WILLES, J.-I am of the same opinion. [Ex. BYLES, J.-I am also of the same opinion. At first, I confess, I had some difficulty, but I think that with respect to sect. 29 it is quite clear that when the Act of Parliament took away from the inhabitants of the parish their means of perfecting the new operations, the effect is the same as if they had said in express terms they should be no longer liable. Sect. 26 makes the new body assigned of the parish who are liable to ways, their liability seems to be absolute; but with COURT OF EXCHEQUER. Reported by F. BAILEY and H. LEIGH, Esqrs, Barristersat-Law. April 19 and 23. Re FERNANDEZ. Contempt of court-Refusal of witness to answer future and present highways. It was not a highway | future be repairable out of the funds of the town. It then, and if dedicated afterwards to the public by the seems to me that there was very good reason for owner, that dedication could not make it a highway the enactment at the time it was passed-that the unless, by sect. 49, the commissioners choose to adopt statute was enacted for that purpose, and I think our it as a highway. They never did choose to adopt it, construction gives force to it. I am of opinion the adand it is therefore not repairable by them. But it is judication of the justices should be reversed. said the parish might continue liable, notwithstanding this auxiliary liability on the part of the commissioners, unless there were words in the private Act exempting the parish from the order and liability, if it chose to repair the highway dedicated to the public within these bounds. And I think there are words which do go to exempt the parish from that order and liability, and it is the exemption arising from the power to impose rates, and by sect. 28 the commissioners are anthorised to rate all the rate-future and present highways. As to the present highable inhabitants within the ambit of the town liable to be rated. But sect. 27 is the clause upon which my judgment turns, because sect. 27 enacts, "that every person who shall be discharged from all highway-rates within the town of Leamington," and it seems to me that this is an exemption within the town of the parishioners from the order and liabilities. The commissioners have made rates, and it is to be presumed they have made the rates properly, and if they have made them properly, they have rated the occupiers for every rateable subject within the parish, and then every rateable subject within the parish that has been rated for that rate under the local Act by sect. 27 is exempted from all liability whatever to the ordinary public parochial highway-rates that is imposed on all the other parishes. This statute, then, does contain an exempting clause from ordinary parochial liability, and differs from the cases which Mr. Quain has adverted to, where the commissioners have power to repair, and there it was held the power or duty to repair did not exempt the parish, if there were not express words creating the exemption. I have alluded to the argument about the dangers and difficulties which the public would be under if the highway were a highway for all purposes of passage, and yet that no one was bound to repair it. I am sensible there might be danger in going over a foundrous highway, or a street that was left in an imperfect and unsound state, but I think that the Legislature have considered that by no means an insurmountable obstacle there. Under the General Highway Act of the 5 & 6 Will. 4, there is an exemption applicable to all parishes throughout the island, that unless they adopt a highway dedicated by the public, they are not bound to repair it. The general enactment to all the community was by the local Act rendered applicable to streets that were dedicated to the public, and not adopted by the commissioners in Leamington; and it appears to me that there is very good reason for it. The commissioners may adopt and make highways and streets dedicated to the public, provided they have been paved, flagged, channelled and sewered. It is a private Act relating to an increasing town, because it contemplates the constructing and making of new streets, and the result of the enactment is, that the proprietors of such new streets should be bound to go to the expense, at the inception of their streets, of making it what we should consider a good, sound, and perfect street for passage; that they should go to the expense of the paving, the flagging, the channelling and the sewering that I have adverted to, and not leave it a mere piece of ground, and then call on the rest of the town to go through the expensive operation I have alluded to. It is contemplated that if a person completes houses on each side of his street, he should complete the road in a proper way; the commissioners therefore have power to say, and they may say, they will not adopt the street until the new street has been completed for passage. When this has been done they may adopt it, and then it would for the The courts of assize are Superior Courts, and have power to commit for contempt by general warrants. Where, therefore, a witness on the trial, at the assizes, of an information for bribery, refused to answer a question put to him, on the alleged ground that the answer would tend to crimi nate him, and the judge committed him to prison for six months, and