tions taken before a coroner or magistrate, with a view to admitting a party committed for trial on a charge of murder or manslaughter, it is the proper course to produce copies of such depositions verified by affidavit, and on them to ground the application. Reg. v. Bartholemy, Dears. C. C. 60; 17 Jur. 184. A certiorari will not be granted to bring up an inquisition of a compensation jury, unless defects in the inquisition are positively sworn to. Reg.v. Manchester and Leeds Railway Company, 8 A. & E. 413; 3 N. & P. 439; 1 W., W. & H. 458; 2 Jur. 857. Application by two Parties-Death of one.]Where a certiorari was granted on the application of two parties, and one of them died before the matter came on for argument, the court heard the case notwithstanding. Rex v. York shire (N. R.) (Justices), 9 D. & R. 204. Notice of Rule.]-Where an order of sessions has been returned under a certiorari, and a rule has been obtained to quash the order, it is a good preliminary objection to an argument on such rule, that no notice of it has been served on the justices who made the order, although served on the parties interested in supporting it. Reg. v. Spackman, 9 D. P. C. 1060. Confirmation of Order by Quashing Rule.] Under 5 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 2, an order removed by certiorari is confirmed by simply discharging the rule for quashing it. Reg. v. Latchford, 6 Q. B. 567. No appeal lies in a case of a certiorari. Boston v. Lelièvre, 3 L. R., P. C. 157; 39 L. J., P. C. 17; 22 L. T. 735; 18 W. R. 408. A rule for a certiorari having been obtained in the Queen's Bench Division to bring up a summary conviction by justices, for the purpose of quashing it on the ground of want of jurisdiction, the court discharged the rule:— Held, that the case was within the last clause of s. 47 of the Judicature Act, 1873, as a judgment of the High Court in a criminal matter, and that there was therefore no appeal. Reg. v. Fletcher, 2 Q. B. D. 43; 13 Cox, C. C. 358; 46 L. J., M. C. 4; 35 L. T. 538; 25 W. R. 149C. A. Leave to Appeal not Required.] — An appeal from an order of the Queen's Bench Division, discharging a rule for a certiorari to bring up an order of justices in petty sessions, is not an appeal from an inferior court within s. 45 of the Judicature Act, 1873, and no leave to appeal is required. Reg. v. Pemberton, Reg. v. Smith, 5 Q. B. D. 95; 49 L. J., M. C. 29; 41 L. T. 664; 28 W. R. 362; 44 J. P. 184-C. A. III. RETURN TO. Form of.]-A return to a certiorari need not be under seal. Rex v. Pickersgill, Cald. 297. The seals of justices of oyer and terminer are not essentially necessary for the removing and authenticating a record transmitted to the court. The return of justices to a certiorari is a mere ministerial act, which the court requires to be authenticated in a particular form; but as it is a form prescribed by no positive law of the land, the court which requires it may receive and adopt any other authentic certificate, that the record transmitted is the genuine record of the court below; and the omission of the particular form can only be objected to by the court itself. Atkinson v. Reg. (in error), 3 Bro. P. C. 517. The return of a certiorari must return the record itself, and not set it out according to its tenor. Askew v. Hayton, 1 D. P. C. 510. The return to a certiorari, to remove proceedings from an inferior court, setting out a copy of the record, but not returning the record itself, is irregular, and the court quashed the return on motion. Palmer v. Forsyth, 6 D. & R. 497; 4 B. & C. 410. A return to a certiorari, to remove a cause, directed to the judge of an inferior court, certifying the cause and claiming conusance by charter, is sufficient if good upon the face of it. Perrin v. West, 5 N. & M. 298; 3 A. & E. 405 ; 1 H. & W. 401. Amendment of.]-A return to a certiorari was sent back to justices by the court to be amended, because they did not put their seals to it, or describe themselves as justices. Rex v. Kenyon, 6 B. & C. 640; 9 D. & R. 694. The court refused a criminal information against a magistrate for returning to a certiorari a conviction of a party in another and more formal shape than that in which it was first drawn up, and of which a copy had been delivered to the party convicted by the magistrate's clerk; the conviction returned being warranted by the facts. Rex v. Barker, 1 East, 186. C Practice as to.]