and justices of the peace, but such jurisdiction is now exercised by the superintendents of her Majesty's dockyards as well as by the justices: (2 Will. 4, c. 40, s. 11.)

The deft. after he was taken to prison on the usual warrant, gave notice of his intention to appeal to the quarter sessions under the 21st section, and having entered into recognisances at Canterbury, before a justice of the county, to prosecute his appeal, applied at chambers, to Blackburn, J., and afterwards to Wightman, J., to be admitted to bail, in order that he might prosecute and try his appeal, but some difficulty being experienced in granting that application the present rule was obtained either to discharge the prisoner on habeas corpus or to liberate him on bail.

The following are the material enactments applicable to the case :

[Q. B.

and to cause sale to be made thereof for payment of such fine and reasonable charges of distress (to be adjudged of by such commissioner or justice respectively) in case they shall not be redeemed within six days, rendering to the party the overplus, if any, and where sufficient goods of the party cannot be found to answer the said fine, to commit the said offender or offenders to the common gaol of the county, division, city, town corporate, liberty, or place for the space of three calendar months, unless such fine shall be sooner paid; or, in lieu of such fine, to cause such offender or offenders to be imprisoned and kept to hard labour in the house of correction for the space of three calendar months, as to such commissioner or justice of the peace respectively shall be thought fit; and every such commissioner or justice shall cause the amount of every such last-mentioned moiety of

The 40 Geo. 3, c. 89, "An Act for the better pre-fine which he shall so receive, and also the moiety of venting the embezzlement of his Majesty's naval, ordnance and victualling stores."

every sum arising from the sale of any barge, boat, or other craft sold under the authority of this Act, and paid into his hands as aforesaid, to be paid into the hands of the said treasurer of the navy or ordnance within thirty days after the expiration of the year in which such fines shall be received by him, or in default thereof such commissioner or justice respectively shall forfeit the sum of 50%., to be recovered with double costs of suit by any person or persons who shall sue for the same by action of debt, bill, plaint, or information in any of his Majesty's courts of record at Westminster, or Court of Exchequer in Scotland, wherein no essiogn, protection, or wager of law, nor more than one imparlance shall be allowed; one moiety of which last-mentioned fine shall go to his Majesty, his heirs and successors, and the other moiety thereof to him or them who shall sue for the same as aforesaid.

Sect. 18. And whereas it might tend to prevent the commission of offences if power were given to the commissioners of his Majesty's navy, ordnance and victualling, and his Majesty's justices of the peace out of sessions, to hear and determine offences in a summary way in cases where the stores found are of small value, and to fine or otherwise punish the offenders accordingly; be it therefore enacted, by the authority aforesaid, that from and after the passing of this Act, it shall and may be lawful to and for any principal officer or commissioner of the navy, ordnance, or victualling for the time being, or any justice of the peace for any county, division, city, town corporate, liberty, or place within this kingdom, to hear and determine any complaint against any person or persons (not being a contractor or contractors, or employed as aforesaid) for unlawfully selling or delivering, or causing or procuring Sect. 20. Provided also and be it enacted, that in to be sold or delivered, or for receiving or having in case such commissioner or justice of the peace shall, bis, her, or their custody, possession, or keeping, or for upon the hearing and determining of such complaint as concealing any stores of war, or naval, ordnance, or aforesaid, adjudge the offender or offenders, in lieu of a victualling stores, or goods marked with such marks fine, to be imprisoned and kept to hard labour as respectively as are hereinbefore mentioned, of any value aforesaid, that then the informer or person or persons in the whole not exceeding 20s., which said commis- who shall have discovered such offender or offenders sioner or justice respectively is hereby authorised and shall have and receive as a reward for such.his, her, or required, upon any information exhibited, or complaint their discovery, the sum of 51. for every such offence made in that behalf, at any time within three calendar so discovered, and the principal officers and commismonths next after any such offence shall have been sioners of his Majesty's navy, ordnance, or victualling, committed, to cause the party or parties accused to be as the case may require, shall cause the said reward of apprehended and brought before him, or if he, she, or 51. to be paid by the treasurer of the navy or ordnance they shall have absconded or cannot be found, then to respectively for the time being out of any public be summoned to appear before such commissioner or money in his hands, upon such informer or other jastice by a notice or summons left at his, her, or their person producing to them a certificate under the hand last or usual place of abode, and also to cause the wit-and seal of the commissioner or justice of the peace nesses on either side to be summoned, and such commissioner or justice shall examine into the matter of fact, and upon due proof made thereof, either by the voluntary confession of the party or parties, or by the oath of one or more credible witness or witnesses (which oath the said commissioner or justice respectively is hereby authorised to administer), give judgment or sentence accordingly, and in case the party or parties accused shall be convicted of such offence, then it shall and may be lawful to and for such commissioner or justice of the peace respectively to inflict a fine of 107. upon him, her, or them, for such his, her, or their offence, which said fine so inflicted shall be divided and distributed one moiety thereof to the informer or discoverer of the offence, and the other moiety thereof (the necessary charges for the recovery thereof being first deducted) to the treasurer of his Majesty's navy or ordnance as the case may be, to be by him applied in such manner as herein before mentioned with respect to the produce of boats, barges, or other craft seized or sold under the authority of this Act, and to award and issue out his warrant under his hand and seal for levying such fine so adjudged on the goods of the offender or offenders,

