dossee, 9 Moo. Ind. App. 387; 2 Moore, P. C. C. N. S. 22; 9 Jur., N. S. 778; 8 L. T. 843.

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But this rule does not apply to the early settlement of the English in India, as the permission to the settlers to use their own laws within the factories did not extend those laws to natives associated with them within the same limits. Ib.

The courts of this country will apply the general law of this country (being abstractedly just, and not exclusively founded upon any peculiar or technical rule) to questions relating to lands in a colony where a different system of jurisprudence prevails, unless it is suggested or shewn that the laws of the colony are different on the point in question. Bentinck v. Willink, 2 Hare, 1.

The law of England must, having regard to the royal charters of 1807, 1826 and 1855, be taken to be the law of Penang, so far as it is applicable to the circumstances of the place, and modified in its application by these circumstances. English statutes, therefore, in their nature inapplicable to Penang are not introduced along with the general law of England. Neo v. Neo, 6 L. R., P. C. 382.

The rule, however, which prevails in England against perpetuities, which exists independently of statutes, and is founded upon public policy, is part of the law of the colony; so also, the exception to that rule, which exists in favour of charitable uses, passes with the rule into the said law. Ib.

In an action to recover possession of real estate at Kandy, in the island of Ceylon, English parties, whose rights were founded upon instruments made in the English form:-Held (there being no particular law in that district), that the principles of English law were to govern the rights of the parties in the action. Lindsay v. Oriental Bank, 13 Moore, P. C. C. 401.

The Falkland islands having been acquired by occupation, the law prevailing there is the common law of England, modified by such statutes and local ordinances as apply to those islands. Falkland Islands Company v. Reg., 2 Moore, P. C. C., N. S. 266; 10 Jur., N. S. 807; 11 L. T. 9; 13 W. R. 57.

The Falkland Island Company's right to kill or take wild cattle is not affected or prohibited by the local ordinance of 1853, and a conviction and order imposing penalties for killing wild cattle without a licence were held to be bad, and were set aside as null. Ib.

As no ecclesiastical tribunal or jurisdiction is required in a colony or settlement where there is no established church, the ecclesiastical law of England cannot be treated as part of the law which settlers carry with them from the mother country. Natal (Bishop), In re, 2 Moore, P. C. C., N. S. 115; 11 Jur., N. S. 353; 12 L. T. 188; 13 W. R. 549.

and effects of a bankrupt, wherever situate, so far as attachable for debt, should by virtue of the act and warrant of confirmation in favour of the trustee, be transferred to and vested in him or any succeeding trustee for the creditors absolutely and irredeemably, as at the date of the sequestration. C. & Co. carried on business in co-partnership in Scotland, and in the island of Tobago. A sequestration issued against them in Scotland :-Held, that the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 41, extended to the colonies. Colonial Bank v. Warden, 5 Moore, P. C. C. 340; 10 Jur. 745.

By an act of the legislature of Tobago, passed in 1841, and confirmed by the Queen in council, it was declared, that such of the common law, and all statutes and parts of the public and general statute laws of England, as are, or shall be, or become applicable and suitable to the circumstances and population of the colony, should be in force in the island :-Quære, whether, by this colonial act, the Interpleader Act (1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 58) could be held to extend to Tobago? Ib.

The Merchant Shipping Act, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, applies to the colonies, and a master has a lien for his wages in the Vice-Admiralty Court, whatever may be the municipal law of the colony. The Rajah of Cochin, Swabey, 472.

The 9 Geo. 4, c. 83, s. 24, refers to the laws regulating the administration of justice in the courts of New South Wales, and not to the general law of the colony. Whicker v. Hume, 7 H. L. Cas. 124; 28 L. J., Ch. 396; 4 Jur., N. S. 933. The Mortmain Act, 9 Geo. 2, c. 36, does not extend to New South Wales. Ib.

The 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106 (Bankruptcy Act) does not extend to New Zealand. Bunny v. Hart, 11 Moore, P. C. C. 189.

2. BANKRUPTCY.

Power of Colonial Court over a Debtor.]-A trader in the island of Barbadoes, having left the island in embarrassed and suspicious circumstances, was, under the Island Act, No. 234, of 1846, adjudicated an insolvent, and his estate and effects administered under that act. He afterwards came to England, and was adjudicated a bankrupt for a debt contracted in England, and obtained a certificate of conformity under the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, s. 200, discharging him from all debts due by him when he became a bankrupt. He returned to Barbadoes, when the court there, before whom the original proceedings in insolvency were had, at the instance of the imposing creditors, sentenced him, under the Island Insolvent Act, to eighteen months' imprisonment for fraud committed against the provisions of that act:-Held, that the Insolvent Court of Barbadoes having acquired jurisdiction in the first instance in the matter of the insolvency, retained such jurisdiction, so as to render him on his return amenable to that court for fraudulent acts committed by him, and the sentence passed on him confirmed. Gill v. Barron, 2 L. R., P. C. 157; 37 L. J., P. C. 33 ; 5 Moore, P. C. C., N. S. 213.

Effect of Colonial Bankruptcy on Action in England.]-A certificate obtained by an insol

vent at Newfoundland, under 49 Geo. 3, c. 27, s. 8, may be pleaded in bar to an action in this country, for a debt contracted here previously to the insolvency, and this is by the express terms of the enactment. Philpotts v. Read, 9 Moore,

623; 1 B. & B. 294.