—A defendant appealed to the sessions against a conviction on a penal statute, where the conviction was affirmed; afterwards the record was removed, and the conviction was quashed for a defect in the information: then the prosecutor moved either that the certiorari should be sent back to the magistrates, in order that they might return the original information (which had not the defect), or that a mandamus might issue to compel the magistrates to proceed on the original information; but the court refused to make such a rule. Rex v. Jukes, 8 T. R. 625. After a rule for a certiorari has been made absolute, and the return thereto filed, if the certiorari issued improvidè, the court will order it to be superseded, and the return taken off the file. Rex v. Wakefield, 1 Burr. 489; 2 Ld. Ken. 164. Third persons cannot object to the misdirection of a certiorari, to remove a cause from an inferior court, if the proper officers, in whose keeping the record is, waive the objection, and return the record upon such writ. Daniel v. Philips, 4 T. R. 499. of the points for argument was, that the convietion was bad in not setting forth the evidence. The court in its discretion refused an application to have the conviction taken off the file and returned to the justices, in order they might amend it, on the ground that the application was too late; and upon an application to quash the writ:-Held, that the form of the writ was right. Reg. v. Turk, 10 Q. B. 540; 16 L. J., M. C. 114; 11 Jur. 774. Held, secondly, that a misdescription of the conviction was no ground for quashing the writ after it had been obeyed and the conviction returned. Ib. For not setting out Order.]-Where a certiorari had been issued to bring up an order under 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 96, s. 6, and neither the order itself nor a copy was returned, the court quashed the writ of certiorari, as it neither set out the order nor stated that it was in writing. Reg. v. Wigan (Justices), 8 Jur. 930, Affidavits used in Proceedings to quash.]Affidavits, on moving for a rule to quash a certiorari, on the ground that it has issued improvidently, should not be intitled in a cause. Reg. v. Gilberdyke, 8 Jur. 792. IV. QUASHING WRIT. When Writ will be quashed.]-The court will When application to Quash should be made.] not quash a certiorari, unless there is an admis--A certiorari to bring up a case from the session, or something tantamount to it, by the party suing it out, that he has done it for the purpose of delay. Landens v. Sheils, 3 D. P. C. 90. The court will grant a rule absolute in the first instance, to quash a certiorari removing a cause out of an inferior court, which has been issued by the party moving to quash it, where no step has been taken by the other party. Ruffman v. Thornwell, 2 W., W. & H. 51. A party indicted at sessions for obstructing a highway, obtained a certiorari, but, without informing the prosecutor that he had done so, gave notice of trial at a subsequent sessions. The prosecutor attended with his witnesses, and on the last day of the sessions, before the case was called on, the defendant lodged his certiorari. The court, under all the circumstances, quashed the certiorari, and ordered a procedendo. Rex v. Higgins, 5 A. & E. 554. If a cause has been removed from an inferior court after judgment, a rule may be granted for quashing the certiorari, though the party is entitled to a rule for a procedendo. Ord v. Robinson, W., W. & D. 593. A For Misdescription of Conviction.] conviction by justices of a borough on the 22nd September, 1846, for harbouring a scaman contrary to sect. 40 of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 112, was drawn up and returned to the Michaelmas sessions. On the 12th November, a certiorari at the suit of the attorney-general issued to remove the conviction, and on the 21st the justices returned a copy of it. On the 3rd December a certiorari issued to the justices of the county, to remove the record of a conviction by two justices assigned to hear and determine divers felonies, trespasses and other misdemeanors committed within the borough, for certain trespasses and contempts against the form of the statute. On the 5th the conviction was returned. Each of the writs was issued without a rule to shew cause. On the 2nd January a rule for a concilium was obtained at the instance of the attorney-general, and one sions was issued in December, 1848, on an affidavit of service of notice on two magistrates sworn to have been present at the time the order was made. A rule nisi to quash the order of sessions was obtained on the 8th of May, in Easter Term, 1849, the return to the certiorari being filed nearly at the same time. A rule nisi to quash the certiorari on affidavit, denying the presence of one of those magistrates, obtained in Michaelmas Term, 1849, was too late. Reg. v. Basingstoke, 3 New Sess. Cas. 693; 6 D. & L. 303; 19 L. J., M. C. 28. Where a case from the sessions comes on for argument, it is too late to take an objection to the form of the certiorari. Reg. v. Fordham, 11 A. & E. 73; 3 P. & D. 95; 4 Jur. 218. V. PROCEDENDO. When granted.]