prohibition to a county court, on the ground that the judge has received improper evidence in a cause before him. Dunford, in re, 12 Jur. 361; S. P., Winsor v. Dunford, 12 Q. B. 603; 18 L. J., Q. B. 14; 12 Jur. 629. Or where, having jurisdiction, he has wrongly decided a point of law. Rayner, Er parte, 5 C. B. 162; 5 D. & L. 342; 17 L. J., C. P. 16; 11 Jur. 1018. Prohibition will not lie to a county court, however erroneous its decision, where there is jurisdiction. Norris v. Carrington, 16 C. B., Ñ. S. 396. A defendant was sued in a county court in the double capacity of executor of A. and administrator of B. On the trial he objected that the plaintiffs ought to elect in which capacity they proceeded against him, and further, that there was no evidence that the attorney who appeared in support of the claim had been duly authorized by the plaintiffs, who were the guardians of the poor of a parish, to bring the action, under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 57, s. 17. The judge overruled both objections, and gave judgment against the defendant generally-Held, assuming the decision to be correct, that, as the judge acted within his jurisdiction, such objections afforded no ground for a prohibition. Lirden and Munster Union (Guardians) v. Southgate, 10 Ex. 201; 23 L. J., Ex. 316. As to Construction of Statute.]-In 1843, B., being a trader owing debts amounting in the whole to less than 3007., obtained an order for protection under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 116. The debts specified in the schedule to his petition exceeded 2007., and remained unpaid in 1851, when, having incurred fresh debts, exceeding 2007., he petitioned the county court for protection. The judge decided that the debts incurred at the time of the order for protection in 1843 were not to be taken into account, and therefore B. was entitled to protection as a trader owing debts amounting in the whole to less than 3007., within 5 & 6 Vict. c. 116, s. 1:-Held, that the construction of the statute in this respect was a matter within the jurisdiction of the county court judge, and therefore, if erroneous, a prohibition could not issue. Bowen, In re, 15 Jur. 1196. Primâ facie Jurisdiction.]-The court refused a prohibition to restrain the judge from proceeding in a plaint before him, where the plaint on the face of it stated a matter within his jurisdiction, and the facts were contested on which the question of jurisdiction arose, which the judge was at liberty to inquire into, and his decision on the merits being founded on the very point on which the question of jurisdiction arose. Joseph v. Henry, 1 L., M. & P. 388 ; 19 L. J., Q. B. 369 ; 15 Jur. 104. If under such circumstances the judge proceeds to hear the case, the defendant not consenting, the High Court, on appeal by the defendant, will set aside the judgment. Semble, such a case is not matter of prohibition. Barker v. Palmer, 8 Q. B. D. 9; 51 L. J., Q. B. 110; 45 L. T. 480; 30 W. R. 59. Issuing Fresh Summons.]-An application for a plaint was correctly made, and the plaint itself was correctly entered against the defendant, as executor of F. W. Taylor, but the summons described him as executor of W. Thompson. At the hearing, the judge, upon it being represented to him that the statute of limitations would intervene to bar the claim, directed a fresh summons to issue, bearing the same date and number as the first :-Held, that the court would not interfere with the course taken by the judge. Foster v. Temple, 5 D. & L. 655 ; 17 L. J., Q. B. 230; 12 Jur. 654. Committing Discharged Debtor.]-After recovery of a judgment for a debt against a defendant in a county court, he petitioned for and obtained his discharge under the Insolvent Debtors Act, and inserted the debt in the schedule. On a judgment summons he pleaded his discharge; but the judge, notwithstanding, made an order for payment of the debt by instalments, and afterwards, on default, for his committal to prison :-Held, that although the defendant, who had been imprisoned, might be entitled to his discharge, it was at most an error in the exercise of his powers on the part of the judge, and not an excess of jurisdiction, and that therefore prohibition would not lie. Still v. Booth, 1 L., M. & P. 440 ; 19 L. J., Q. B. 521 ; 15 Jur. 577. Amending Particulars.]