adjudged him to pay a fine of 500%, for contempt, by a warrant which did not state what the question was, or set forth the particulars of the offence; and a writ of habeas corpus was moved for to bring up the prisoner, in order to his being discharged on the ground that the warrant was bad for generality: Held, that the warrant was good, and that the writ should not be issued. The court of sessions at the Old Bailey is a Superior Court. The circumstances under which the application here inafter made to the court in this case arose are as follow:-In Nov. 1859 Mr. Jose Luis Fernandez wasexamined as a witness before the commissioners appointed (under the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 57) to inquire into alleged corrupt practices at an election for the borough of Wakefield, and had subsequently, in Jan. 1860, received from the said commissioners a certificate writing under their hand" (sect. 10 of the above Act) stating that he had made a true disclosure touching all things to which he had been examined. laced, On the trial before Hill, J.,at the York assizes, in? March last, of an information filed by the Attorney-General against Mr. J. B. Charlesworth, for bribery at the last election for Wakefield, J. L. Fernandez was pro sworn and examined as a witness on the part of the Crown. In the course of his examination he was asked the following question by the Solicitor-General:"Did you, in the month of April 1859, receive any money from Mr. Charlesworth?" He refused talswer this question, on the ground that his answer might tend to criminate himself. It was proved that he had been examined before the commissioners as above stated, and that he had received the above-mentioned certificate, protecting him (puder L 3 sect. 9 of the above Act) "from all penal actions, forfeitures, punishments, disabilities and incapacities, and all criminal prosecutions to which he may have been or may become liable at the suit of her Majesty, her heirs or successors, or any other person, for anything done in respect of such corrupt practice." The witness, however, alleged that he was acting under the advice of counsel, who were of opinion that the certificate, though protecting him in all other respects, did not extend to freeing him from impeachment by the House of Commons. The question was put to him by the learned judge, with the like result. Hill, J. thereupon consulted his brother judge, Keating, J., and then informed the witness that they were both of I opinion that he was completely protected by the certificate, and was bound to answer the question. Upon his still refusing to answer, the learned judge told him he had been guilty of a contempt of a most serious character, and thereupon sentenced him to be imprisoned for six months, and to pay a fine of 500% for contempt of court, under the following warrant :"Yorkshire to wit.-At the assizes held at the Castle of York, in and for the said county, on Thursday, the 7th day of March, in the 24th year of the reign of our Sovereign Lady, Victoria, by the grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Queen, Defender of the Faith, and in the year of our Lord 1861, before the Hon. Sir Hugh Hill, Knight, and the Hon. Sir Henry Singer Keating, Knight, two of her Majesty's justices assigned to take the said assizes, according to the statute, &c. [Ex. it is submitted that what is said in those cases, and what it is admitted is true of Superior Courts, has no application to a warrant issued under the circumstances in this case. The warrant here professes to be signed by the associate, and to be made at the assizes held at York." Now a court of assize is not a Superior Court, and has not the power of one. The judges of assize determine some matters by virtue of their commissions, others by virtue of the statute of Westminster 2nd; and by the common law (4 Inst. 159, 160), these commissions are various: there is, first, the commission of oyer and terminer and gaol delivery; another is the commission of assize, by virtue of which and the statute of Westminster 2nd issues are tried; and thirdly, a general commission of the peace. In each of these commissions there are associated with the judges other persons of less dignity; as, for instance, in the commission of oyer and terminer, Queen's counsel, serjeants, and even justices; and now by recent Act of Parliament Queen's counsel are also included in commissions of assize. Such being their constitution, these courts are not like the Superior Courts at Westminster, nor do they emanate therefrom, but are held under a royal commission; and it would be strange to say, nor can it have been intended, that any one sitting under such a commission, as Queen's counsel, serjeants, or magistrates, should have an unlimited power to fine and imprison (it may be for life) by virtue of a general warrant. [POLLOCK, C. B.-There is no difference whatever between the Lord Chief Justice of England sitting at assizes "Reg. v. John Barff Charlesworth.