« EelmineJätka »
Declaration required by 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 50.]-Where a person has been declared duly elected a councillor, and has made the declaration prescribed by this statute, and has been admitted into the council, the court will not grant a mandamus to two town councillors, to administer the declaration to another person who claims to have been duly elected instead of the former. Reg. v. Derby (Councillors), 2 N. & P. 589; W., W. & D. 671.
The 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 50, requiring persons elected councillors to make the declaration within five days after they have notice of their election, applies only to persons who are returned as elected, and the five days are to be computed from the notice of their return. Reg. v. Čoaks, 3 El. & Bl. 249; 2 C. L. R. 947; 23 L. J., Q. B. 133; 18 Jur. 378.
Oath or Declaration.]-No oath is necessary as a qualification for eligibility for a mayoralty, but a declaration to the effect required by 31 & 32 Vict. c. 72, s. 12, is sufficient. Hall v. Walker, 9 Ir. R. C. L. 66.
Annual Indemnity Act.]—The Annual Indemnity Act is prospective as well as retrospective, and extends to persons who may be in default during the time for which it is made, and is not limited to those who had incurred penalties or disabilities before it was passed; it being the intention of the legislature to extend the time for taking the oaths and performing the other acts required of persons filling certain offices. Stevenson, In re, 2 B. & C. 34.
Taking the Sacrament.]-One who had not taken the sacrament according to the rites of the Church of England, within a year before his election in fact to a corporate office, was disqualified by 13 Car. 2, st. 2, c. 1, s. 12, from being elected; and if such disqualification was notified to the electors at the time of election, votes afterwards given to such person were then thrown away; and any candidate having the most legal votes, though in fact inferior in number to the first, was duly elected and entitled to be sworn in; but until he was sworn in, the office was not legally filled up and enjoyed by him, within the exception of the Annual Indemnity Act; and therefore, if the disqualified person who had the greatest number of votes was sworn into the office, and afterwards qualified himself by taking the sacrament, within the time allowed by the Indemnity Act, he was thereby recapacitated and freed from all disability, and his title to the office thereby protected, such office not having been then already vacated by judgment, or legally filled up and enjoyed by another person. Rer v. Parry, 14 East, 550. And see Rex v. Bridge, 1 M. & S. 76.
At a meeting duly held for the election of an alderman for a borough, A. and B. were candidates. Two votes were given for each, when they were interrogated whether they had qualified by taking the sacrament within the year before the election, pursuant to 13 Car. 2. st. 2, c. 1, s. 12. A. admitted he had not, B. answered that he had. Public notice was then given of A.'s disqualification; but the poll proceeded, and after the notice twenty voted for A. and sixteen for B.: the mayor swore in A.; two of the aldermen (as they might by the constitution of the borough) swore in B.; A. took the sacrament within the time limited
by the Annual Indemnity Act:-Held, first, that though notice of the disqualification of A. was not given till after the commencement of the election, all the votes for him after such notice were thrown away; secondly, that B. having the greatest number of legal votes, was duly elected, and having been sworn in by the proper officers, the office was legally filled up by him, so as to exclude the operation of the Annual Indemnity Act in favour of A.; thirdly, that B. must be presumed to have been qualified according to his own declaration, there being no evidence to the contrary. And the court appeared to have considered it of great weight that the majority (thirty-six out of forty) was unpolled at the time of the notice, though not prepared to say that it would have made any difference, though the notice had not been given till a more advanced period of the poll, if the votes for B. had exceeded the number given for A. before notice. And this judgment was affirmed by the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor thinking that those who had voted for a disqualified person without notice, might, if they chose to demand permission, vote again for another person, but that no one was bound to call upon them to do so. Hawkins v. Rex, 2 Dow, 124; 10 East, 211. And see Rex v. Bridge, 1 M. & S. 76; Rex v. Parry, 14 East, 549.
A freeman of the city of London was elected one of the sheriffs, but refusing to take the office on account of his being a dissenter, and as such not having received the sacrament according to the rites of the Church of England within a year before his election, an action was brought against him for the penalty incurred by such refusal, and a judgment recovered. The action being brought in the sheriffs' court, a writ of error was brought in the court of hustings, where the judgment was affirmed. But the defendant having obtained a special commission of errors, the judges delegated reversed both the judgments; and on a writ of error in parliament, the judgment of reversal was affirmed. Harrison v. Erans, 3 Bro. P. C. 465.