—A prohibition issued to a county court judge, where he, of his own authority, and without the consent of the plaintiff, amended the particulars, with a view, by reducing the plaintiff's demand below 507., to give the county court jurisdiction. Hill v. Swift, 10 Ex. 726 ; 24 L. J., Ex. 137 ; 1 Jur., N. S. 167. Disregarding Admissions.]—A judge of a county court, notwithstanding an admission by the plaintiff that a plea of judgment recovered in another court for the same debt was true, gave judgment for the plaintiff. The court refused to grant a rule nisi for a prohibition, the question decided being within the jurisdiction of the judge. Rayner, Ex parte, 5 C. B. 162; 5 D. & L. 342; 27 L. J., C. P. 16; 11 Jur. 1018. Malicious Prosecution.]-On a plaint in a county court for false imprisonment, the evidence was that the defendant directed the police to arrest the plaintiff on a charge of felony, which Irregular Service of Summons.] In an the police accordingly did. The charge was unaction of ejectment properly brought in the founded in fact: the judge of the county court, county court, the summons must be delivered to in his judgment, used expressions indicating that the bailiff forty clear days at least before the he gave damages in respect of the unfounded return day under Ord. VIII. r. 7 of the County charge of felony :-Held, that the cause of action Court Rules, 1875, and the judge of the county alleged in the plaint being one over which the court has no power to waive this condition even judge had jurisdiction, and the evidence having where, though the bailiff has not received the proved it, prohibition would not lie, even on the summons forty days, he has yet served it on the assumption that the judge, in estimating the defendant thirty-five days before the return day damages, erroneously took into consideration as required by the latter part of the same rule. matters, the subject of an action for malicious prosecution, and therefore not within his juris- |-Held, that he was nevertheless entitled to a diction. Chirers v. Savage, 5 El. & Bl. 697; 25 prohibition. Knowles v. Holden, 24 L. J., Ex. L. J., Q. B. 85; 2 Jur., N. S. 137. 223. A plaintiff sought to recover "177. 12s. 6d., A party who objects that the county court has being for moneys paid for loss of time and at- no jurisdiction to determine a plaint, does not tendance before magistrates upon a complaint acquiesce in the jurisdiction of that court, or and information of W. on behalf of the defen- waive his right to a writ of prohibition by obtaindants." The plaintiff having been summoned ing from the judge the statement of a case for the before the magistrates for riding in a railway | opinion of a superior court. Jackson v. Bearcarriage without having paid his fare, the sum-mont, 11 Ex. 300; 24 L. J., Ex. 301. mons was dismissed with costs, and the action was brought to recover the expenses occasioned Effect of 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61.]-The 13 & 14 by such summons :-Held, that the plaint was in Vict. c. 61, s. 14, giving a right of appeal, or §. substance a plaint for a malicious prosecution, 16, disallowing a writ of certiorari to remove and that an order for a prohibition was properly judgments or orders, does not take away the writ made. Hunt v. North Staffordshire Railway | of prohibition in cases where the county court is Company, 2 H. & N. 451. acting without jurisdiction. Pears v. Wilson, 2 L., M. & P. 515; 20 L. J., Ex. 381; 15 Jur. 932. Value of Land.]-By 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142, s. 11, all actions of ejectment, where neither the value of the lands, tenements or hereditaments, or the rent payable in respect thereof, shall exceed the sum of 207. in the year, may be brought and prosecuted in the county court of the district in which the lands, &c.. are situate :-Held, that by the words "rent payable in respect thereof,' is meant the rent due to the person bringing the ejectment, although his lessee may have sub-let the premises at a rent greater than the amount to which the jurisdiction of the county court is limited. Brown v. Cocking, 3 L. R., Q. B. 672; 37 L. J., Q. B. 250; 18 L. T. 560; 16 W. R. 933; 9 B. & S. 503. When at the trial of an ejectment there was a conflict of evidence as to whether the value of the premises exceeded 207. by the year, and the premises were held subject to a ground-rent, and by deducting the amount of such ground-rent, the judge arrived at the conclusion that the value did not exceed 201. by the year, that he therefore had jurisdiction, and he gave judgment for the plaintiff :-Held, that, although there was a conflict of evidence as to the value, the court would grant a prohibition, as the judge was wrong in deducting the grount-rent. Helstone, In re, 38 L. J., Q. B. 6. S. C. nom. Elston v. Rose, 4 L. R., Q. B. 4; 19 L. T. 280; 17 W. R. 52; 9 B. & S. 509. Excessive Execution.]