who shall have convicted such offender or offenders as aforesaid, certifying such conviction and the punishment which he hath inflicted on the offender or offenders, and the name or names of the person or persons who in his judgment is entitled, and in what proportion or proportions to such reward, which certificate the said commissioner or justice of the peace respectively is hereby required to give without fee or reward, and the money paid by any such treasurer on account of such last-mentioned reward shall be allowed in his accounts, and he shall be discharged thereof accordingly, any law, custom, or usage to the contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding; provided also that no such summary proceeding as before mentioned shall be had before any justice of the peace under the authority of this Act without the consent in writing of the principal officers or commissioners of his Majesty's navy, ordnance, or victualling for the time being, or one of them, for that purpose first had and obtained, and that every adjudication or sentence to be had or given without such consent as aforesaid shall be null and void to all intents and purposes whatsoever.

Sect. 21. And be it further enacted, by the authority

aforesaid, that if any person or persons shall find himself, herself, or themselves aggrieved by the judgment of any such commissioner or justice touching or concerning any such stores as last aforesaid under the value of 20s., then he, she, or they shall or may, upon entering into a recognisance to his Majesty, with one or more surety or sureties, to the satisfaction of such commissioner or justice, to the amount of treble the value of such fine, appeal to the justices of the peace at their next general quarter sessions of the peace for the county, division, city, town corporate, liberty, or place wherein the offence was committed, who are hereby empowered to summon and examine witnesses upon oath, and to finally hear and determine the same, and in case the judgment shall be affirmed, it shall be lawful for such justices of the peace to award the person or persons so appealing to pay such costs occasioned by such appeal, as to them the said justices shall seem meet, and to enforce payment thereof, according to the course and practice of such court.

The 2 Will. 4, c. 40, ss. 10, 11, substitutes superintendents for commissioners at the dock yards, and empowers them to administer oaths and exercise the duties, powers and authorities of justices in all places whatever, and in all matters relating to the naval service, and in all other cases in which any commissioner of the navy or victualling is empowered to act as a justice.

[Q. B.

not being levied to imprison him; but the subsequent part of the enactment raises considerable difficulty in the way of this construction. The words "or in lieu of such fine" look as if there was to be a fine in the first instance, and then imprisonment if that could not be levied. On the other hand, it seems difficult to understand why the justice should have power to inflict in lieu of the fine imprisonment with hard labour, while he has power to imprison merely without hard labour where a fine has been imposed, and sufficient goods of the party cannot be found to answer the said fine. Upon the whole, therefore, I think the Legislature meant to give the alternative power to the magistrate, and that he should exercise his judicial discretion upon the case as to whether it was a case in which he should impose a fine, or imprison the party with hard labour, without regard to any fine. This rule further asks the court to discharge the party out of custody on entering into recognisances to prosecute the appeal. Upon this point the first difficulty is, that it is not plain that sect. 21 gives any appeal at all in this case. Possibly, under the words "treble the amount of such fine," when imprisonment is substituted for a fine, the party would be entitled to appeal, but it is not necessary to decide whether or not that is the true construction; for it may be that the party has a right to appeal but still what power has this court to discharge him on entering into a recognisance to prosecute the appeal? The 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43 (Jervis Act) gives no such power; and sect. 27 only enacts that when an appeal against any conviction shall be decided in favour of the resps. the justice who

tion of the same. In this case the warrant has already been issued, and the man is in custody under the warrant of commitment. That section does not apply to a case like this The rule must therefore be discharged.

