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party actually prosecuting a decree or order, does not proceed before the Master with due diligence, there the Master shall be at liberty, upon the application of any other party interested, either as a party to the suit, or as one who has come in and established his claim before the Master, under the decree or order, to commit to him the prosecution of the said decree or order; and from thenceforth, neither the party making default, nor his solicitor, shall be at liberty to attend the Master as the prosecutor of the said decree or order."-56 N. O.

In proceeding under this order, the creditor takes out and serves a warrant on the party prosecuting the decree, and on all other parties, that the conduct of the cause may be given to him. On the return of the warrant the question is discussed, and is then or afterwards decided by the Master.

If the Master refuses the prosecution of the suit, his decision is not final, and it is competent to the parties to apply to the Court for the prosecution of the cause. In Wyatt v. Sadler, 5 Sim. 450, an application was made to the Master, under the 56th N. O., on behalf of two creditors, that the prosecution of the cause might be committed to their solicitor, instead of the plaintiffs. The Master refused the application. On a motion to the Vice Chancellor the application was granted.

Where great delay has occurred in the prosecution of a decree for the administration of assets, a creditor may apply to have the conduct of the cause, though it has become abated by the death of a defendant. Cook v. Bolton, 5 Russ. 282.

A plaintiff who sues as a creditor will not be deprived of the conduct of the suit, because the Master has reported that he is not a creditor, if exceptions to that finding of the

report are pending, and there is no reason to suppose that the exceptions will not be prosecuted actively. Jeudwine v. Agate, 5 Russ. 283.

If after a decree one of the plaintiffs in a creditor's suit dies, his personal representative has a right to revive. Burney v. Morgan, 1 S. & S. 358. If the representative of a deceased plaintiff creditor do not revive the suit, any creditor may serve a notice of motion on such representative that he may file a supplemental bill within a limited time, or that such creditor may be at liberty to file such The supplemental bill. Dixon v. Wyatt, 4 Madd. 392. order is drawn up in the terms of the notice, and if no supplemental bill is filed by the representatives within the time limited, the creditor is at liberty to file a supplemental bill.

If an order is made in a creditor's suit, giving a creditor not a party to the original suit liberty to file the supplemental bill, on behalf of himself and all other creditors, to have the benefit of the decree in that suit, the propriety of the order which authorized the creditors to file the supplemental bill cannot be questioned at the hearing of the supplemental cause. So soon as leave is given to file such a bill, the plaintiff in it is entitled to the same decree to have the benefit of former proceedings, as the representatives of the original plaintiffs would have been entitled to on a bill of revivor. Houlditch v. Marquis of Donegall, 1 S. & S. 491.

Although the charge may be correctly sustained in the points before referred to, it may, perhaps, be barred by the statute of limitations, into which it will become those opposed to the creditors to examine.

By the 21 Jac. 1. cap. 16. s. 3, it was enacted, that all actions of trespass, detinue, trover, or replevin for goods, all actions of account, and on the case, other

than actions concerning trade between merchants; and all actions of debt grounded on any lending or contract without specialty; and all actions of debt for arrearages of rent, should be commenced and sued (with exceptions as to actions for slander and personal trespass) within six years next after the cause of such actions or suit, and not after.

By the 9 Geo. IV. c. 14. s. 1, it is enacted, that in actions of debt, or upon the case, grounded upon any simple contract, no acknowledgment, or promise by words only, shall be deemed sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract, whereby to take any case out of the operation of the enactments, contained in the third section of the statute of limitations, or in the section of the Irish act to the same effect, or either of them, or to deprive any party of the benefit thereof, unless such acknowledgment or promise shall be made or contained by or in some writing, to be signed by the party chargeable thereby.

By 3 & 4 William IV. c. 42. s. 3, it is enacted, that all actions of debt for rent, upon an indenture of demise, all actions of covenant or debt upon any bond or other specialty, and all actions of debt or scire facias upon any recognizance, and also all actions of debt upon any award, where the submission is not by specialty, or for any fine due in respect of any copyhold estates, or for an escape, or for money levied on any fieri facias, and all actions for penalties, damages, or sums of money given to the party grieved, by any statute now or hereafter to be in force, that shall be sued, or brought at any time after the end of the present session of parliament, shall be commenced and sued within the time and limitation hereinafter expressed and not after; that is to say, the said actions of debt for rent, upon an indenture of demise, or covenant, or debt upon any bond or other specialty, actions of debt, or scire facias upon recognizance, within ten years

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after the end of the present session, or within twenty years after the cause of such actions or suits, but not after; the said actions by the party grieved, one year after the end of this present session, or within two years after the cause of such actions or suits, but not after; and the said other actions, within three years after the end of this present session, or within six years after the cause of such actions or suits, but not after; provided that nothing herein contained shall extend to any action given by any statute, when the time for bringing such action is or shall be by any statute specially limited.

A bill filed by one creditor, on behalf of himself and others, will prevent the statute of limitation from running against any of the creditors who come in under the decree. Sterndale v. Hankinson, 1 Sim. 393; neither does time run against a creditor after the death of the testator, in the case of a trust or charge for the payment of debts. Hargreaves v. Michell, 6 Madd. 326.

If a debt is barred by the statute of limitations, a plaintiff creditor may object to it, although the executor is willing to waive the objection. Shewen v. Vanderhorst, 2 R. & M. 75. In this case the plaintiff objected to the demand as barred by the statute, and the Master disallowed it on exceptions by the creditor. The Master of the Rolls said, that the ground of his decision was, that after a decree the executor was not at liberty to do any act which affected the relative rights of creditors.

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CHAPTER XXIX.

LEGACIES AND ANNUITIES.

IN the administration of assets the subject of legacies forms an important branch of inquiry. The proceedings relative to the legacies may go on at the same time as those concerning the debts.

The party having the carriage of the decree should bring in a general state of facts, stating what legacies were bequeathed by the will, and what remain unpaid. This state of facts is examined with the will, to see that the legacies are bequeathed, and the payments are shown by the executor's discharge.

If the decree directs an inquiry who are now entitled to the legacy, and the legatee is either dead, or has assigned his legacy, it is generally necessary for the legatee to bring in a distinct state of facts as to his own legacy.

In preparing or examining a state of facts as to legacies, it should be ascertained, 1st, whether the legacy was vested, or if it had lapsed; 2nd, whether, if given conditionally, the condition had been complied with; 3rd, whether the legacy is specific or general; 4th, whether any part has been paid; 5th, whether any interest is due, and if so, at what rate, and from what time.

VESTED LEGACY.

In ascertaining whether a legacy is vested, or whether

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