--It is no ground for a prohibition to a county court, that under process from that court to levy a sum within its jurisdiction, the officer has seized property to a greater amount. Summers, Ex parte, 2 C. L. R. 1284; 18 Jur. 522. After Judgment.]-A prohibition may issue after judgment in a county court for an excess of jurisdiction not appearing on the face of the proceedings there. Marsden v. Wardle, 3 El. & Bl. 695 ; 2 C. L. R. 1707 ; 23 L. J., Q. B. 263; 13 Jur. 578. Waiver.]-A total want of jurisdiction cannot be cured by the assent of the parties. Jones v. Owen, 5 D. & L. 669; 18 L. J., Q. B. 8; 13 Jur. 261. Where the parties to a plaint appeared before the judge, and consented to a reference, without objecting to the want of jurisdiction, but one of them, during the progress of the reference, objected to the jurisdiction of the arbitrators, on the ground that title to land came in question, and the arbitrators proceeded with the reference: Where an objection is taken to the jurisdiction of the judge of a county court he ought to enter it on the proceedings, in order that a superior court may see if there is ground for a prohibition. Ib. Since 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, s. 42.]-Under the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, s. 42, the doctrine that prohibition as to cases in county courts is taken away from the superior courts, must depend upon the question whether the prohibition should go or not. Lawford v. Partridge, 1 H. & N. 621; 26 L. J., Ex. 147; 3 Jur. 271. Where a county court judge has taken time to consider as to nonsuiting a plaintiff, on the ground of want of jurisdiction, by reason of the title to land coming in question, and a prohibition issued before he had decided, and he then nonsuited the plaintiff, and awarded costs of nonsuit to the defendant, the rule for a writ of prohibition was made absolute. Ib. Before that Statute.]-A writ of prohibition to restrain a judge of a county court from further proceeding, in a matter over which he had no jurisdiction, was a writ as of right. Jackson v. Beaumont, 11 Ex. 300; 24 L. J., Ex. 301. Where a writ of prohibition was issued out of the Petty Bag Office of the Court of Chancery, in vacation, upon an ex parte affidavit, without leave of the court or judge, and disclosed no sufficient ground of prohibition on the face of it, the court set it aside on motion under the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 109, s. 39. Still v. Booth, 1 L., M. & P. 440. A writ of prohibition issued out of the Court of Chancery is a proceeding within the meaning of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 109, s. 39, and a motion to set such writ aside may be made in either of the superior courts at Westminster. Baddeley, In re, 4 Ex. 504; 7 D. & L. 210; 19 L. J., Ex. 44. It is no answer to such motion that the attor ney of the applicant has not entered his name and address in a book at the Petty Bag Office, pursuant to 12 & 13 Vict, c. 109, s. 44. Ib. Delaying Application.]