Collier (West with him), on behalf of the Admiralty, showed cause.-It is contended for the prisoner that the superintendent had no power to inflict imprisonment, but was bound in the first instance to impose a fine, and then, in default of payment or satis-made the conviction may issue his warrant for execufaction by distress, imprisonment. The question depends upon the construction of sects. 18 and 20 of 40 Geo. 3, c. 89. It is submitted that the right construction is, that the convicting magistrate has the alternative power of inflicting imprisonment with hard labour, or a fine, according as in his judgment the case may be a serious or trifling one. That has been the construction that has been acted upon by the authorities for a long time past. Secondly, there was no appeal in this case, as the appeal clause is only applicable where a fine is inflicted. Thirdly, the recognisances to prosecute the appeal were entered into before the wrong magistrate. Sect. 21 enacts that they are to be entered into before "such" commissioner or justice, i. e. the committing one, and that was not done in the present case: (Reg. v. Brooke, 2 T. R. 190.)

Prentice in support of the rule.-The 40 Geo. 3, c. 89, s. 18, is a penal enactment, and is to be construed in favour of the liberty of the subject. This section only gives the same power as is found in all similar enactments, viz., in the first instance to impose a fine, and then, in default of satisfaction, to imprison. And this view is supported by Jervis' Act, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, ss. 19, 27. As to the discharge on the ground of the prisoner having appealed. [CROMPTON, J.-The appeal does not operate as a suspension of the commitment. Buller, J., in R. v. Brooks, says that the magistrate would have no right in a case like this to commit after the appeal has been heard.] It is submitted that he would have under sect. 27 of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43. It is unjust that a prisoner should have to undergo the sentence while an appeal is pending. COCKBURN, C. J.-I am of opinion that this rule must be discharged. It is certainly no easy task to construe an enactment like sect. 18. The more reasonable construction appears to me to be, that the superintendent has the alternative power either to impose a fine and imprisonment in the absence of goods of the offender whereon the fine may be levied, or, without imposing a fine at all, to sentence the offender to three calendar months' hard labour. The introductory words of the enactment look as if the justice was to have Iower to fine the offender, and in the event of that

CROMPTON, J.-I am of the same opinion. The conviction seems to me to be good. On looking at the clauses of 40 Geo. 3, c. 89, that have been referred to, I am clearly of opinion that the statute intended to give the alternative power to the magistrate of punishing either by fine or imprisonment. "In lieu of such fine" should be read "in lieu of inflicting such fine;" and then the construction is clear. It would be absurd to say that, where no sufficient goods of the party are found, there was to be imprisonment merely, and that imprisonment with hard labour might be imposed in lieu of a fine. The 20th section seems extremely strong to show that, on the hearing of the offence, the magistrate is to come to a decision, whether a fine or imprisonment shall be imposed. The only answer given to this view is the appeal clause, which brings us to the second question, whether there is an appeal or not in this case. I am inclined to think that there is an appeal in both cases, where either a fine or imprisonment is imposed. Then, supposing that a right of appeal exists in this case, have we any power to dis charge the party on entering into recognisances to prosecute the appeal? The authorities are clear that a warrant of commitment once made is not suspended by an appeal being lodged. It may be a hard thing to keep a party in prison while an appeal is pending, but the law is well established, that an appeal does not or itself suspend a warrant of commitinent: (Kendall v. Wilkinson, 4 E. & B. 680.)

HILL, J.-I am of the same opinion, and for the same reasons.

BLACKBURN, J.-I am of the same opinion. In sect. 18, after the words, "to inflict a fine of 10% for such his, her, or their offence," the following words down to "or in lieu of such fine" should be read as one long parenthesis, and then the grammatical construction is plain, and shows that it was intended to give the alternative power either to fine or impri

WHITEHOUSE t. FELLOWES AND OTHERS.