-A certiorari to remove an order of sessions had been quashed, because the affidavit on which it issued omitted to state that the justices on whom it was served had been present at the making of the order. A fresh certiorari being subsequently moved for and refused, in consequence of more than six months having elapsed, application was then made for a mandamus, commanding the justices to enter continuances and hear; but, semble on the antecedent facts, there had been already a hearing of the appeal by the justices. On an intimation, however, that a doubt existed at the Crown Office as to whether it was the record or a transcript merely which had been returned and filed, the court granted a rule nisi for a procedendo to carry back the record to sessions. Reg. v. Cartworth, 8 Jur. 360. The 17 Geo. 3, c. 56, s. 14, imposes a penalty of 201. on any person having in his possession materials purloined or embezzled, which forfeiture may be levied by distress. By a conviction by two justices under this statute, the defendant was sentenced to a forfeiture of 201., or, in default, to be committed to prison. The conviction, having been subsequently quashed | inferior court by a habeas corpus cum causâ, to on appeal, subject to a case, was removed into which a return was made, stating a custom under the Queen's Bench by certiorari, and confirmed. which the defendant was sued and arrested: A levari facias issued for the penalty, to which error was suggested upon the face of the prothere was a return of nulla bona. The court ceedings below; the court would not stay the granted a procedendo to carry back to the ses-procedendo merely on that ground, but left the sions the record of conviction, commanding the defendant to his writ of error. Horton v. Beckjustices to proceed to enforce execution against man, 6 T. R. 760, the defendant. Reg. v. Rushworth, 1 New Sess. Cas. 415; 9 Jur. 161. If the city of London, in their return to a habeas corpus, set out a declaration in the inferior court, containing a defective count, the court will not, therefore, refuse a procedendo. Clark v. Denton, 1 B. & Ad. 92. Where a cause was removed from an inferior court after interlocutory judgment, and before inquiry, the court refused to award a procedendo, as the cause might be removed at any time before the sheriff's jury was sworn. Goldley v. Marsden, 6 Bing. 433; 4 M. & P. 138. A procedendo was denied to a borough court, who had tried a cause without the presence of an utter barrister of three years' standing. Fairley v. M'Connell. 1 Burr. 513. Though a habeas corpus was not delivered to the sheriff's court in London till after interlocutory judgment and notice of inquiry, yet a procedendo was denied. Cox v. Hart, 2 Burr. 758. If the judge of an inferior court of record receives a certiorari after the time limited by 21 Jac. 1, c. 23, s. 2, a procedendo will issue; and that although in the mean time the record has been filed in the court above. Laverack v. Bean, 3 M. & W. 62; 6 Dowl. P. C. 111; M. & H. 338; 1 Jur. 964. If an indictment for felony has been removed from an inferior court, in order to issue process of outlawry upon it, and the party accused comes in, the court will award a procedendo to carry the record back. Rex v. Perry, 5 T. R. 478. When a prisoner was convicted of perjury in an inferior jurisdiction, and the sentence of transportation was entered on the record as follows:-"Wherefore all and singular the premises being seen by the justices here, and fully understood, it is therefore ordered that he the said L. K. be transported to the coast of New South Wales, or some one or other of the islands adjacent, for and during the term of seven years:"-Held, that this was not a judgment, but merely an order; and the court awarded a procedendo commanding the court below to pronounce the proper judgment, and in the mean time admitted the prisoner to bail. Rex v. Kenworthy, 3 D. & R. 173; 1 B. & C. 711. Jurisdiction to grant.]—A judge of any of the three superior common law courts has jurisdiction to make an order for the issuing of a procedendo, to send back proceedings on an indictment for felony removed by certiorari from an inferior court, and it rests in his discretion whether such order should be made upon a summons to shew cause, or immediately. Reg. v. Scaife, 18 Q. B. 773; 2 Den. 513; 3 C. & K. 211; 21 L. J., M. C. 221; 17 Jur. 232. On the return of a bye-law to a habeas corpus cum causâ, a procedendo cannot be awarded to any corporation except London. Rex Worcester (Chamberlain), 2 Ld. Ken. 469. V. When stayed.]