For Concealing Birth.]-On an indictment for child murder, a conviction for concealing the birth cannot be supported. Reg. v. Hicks, 2 M. & Rob. 302.

Sentence and Execution.]-By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 2, upon every conviction for murder the court shall pronounce sentence of death, and the same may be carried into execution, and all other proceedings upon such sentence and in respect thereof may be had and taken, in the | same manner in all respects as sentence of death might have been pronounced and carried into execution, and all other proceedings thereupon and in respect thereof might have been had and taken, before the passing of this act, upon a conciction for any other felony for which the prisoner might have been sentenced to suffer death as a felon.

By s. 3, the body of every person executed for murder shall be buried within the precincts of the prison in which he shall have been last confined after conviction, and the sentence of the court shall so direct.

By 31 & 32 Vict. c. 24, capital punishment for murder is to be carried out within the prison walls.

Sentence of Death - Sentence for another Offence.]-A man upon whom sentence of death has passed ought not, while under that sentence, to be brought up to receive judgment for another felony, although he was under that sentence when he was tried for the other felony, and did not plead his prior attainder. Rex v. Brady, R. & R. C. C. 268.

Sentence-Form of.]-The time and place of the execution of a convicted felon form no part of the sentence. Rex v. Doyle, 1 Leach, C. C. 67.

A judge might, if he saw fit, have ordered a person convicted of murder to be executed immediately, or at any time within 48 hours after the conviction, as he might have done in any other capital felony. Rex v. Wyatt, R. & R. C. C. 230.

It was not essential to award the day of execution in the sentence, the 25 Geo. 2, c. 37, being in that respect only directory; and if a wrong day was awarded, it would not vitiate the sentence, if the mistake was discovered and set right during the assizes. Ib.

The bodies of executed murderers were by the common law at the king's disposal, and therefore the court could not direct them to be hung in chains. Rex v. Hall, 1 Leach, C. C. 21.

Quære, whether on passing sentence of death on a conviction for murder, the award of dissection and anatomizing, in pursuance of 25 Geo. 3, c. 37, was an essential part of the sentence to be pronounced by the judge. Rex v. Fletcher, R. & R. C. C. 58.

The omission of it might be remedied by the judge going again into court after adjournment, from his lodgings, and ordering the prisoner to be again brought up, and then passing the proper judgment, as the sentence might be corrected or altered at any time during the assizes. Ib.

person convicted of murder. Reg. v. Hogg, 2 M. & Rob. 381.

Habeas Corpus - Certiorari - Time.]-On a conviction for murder, in which the prisoners were brought up by habeas corpus, and the record by certiorari, the court gave the prisoners three days' time to examine the record and instruct counsel to shew cause why execution should not be awarded against them. Rex v. Garside, 4 N. & M. 33 ; 2 A. & E. 266.

The attorney-general is entitled, as of course, to a habeas corpus and certiorari, to bring up a prisoner and the record of his conviction in case of felony. Ib.

Pleas why Sentence should not pass.]-A proclamation promising a pardon cannot be pleaded as a pardon. Ib.

But where such proclamation had been made, the court, in their discretion, deferred the awarding of execution upon the sentence, until the prisoner should have had time to apply to the secretary of state for a pardon, according to the terms of the proclamation. Ib.

Semble, that a pardon after judgment may be pleaded ore tenus, and in bar of execution; and there may be a demurrer to such a plea ore tenus. Ib.

Where a woman who had been condemned to death did not, when called upon to say why execution should not be done upon her, plead her pregnancy, the court would not permit that question to be formally inquired into, at the suggestion of her counsel that she was in fact pregnant. Reg. v. Hunt, 2 Cox, C. C. 261.

Sheriff-Jurisdiction of Queen's Bench over.] The court of King's Bench has authority to order the sheriff of any county, or the marshal of the court, to carry into execution a sentence of death, pronounced by a judge under a commission of oyer and terminer and general gaol delivery. Reg. v. Garside, 4 N. & M. 33; 2 A. & E. 266.

Duty of.]-A sheriff is not bound, upon service of a copy of the calendar of prisoners signed by a justice of gaol delivery at the assizes, to execute prisoners against whom sentence of death has been passed, unless such prisoners are in his legal custody. Rex v. Antrobus, 4 N. & M. 565; 2 A. & E. 798; 1 H. & W. 96; 6 C. & P. 784.

Where the sheriff has the custody of a prisoner, the judgment of the court passing sentence of death upon him is, without any warrant or copy of the calendar, sufficient to authorize and require the sheriff to do execution; the copy of the calendar signed by the judge is a mere memorial. Ib.