10. BRIBERY, PERSONATION, AND PERJURY.
Employment Corrupt Bargain.]-A declaration for bribing a voter in the election of councillors, by corruptly promising to give him employment in hauling stones at certain hire, as and for a reward to give his vote for particular candidates, is good; for an employment is a reward within the latter as well as the former branch of the above section; and whether the employment in the particular case was given by way of corrupt bargain, was a question for the jury; but the court must assume that such was the case, a corrupt agreement being sufficiently alleged in the declaration. Harding v. Stokes, 1 M. & W. 354; 2 Gale, 41. Affirmed, 2 M. & W. 233; M. & H. 6; 1 Jur. 200.
Completion of Offence.]-The offence of corrupting a voter is complete where the bribe is offered and accepted, and the voter promises to vote in pursuance of the corrupt contract, although he may break his promise, or may never have intended to perform it; but when a bribe is offered, but not accepted, the offence is that of offering to corrupt; and it is for the jury to
say whether there was a complete agreement or not. Ib.
After Voting.]-Giving money to a person, after having voted, is evidence of a previous agreement" for gift or reward," for the purpose of corrupting him to give his vote, within 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 34. Reg. v. Thwaites, 1 El. & Bl. 704; 22 L. J., Q. B. 238; 17 Jur. 712.
Promises.]-In an action on the 22 Vict. c. 35, s. 11, for a penalty for bribery, it appeared that the defendant, while soliciting a vote at an election of councillors for a city, told the voter that he would be remunerated for loss of time. The judge of the county court gave judgment for the defendant, but submitted the question whether the transaction was bribery within the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 102), s. 2, sub-s. 1, which by 22 Vict. c. 35, s. 12, applied to municipal elections :-Held, that it was so, inasmuch as it amounted to an offer or a promise to procure. or endeavour to procure money or valuable consideration for a vote in order to induce him to vote at the election. Simpson v. Yeend, L. R., Q. B. 626; 38 L. J., Q. B. 313; 21 L. T. 56; 17 W. R. 1100; 10 B. & S. 752.
Charging, that he gave the false answer falsely and fraudulently, is not sufficient. Ib.
Son acting as Father.]-The son of a burgess, of the same name as his father, living in the house in respect of which the father had been qualified, but the father having for some time been absent, and the son paying the rates, is not indictable for untruly answering the questions put to voters upon his voting. Reg. v. Goodman, 1 F. & F. 502.
Personation of Voters.]-A person inducing another person to personate a voter at a municipal election may be convicted, although the vote was rejected. Reg. v. Hague, 4 B. & S. 715; 9 Cox, C. C. 412; 33 L. J., M. C. 81; 10 Jur., N. S. 359; 9 L. T. 648; 12 W. R. 310.
The conviction need not set out the facts upon which it proceeded. Ib.
On the trial of an indictment for personating a burgess at an election of a councillor for a ward of a borough, divided into wards under the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, it is enough for the prosecutor to shew that the personation took place at what purported to be a ward election for that ward. Reg. v. Thomson, 2 M. & Rob. 335.
It is not necessary to prove the due division of the boroughs into wards, or that such division was approved by the privy council. Ib.
11. REFUSING TO SERVE OR ACCEPT OFFICE.
The 17 & 18 Vict. c. 192, s. 2, enacts in clause 1, that to promise money to a voter in order to induce him to vote, and corruptly to give money to a voter on account of his having voted, are severally matters which subject to a penalty the person so promising or giving : -Held, that a promise to a voter of his travel- Evidence of Qualification.]-On a conviction ling expenses conditionally on his coming and under 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 51, upon a bye-law voting for the promisor or for a particular for not serving an office, there need not be excandidate is within the first part of the enact-press or actual evidence, but there must be some ment, but that a promise of travelling expenses is not. Cooper v. Slade, 6 El. & Bl. 447; 25 L. J., Q. B. 324; 2 Jur., N. S. 1016.
Refreshment to Voters.]-By the Corrupt Practices (Municipal Elections) Act, 1872, the provisions of s. 23 of 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102, by which giving refreshments to voters at parliamentary elections is made illegal under a penalty of forty shillings, are rendered applicable in the case of municipal elections. Hargreaves v. Simpson, 4 Q. B. D. 403; 48 L. J., Q. B. 607 ; 41 L. T. 216; 27 W. R. 885.
Separate Penalty for each Act.]-A person guilty of bribery at an election may, under 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102, and 35 & 36 Vict. c. 60, be sued for the penalty for every act of bribery, and not merely once for bribery at the election. Milnes v. Bale, Milnes v. Lea, 10 L. R., C. P. 591; 44 L. J., C. P. 336; 33 L. T. 171; 23 W. R. 660.