-On the trial and the youngest Queen's counsel sitting under these of the information against the deft. for bribery alleged commissions. However that may be, it is conto have been committed by him on the election of a tended that there is a vast difference between persons burgess to serve in Parliament for the borough of acting under these commissions and the Superior Wakefield, Jose Luis Fernandez, a witness produced, Courts at Westminster; and the question as to the sworn and examined on behalf of the Crown, having power of such commissioners to issue general warrant refused to answer a certain question, touching the is a serious and important one. The power of a court matter in issue in the said information, put to him by of record to fine and imprison is admitted, but that her Majesty's Solicitor-General of counsel for the power does not affect this question. In Bacon's Crown in that behalf; and this court having adjudged Abridgment, tit. "Court," D. 1, our courts are that the said Jose Luis Fernandez was bound by law divided into three classes-supreme, superior, and to answer the said question, and having required him inferior; and the superior are subdivided into more or so to do, he wilfully and in contempt of the court re- less principal-the "less principal ones," he says, fused to answer the said question, and he having wil-"are such as are held by commissions of oyer and fally persisted, and still so persisting. in such his terminer, assize, Nisi Prius, &c. by custom or charter, refusal, the said court doth therefore adjudge that the or by virtue of Acts of Parliament and the King's comsaid Jose Luis Fernandez has been and is guilty of a mission, as the court of sewers, justices of the peace, &c., contempt of court, and the said court doth order and thus placing courts of oyer and terminer, of assize, and adjudge that the said Jose Luis Fernandez be for Nisi Prius, in the same category as courts of sewers, &c. such his contempt committed, and he is hereby com- Bushell's case, Vaughan's Rep. 135, is a distinct authority mitted, to the custody of the sheriff of the said county to show that the court of sessions at the Old Bailey, of York, and to his keeper of her Majesty's gaol of the which is a court of oyer and terminer, is an inferior Castle of York, in and for the said county, to be there tribunal, and has not the power to commit by a general detained and kept in safe custody for the term of six warrant. The court of sessions at the Old Bailey is calendar months from the date and year first above similar in its constitution to a court of assize, and is mentioned; and the said court doth further order and composed in the same manner of judges and others of adjudge that the said Jose Luis Fernandez also for subordinate authority; and if, therefore, the one court such his contempt shall and do pay to our said Lady has not the power, neither has the other. That such the Queen the sum of 500., and that he be further courts have the power of punishing contempt by fine detained in custody aforesaid until the said sum of and imprisonment is not disputed; but such authority 500%. shall have been paid. is subject to revision by a superior tribunal, and the warrant must therefore set forth the grounds and circumstances under which the committal took place, in order to enable the court above to see whether a correct conclusion has been arrived at. (Bullock v. Parsons, 1 Salk. 454, was also referred to.) The authority of Bushell's case is recognised by Lord Ellenborough in Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East, 69, 70; and more recently by Lord Denman, C.J., who plainly shows the reason for accuracy and particularity in the warrant, when he says, "What injustice might not have been committed by the ordinary courts in past times, if such a course had been recognised, as, for instance, if the recorder of London in Bushell's case had suppressed the fact that the jurymen were imprisoned for returning By the Court. BELL, Associate." Bovill, Q.C. (with whom were Price, Q.C. and T. Jones) now moved on affidavits for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, directed to the governor of York Castle, to bring up the body of the said J. L. Fernandez, in order that he might be discharged from custody on the ground that the commitment was illegal. The warrant under which the committal took place is in general terms. Now although the two Houses of Parliament and the Superior Courts at Westminster have power to issue general warrants (for which Lord Shaftesbury's case, I Mod. 144, R. v. Flower, 8 T. R. 314; Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East, 1; and Howard y, Gosselt, 10 Q. B. 359, are respectively authorities), Ex.] Re FERNANDEZ. [Ex. [WILDE, B.-The result would be that you would never be able to obtain an answer to the simplest question: a man might refuse to tell his name.] Lastly, the witness should have been asked if he had any cause to show why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt, and then the matter and the bona fides of the refusal could have been inquired into. But this was not done, and no proper opportunity was given to the witness to explain his conduct. In his affidavit the witness swears to his bonâ fide belief that the answer would have a tendency to criminate him; that he was not acting in collusion with J. B. Charlesworth, and that he had no intention to commit a contempt of court. a verdict of acquittal:" (Sheriff of Middlesex case, | 11 A. & E. 292.) In Lord Shaftesbury's case, this distinction between the powers of a superior and inferior court is referred to; that was a committal by the House of Lords for contempt, and the return to a writ of habeas was to the effect that the committal was under a general warrant, and in giving judgment, remanding the prisoner, it is expressly said: "Such a return, if made by an ordinary court of justice, would have been ill and uncertain:" (1 Mod. 157.) And in Reg. v. Patey, 2 Ld. Raym. Rep. 1106, Gould, J., in giving judgment, says: "If this had been a return of a commitment by an inferior court it had been naught, because it did not set out a sufficient cause of commitment." As to what ought to appear POLLOCK, C.B.