—A plaint having been brought in a county court, at the hearing, on the 11th of September, 1862, the defendants excepted to the jurisdiction, on the ground that the matter was a dispute between members of a friendly society, which, by the rules of the society, was to be settled by a committee of the society, and that the county court had therefore no jurisdiction by reason of 18 & 19 Viet. c. 63, s. 40. The judge overruled the objection, and gave a verdict for the plaintiff. Between the 20th and 24th of September notices were served on the plaintiff and his attorney, and on the judge and registrar of the court, of the defendant's intention to apply for a prohibition. On the 8th of October the defendants were served with an order from the court to pay debt and costs; and on the 10th of October one of them paid the amount to the registrar, to avoid an execution. On the same day a summons was taken out on behalf of the defendants, calling on the plaintiff and the judge to shew cause why a prohibition should not issue. This summons was served on the 13th of October, being returnable on the 14th, when it was adjourned to the 24th; on the 16th of October the money was paid out of court by the registrar to the plaintiff's attorney. The matter having been referred to the court on the 24th of October:-Held, that the application had been delayed too long, and that on that ground a prohibition ought not to issue. Denton v. Marshall, 1 H. & C. 654; 32 L. J.. Ex. 89; 9 Jur.. N. S. 337; 11 W. R. 268. Judgment having been given in a county court for the plaintiff, execution issued, and a levy was made on the defendant's goods; but, before the sale a writ of prohibition was moved for :-Held; that the defendant was not too late. Kimpton v. Willey, 1 L., M. & P. 280; 19 L. J., C. P. 269; 14 Jur. 762. Stating Grounds for.]-It is not necessary that the grounds for issuing a prohibition should appear in the rule or order for a prohibition. Ecersfield v. Newman, 4 C. B., N. S. 418. Service of Writ.]-Where a rule for a prohibition to a county court was directed to be served on the plaintiff and on the judge, service on the judge and the attorney of the plaintiff in the county court is insufficient. Massey v. Burton, 3 Jur., N. S. 1108. Appeal.]—An appeal lies from the decision of the divisional court on an application for a prohibition to a county court; for s. 42 of 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108 relates to procedure only, and does not enact that the judgment of the divisional court shall be final. Barton v. Titchmarsh, 49 L. J., Ex. 573; 42 L. T. 610; 28 W. R. 821 C. A. VIII. RULE TO COMPEL JUDGE TO DO HIS DUTY. To City of London Court.]-By the operation of 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142, ss. 34, 35, the city of London court is made a county court for all purposes, and all the county court acts apply to it; and consequently, the proper mode of proceeding against the judge of the London court is by rule under 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, s. 43; and the proviso in s. 35, reserving all rights and privileges of the judge, has no application to the case. Blades v. Lawrence, 9 L. R., Q. B. 374; 43 L. J., Q. B. 133; 30 L. T. 378; 22 W. R. 643. What Refusal Justifies.]-The court will not grant an order, under 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108. s. 43, to compel a county court judge to do his duty, unless it appears that he has absolutely refused to act in some matter wherein he ought to have acted. Irving v. Askew, 20 L. T. 584. A mere qualified or temporary refusal, as by suggesting an adjournment, with a view to an arrangement, is no ground for issuing such an order, which, being of the same nature as a mandamus, is to be governed by similar rules. Ib. The court will not grant a rule to compel a judge to do his duty, when he has acted under a particular impression as to a point of law in a case involving a small amount, and the effect of granting a rule would be to give the party moving an indirect appeal when the statute has forbidden a direct one. Brown v. Taylor, 18 L. T. 657. Where a judge has entered upon the hearing of a plaint, and, from the evidence adduced before him, has decided that he had no jurisdiction to adjudicate between the parties, a mandamuswould not lie commanding him to hear and determine it, even although he may be wrong in point of law. Milner. In re, 15 Jur. 1037. Contra, if, in a case in which he has jurisdiction he refuses to hear it, upon the mistaken notion that he has no jurisdiction to do so in respect of some preliminary matter. Ib. At the trial of an ejectment, the judge, after hearing contradictory evidence as to the annual value of the premises, decided that it did not exceed 207.. and gave judgment for the defendant :-Held, that the court would not grant a prohibition to restrain the county court from. proceeding with the canse upon affidavits, suggesting that the decision of the judge was against the weight of evidence. Ib. And see cases under PROHIBITION, supra. Application to compel Judge to sign Note or to hear Case.]