Effect of Conviction.]-A person who has been convicted of bribery at a municipal election, and fined 40s. in a county court for that offence, is not disqualified for six years from serving a municipal office. Wray, In re, 12 L. T. 270; 13 W. R. 633.
Indictment-False Answer.]-An indictment upon section 34 of 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76 for giving a false answer on voting for a town councillor, is bad, if it does not allege that the defendant wilfully gave the false answer. Reg. v. Bent or Beat, 2 C. & K. 179; 1 Den. C. C. 157.
evidence of qualification; and if, in fact, the party was not qualified, he is not liable to the penalty, and a conviction will be invalid. Reg. v. Richmond, 11 W. R. 65.
Notice of Election.]-The notice of his election, within five days of which the mayor elect is required, by the above section, to accept such office, by making and subscribing the declaration, means notice received either by being present at the election, or by official notification. Reg. v. Preece, 5 Q. B. 94; D. & M. 156; 12 L. J., Q. B. 335; 7 Jur. 896.
A mayor was elected on the 9th November, being then absent from the borough, to which he did not return until the 23rd November. He had in the meantime casual information of his election, but did not receive any official notice of it until his return. Within five days after his return, he made the requisite declaration and took upon him the office:-Held, a sufficient acceptance of the office within five days after notice. Ib.
Exemption.]-Payment of a fine, imposed by the bye-laws of a corporation for refusing to accept a corporate office, does not exempt the party elected from serving the office, and he may be compelled to do so by mandamus. Rex v. Bower, 2 D. & R. 842.
Removal of Residence.]-Under a charter of Will. 3, the mayor of a corporation was appointed to be elected out of the forty-one common councilmen, and every mayor was appointed an alderman-Held, that a common councilman,
who had once served the office of mayor, and Jurisdiction.]-A petition was presented, under acted as justice for the town, but had since 35 & 36 Vict. c. 60, by an unsuccessful candidate quitted the town, and resided four miles distant, having only a bank there, and was an acting magistrate for the county, was not entitled to refuse to stand at a subsequent election of a mayor, though the serving that office would compel him to remove his residence to the town, and prevent his acting as magistrate for the county. Rex v. Leyland, 3 M. & S. 184.
at an election of councillors for a borough, questioning the election of a councillor but not claiming the seat. The nomination paper of the petitioner was delivered to the town clerk by an agent of the petitioner, and was not otherwise delivered by the candidate himself or his proposer or seconder, as required by 38 & 39 Vict. c. 4, s. 1, sub-s. 3; the nomination paper was objected to on this ground; the mayor disallowed this ground of objection, but allowed others; and the petitioner was the only candidate competing with the successful candidates : Lon-Held, first, that the delivery of the nomination paper by an agent invalidated the nomination. Monks v. Jackson, 1 C. P. D. 683; 46 L. J., C. P. 162; 35 L. T. 95.
12. CUSTOMS AT ELECTIONS IN CITY OF LONDON.
Jurisdiction.]—The common council of don has not any jurisdiction to inquire concerning the election of any person to be one of the common councilmen of the city, for, by the immemorial custom of the city, the cognizance and examination of such elections belong to the court of record, held before the lord mayor and aldermen. Bolton v. Jeffes, 2 Bro. P. Č. 463.
A custom of the city of London for the court of mayor and aldermen to examine and determine whether or not a person elected alderman of a ward, and returned to the court as such alderman, is, according to their discretion and
sound consciences, a fit and proper person and duly qualified, is a valid custom. Rex v. Johnson, 5 A. & E. 488; 6 N. & M. 870; S. C., in the House of Lords affirming judgment, 1 Rob. 1;
6 Cl. & F. 41.
So a custom, that when the inhabitants of any
ward shall three times return to the court the same person to be alderman, who shall be by the court, according to the former custom, adjudged on such three returns, according to the discretion and sound consciences of the mayor and aldermen, not a fit person to support the dignity and discharge the duties of the office, the mayor and aldermen may, for remedy thereof, nominate, elect, and admit a fit person, being a freeman, out of the whole body of the citizens, to be alderman of such ward. Ib.
The latter custom is not abrogated by 11 Geo. 1, c. 18, s. 7; nor by the bye-law of the city, 13 Anne. Ib. See also Scales v. Key, 3 P. & D. 505; 11 A. & E. 819 and Rex v. Parkyns, 3 B. & A. 668.