-We think we ought to take time on the face of general warrants, he referred to judg-to consider the argument which has been prepared ments of Coleridge, J., in Howard v. Gossett, 10 Q. B. with so much pains, and presented to us with such pp. 380-1, and Lord Denman, C.J. Ib. P. 407. Again, ingenuity, and here we do no wrong to the applicant, the court of assize exercises its power by virtue of a because, if we gave judgment now, it would probably be statute, and where special jurisdiction, independent of adverse to his application. Cur, adv. vult. the ordinary power of the court, is exercised, it is ne- April 23.-POLLOCK, C.B. now delivered the judgcessary to show plainly the facts giving the jurisdiction: ment of the court.-I have the written judgment of (Christie v. Unwin, A. & E. 373, per Coleridge, J., the court in the matter of Fernandez, and I now proceed p. 379; Harrison v. Wright, per Parke, B., 13 to deliver it. This was a case moved by Mr. Bovill, M. & W. 818; Ex parte Leake, per Parke, B, 9 on Friday last, and the motion was for a writ of habeas B. & C. 240; Rex v. Brown, 8 T. R. 26; Thomlin- corpus to bring up the body of the deft. in order to son's case, 12 Rep. 104.) Another objection is, that his being discharged on the ground of the commitment the warrant does not show whether the offence was being illegal. The argument occupied a considerable committed during a civil or criminal trial, or whether time, and was founded on cases not very often cited or not before a jury. It says, "At the assizes held," in court, and some of them of an ancient date. We &c., and "this court having adjudged," &c. It is had little doubt at the close that the writ ought not to impossible to say whether this took place under issue, but we thought it desirable to take a short time the commission of oyer and terminer, or of assize, to look into the state of the law upon the subject, or whether it was an information laid by the and we are now clearly of opinion that no Attorney-General before the justices, as commis-writ ought to be granted. The only question sioners of the peace. It is bad too for not showing in reality before us is, whether the court of assize at special authority and jurisdiction. Wilde, B. refers to York which ordered this commitment is a superior or the judgment of Ashurst, J.in R. v. Joliffe, that although an inferior court. If superior, it is not required to judges of assize derive authority under a particular sta-set out the cause of commitment with the particular tute, yet all that is done by them is virtually done under circumstances-it is sufficient to state the cause genethe authority of the court above. Again, it ought to appear rally; and the case would be otherwise if it be an infeon the warrant whether it emanated from a Superior rior court. To support the view of Mr. Bovill, that a Court, which the court of oyer and terminer is not. court of assize is an inferior court, two authorities, and [BRAMWELL, B.-There were two judges assigned to two authorities only, were cited. The first was in take the assizes: records are drawn up under different Bacon's Abr. tit. "Courts," D; upon referring to which captions, according to the business done-the criminal it appears to be an authority directly the other way. business under the commission of oyer and ter- The courts of record are there divided into supreme, miner; the civil, under the commission of assize.] superior, and inferior. Superior Courts of record are Then if it is to be assumed, from the caption, that it more principal or less principal; the more principal was under the commission of assize, it is bad for are-Parliament, Chancery, Queen's Bench, Cornmon not showing that the proceedings were under an in- Pleas, and Exchequer, the justices itinerant, &c.; the formation sent down by the Court of Q. B. Further, less principal courts are such as are held by commission the warrant does not state what the question was, nor of gaol delivery, oyer and terminer, assize, Nisi Prius, that it was material. In such a case nothing must be &c. All these seem to stand on the same footing. A presumed. But, apart from all question as to jurisdic-court of assize, or of Nisi Prius, is therefore a Supetion and the validity of the warrant, the witness was not bound to answer the question; the 9th and 10th sections of the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 57, do not extend to impeachment by the House of Commons. The certificate, however powerful to shelter the witness from any other proceedings, cannot stop the House of Commons—it is a casus omissus. Nor could the judge protect him by his opinion. The witness alone can determine whether an answer has a tendency to criminate him, and it is his privilege so to do; and even if he were mistaken in supposing himself liable to impeachment, he is