8. CONSPIRING OR SOLICITING TO COMMIT MURDER.

Statute.]-By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 4, all persons who shall conspire, confederate and agree to murder any person, whether he be a subject of her Majesty or not, and whether he be within the Queen's dominions or not, and whosoever shall solicit, encourage, persuade, or endeavour to persuade, or shall propose to any person to murder any other person, whether he

Poison-What is.]—Administering unbroken cocculus indicus berries to an infant was administering poison within 7 Will, 4 & 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 2, although it was proved that the berries were not poisonous till the exterior or pod was broken, and that by reason of the weakness of the infant's digestive organs, the berries were innocuous. Reg. v. Cluderay, 1 Den. C. C. 515; 2 C. & K. 907; T. & M. 219; 4 Cox, C. C. 84; 19 L. J., M. C. 119; 14 Jur. 71.

If a person, intending to shoot another, put his finger on the trigger of a loaded pistol, but was prevented from pulling the trigger, this was not an attempt to discharge loaded arms by drawing a trigger, or in any other manner, within 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 85, ss. 3, 4, as the words, “in any other manner," in that statute, meant something analogous to drawing the trigger, which was the proximate cause of the loaded arms going off. Reg. v. St. George, 9 C. & P. 483.

The applying a lighted match to a loaded match-lock gun, or the striking the percussion cap of a percussion gun, was a sufficient attempt within these enactments. Ib.

Evidence.]-An indictment for causing poison to be taken by A. with intent to murder A. is not sustained by evidence shewing that the poison, although taken by A., was intended for another person. Reg. v. Ryan, 2 M. & Rob. 213.

On an indictment for administering poison with intent to murder, the police having, in consequence of certain information, found the bottle containing the poison in a place used by the prisoner, are bound to disclose from whom they had the information. Reg. v. Richardson, 3 F. & F. 693.

b. By Shooting, Wounding, Drowning, Suffocating or Strangling.

Statute.]-By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 14, whosoever shall shoot at any person, or shall, by drawing a trigger or in any other manner attempt to discharge any kind of loaded arms at any person, or shall attempt to drown, suffocate or strangle any person, with intent, in any of the cases aforesaid, to commit murder, shall, whether any bodily injury be effected or not, be guilty of felony, and, being convicted thereof, shall be liable at the discretion of the court, to be kept in penal servitude for life, or for any term not less than five years (27 & 28 Vict. c. 47), or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour, and with or without solitary confinement. (Former enactment, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 3.)

And by s. 11, whosoever shall, by any means whatsoever, wound or cause any grievous bodily harm to any person, with intent to commit murder, shall be guilty of felony. (Punishment as in last section. Former provisions, 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, ss. 11, 12, and 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 2.)

Attempt to Discharge Firearms.]-B. drew a loaded pistol from his pocket for the purpose of murdering S., but before he had time to do anything further in pursuance of his purpose the pistol was snatched out of his hand, and he was at once arrested :-Held, that the offence was not within s. 15 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, under which section the prisoner had been tried and convicted. Reg. v. Brown, 10 Q. B. D. 381; 52 L. J., M. C. 49; 48 L. T. 270; 31 W. R. 460; 47 J. P. 327; 15 Cox, C. C. 199.

Semble, that the offence was within s. 14 of

An indictment on 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 85,

ing to discharge at the prosecutor a certain blunderbuss, loaded with gunpowder, and divers leaden shots. The prisoner on a refusal by the prosecutor to give up some title-deeds, addressed him in these words, "Then you are a dead man," and immediately unfolded a greatcoat which he had on his arm, and took out a blunderbuss, but was not able to raise it to his shoulder, or point it directly at the prosecutor, before he was seized. The blunderbuss was found to be very heavily loaded, but the flint had dropped out, and was discovered between the lining of the great coat :-Held, that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the charge in the indictment. Reg. v. Lewis, 9 C. & P. 523.

What are Loaded Arms.]-By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 19, any gun, pistol, or other arms which shall be loaded in the barrel with gunpowder or any other explosive substance, and ball, shot, slug or other destructive material, shall be deemed to be loaded arms within the meaning of this act, although the attempt to discharge the same may fail from want of proper priming, or from any other cause.

G. was charged with a felonious attempt to shoot. He was proved to have presented a pistol at a man, and to have pulled the trigger, but the pistol did not go off. On examining the pistol, it was found that, if it ever had been primed, it would have been impossible for the priming to have fallen out, and the pistol must have gone off:-Held, that there was no case to go to the jury. Reg. v. Gamble, 10 Cox, C. C. 545.