Validity of Election.]-Where, at an election of aldermen in London, three poll clerks were first appointed, and two of them afterwards dismissed, and it appeared that, upon a scrutiny being demanded, the wardmote was adjourned to meet again on a fresh summons; that the mayor then went out of office, and the new mayor assembled a wardmote by a fresh summons, took the scrutiny, and declared A. duly elected, and that upon a return thereof being made to the court of mayor and aldermen, they upon petition declared the election void :-Held, that the dismissal of the poll clerks, and the change of the mayor, were no objections to the validity of the election; and that the mode of adjourning the wardmote was not a dissolution, and did not affect the proceedings at the scrutiny. Rex v. London (Mayor, &c.), 3 B. & Ad. 255; 2 N. &
allowance of this ground of objection by the Held, secondly, that notwithstanding the dismayor, the defect was cognizable by the court, and that the respondent must be declared to have been duly elected. Ib. See also col. 1202.
"Complaint of Conduct."]-Where a mayor has bona fide given a decision under 38 & 39 Vict. c. 40, s. 1. sub-s. 3, on the validity of an objection made to a nomination paper, a com
plaint of such decision as erroneous is not a within the meaning of 35 & 36 Vict. c. 60, s. 13, 'complaint of the conduct" of such mayor sub-s. 6. Harmon v. Park (No. 1), 6 Q. B. D. 750 45 J. P. 436-C. A. Reversing 50 L. J., Q. 323; 50 L. J., Q. B. 227; 44 L. T. 81; 29 W. R.
Returning Officer.]-At the election of a councillor for a ward in a borough, the mayor is not the returning-officer within the meaning of s. 20 of the Ballot Act, unless he also happens to be alderman of such ward, or unless the office of alderman in such ward be vacant. Ib. See also Reg. v. White, col. 1204.
Appeal on Interlocutory Matter.]-From an order of a divisional court upon an interlocutory matter arising in an election petition, an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal. İb.
as to be
Respondents.]-An unsuccessful candidate at an election cannot be made a respondent to a petition complaining of the election, although he had coalesced for the purposes of the election with two successful candidates, so responsible equally with them for any acts done by any of the three in furtherance of the common purpose. Lovering v. Dawson, 10 L. R., C. P. 726; 44 L. J., C. P. 321; 32 L. T. 819.
Statement of Special Case.]—A petition against a municipal election having been duly brought to the notice of a respondent, but he having taken no steps with reference thereto, the petitioners obtained an order from a judge at chambers under the Corrupt Practices (Municipal Elections) Act, 1872, s. 15, sub-s. 6, directing a special case to be stated, and that if the parties differed the case was to be settled by a certain arbitrator. The respondent had been served with the summons upon which that order was obtained but did not appear at the hearing, and the order was made without the petitioners being required to verify the facts in the petition by affidavit. A special case was stated by the arbitrator in the
absence of the respondents, and set down for all the costs of the inquiry were to be borne by hearing, notice thereof being put up in the him, and made an order in writing for the paymaster's office. The court, after hearing the ment by the councillor of certain costs under s. petitioners, in the absence of the respondents, 19 of the act. The written order made no proremitted the case to be re-stated. Notice of the vision for the remuneration and allowances to re-hearing was put in the master's office, but at the barrister and other persons unders. 22. The the hearing the respondents again did not appear, Lords Commissioners of the Treasury paid the and the court gave judgment in favour of the amount of such remuneration and allowances petitioners. Upon a rule to set aside the pro- and certified the payment to the borough ceedings as irregular :-Held, that the applicant treasurer, and required him to repay them the had had sufficient notice of the proceedings; that amount out of the borough fund or rates as prothe judge had full power to make the order vided by s. 22. A rate was accordingly made directing the statement of a special case; and and levied. The commissioners, afterwards, on that the special case had been properly stated, receiving from the barrister a letter that he had and the court had full power to adjudicate upon always intended to visit all the costs upon the it. Burgoyne v. Collins (No. 2), 46 J. P. 710. councillor, and had said so in giving judgment, cancelled their certificate, and the borough corporation abandoned their rate and returned the sums levied to the ratepayers. Afterwards the commissioners, finding that the barrister had made no written order for the payment of the remuneration and allowances under s. 22, issued a fresh certificate requiring the borough treasurer to repay them out of the borough fund or rates the amount of such remuneration and allowances. These facts being raised upon the return to a mandamus commanding the treasurer to repay the commissioners out of the borough fund or rate, and the corporation to cause such payment :-Held, that no valid order was made by the barrister for the payment of such allowances and remuneration under s. 22; that the election court for the trial of petitions under the act was by virtue of s. 14, sub-s. 5, a court of record, and that neither the Queen's Bench Division nor the Court of Appeal on the return to the mandamus could amend the barrister's order so as to make it include the payment of such remuneration and allowances; that the act of the commissioners in certifying was not a judicial act, and that they had the power to make the second certificate; and were entitled to a peremptory mandamus compelling the treasurer to repay to them the amount of such remuneration and allowances out of the borough fund or rate, and compelling the corporation to order such amount to be levied by a borough rate. Reg. v. Maidenhead (Mayor), 9 Q. B. D. 494; 51 L. J., Q. B. 444 ; 46 J. P. 724—C. A. Affirming 8 Q. B. D. 339; 51 L. J., Q. B. 209.