-A request to a county court judge, at the commencement of the trial, and before any specific question of law has been raised, that he should take a note of the evidence, as it was an important case and might go to the the meaning of s. 6 of the County Courts Act, superior court, is not a sufficient request within 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 50); and therefore a note which the judge afterwards took, and which he stated was an incomplete one, and not such as he would have taken if he had been requested to of the evidence in relation thereto, is not a note take a note of any specific question of law and taken under that section which the court will order him to sign. Morgan v. Rees or Reiss, 6 Q. B. D. 508; 50 L. J., Q. B. 491; 44 L. T. 133; 29 W. R. 345—C. A. Affirming 6 Q. B. D. 89; 50 L. J., M. C. 27; 43 L. T. 758; 29 W. R. 213;. 45 J. P. 269. To order Cause to be re-entered.]-The High Court of Justice has no power to order a county court judge to re-enter a cause in his list.. Ib. 50 L. J., M. C. 27; 29 W. R. 213. Necessity of Affidavit.]—Judgment having been given in a county court, the plaintiff proposed to appeal. In consequence of delays in settling it, the case agreed to by both parties was not presented to the judge for his signature till nearly six months after the day when judgment was given. No security for costs of the appeal had been given. The judge refused to sign the case. Thereupon a summons was issued by a judge at chambers in pursuance of the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, s. 43, to compel him to do so; but no affidavit of the facts was sworn till two days after the summons issued. On the hearing of the summons the county court judge did not attend, and an order was made that he should sign the case. The order having been served upon him and disobeyed-Held, first, that assuming that the summons ought not to have issued, except on an affidavit, the want of such affidavit was an irregularity only. Furber v. Sturmy, 3 H. & N. 521 ; 27 L. J., Ex. 453; 4 Jur., N. S. 956 Held, secondly, that after the order had been served and disobeyed, and the rule for an attachment obtained, it was too late for the county court judge to object that the case was incorrectly stated, or that the summons had issued improperly. Ib. Held, thirdly, that the order that the county court judge should sign the case, was rightly made. Ib. To hear Witnesses.]—To enable the court to interfere under 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, s. 43, the county court judge must have refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him; but where upon his refusal to hear certain witnesses tendered by the plaintiff, the plaintiff elected to be nonsuited-Held, that the court had no power to command him to hear them, as the nonsuit, whilst it stood, left the judge no case upon which he could act. Fortescue v. Paton, 3 L. T. 268. To review Taxation.]—A superior court has no power under 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, s. 43, to direct a county court judge to order a review of taxation of costs. Clifton v. Furley, 7 H. & N. 783; 31 L. J., Ex. 170. To remove Petition from File.]-An insolvent filed his petition in a county court, and obtained an order for protection from process until the day appointed for his first examination. On that day his attorney applied to the county court judge for leave to withdraw the petition, on the ground that the date on which it was presented did not appear upon it. The application was opposed by several creditors, and the county court judge refused it, and adjourned the examination of the insolvent sine die :-Held, that as the judge had adjudicated upon the matter, the court had no power, under 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, s. 43, to order him to remove the petition from the file, or dismiss it, or name a day for the hearing. Corbett, In re, 4 H. & N. 452; 28 L. J., Ex. 254; 33 L. T., O. S. 152. I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AS TO. Jurisdiction.]