The defts. were the trustees of a turnpike-road, and
the plt. alleged that they so negligently made and
maintained certain catchpits for carrying off the
water from the road, that large quantities of water
ran into his land and collieries, whereby he was
greatly damaged. The plt. first complained in July
1859, and the defis. made some alterations; he was
again damaged, and complained in December of the
same year, and eventually brought this action. On behalf
of the defts. it was contended that the action was not
brought in time, inasmuch as it was not brought
within three months after the act complained of was
committed, as enacted by sect. 147 of the Turnpike-
road Act, 3 Geo. 4, c. 126:
Held, that the action was in time, as no cause of action
arose to the plt. so long as the works of the defts.
caused him no damage, and that the cause of action
first accrued when the plt. received actual damage.
It was also contended that, according to the case of
Sutton v. Clarke, the defls. being trustees were not
liable, and that the learned judge did not leave the
question properly to the jury to say whether the defts.
had been guilty of negligence:

Held, that the learned judge was right in asking the jury
whether they considered the defts. had been guilty of
negligence, and that they having found in the affirma-
tive, that then the defts. were liable for such negli-

C. B.]

WHITEHOUSE v. FELLOWES AND OTHERS.

Then I say that the action is too late; and that it ought to have been brought as soon as the cause of action arose. (He referred to and reviewed the cases already cited.)

[C. B.

they were to say whether the defts. had been guilty of negligence, and the jury have found that they were, and in this direction I can see nothing wrong. Then as to the question whether or not WILLIAMS, J.-This rule has been obtained upon the plt. is bound to rely on the negligence of the three grounds-two based upon points of law, and the defts. when the damage first occurred, or whether other on the ground that the verdict was against the he can maintain his action after three months have weight of evidence. Now the points of law are, first, elapsed from the first damage, I am of opinion that whether the declaration is answered by the plea relying where the defts. have been guilty of negligence in the upon sect. 147 of the Turnpike Act, 3 Geo. 4, c. 126, management of the highway over which they have which says that "if any action shall be commenced charge, and that by reason of such negligence damage against any person or persons for anything done in has been caused, which has been accompanied by a pursuance of this Act, then and in every such case, fresh damage, such a state of things brings the plt. such action or suit shall be commenced or prosecuted within the time limited by the statute. There is no within three months after the fact committed, and not doubt that a fresh damage is no cause of action, and afterwards;" and, secondly, on the ground that the the case of Fetter v. Beale, 1 Salk. 11, is an authority learned judge was wrong in not leaving the question to upon that point. In that case an action was brought the jury to say directly whether the defts. had been by the plt. for a blow he had received on the head, and guilty of that description of culpable negligence which which at the time appeared slight, and he obtained would make them liable in this action. I think it damages accordingly; but afterwards it turned out would be more convenient if I address myself to the that the injury was of a more serious nature, and the second ground first. Now there is a great difference plt. then brought a second action, but it was held that between the acts of trustees and those of private indi- it would not lie, Holt, C. J. saying, "Every new viduals, and a great many cases have been referred to dropping is a new nuisance, but here is not a new upon this point, but several of them do not appear to me battery, and in trespass the grievousness or consequence to have any application at all to the subject in hand. The of the battery is not the ground of the action, but the case which has been most relied on is that of Sutton v. measure of the damages which the jury must be supClarke, but that only bears upon the cases where the trus-posed to have considered at the trial;" but here the tees were authorised by Act of Parliament to do some plt. has been again damaged by reason of the defts. special act, as in the case of The Governor and Company neglecting their duty, and is he to have no remedy at of the British Cast-plate Manufacturers v. Meredith, all? It seems impossible to suppose that such was con4 T. R. 794, where it was held, that where the acts templated by the Act. Here it is not only the fresh of commissioners appointed by a Paving Act occa- damage, but the continuance of the original neglect sioned a damage to an individual without any excess that constitutes a new cause of action, and I think of jurisdiction on their part, the commissioners, or that this wrongful act may be a fresh cause of action. paviors acting under them, were not liable; and in And I therefore am of opinion that on both points our Sutton v. Clarke, and the cases similar to it, that doc-judgment should be for the plt. And now as to the trine seems to have been recognised, that where persons are authorised to do some particular act, and by doing such act they prejudice the rights or injure the property of some private individual, they are not liable for doing that act, notwithstanding that, if that act had been done by a private person, he would have been liable. So the trustees of a turnpike-road, if authorised to raise the road, would not be liable for any damage which such act might occasion, although a private individual would be if he had done the same thing; but it would be otherwise if the trustees had done their work so carelessly and negligently as to create such damage. I understand that the plt. complains that the defts., in discharging their regular duty in keeping the roads in repair, have been guilty of negligence, whereby he has been injured; and the facts appear to be, that when the trustees entered upon their duties as such trustees, they found open drains; and the objection to them was, that when a heavy fall of rain came there was a gush of water on the road, but which these open drains carried away to the canal, or it dispersed itself in such a way as to be wholly innocuous to the adjoining owners; that being so, in order to prevent the gush of water on the road, they are advised to disturb the state of things then existing and cover the drains, which had the effect of turning the water on to the adjoining owner's land, as the catchpits made to prevent that were not sufficient, and the plt. says that the trustees have been guilty of negligence and carelessness in so changing the state of things as to make the water accumulate on the adjacent lands, by reason of the catchpits being insufficient, and that they are further guilty for continuing them in such insufficient state; and I think that is a state of things upon which the jury might rightly have been asked, whether the defts. had been guilty of negligence, and I understand that it was so left to them, that supposing they found such a state of things to exist, that then