Before this Enactment.]-A rifle which was loaded, but which for want of proper priming would not go off, was not a loaded arm within the 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 3; and the pointing a rifle thus circumstanced at a person, and pulling the trigger of it, whereby the cock and hammer were thrown, and the pan opened, did not warrant a conviction of felony under s. 3. Reg. v. James, 1 C. & K. 530.

In order to constitute the offence of attempting to discharge loaded fire-arms, within 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, they must have been so loaded as to be capable of doing the mischief intended. Rex v. Carr, R. & R. C. C. 377; S. P., Rex v. Whitley, 1 Lewin, C. C. 123.

If a pistol was loaded with gunpowder and ball, but its touch-hole was plugged, so that it could not by possibility be fired, this was not loaded arms, within 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, ss. 11, 12. Rex v. Harris, 5 C. & P. 159.

A. sent a tin box to B., containing three pounds of gunpowder, and two detonators, which were intended to ignite the gunpowder when any person opened the box, and so destroy the person who opened it :-Held, that this was not an attempt to discharge loaded arms at B. within 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, ss. 11, 12. Rex v. Mountford, 7 C. & P. 242; 1 M. C. C. 441.

What sufficient Evidence.]-The fact of firing a gun into a room of A.'s house, with intent to shoot A., the prisoner supposing him to be in the room, will not support a charge of shooting at A., if he is not shewn to be in the room, or within reach of the shot. Rex v. Lovel, 2 M. & Rob. 39.

Intention to Shoot different Person.]-A person intending to shoot at and kill L., shot at H., mistaking him for L., but did not kill H. On an indictment for shooting at H., with intent to murder H., the judge left it to the jury to say whether there was an intent to murder H.; but he laid it down, that the law infers that a party intends to do that which is the immediate and necessary effect of the act which he commits. The jury found that the prisoner did not intend to do any harm to H., and the judge directed an acquittal to be recorded. Rex v. Holt, 7 C. & P.

519.

An indictment under 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 12, for maliciously shooting at A., was supported, if he was struck with the shot, though the gun was aimed at a different person. Rex v. Jarvis, 2 M. & Rob. 40.

If intending to murder A., and supposing B. to be A., a person shoots at and wounds B., he may be convicted of wounding B., with intent to murder him. Reg. v. Smith, Dears. C. C. 559; 25 L. J., M. C. 29; 1 Jur., N. S. 1116.

Intention to Murder must be Present.]-On an indictment on 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 2, for the offence of inflicting an injury dangerous to life, with intent to murder, the jury ought not to convict unless satisfied that the prisoner had in his mind a positive intention to murder; and it is not sufficient that it would have been a case of murder if death had ensued. Reg. v. Cruse, 8 C. & P. 541.

What is a Shooting.]—A. had the barrels of a double-barrelled percussion gun detached from the stock and lock, and by striking the percussion cap which was on the nipple of one of the barrels, he fired it and shot B. :-Held, to be within 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, ss. 11, 12. Rex v. Coates, 6 C. & P. 394.

Indictment.]-Upon the trial of an indictment for shooting, with intent to murder a person unknown, it must be proved that there was an intent on the part of the prisoner to murder some particular person. Reg. v. Lallement, 6 Cox, C. C. 204.

In an indictment for maliciously shooting, under 7 Will, 4 & 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 4, it was suf ficient to say, "with a certain loaded gun." without going on to state with what it was loaded. Reg. v. Cox, 3 Cox, C. C. 58.

If an indictment for shooting another, with intent to murder, in all the counts avers that the pistol was loaded with powder and a leaden bullet, it must appear that the pistol was loaded with a bullet, or the prisoner will be entitled to an acquittal. Rex v. Hughes, 5 C. & P. 126. See Reg. v. Oxford, 9 C. & P. 525.

On an indictment for maliciously shooting, one act of shooting may be laid in one set of counts, as being with intent to murder H.; and in another set of counts as with intent to murder L. Rex v. Holt, 7 C. & P. 519.

An indictment which charges that the prisoner feloniously assaulted J. H., and, by feloniously " 'drawing the trigger of a pistol, loaded with gunpowder and a leaden bullet, then and there feloniously and maliciously did attempt to discharge the said pistol at J. H.," with intent to murder him, is good, without stating that "the said pistol" was "so loaded as aforesaid." Reg. v. Baker, 1 C. & K. 254.

Evidence.]-Upon an indictment for malici ously shooting, it appeared that there were two shootings; but it being questionable whether the first shooting was by accident or design :— Held, that proof of the prisoner having intentionally shot at the person the second time, was evidence to shew that the first was wilful. Rez v. Voke, R. & R. C. C. 531.