—Where an act establishes a court for a particular part of the United Kingdom, the true construction of it is, that every thing which is to be done under the authority of the court is to be done within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the act either in express terms or by necessary implication enacts that it may be done out of the jurisdiction. O`Loghlen, Er parte, 6 L. R., Ch. 406; 40 L. J., Bk. 28; 23 L. T. 878; 19 W. R. 459. A court of limited jurisdiction cannot give itself jurisdiction by finding any facts: it has no jurisdiction beyond what the legislature has given it. Rorke v. Errington, 7 H. L. Cas, 617, 632. Power of Parties to Waive.]-A total want of jurisdiction cannot be cured by the assent of the parties. Jones v. Owen, 5 D. & L. 669; 18 L. J., Q. B. 8; 13 Jur. 261; S. P.. Foster v. Usherwood, 3 Ex. D. 3 ; 47 L. J., Ex. 30; 37 L. T. 389; 26 W. R. 94. Buse v. Roper, 41 L. T. 457. Wellesley v. Withers, 4 El, & Bl. 759. Power of Crown to Establish.]-Though the crown by its prerogative may establish courts to proceed according to common law, yet the crown cannot create any new court to administer any other law. Natal (Bishop), In re, 3 Moore, P. C. C., N. S. 115; 12 Jur., N. S. 353 ; 12 L. T. 188 ; 13 W. R. 549. Power of Court of Session.]-The Court of Session has no power to alter, vary, or discharge any order of the Court of Chancery made under the jurisdiction of the great seal, which is as much the great seal of Scotland as of England. Bute (Marquis) v. Stuart, 2 Giff. 582. Affirmed on appeal, 4 Macq. H. L. Cas. 49; 9 H. L. Cas, 440; 7 Jur., N. S. 1129 ; 4 L. T. 182 : 9 W. R. 722. COURT. I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AS TO. II. INFERIOR COURTS. 1. Palatine Courts, 1504. 2. Borough Courts, 1506. II. INFERIOR COURTS. 1. PALATINE COURTS. Jurisdiction in Chancery.]—The principle under which the jurisdiction in personam of the old Court of Chancery extends, in effect, to property wherever situate, applies to the Chancery court of the county palatine of Lancaster. Lengdedale Cotton Spinning Company, In re, 8 Ch. D. 150; 38 L. T. 776; 26 W. R. 491. 3. Ancient County and other Courts, in the Chancery court of the county palatine of Therefore, where the defendants in an action 1507. Lancaster were within, but their property was beyond, the boundary of the local jurisdiction:Held, that the jurisdiction of that court was the jurisdiction in personam of the old Court of Chancery within the boundary, and therefore that the palatine court could exercise jurisdiction over the property, and could enforce any order in the action by applying to the Supreme Court under the Court of Chancery of Lancaster Act, 1854, s. 7, and Judicature Act, 1873, s. 18, sub-s. 2, and motion by the defendants to stay the action for want of jurisdiction refused with costs. Ib. The vice-chancellor of the county palatine has no jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining proceedings in the High Court. Alison, In re, Johnson, In re, 8 Ch. D. 1; 47 L. J., Ch. 755; 38 L. T. 304; 26 W. R. 450-C. A. Appeal from Court of County Palatine of Lancaster.] Ord. LVIII. of the Rules of Court, 1875, applies to appeals from the court of the county palatine of Lancaster as well as to appeals from the High Court of Justice, and the time for appealing is now regulated by r. 15 of that order, and is no longer governed by the General Orders of 1855 regulating appeals from the court of the county palatine. Lee v. Nuttall, 12 Ch. D. 61; 48 L. J., Ch. 616; 41 L. T. 4; 27 W. R. 805-C. A. Rules as to Costs.] Under the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 91, which enacts that the several rules of law enacted and declared in this act shall be in force and receive effect in all courts whatsoever in England so far as the matters to which such rules relate shall be respectively cognizable by such courts: Order LV. (under the Judicature Act, 1875) is applied to proceedings in the Court of Passage of the borough of Liverpool; and a plaintiff who recovers a shilling damages in an action for slander tried by a jury in that court is entitled to his costs unless the judge before whom the action was tried has ordered otherwise. King v. Hawkesworth, 4 Q. B. D. 371 ; 48 L. J., Q. B. 484; 41 L. T. 411; 27 W. R. 660. Writ-Service out of Jurisdiction-Transfer to High Court.]