-A cause was removed from an Practice as to.]-A cause remanded from an inferior court by habeas corpus, and afterwards removed back by procedendo, cannot be again removed upon the ground of its alleged importance. Hayward v. Wright, 2 M. & R. 366; 8 B. & C. 386. The court will grant only a rule nisi in the first instance for a procedendo, a cause having been removed from an inferior court without the proper recognizance having been entered into, even where it appears on the return to the certiorari that the sum demanded was under 201. Catton v. Faires, W., W. & D. 46. Where one of several defendants has removed an indictment for conspiracy by certiorari, and he alone has entered into the necessary recognizances, the court will not award a writ of procedendo, or impose terms as to the other defendants taking short notice of trial, although, by the practice of the court, the trial could not be pressed on against the other defendants, and great delay would probably take place. Rex v. Newton, 2 N. & P. 121; W., W. & D. 497. Where a cause has been removed from an inferior court by habeas corpus at the defendant's instance, and no further step taken on either side for a year, the plaintiff may apply ex parte for a procedendo to issue, unless bail in the Queen's Bench is given within four days. And the bail below cannot move to set aside such procedendo when issued, until they or the defendant have put in bail in that court. Blanchard v. De la Crouée, 9 Q. B. 869; 16 L. J., Q. B. 181; 11 Jur. 283; S. P., Day v. Paupierre, 13 Q. B. 802; 18 L. J., Q. B. 270. CEYLON. See COLONY. CHALLENGE. I. OF JURY IN CIVIL ACTIONS.- See JURY. II. IN CRIMINAL CASES.-See CRIMINAL LAW, CHAMBERS. See PRACTICE. 1. WHAT AMOUNTS TO. a suit to establish his right to certain coal mines, upon being indemnified against the costs of the proceedings-Held, that the contract amounted to champerty and maintenance, but the party was not disqualified from suing, since his title was vested in him before he entered into the illegal contract. Hilton v. Woods, 4 L. R., Eq. 432; 36 L. J., Ch. 491; 16 L. T., 736; 15 W. R. 1105. If, however, the solicitor had been the party Supplying Funds for Suit.]—A fair agreement suing by virtue of a title derived under such a to supply funds to carry on a suit in considera-contract, his bill would have been dismissed. Ib. tion of having a share of the property, if recovered, ought not to be regarded as being per se opposed to public policy. But an agreement of such a kind ought to be carefully watched, and when extortionate, unconscionable, or made for improper objects, ought to be held invalid. Ram Coomar Coondoo v. Chunder Canto Mookerjee, 2 App. Cas. 186—P. C. A lady resident in Ireland agreed with an Irish solicitor, that, if he would employ a solicitor in London to take out for her letters of administration in England, which were necessary to complete her title to a fund in the Court of Chancery in England, and afterwards procure the fund for her, he should receive a commission of 107. per cent. upon the amount of the fund, and also be reimbursed what he should pay to the London solicitor :-Held, that the agreement was contrary to policy, and, therefore, could not be enforced. Strange v. Brennan, 15 Sim. 346. Affirmed by the Lord Chancellor, 2 Cooper, 1 ; 15 L. J., Ch. 389; 10 Jur. 649. legal costs and charges, a sum which should be commensurate with his outlay and exertions, and with the benefit resulting to the client, is void on the ground of maintenance. Earle v. Hopwood, 9 C. B., N. S. 566; 30 L. J., C. P. 217; 7 Jur. N. S. 775 ; 3 L. T. 670; W. R. 272. Common interest.]-The plaintiff having sat and voted as a member of parliament without having made and subscribed the oath appointed by the 5th section of 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, the defendant, who was also a member of parliament, procured C. to sue the plaintiff for the penalty A contract whereby an attorney stipulates imposed by that section for contravention thereof. with a client to receive, in consideration of the C. was a person of insufficient means to pay the advances requisite to the conducting the procosts in the event of the action being unsuccess-ceedings to a successful issue, over and above his ful. After the commencement of the action the defendant gave to C. a bond of indemnity against all costs and expenses he might incur in consequence of the action. It was ultimately decided in the House of Lords that the above-mentioned section does not enable a common informer to sue for the penalty, and that therefore the action would not lie. The plaintiff brought an action for maintenance against the defendant :-Held, that the defendant and C. had no common