Evidence of a wound having been made by the contents of a pistol, although no ball was found, and of its having made a loud report. with reference to its size, is sufficient to go to a jury of its having been loaded with ball. Rez v. Weston, 1 Leach, C. C. 247.

c. By the Explosion of Gunpowder, &c.

Statute.]-By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 12, whesoever, by the explosion of gunpowder or other explosive substance, shall destroy or damage any building with intent to commit murder, shall be guilty of felony, and, being convicted thereof, shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be kept in penal servitude for life, or for any term not less than five years (27 & 28 Vict. e. 47), or to be imprisoned for any term not ezceeding two years, with or without hard labour and with or without solitary confinement. (Former enactment, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 25, s. 2.)

and wounds suffered by others at the same time, is admissible for the purpose of proving the character of the grenades. Reg. v. Bernard, 1 F. & F. 240.

Evidence of Maker connected with Prisoner.] -A witness being called to prove that he manufactured certain grenades, by which the death in question had been caused :-Held, that the name of the person who gave the order for them might be asked as a fact in the transaction, even though he had not then been shewn to be connected with the prisoner. Ib.

d. By Setting Fire to or Casting Away Ships.

Statute.]-By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 13, whosoever shall set fire to any ship or vessel, or any part thereof, or any part of the tackle, apparel, er furniture thereof, or any goods or chattels being therein, or shall cast away or destroy any ship or vessel, with intent in any of such cases to commit murder, shall be guilty of felony, and, being convicted thereof, shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be kept in penal servitude for life, or for any term not less than five years (27 & 28 Vict. c. 47), or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour, and with or without solitary confinement. (Former enactment, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 89, s. 4.)

e. Preventing Rescue from Shipwreck. Statute.]-By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 17, whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously prevent or impede any person, being on board of or having quitted any ship or vessel which shall be in distress or wrecked, stranded, or cast on shore, in his endeavour to save his life, or shall unlawfully and maliciously prevent or impede any person in his endeavour to save the life of any such person as in this section first aforesaid, shall be guilty of felony. (Punishment same as in last section. Former provision, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 89, s. 7.)

f. By other Means.

B. ASSAULT, BATTERY, WOUNDING, &c. 1. Shooting, Wounding, &c., with Intent to Maim, &c.

2. Administering Chloroform to commit Indictable Offence, 2073.

3. Administering Poison, &c., with Intent to Endanger Life, Aggrieve or Annoy, 2073.

4. Injuring Persons by Explosive or Corrosive Substances, 2074.

5. By Spring Guns, 2075.

6. Injuring Persons by Wanton or Furious Driving, 2075.

7. Ilitreatment of Helpless Persons, 2076.
8. False Imprisonment, 2079.
9. Assault.

a. Common Assaults, 2080.

b. On Clergymen or Ministers of Religion, 2084.

c. On Magistrates or other Persons preserving Wrecks, 2084.

d. On Peace and other Officers in Execution of Duty, 2085.

e. On Seamen, Keelmen, or Casters, 2087. On Obstructing Sale of Grain or its Free Passage, 2088.

f.

g. Arising from Trade Combinations or Conspiracies, 2088.

h. Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm, 2088. i. Indictment and Evidence, 2088. j. Punishment, 2089.

k. Costs of Prosecution, 2089.
7. Summary Convictions.

i. In what Cases, 2090.
ii. Hearing and Certificate, 2092.

10. Trial, 2096.

TO MAIM, &c.

Suicide not within this Act.]—An attempt to commit suicide is not an attempt to commit murder within 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, and is not merged in any of the felonious attempts to commit murder made punishable by that act, but remains a misdemeanor at common law triable by the court of quarter sessions. Reg. v. Burgess, L. & C. 258; 9 Cox, C. C. 247; 32 L. J., M. C. 55; 7 L. T. 472; 11 W. R. 96.

Abandonment of Child.]-A female abandoned her infant child, having first deposited it in the bottom of a dry ditch among some nettles, by which it was not hurt; and, in consequence of being shortly afterwards found by other persons, had not experienced any inconvenience from the exposure:-Held, that she could not be convicted

Statute.]-By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 18, whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously, by any means whatsoever, wound or cause any grievous bodily harm to any person, or shoot at any person, or, by drawing a trigger or in any other manner, attempt to discharge any kind of loaded arms at any person, with intent, in any of the cases aforesaid, to maim, disfigure or disable any person, or to do some other grievous bodily harm to any person, or with intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of any person, shall be guilty of felony, and, being convicted thereof, shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be kept in penal servitude for life, or for any term not less than five years (27 & 28 Vict. c. 47), or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour, and with or without solitary con finement. (Previous provision, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 4.)