-The sole defendant in an action commenced in the Court of Chancery of the county palatine of Lancaster resided out of the jurisdiction. On the 15th June the Court of Appeal, on the ex parte application of the plaintiff, gave the plaintiff leave to serve the writ out of the jurisdiction of the Palatine Court, on the plaintiff undertaking to consent to a transfer of the action to the High Court of Justice in case an application for such transfer should be made by the defendant. On the defendant subsequently applying for a transfer, the Court of Appeal made the order. and ordered the plaintiff to pay (in any event) the costs incurred in obtaining the order. Watmough, In re, Serjeneson v. Beloe, 24 Ch. D. 280; 49 L. T. 220; 32 W. R. 101-C. A. Jurisdiction of Common Pleas Court.] The Court of Common Pleas at Lancaster being a superior court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an action arising out of the county palatine, provided the parties come within the jurisdiction. Oulton v. Radcliffe, 9 L. R., C. P. 189; 43 L. J., C. P. 87; 30 L. T. 22; 22 W. R. 372. When plaintiff and defendant both resided out of the county palatine of Lancaster, and the cause of action arose also wholly outside the county, and a writ of summons issued out of the Court of Common Pleas at Lancaster, was sent to the defendant's attorney in Staffordshire, who gave an undertaking to appear, and afterwards VOL. II. did appear :-Held, that the service could not be set aside, as any irregularity had been waived by the appearance. Ib. By Judicature Act, 1873, s. 16, the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster was transferred to the High Court. 2. BOROUGH COURTS, Lis Pendens in.]-The borough court of Liverpool is an inferior court, therefore the pendency of an action in that court cannot be pleaded to an action for the same cause in a superior court. Laughter v. Taylor, 6 M. & W. 695; 8 D. P. C. 776. Appeal from Justices.]-The recorder of a borough, which has a commission of the peace and a court of quarter sessions, though it is not a county, has power under 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 105, to try an appeal against an order made by justices or parish officers, under 9 Geo. 4, c. 38, for the costs of removing an insane pauper to a lunatic asylum. Reg. v. St. Lawrence, Ludlow, 3 P. & D. 155; 11 A. & E. 170; 4 Jur. 245. Disuse. When a charter was granted to a corporation to hold a court for the trial of causes, the disuse of that court for 200 years, and the want of funds to hold it, are no answer to a rule for a mandamus commanding the corporation to hold it. Rex v. Wells (Mayor, &c.), 4 D. P. C. 562. Order for Costs.]-The recorder of a municipal sessions may, on ordering costs, refer the taxation of the amount to an officer of the court, but such taxation must be adopted by him during the continuance of the same sessions. An order for such costs, founded on a subsequent adoption, is invalid. Reg. v. Long, 1 G. & D. 367; 1 Q. B. 740; 6 Jur. 98. By an act of parliament, jurisdiction was given to a local court of record to try actions of debt where "the sum or damages sought to be recovered shall not exceed 507.:”—Held, that the court, in addition to the sum of 507. claimed as a debt, had the power to award a further sum for the purpose only of giving costs. Joule v. Taylor, 2 L., M. & P. 615; 7 Ex. 58; 21 L. J., Ex. 615. Limit of Jurisdiction.]-An act of parliament, after giving jurisdiction in trespass, to the amount of 501., to a court previously having jurisdiction in actions on the case to the amount of 40s. only, proceeded to except slander from the actions cognizable by the court, in which jurisdiction beyond 501. might be conferred by consent :Held, that jurisdiction in slander to the amount of 50%. was given by the act. Farrow v. Hague, 3 H. & C. 101; 33 L. J., Ex. 258; 10 Jur., N. S. 638; 10 L. T. 534; 12 W. R. 868. Application to Crown.]-The 5 & 6 Will, 4, c. 76, s. 103, empowers the crown to grant a separate court of quarter sessions, on petition of the council of any borough, "setting forth the grounds of the application, the state of the gaol, and the salary they are willing to pay the recorder in that behalf :" a plea, stating that the application was "by petition to her Majesty in council, setting forth the matters in and by the act of parliament in that behalf required and 3 с |