verdict being against the weight of evidence, without going so far as to say that this verdict was against the evidence, yet, looking at it in all its bearings, I think it would be more satisfactory that they should be reinvestigated, on the condition that the defts. pay the costs of the former trial.

WILLES, J.-I am of the same opinion. As to the misdirection, it appears that the jury were told to find for the plt. if they were of opinion that the defts. had, by the negligent construction of the catchpits, occa sioned injury to the plt. I assumed, therefore, that the jury found negligence on the part of the defts, therefore there can be no reason for granting a new trial on the ground of misdirection. Then, as to the question on the Statute of Limitations, that is a question of considerable nicety. Certain expressions have fallen from the courts, and have been used, which have not applied to the particular facts of the cases in which they were made. After what my brother Williams has said, I do not think it necessary to refer to more than one decision, and that is the case of Bonomi v. Backhouse. The cause of action there was in respect injury occasioned by the support to land being taken away. There the court threw out that it did appear the support was taken away, and that the canse of action was then complete. Then compare that case with the present. Here the cause of action is the injury to the land. It cannot be said that the plt. in this case had a right to say that the trustees should not make this work on the road. In Bonomi v. Backhouse it was said that the plt. had a right to prevent the ground from being taken away where it would interfere with his supports. All that the plt. could do here was to demand that the works should be done in such a manner as not to injure his land; and each action was to be limited to such injury; and it appears to me that the Statute of Limitations ought to r from the time the damage was effected. regard to the verdict being against the evidence, I need

With

V.C. W.]

ELLIS V. THE CORPORATION OF BRIDGNORTH.

BYLES, J.-I shall say nothing as to the misdirection, but I wish to say a word as to the limitation of time for bringing the action. The case of Bonomi v. Backhouse is a decision of the Court of Ex. Ch., and is binding upon us, and clearly establishes the law that the period runs, not from the act done, but from the damage itself, but it leaves the question open-does it run from the first damage, excluding all subsequent damage? or does it not say, may not there be a case where new damage gives a new cause of action? There the damage was one act; but here the damage arises from every shower, and every time there is a storm there is a new and distinct injury. With regard to the verdict being against the weight of evidence, I do not think that that was so; but, as this is a case of great importance, I think that in justice to both parties there should be a new trial, if the defts. are willing to pay the costs of the former one.

[V.C. W.

add nothing to what has already been said by my | ment for the allowance of bye-laws, made for rebrother Williams. gulating the use of the market-places provided for them in Bridgnorth. The plts., feeling themselves aggrieved by the contemplated removal of the market from its ancient situation in the High-street, in violation as it was alleged of their prescriptive rights of stallage, served the local board with notice of their intention to oppose the allowance of the bye-laws, stating, among other grounds of objection, that the bye-laws ought to have been published under the Fairs and Markets Clauses Act 1847, and the application for their allowance first made at quarter sessions; secondly, that the removal of the market without the consent of the plts. (having the prescriptive right of stallage) was illegal and contrary to the provisions of the Local Government Act 1858, and the Fairs and Market Clauses Act 1847. The plts. subsequently filed their bill, and now moved for an injunction in the terms before stated. They cited Mayor of Northampton v. Ward, 1 Wils. 107; S. C. 2 Strange, 1238; Campbell v. Wilson, 3 East, 298; Ellwood v. Bullock, 6 Q.B. Rep. 330; Tyson v. Smith, 4 Ad. & Ell. 407.