interest in the result of the action for the penalty; that the conduct of the defendant in respect of such action amounted to maintenance: and that the action for maintenance was therefore maintainable. Bradlaugh v. Newdegate, 11 Q. B. D. 1; 52 L. J., Q. B. 454; 31 W. R. 792. An agreement (to be carried into effect in this country) which would be void on the ground of champerty, if made in this country, is not the less void because made in a foreign country where such a contract would be legal. Grell v. Levey, 16 C. B., N. S. 73; 10 Jur., N. S. 210; 9 L. T. 721 ; 12 W. R. 378. Where, therefore, an attorney entered into an agreement in France with a French subject to sue for a debt due to the latter from a person residing in this country, whereby the attorney was to receive by way of recompense a moiety General intention.]-The essence of the com- of the amount recovered:-Held, that the agreemon-law offence of maintenance consists in the ment being void for champerty, the attorney criminal intention with which the act is done; so was remitted to his ordinary retainer as an that when several persons, against all of whom a attorney, and, the work having been done and general claim is put forward by a third party, enter the client having received the benefit of it, was into an agreement to uphold each other in resist-entitled to his costs as between attorney and ing that claim, it is not an act of maintenance if | client. Ib. they did so under the bonâ fide, though erroneous, belief, that they were uniting in the defence of a common interest. Findon v. Parker, 11 M. & W. 975; 12 L. J., Ex. 444; 7 Jur. 903. A landlord may assist his tenant in resisting a claim of tithes in kind, without rendering himself guilty of maintenance. Ib. If a man walking in the street were to see a poor person very much oppressed and abused, and without any power of redress, and were to furnish that poor person with money to enable him to procure the assistance of an attorney, in order to have his wrongs righted, and doing so without any intention of oppressing others, or stirring up litigation, he would not be guilty of maintenance. 1b. Agreements with Solicitors.]-A party agreed with a solicitor to give him a portion of the profits arising from the successful prosecution of An attorney agreeing to save a party harmless from all costs of some suits, on his being allowed to retain half of whatever sums are recovered, amounts to maintenance, and is illegal. Musters, In re, 1 H. & W, 348. Reasonableness.]—On an application at the instance of a taxing master for the opinion of the judge under the Attorneys and Solicitors Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 28), as to the reasonableness of an agreement between a firm of solicitors and their clients, whereby the solicitors were to receive a percentage of 10., plus their ordinary charges, on the property to be recovered in an intended action, and in case no property should be recovered then only costs out of pocket with interest thereon; the court said it was unnecessary to give any opinion within the meaning of s. 4, since nothing had become payable to the solicitors under the agreement; but at the same time referred to s. 11, and intimated its opinion that the agreement was clear champerty. Anon., 1 Ch. D. 573 ; 45 L. J., Ch. 47; 24 W. R. 38. And see SOLICITOR. court, and to which he was ultimately found entitled, mortgaged it pendente lite to enable him to carry on his claim :-Held, not void for champerty. Cockell v. Taylor, 15 Beav. 103; 21 L. J., Ch. 545. Ante litem motem.] It is not champerty where the right purchased was originally clear, but the litigation is the result of circumstances subsequently arising or subsequently known. Wilson v. Short, 6 Hare, 366; 17 L. J., Ch. 289; 12 Jur, 301. An assignment by the representative of an Power to realize Property recovered.]-agent to the principal for the purpose of enA. having recovered a verdict in ejectment, exe-abling such principal to maintain a suit is not cuted a deed, reciting that he was indebted to champerty. Fischer v. Kamala Naicker, 8 Moo. the attorney who had conducted the action in Ind. App. 170; 8 W. R. 655. 