still entitled to the privilege, and it is not to be assumed that the tendency to criminate must have reference solely to bribery. Suppose he had embezzled the money; the certificate would have been no protection there, whilst the answer might be a link in the chain to convict him hereafter. În Fisher v. Ronalds, 12 C. B. 765, Maule, J. clearly states the nature of the privilege, and his view has been adopted by Pollock, C. B. in Adams v. Lloyd, 3 H. & N. 361, and was referred to in Garbett's case, 2 Carr. & Kir. is no rior Court, although a less principal one, and as such, Ex.] REG. on the prosecution of MAPPIN AND OTHERS v. Youle. decision was undoubtedly quite right in law to the extent of holding that the cause of commitment must appear in the commitment of the inferior court. The argument therefore fails to show that the court of commissioners at the Old Bailey was an inferior court. But 2 there is an authority, not cited by Mr. Bovill, which goes directly to show that that court is a Superior Court, in the opinion at least of Abbot, C. J., and also was expressly so held by Wood, B., in the case of Rex v. Clement, 4 B. & Ald. 218, and 11 Pri. 70. In that case the court at the Old Bailey had made an order forbidding any publications of a portion of certain trials until the whole were concluded. This order had been disobeyed by the deft, and the court fined him 5001. for his contempt in disobeying the order, not stating what was the order he had disobeyed. The presiding judge at that session was Abbot, C. J., and we have no doubt that the order, imposing the fine for the contempt of the deft. in disobeying the order, was very carefully considered and prepared. It is set out at full in the report in 11 Price, and it is an authority to show that the court, at that time, Abbot, C.J. being the commissioner, claimed to act and did act as a Superior Court, not setting out the particulars of the contempt it proposed to panish, and Wood, B. in his judgment (11 Price, 87), expressly speaks of the court as a Superior Court of Record. Assuming, therefore, that a court of assize is a Superior Court (and it certainly may be taken without any doubt that a court of assize is as much a Superior Court of Record as a court of commissioners at the Old Bailey was before it was superseded by the present court established by Act of Parliament), assuming a court of assize to be a Superior Court, the law applicable to this commitment is really not open to any doubt. It was solemnly decided in the H. of L., in Burdett v. Abbott (in error, 5 Dow. Rep. 200), as it had been in the court below, 14 East, and in The Sheriff of Middlesex case, 11 Ad. & Ell. 292, that in a warrant of commitment by a Superior Court, the adjudication of the contempt may be general, and the particular circumstances need not be set forth. This is all that is necessary for the purpose of the decision of this case now before us; but we do not regret that Mr. Bovill brought under our notice all the circumstances that took place at the trial, as it affords us an opportunity of saying that we entirely concur in the view taken by the learned judge who presided (Hill, J.), as to the whole course of proceeding on that occasion. There will be no writ of habeas corpus issued. Writ refused. Attorneys for the applicant, Singleton and Pitman. Monday, April 29. [Ex. him by his attorney that he is not bound to return in consequence of the previous conviction having put an end to the contract, but the justices nevertheless convict him for not returning: Held (per totam curiam), that the workman in acting upon such bona fide claim of right is not liable to be proceeded against before the justices a second time, and that the second conviction is bad on that ground. Held also, that a conviction under 6 Geo. 3, c. 25, s. 4, is bad on the ground that that statute is repealed or practically superseded (quoad these particular proceedings) by the 4 Geo.4, c. 34, s. 3. Special case under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, stated by two justices of the borough of Sheffield for the opinion of the court, as to the validity of a conviction by said justices under 6 Geo. 3, c. 25, s. 4, of a workman for absenting himself from his master's service before his contract had expired. The facts found by the case are as follow: The app., a journeyman cutler, was in the service of Messrs. Mappin, of Sheffield, under a written agreement, signed by both parties, in the following form : "An agreement made this 19th Dec. 1859, between Robert Youle of the first part, and Edward Mappin and Joseph Charles Mappin of the second part. The said R. Youle doth hereby hire himself and agree to work for the said parties of the second part as a journeyman springknife cutler, for the term of three years from the date hereof, during all which time the said Robert Youle shall and will diligently and wholly employ and apply himself in the service of the said parties of the second part, and shall not work for, serve, or assist any other person or persons whatsoever," and in consideration thereof the said E. and J. C. Mappin did thereby "hire and agree fully to employ the said R. Youle in the capacity and for the term aforesaid," and to pay him as in the said agreement mentioned for the work which he should do, with a proviso enabling either party to determine