KEATING, J. concurred.

Rule absolute.

V. C. WOOD'S COURT.

Reported by W. H. BENNET, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

Jan. 31.

ELLIS V. THE CORPORATION OF BRIDGNORTH. Injunction-Market-Local Government Act 1858-Stallage-Legal right.

Where the members of a corporation elect to proceed
under their Local Government Act, instead of assert-
ing their common law right as a corporation, they
will be bound to proceed according to the provisions
of such Act.

Thus, although there may be a clear right at law to
change the site of a market in the corporation of a
borough, if the corporation proceeds under the Act
to change such site, and transfer and regulate the
market, they must not exceed the powers conferred
upon them by such Act of Parliament, although less
extensive than their rights at common law.
The court will require the right of stallage to be de-
cided at law, before granting an injunction to restrain
a corporation from interfering with such rights of
stallage, where the right has not been admitted by
the corporation.

Giffard, Q.C. and Roberts, for the defts. the corporation, contended that the common law right in the corporation to remove the market still existed notwithstanding the passing of the Acts of Parliament. Even if the plts. had proved that they were within sect. 50 of the Local Government Act 1858, as persons whose rights were interfered with by the establishment of any new market, the remedy was at law. They commented upon the trifling nature of the interest asserted by the plts'. bill, and the very large terms in which the prayer was framed.

Rolt in reply.

Feb. 1.-The VICE-CHANCELLOR said there was no doubt a clear case to be tried. The plts. sought to restrain the corporation from interfering with the immemorial right of every owner of a house in the Highstreet of placing before his door stalls, which would otherwise be an obstruction to the thoroughfare, and of exacting for the use of those stalls a rent of 107. a year. If the corporation were, as had been contended, the owners of the soil, then, to their knowledge, they had been allowing these' payments to be made to the owners of the houses by the persons using stalls. The market had been held from time immemorial in the High-street. It was to be observed that, in proRolt, Q.C. and C. Hall moved for an injunction to posing to transfer the market, the defts. had not acted restrain the defts. from establishing or holding a as the corporation, and in their corporate capacity they market in the New Market-buildings at Bridgnorth, had a clear right at common law to transfer the marand from interfering with the rights and privileges of ket, but through a sort of combined medium of the the plts., as occupiers of houses in the High-street of joint-stock company and the local board of health. Bridgnorth, in which the weekly market has been held Though in one sense the same body, yet the local board from time immemorial, the case made by the bill being was distinct from the corporation, and intrusted with that certain privileges and profits from stallage on large powers, which the corporation could never exermarket-days have been enjoyed by the High-street cise. If, then, they did not choose to exercise their householders, and that those rights will be entirely de-common law right, but availed themselves of the stroyed by the removal of the market. By the plts.' bill it appeared that in 1854 a company was formed under the title of the "Bridgnorth Public Buildings and Market Company (Limited)," for the purpose of erecting new market buildings in Bridgnorth. The company had erected new market buildings in another part of the High-street, at a distance of 110 yards from the old market-house, erected in 1650, but the speculation was stated to have been unprofitable, as the holders of stalls in the High-street could not be induced to remove to the new buildings. After the passing of the Local Government Act 1858 negotiations took place between the company and the local board of health, under which the company granted a new lease of the new market buildings. In Dec. 1860 notice was published in the Bridgnorth Journal by the clerk to the local board, that, in pursuance of the Fairs and Markets Clauses Act 1847, and the Local Government Act 1858, the local board intended to apply to Govern

powers confided to them by the Local Government Act
(far exceeding any power in the corporation), they must
be bound by every provision of that Act in the strictest
sense); otherwise there would be monstrous injustice
if the defts. were allowed to avail themselves of their
common law rights as owners of the market, and also to
apply to the Secretary of State under the Local Govern-
ment Act to sanction their bye-laws for regulating the
market. They took the lease of the buildings from the
joint-stock company, as the local board, and they must be
considered as acting under the Act, and the Act alone.
With respect to sect. 50, which provided
market or slaughter-house shall be established in pur-
suance of this section,so as to interfere with any rights,
powers, or privileges enjoyed within the district by any
person, chartered joint-stock company, or incorporated
company, without his, her, or their consent," there
was a strong intimation of an intention by the defts. to
change the site and remove the market out of the High-

"that no