Service of Notices.]-It is a condition precedent to the trial of a municipal election petition that, within five days after the presentation of it, the petitioner should in the prescribed manner serve on the respondent a notice of the presentation, and of the nature of the proposed security, and a copy of the petition as required by 35 & 36 Vict. c. 60, s. 13, sub-s. 4. Williams v. Tenby (Mayor), 5 C. P. D. 135; 49 L. J., C. P. 325; 42 L. T. 187; 28 W. R. 616; 44 J. P. 348.
Delivery of Particulars.]—In a municipal election petition the respondent applied for an order for delivery of particulars of the alleged corrupt practices-Held, that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the petitioners should not be ordered to deliver particulars more than seven clear days before the hearing of the petition. Lenham v. Barber, 10 Q. B. D. 293; 52 L. J., Q. B. 312; 21 W. R. 428; 48 J. P. 23; S. P., Clark v. Lowley or Wallond, infra.
Amendment of Petition-Jurisdiction of High Court.]By the 4th sub-section of the 88th section of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 50), a municipal election petition shall be presented, except in the case of matters arising after the election, within twenty-one days after the day on which the election was held and by the 89th section other times are prescribed depending on the date of the presentation of the petition. By the 4th sub-section of the 100th section "the High Court shall, subject to this act, have the same powers, jurisdiction and authority with respect to a municipal election petition, and the proceedings thereon, as if the petition were an ordinary action within its jurisdiction:"-Held, that by reason of the words "subject to this act," the 4th sub-section of the 100th section gives no jurisdiction to the High Court to allow more than twenty-one days after the election, an amendment in a municipal election petition adding the words "and treating' to the grounds on which the petition questions the election, inasmuch as the petition would thereby be made a new petition, which would thus be presented after the time prescribed by the 4th sub-section of the 88th section. Clark v. Lowley or Wallond, 52 L. J., Q. B. 321; 48 L. T. 762; 31 W. R. 551 ; 47 J. P. 551.
Expenses of Election Court.]—Upon the trial of apetition against the return of a borough councillor under the Corrupt Practices (Municipal Elections) Act, 1872, the barrister in delivering judgment said that he found the councillor guilty of personal bribery, aud that
Costs.]-To obtain costs ordered to be paid by a commissioner, under the Corrupt Practices at Municipal Elections Act, 35 & 36 Vict. c. 60, and to take proceedings under r. 55, the order of the commissioner should first be made a rule of court. Pare v. Hartshorn, 31 L. T. 486 ; 23 W. R. 138.
The entry of the order by the registrar is sufficient; such order need not be actually indorsed on the petition by the commissioner. 1b.
The barrister appointed under the Corrupt Practices (Municipal Elections) Act, 1872, has absolute discretion over the costs under s. 19. Lovering v. Dawson, 10 L. R., C. P. 726 ; 44 L J., C. P. 321; 32 L. T. 823.
The 19th section says that all costs, &c., shall be defrayed by the parties to the petition, in such a manner and in such proportions as the court by which the petition is tried may determine :Held, that in a case where the petitioners had improperly made an unsuccessful candidate a respondent, they could not object that he was
not a party to the petition, so as to deprive cil, and that the plaintiff was duly elected at the barrister who tried the petition of jurisdiction to make an order upon them for his costs. Ib.
