that though strictly regular, it was done too quickly.* On this point, the decision of Lord Lyndhurst, in Barnes v. Wilson, 1 R. & M. 492, wherein he says a party has a right to use as much expedition as he chooses in enrolling a decree, is conclusive.

In Kemp v. Squire, 1 Vez. 205., the enrolment of the decree was opened, the defendant only having obtained his majority six weeks before the decree. In that case two authorities were cited in support of the application, but it appears that in both, the decree (the enrolment of which was opened) was not pronounced on the merits.

In Stevens v. Guppy, 1T. & R. 178. the decree was pronounced on the 30th March, 1822; on the 6th Dec. 1822, the plaintiff presented a petition of rehearing; the order for rehearing was dated on the 7th Dec. 1822, and was entered with the registrar, and served on the 12th Dec. 1822. The decree was enrolled on the 10th Dec. Previous to the month of December, several conversations had taken place between the solicitors of the plaintiff and the defendant, in which intimation had been given of the plaintiff's intention to appeal from the decree; and in a conversation which passed a few days before the petition of rehearing was presented, the solicitor for the plaintiff had informed the solicitor for the defendant that the petition was prepared; to which the latter had answered, by desiring that no time might be lost in presenting it. Lord Eldon said, "I have no difficulty in saying that it is a surprise, if the party enrolling the decree has said that which might lead the other party to believe that the decree would not be enrolled."

As the leading reason in this case for opening the enrolment was the mistake of the party, in applying to the Rolls chapel to enter a caveat, instead of at the secretary of decrees, the observation that the enrolment was too quick may be regarded rather as a dictum than as a decision.

In Whitaker v. Leach, 4th Dec. 1834, an enrolment was vacated by Lord Lyndhurst under the following circumstances. Soon after the order on further directions, which dismissed the bill, had been pronounced, the plaintiff's solicitor wrote to the solicitor of the defendant, that he intended to appeal, and also on the subject of possession of a house being given up. The defendant's solicitor, in answer, said he could not take any notice of the appeal, and a correspondence ensued on other subjects connected with the points in dispute. In one of these letters, dated 24th July, 1834, the defendant's solicitor thus expressed himself to the plaintiff's solicitor:-"It may be as well to settle the amount of rent previously, which is to be paid, subject to the decision on the appeal." The petition of appeal was presented 7th August, 1834, on the 9th August, 1834, the deposit was paid, and on the 14th of August the order was served. No caveat was entered against the enrolment. The docquet of the enrolment was signed on the 12th August. A point was made on the argument that no notice had been given of passing the order, and that it was drawn up by the defendant's solicitor, instead of by the plaintiff's solicitor. This was not decided, but the enrolment was vacated on the ground that the defendant's solicitor, by the above passage in his letter, led the other party to suppose that he acquiesced in his appealing, and induced him not to enter a caveat. In his judgment, Lord Lyndhurst said, a misapprehension on one side, not produced by the acts of the other side, is not a ground to vacate an enrolment.

In Barnes v. Wilson, 1 R. & M. 486, the enrolment was left at the proper office about noon on Monday, and sent down to Brighton to the Lord Chancellor, who signed it late that night. In the course of that evening, a caveat was tendered, but the party was told that the enrol

It

ment had been forwarded to the Lord Chancellor. was decided that the enrolment was completed, by delivery of the documents to the messenger for the purpose of being signed, and that the caveat was not in time.

If the decree has been pronounced, upon hearing the merits, the Court will not open the enrolment, to enable the party to appeal. Charman v. Charman, 16 Ves. 115.

In Robinson v. Newdick, 3 Mer. 13, the usual notice of the docquet having been presented for signature, was received by the defendants on the 15th March. On the 11th April following, a petition of appeal was presented, which was answered on the 12th April; and on the 14th April, notice was given to the plaintiffs of the order made upon that petition. On the 12th of April, plaintiff obtained signature to the docquet of the enrolment; and on the same day, an order was made to enrol nunc pro tunc ;— the enrolment was objected to on three grounds: 1st, that the petition of appeal, under the circumstances, had the priority; 2dly, that the twenty-eight clear days were not expired before the 13th April; and, 3dly, that in strict practice, the docquet ought not to have been presented, until after the order to enrol nunc pro tunc had been passed and entered.* Upon all these grounds, Lord Eldon thought the defendants were right, and that leave must be given to them to prosecute their appeal.

In Richards v. Wood, decided by Lord Lyndhurst, 21st March, 1835, a motion was made, on behalf of the defendant, that the enrolment of the decree might be vacated for irregularity, under the following circumstances. On the 31st May, the defendant entered a caveat against the enrolment. On the 4th August, the docket

• It appears that the order to enrol nunc pro tunc was not entered on 22d April.

of the enrolment, at the instance of the plaintiff, was left with the secretary, and the usual notice was served on the defendant's clerk in court, that the same had been left. A petition of appeal, by defendant, was presented and left at the office of the Lord Chancellor's secretary on the 30th of August, and on the same day a letter was written and delivered to the plaintiff's solicitors, by the defendant's solicitor's clerk, stating that he had presented a petition of appeal. This petition was sent into the country to be answered by the Lord Chancellor, and was not returned until the 15th September. The deposit was made on the 16th or 17th of September, and the order, which was dated on the 30th August, was served on the 19th of September. In the mean time, viz. on the 4th September, the docquet of the enrolment was signed by the Lord Chancellor. The grounds upon which the plaintiff sought to sustain the enrolment were, that, although the petition of appeal was presented within twenty-eight days after the defendant had received notice of the docquet of the enrolment having been left with the secretary, yet that the deposit of 20l. was not made, nor the signature of the clerk in court obtained to the petition, nor the order served, within such twenty-eight days. The grounds for sustaining the petition of appeal were, that it was presented before the expiration of the twenty-eight days after notice that the enrolment had been presented; that no time was lost in drawing up and serving the order, that the delay in so doing, and in making the deposit, arose from the accidental circumstance of the Lord Chancellor's absence. The Lord Chancellor ordered the enrolment to be vacated, and held the petition of appeal to be regular.

In Balguy v. Chorley, 1 M. & K. 640, the defendants

moved to vacate the enrolment on the ground of surprise. It appears that on the 8th of May, the day the minutes were settled, the agents for the defendants distinctly informed the plaintiff's solicitor that the defendants intended to appeal, and that instructions were already laid before counsel, with a view to his preparing the necessary petition; and, in reply to that communication, the plaintiff's solicitor stated that he was open to any fair offer of arrangement, to prevent the necessity of an appeal, provided the solicitor for the defendants felt disposed to make a proposal for that purpose. On the 12th May, the defendant's London agents, in compliance with the suggestion of the plaintiff's solicitor, wrote a letter to their client, the solicitor in the country, mentioning the nature of the communication made by the plaintiff's solicitor; and the country solicitor wrote to them on the 17th of May, in answer, that he wished them to ascertain what sort of proposal the plaintiff's solicitor contemplated or referred to. No further steps were, however, taken, with a view to carry on their negociation. From the 10th of May, when the minutes were left with the registrar, in order that the decree might be drawn up and passed, till the 21st of the same month, the registrar's office was closed, but on the 22d of May, being the day after the office opened, the defendant's agents obtained an office copy of the decree, and left it with the counsel, who was drawing the petition of appeal, and, on the 24th, they applied to enter a caveat, when they found that, on the preceding day, the decree had been enrolled by the plaintiff. The Lord Chancellor said, the principle, as laid down in Stevens and Guppy, was, that if a party had been surprised, or misled by the language or conduct of his adversary — not merely if his expectations had been dis