the hiring at the end of two years, on giving to the other of them one month's notice in writing; "and if the said R.Youle be the person giving such notice, on his paying to the said parties of the second part at the time of giving such notice the whole of any debt which he may then owe to them." The app. was to be paid by piecework-that is to say, not by wages by the week or month, but in proportion to the value of the work done according to a certain scale of prices. Under this contract he entered and remained in Messrs. Mappin's service until the 7th July last, when he absented himself without their consent, and continuing so absent, a complaint was laid against him on the 3rd Aug. After hearing evidence upon oath on both sides, the justices conREG. on the prosecution of MAPPIN AND victed the said R. Youle of a misdemeanor in resOTHERS (resps.) v. YOULE (app.) pect of his contract, "for that he did on the 7th July, Master and workman-Absenting from service-Con- and still did, unlawfully absent himself from his said viction for by justices under 6 Geo. 3, c. 25-Second master's service, without leave or lawful excuse, and leaving service under bona fide claim of right-without his said master's consent, and neglected to Statutes 6 Geo. 3, c. 25, and 4 Geo. 4, c. 34-fulfil the conditions of the said contract, contrary to the Repeal of former by latter Act. Where at the time of the original departure from the master's service the workman means it to be a permanent departure, and has no intention to return to such service: statute in that case made and provided;" and the said justice did thereupon adjudge that the said R. Youle should be "imprisoned in the house of correction at Wakefield, and kept to hard labour for the space of twenty-one days, and that during the said term the wages of the said Robert Youle should abate." Held (per Pollock, C. B. and Martin, B.; dissentiente, Bramwell, B.), that the master puts an end to the In pursuance of the above conviction, which was contract of service by proceeding against the work- made under the 4 Geo. 4, c. 34, s. 3, the app. was man summarily under the Act; and that the justices committed to prison for twenty-one days. He did not have no power to convict the workman a second return to Messrs. Mappin's service at the expiration of time for not returning to the service after the expi- his imprisonment, whereupon on the 12th Sept. they ration of the first imprisonment. preferred a second complaint against him, "for that Where a workman declines to return to the service he did, on the 29th Aug. last, before the term of his after his first imprisonment, under a bonú fide claim | contract was completed, unlawfully absent himself of right founded on his belief in the advice given without leave or lawful excuse." This complaint was Ex.] REG. on the prosecution of MAPPIN AND OTHERS v. Youle. [Ex. heard on the 13th Sept., before the two justices who | prisonment had expired, the app. had stated, in answer state this case. to the question why he had not returned to his work at Messrs. Mappin's, that he was willing to pay them the money he owed them for advances, which they ought to accept, and release him from his contract, as he was earning higher wages elsewhere, and more than Messrs. Mappin would allow him to earn ; and secondly, that he absented himself from his work owing to a dispute with his master about the prices allowed for work, and also about the kind of work on which he had been employed; and that he was advised by his attorney that the contract was at an end, and that he was not compellable to return, and the justice thought it very probable that he bonâ fide believed the opinion of his attorney. The following are the sections of the two statutes bearing on the question : The 6 Geo. 3, c. 25, "An Act for better regulating apprentices and persons working under contract.” It was proved before them that the app. entered Messrs. Mappin's service under the aforesaid agreement and was absent therefrom on the day named in the information (29th Aug.), and had not returned since that day; that he was found on the 11th Sept. working at another manufactory, when, on being asked why he had not come to his work now he was out of prison, he said he "had offered to pay Mr. Mappin the money he owed him, and he thought Mr. Mappin ought to accept it, and release him from the agreement, for he was earning more money there and did not want to return." His previous committal on the 3rd Aug., and that he had not returned to his service since his discharge from prison, were also proved. In answer to a question by the justices, he said he declined now to return to Messrs. Mappin's service in consequence of his solicitor having advised him not to do so. It was urged on his behalf before the justices Sect. 1. Recites, that persons employed in several that, having been once convicted for leaving the service, manufactories of this kingdom frequently take apprenhe could not again be convicted for not returning; that tices, and such apprentices frequently absent thenthe justices had no jurisdiction, inasmuch as it was one selves from their service, for remedy whereof it is offence which had been satisfied. The justices, how-enacted, that "if any apprentice shall absent himself ever, convicted him "of having on 29th Aug. last past, at the borough