But the discharge of an insolvent from his debts, under a sequestration, pursuant to an act of a colonial legislature, having power from the imperial legislature of this country to make laws, is no answer to an action by an English subject on a contract made and to be performed in England. Bartley v. Hodges, 1 B. & S. 375; 30 L. J.. Q. B. 352; 8 Jur., N. S. 52; 4 L. T. 445; 9 W. R. 693.

Action for money received, money lent, money paid, interest, and on accounts stated. Plea, that the defendant was resident in the colony of Victoria, and that the debts were contracted within the colony, and subject to the laws thereof, and that he was discharged from the debts by the insolvent law of the colony. Replication, first, that when the debts were contracted the plaintiff was resident in England, and that at the time of the commencement of the action the defendant was resident in England; and secondly, that under and by virtue of the contracts by which the debts became payable they ought to have been paid to the plaintiff in England :Held, that the replications shewed no answer; because the first admitted that the debts sued on were contracted within the colony of Victoria; and the second did not shew that they were payable in England, and not elsewhere. Gardiner v. Houghton, 2 B. & S. 743.

Colonial Bankruptcy-Property in England vesting in Assignee.-An insolvency in South Australia vests in the assignee pure personalty situate in England to which the insolvent is entitled, if, at the time of his insolvency, he was domiciled in Australia, secus; if he was domiciled in England. Blithman, In re, 1 L. R., Eq. 23; 35 L. J., Ch. 255; 12 Jur., N. S. 84; 14 L. T. 6; 35 Beav. 219.

Effect on Person not Domiciled there.] A colonial insolvency suffered by one not domiciled in the colony is in the nature of a foreign judgment; and the assignees must sue the insolvent, or his representatives, in England upon the insolvency, to get at his assets in England. Ib.

Colonial Insolvent Deceased Domiciled in England.]-A person died in England, having been adjudicated insolvent in Australia, and debts to a large amount having been proved in the insolvency and not satisfied :-Held, that even if the domicil of the deceased was English, a sum of money paid into the Court of Chancery in England to his credit must be applied towards payment of the debts proved in the insolvency in Australia, in priority to any claim by an English administrator. Davidson, In re, 15 L. R., Eq. 383; 42 L. J., Ch. 347; 21 W. R. 452.

Effect of English Bankruptcy on Colonial Contract.]-The English bankruptcy law is binding upon the colonies, and an English composition deed, containing a covenant not to sue, may be pleaded to an action on a Canadian debt in a Canadian court. Ellis v. M'Henry, 6 L. R., C. P. 228; 40 L. J., C. P. 109; 23 L. T. 86; 19 W. R. 503.

Therefore, in an action on a Canadian judg ment, founded on a contract made and to be performed in Canada, the defendant cannot set up a composition deed made in England before the judgment in Canada. Ib.

The English courts are bound by the provisions of the English bankruptcy law in actions on foreign and colonial as well as English debts. Ib.

Therefore, if a creditor in respect of a contract made and to be performed abroad sues in an English court, an English composition deed containing a covenant not to sue, is a good answer to the action. Ib.

Adjudication not permitted in order to obtain Discharge from Colonial Creditors.]-An adjudication in bankruptcy will not be permitted upon the petition of a person who, having been made insolvent in a colony, has failed to obtain a certificate there, where it is apparent to the court that the object of the adjudication is merely to get a discharge from the claims of the colonial creditors. Gibson, Ex parte, 34 L. J., Bk. 31; 11 Jur., N. S. 273; 12 L. T. 101; 13 W. R. 530.

3. CHURCH AND CLERGY.

Prerogative of the Crown.]-The prerogative of the crown to present to a benefice in England, avoided by the promotion of the incumbent to a bishopric in England, does not extend to present to a benefice in England which becomes vacant on the promotion of the incumbent to a colonial bishopric within the Queen's dominions, created solely by the prerogative of the crown. Reg. v. Eton College (Provost and Fellows), 8 El. & Bl. 610: 27 L. J., Q. B. 132; 4 Jur., N. S. 335.

When there is an independent legislative assembly in a colony, there is no power in the crown, by virtue of its prerogative (without the provisions of a statute of the Imperial Parliament), to establish a metropolitan see or province, or to create an ecclesiastical corporation, whose status, rights, and authority the colony can be required to recognize. Natal (Bishop), In re, 2 Moore, P. C. C., N. S. 115; 11 Jur., N. S. 353; 12 L. T. 188 ; 13 W. R. 549.

The crown has no power to confer any jurisdiction or coercive legal authority upon the metropolitan over a suffragan bishop, or over any other person in a colony. Ib.

After the establishment of an independent legislature in a colony, there is no power in the crown, by virtue of its prerogative, to establish a metropolitan see or province, or to create any ecclesiastical corporation, whose status, rights and authority the colony is required to recognize. Natal (Bishop). In re, 2 Moore, P. C. C., N. S. 115; 11 Jur., N. S. 353; 12 L. T. 188; 13 W. R. 549.

After a colony or settlement has received legislative institutions, the crown stands in the same relation to that colony or settlement as it does to the United Kingdom. Ib.

Even if the crown, as legal head of the church, has a right to command the consecration of a bishop, it has no power to assign him any diocese. Ib.

Position of Church-Mode of enforcing Discipline.]—The Church of England, where there

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