1007. for money lent and for work done as an attorney, and was unable to pay it, and had agreed to seizure as after mentioned; and he granted and assigned to the attorney the crop of potatoes growing upon the close which was the subject of the action, and all other effects thereon, with power to the attorney to enter upon the close, and inspect, until payment of the money and interest; proviso, that if A. should pay the money and interest by a day named, the deed should be void; covenant by A. to pay the money and the interest meanwhile. Power to the attorney, in case of default of payment, to enter and carry away the effects assigned, or otherwise to remain on the premises for the purpose of disposing of the effects, and converting them into money; proviso, that till default A. should remain in possession, and that, if the attorney sold the property, he should hold the surplus, after paying the expenses and reimbursing himself, in trust for A. :-Held, that this deed could not be impeached, either on the ground of its amounting to champerty or maintenance, or as being contrary to public policy. Anderson v. Radcliffe, El. Bl. & El. 806; 29 L. J., Q. B. 128; 6 Jur., N. S. 578; 8 W. R. 283-Ex. Ch. Purchase for purpose of Suit.]—A creditor presented a petition for the winding-up of a company, from which he could not obtain payment of his debt. Before the hearing of the petition he sold his debt and the right to proceed with the petition to a shareholder of the company, who obtained leave to amend the petition by making himself a co-petitioner :Held, that the purchaser could not obtain a winding-up order on the petition, as the court could not sanction his purchase of the right to proceed with it. Paris Skating Rink Company, In re, 5 Ch. D. 959; 37 L. T. 298; 25 W. R. 701 -C. A. The purchase of shares in a company, for the purpose of instituting a suit to restrain the carrying out of an agreement alleged to be illegal, is not maintenance, or anything savouring of maintenance. Hare v. London and North Western Railway Company, Johns. 722; 7 Jur., N. S. 1145. An agreement by a shareholder in a company which is being compulsorily wound up, that, in consideration of a pecuniary equivalent, he will endeavour to postpone the making of a call, or will support the claim of a creditor, is illegal, as being contrary to the policy of the Winding-up Acts. Elliott v. Richardson, 5 L. R., C. P. 744; 39 L. J., C. P. 340; 22 L. T. 858; 18 W. R. 1157. A legatee, too poor to sue, assigned his legacy for less than it was worth to a person, who bought it for the purpose of enforcing payment by suit: Held, that this did not amount to champerty or maintenance. Tyson v. Jackson, 30 Beav. 384. A party prosecuting his claim to a fund in Sale of Property for Purposes of Litigation and to prevent Deterioration.]-A company which was being wound up was desirous of bringing an action against one F. to rescind a contract for purchase of the company's mine and to recover the purchase-money of 70,0007. from F. The company had no funds to prosecute the litigation. Accordingly a new company was formed and an agreement under seal was entered into between the old and the new company, whereby the mine and plant were assigned to the new company, who were to provide money not exceeding 30,000l., partly for the purposes of litigation against F., and partly to prevent deterioration by working the mine. F. took out a summons for leave to bring an action to impeach the deed-Held, that the essence of the transaction was that it was a mode of converting the mines and plant into money, to be used partly in litigation and partly to prevent deterioration by working the mine, and therefore the deed was not bad either on the ground of maintenance or champerty. Cambrian Mining Company, In re, 48 L. T. 114. Agreement to contest Will.]-A declaration that H., a brother of the defendant and a cousin of the plaintiff, died, leaving large real and personal property; that the defendant was heir-atlaw of H., and one of his next-of-kin; that H. left a will whereby his real and personal property was given to persons other than the plaintiff and the defendant, and the plaintiff believed that the will revoked a former will by which H. had bequeathed property to the plaintiff; and that in consideration that the plaintiff would take the necessary steps to contest the will, and would advance money and obtain evidence for such purpose and instruct an attorney, the defendant promised to share with the plaintiff half the real and personal property which might come to the defendant by reason of such proceedings :-Held, that the agreement amounted to champerty; and that the fact, that the plaintiff was a relation of the defendant and had some collateral interest in the suit, did not prevent a contract by which he was to receive half of what the defendant recovered, being champerty. Hutley v. Hutley, 8 L. R., Q. B. 112; 42 L. J., Q. B. 52 ; 28 L. T. 63; 21 W. R. 479. By the prior of two wills, the eldest son of an heir-at-law of a testator took an estate tail in remainder. By a subsequent will this remainder was taken from him and limited to another party. The subsequent will was admitted to probate, but the heir contested its validity. After |