aforesaid, without notice, and before the term of his contract was completed, unlawfully, without the consent of his said masters, or either of them, and without just or lawful excuse, absented himself from his said service; and of not having fulfilled his said contract, contrary to the form of the statute made and passed, &c. (6 Geo. 3, c. 25), and did adjudge the said R. Youle to be imprisoned in the house of correction at Wakefield, in the West Riding of Yorkshire, for the space of one month." Being dissatisfied with the above decision, as erroneous in point of law, the app. applied to the justices for a case, under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, and was admitted to bail in the meantime. from his master's service before the term of his apprenticeship shall have expired, every such apprentice shall, at any time or times thereafter, whenever he shall be found, be compelled to serve his said master for so long a time as he shall have absented himself from such service, unless he shall make satisfaction to his master for the loss he shall have sustained by his absence from his service; and so, from time to time as often as such apprentice shall, without leave of his master, absent himself from his service before the term of his contract shall be fulfilled; and in case any such apprentice shall refuse to serve as hereby required, or to make such satisfaction to his master, such master may complain, upon oath, to any justice of the peace for the county or place where he shall reside, which oath such justice is hereby empowered to administer, and to issue a warrant under his hand and seal for upon hearing the complaint, may determine what satisfaction shall be made to such master by such apprentice; and in case such apprentice shall not give security to make such satisfaction according to such determination, it shall and may be lawful for such justice to commit every such apprentice to the house of correction for any time not exceeding three months." The justices say: "We were of opinion that the deft. was proved to be guilty of the offence charged in the information and complaint, and against the provi-apprehending any such apprentice; and such justice, sions in that behalf contained in the statute of 6 Geo. 3; and we were also of opinion that deft. was liable under the above statute to be again convicted and imprisoned for not returning after his said imprisonment, under the same agreement, but on the contrary, advisedly, absenting himself from the service of his masters, and working for others, after his former imprisonment and before the time of his agreement with Messrs. Mappin had expired; and we accordingly adjudged him to be imprisoned in the house of correction at Wakefield for one month. If the court shall be of opinion that the said determination is not erroneous in point of law, then the said determination shall be confirmed; but if the court shall be of a contrary opinion, then the said determination shall be reversed." The case came on for argument in Hilary Term, when the court directed the case to be sent back for amendment and more specific statement by the justices on the two following points : 1. If any evidence was given before them to show whether the absence of the app. in respect of which the first conviction was made was a temporary absence, or an absence with intention not to return at all, and not to fulfil the contract? and if there was, to state it, and the conclusion they draw from such evidence. 2. Whether on the last occasion on which he refused to return to the service, he bona fide believed that he was not bound to return to the service, in consequence of the previous conviction? The amended case states in substance, first, that there was no evidence to show whether the first absence was temporary only, or an absence with intention not to return at all, and not to fulfil the contract except that, on the 11th Sept., eighteen days after his im Sect. 4. "And whereas it frequently happens that artificers, calico printers, handicraftsmen, &c. and others, who contract with persons for certain terms, do leave their respective services before the terms of their contracts are fulfilled, to the great disappointment and loss of the persons with whom they so contract, for remedy whereof be it further enacted, that if any calico printer, handicraftsman, &c., or other person shall contract with any person whomsoever, for any time or times whatsoever, and shall absent himself from his service before the term of his contract shall be completed, or be guilty of any other misdemeanor, that then and in every such case it shall and may be lawful for any justice of the peace of the county or place where any such artificer, &c. shall be found, and such justice is hereby authorised and empowered, upon com plaint thereof made upon oath to him by the person with whom such artificer, &c. shall have so contracted, or by his or her steward or agent, which oath such justice is hereby empowered to administer, to issue his warrant for the apprehending every such artificer, &, and to examine into the nature of the complaint; and if it shall appear to such justice that any such artificer, &c. shall not have fulfilled such contract, or hath b guilty of any misdemeanor, it shall and may be lawful for such justice to commit every such person to the |