The barrister who tried a municipal election petition duly certified his decision under 35 & 36 Vict. c. 60, s. 15, par. 4, in writing, and he also orally determined that the petitioner's costs were to be paid by one respondent. The registrar indorsed on the petition, "Election void, petitioner's costs to be paid by the respondent, R. A. S.: "-Held, that such indorsement was to be treated as the certificate of the barrister, and could be made a rule of court in the ordinary way, so as to enable the petitioner to issue execution upon it as "the rule of court ordering them to be paid " in the manner provided by r. 55, Michaelmas Term, 1872. Pare v. Hartshorn, 31 L. T. 486; 23 W. R. 138.
Appointment.]-By a local act of parliament creating a court of request for a borough, it was enacted, that the mayor, recorder, deputy recorder, aldermen, and common councilmen for the time being of the borough, the justices of the peace for a certain district, together with other persons therein mentioned, should be the commissioners thereof; and that in case of a vacancy in the situation of clerk of the court, the mayor and aldermen of the borough for the time being, or the major part of them, should appoint a successor, and that until such appointment should be made, the commissioners, or any three or more of them, should nominate officers to do the business of the court. At a meeting of the town council, specially summoned for the purpose of electing a clerk, the plaintiff, who was a member of the council, was elected by the council, and before the end of the election he tendered to the mayor his resignation of the office of town councillor, together with 507. as a fine on resignation, under 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 51. No bye-law had been made to enforce a fine on resignation, and therefore the mayor returned the 50%. in the presence of the council, after the election. The plaintiff's seat in the council was afterwards filled by the election of another person; and at a quarterly meeting of the town council, of which no notice had been given, the plaintiff was again elected by the town council-Held, first, that neither the 73rd section of 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, nor the 8th section of 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 104, was applicable to this case. Staniland v. Hopkins, 9 M. & W. 178.
the first meeting; that, under all the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff's resignation of the office of town councillor was sufficient; but that, if it was not, his election to the office of clerk had the effect of vacating his office of town councillor. Ib.
A borough, until May 1st, 1836, had its own quarter sessions, and W. held the offices of town clerk and clerk of the peace. He resigned, and thereupon, by a resolution of the town council, on July 20th, 1836, S. was elected town clerk; but no step was taken towards investing him with the office. At an adjourned meeting of the council, July 25th, 1836, a resolution was passed, rescinding that of July 20th, and by another resolution T. was elected town clerk. In August, 1836, the borough obtained a grant of quarter sessions, and on August 15th. T. was, by resolution of the council, elected clerk of the peace: -Held, on motion for a quo warranto information against T., at the instance of S., for claiming to exercise the two offices, that T. was legally appointed town clerk on July 25th, and clerk of the peace on August 15th; that the offices were not full at the time of such respective elections; that T. could not be presumed to claim the office of clerk of the peace as incidental to the office of town clerk, by the appointment of July 25th, no specific act appearing to have been done by him in the capacity of clerk of the peace between that time and August 15th. Reg. v. Thomas, 8 A. & E. 183; 3 N. & P. 288; 2 Jur. 347.
Objection to Title.]-The office of town clerk, under the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, is not the same as in the old corporations; and an objection to his title under that act is not aided by the fact of his having held the office for more than six years before the act passed, under a valid appointment. Rex v. Poole, i Jur. 942.
Criminal Information against.]-The court will not order a town clerk, against whom a criminal information has been filed for misconduct in his office relating to an election of councillors of the borough, to produce the election papers which are in his official custody, in order that they may be impounded, to be forthcoming at the trial as evidence against him; though it is suggested, that the six months during which the clerk is required to keep the papers (by 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 35) will expire before the trial. Rex v. Nicholetts, 5 A. & E. 376.
Inspection of Voting Papers.]-Semble, that a Within 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 72.]the voting papers delivered at the election of town clerk is not bound to allow inspection of Held, secondly, that the case was within the councillors, under 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 35. to 72nd section of 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76; the true construction of which was, that the body corpo-6 N. & M. 152; 4 Å. & E. 657. more than one burgess at a time. Rex v. Arnold,
rate, under that act, should be trustees or commissioners for executing, by the town council, the powers and provisions of all acts of parliament, of which powers and provisions the old body corporate, or any of the members thereof, in their corporate capacity, were sole commissioners or trustees before the election of the town council; and as the mayor and aldermen were, by the local act, sole trustees or commissioners for the purpose of appointing the clerk, that their powers devolved upon the town coun
Nor to allow any burgess to have more than one of such voting papers in his hand at the same
But he is bound to allow any burgess, who brings with him a list of the burgesses, to make marks upon such list, denoting how each voter appears by the voting paper to have given his vote. Ib.
Fees and Remuneration.]-A town clerk of a